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INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST TAKE-
OVER AND OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY

FIFTH INTERIM REPORT OF
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUNGARY
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST
AGGRESSION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
UNDER AUTHORITY OF
H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438

HUNGARY

WASHINGTON, D. C.
AUGUST 20, 1954
NEW YORK, N. Y.
AUGUST 23, 24, AND 25, 1954
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AUGUST 26 AND 27, 1954

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New York Exhibit No. 2.

Persecution of the church in Hungary.

New York Exhibit No. 3.

Abolition of freedom in Hungary.

New York Exhibit No. 4.

Communization of our economic life in Hungary.

New York Exhibit No. 5.

Destruction of Hungarian capital by the Soviets.

New York Exhibit No. 6.

How free employment has generally been transferred into forced labor in Hungary.

New York Exhibit No. 7.

Memorandum on prisoners of war in Hungary.

New York Exhibit No. 8.

A memorandum on disintegration of the Hungarian Army.

New York Exhibit No. 9.

Bolshevism of Hungarian national culture.

New York Exhibit No. 10.

Bolshevism of our Hungarian economy.

New York Exhibit No. 11.

Bolshevism of our Hungarian agriculture.

New York Exhibit No. 12.

Genocide of our Hungarian nation.

New York Exhibit No. 13.

Deposition of Mr. Vince Nagy.

New York Exhibit No. 14.

Document prepared by the Federation of Free Hungarian Jurists in America concerning the indictment on the matter of genocide crimes against the responsible members of the Russian and Hungarian Governments, presented by Mr. Vince Nagy.

New York Exhibit No. 15.

Deposition of Countess Revay.

New York Exhibit No. 16.

Book, The Legal Aspects of Forced Labor in Hungary, presented by Dr. Laszlo Varga.

PREFACE

This is the fifth interim report of the Committee on Communist Aggression (formerly the House Baltic Committee) and consists of testimony taken at hearings in Washington, D. C. on August 20, in New York City on August 23, 24, and 25, and in Cleveland, Ohio on August 26 and 27.

The testimony at these hearings was devoted to the Communist takeover and occupation of Hungary, and was heard by a subcommittee of which Congressman Alvin M. Bentley was chairman, and Congressmen Edward J. Bonin, Thomas J. Dodd, and Michael A. Feighan were members. The hearings were recorded by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe for rebroadcast to Communist Hungary.

The subcommittee hearings opened in Washington, D. C. on August 20, which appropriately is the Day of St. Stephen, patron saint of Hungary.

Msgr. Bela Varga, last legally elected Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament (a post he never relinquished) and known throughout the world because of his fight against the Nazis and Communists, and Maj Gen John H. Stokes, Jr., commanding general, Military District of Washington, and former deputy commanded of the American Element of the Allied Control Commission of Hungary (1946-47) were the principal witnesses at the opening hearing in Washington on August 20. Their verbatim testimony, showing the technique and brutal methods used by the Communists in transforming Western-oriented Hungary into a Communist police state, may be found in this volume.

Among the witnesses who appeared at the series of hearings in Washington, New York, and Cleveland were Ferenc Nagy, political leader, statesman and Prime Minister of Hungary, 1946-47; former three-time Cabinet Minister and internationally known labor leader Charles Peyer; former Cabinet Ministers such as Minister of Finance Dr. Nicholas Nyaradi and Minister of Education, Dr. Geza Teleki; former members of Parliament such as Vince Nagy, Julius Belso and Mrs. De Szily; former high government officials such as Dr. Leslie J. Jekely and Zoltan Pfeiffer; former prominent newspaper editors and correspondents such as Istvan Barankovics and Paul Vajda; and recent escapees from Communist Hungary such as Mr. and Mrs. Geza Kapus and their little daughter, Eva.

Miss Ilona Massey, prominent Hungarian-born actress and opera star; Dr. Bela Fabian, well-known Hungarian political figure and author; and Paul Ruedemann, manager of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey's properties in Hungary from 1945 to 1948, gave testimony to the committee on various aspects of Communist aggression and terror in Hungary.

In addition to the foregoing, the committee heard testimony of a woman in New York, and of a man in Cleveland, both of whom concealed their true identity during the course of their testimony because

of fear of reprisals against loved ones still living in Communist Hungary. She told of being raped seven times by Soviet soldiers, and he told of the repeated rape of his daughter by Soviet soldiers which afterwards caused his daughter to commit suicide.

The eyewitness testimony of others who suffered the inhumanities and deceit of communism is printed in this volume. Still fresh in the minds of those who heard his testimony is witness George Perczel, who, gaunt, and in a trembling voice, with eyes which mirrored the horror of the savage beatings and tortures which were inflicted upon him by the Communist police, testified he never recovered from these tortures. The Subcommittee learned that he died several weeks after giving his testimony.

Hungary is unique among the nations of East Europe taken over by the Communists because it is the one Communist-occupied nation where the Communists lost an election. Not long after its so-called "liberation" by Soviet troops in 1945, relatively free parliamentary elections were held throughout the country. These elections resulted in a smashing defeat for the Hungarian Communist Party and an absolute majority for the Small Landholders Party which at that time was almost completely free of Communist influence. Thereafter all so-called elections in Hungary and in the rest of the captive nations were conducted in accordance with the Kremlin formula for victory well in advance of the first ballot being cast.

However, despite the clear majority won by the Small Landholders Party they were compelled by the Russian chairman of the Allied Control Council to form a coalition government which included the Communists. Moreover, the majority party was required to hand over to the Communists the important Government posts of Minister of State, Minister of Interior, Minister of Public Welfare, and Minister of Transportation. Very shortly thereafter the Communists began a calculated program of character assassination and intimidation against the non-Communist members of Parliament and the legal Government. Backed by the Russian chairman of the Allied Control Council resignation upon resignation of loyal Hungarians was demanded and obtained. Thus the legal Government was whittled away, demoralized and paralyzed.

Nearly 2 years passed before the Communists and their allies dared risk another election—1947. In spite of a steady terror campaign carried out against the members of Parliament, the legal government, and the Hungarian people the Communist vote in that election was far from impressive. Aided, however, by the conclusion of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of Allied military personnel, except for a sizable number of Soviet "communication" troops, the Communist-dominated government coalition was able to seize and retain power within a comparatively short space of time.

At about the time the subcommittee hearings opened in Washington on August 20, Bishop Janos Peter, one of the Hungarian Protestant clergymen who was granted a passport by the Hungarian Communist Government to attend the World Council of Churches Convention at Evanston, Ill., stated that conditions in Hungary were favorable for the growth of churches and that freedom of religion still exists.

Bishop Alexander St. Ivanyi, former Unitarian Bishop of Hungary; Rev. Laszlo Vatai and Rev. Andrew Hamza, former prominent minister of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Budapest—all of whom were serving as ministers of the gospel in Communist-occupied Hungary until their escape—gave eloquent testimony, however, concerning the true picture of religion in Hungary today. Their verbatim testimony concerning the persecution of the Protestant religion in Communist Hungary may be found in this report. Their testimony, together with the testimony of Catholic clergymen which may also be found in this report, rip the mask of deceit from the Hungarian Communist Government which, through dupes, or agents, would have the free world believe that there is freedom of religion in Hungary today.

Communism is an irreconcilable enemy of religion whether it be Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Orthodox, or Moslem—Communist Hungary is no exception to the rule.

INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY

FRIDAY, AUGUST 20, 1954

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUNGARY OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a. m., in room 219, House Office Building, Hon. Charles J. Kersten, chairman, presiding.

Present: Messrs. Kersten, Bonin, Feighan, and Dodd.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. KERSTEN. The hearing will come to order. This is a continuation of hearings of the Committee on Communist Aggression.

Congressman Alvin Bentley, who had planned to be here this morning is not here because he was appointed as a member of the delegation to go to Michigan in connection with the death of Congressman Paul Shafer. I believe the funeral of Congressman Shafer is this morning and that is the reason why Congressman Bentley is not here.

He wished, however, that a statement be made in his behalf.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY (AS READ BY MR. KERSTEN)

The Select Congressional Committee on Communist Aggression opens today a series of hearings on the question of Communist and Soviet aggression with respect to Hungary.

While the end result of Hungary is not unique among the nations of East Europe which have come under Communist domination, some of the circumstances surrounding this result are particularly worthy of note. Not long after its so-called liberation by Soviet troops in 1945, relatively free parliamentary elections were held throughout the country. These elections resulted in a smashing defeat for the Hungarian Communist Party and an absolute majority for the Small Landholders Party which at that time was almost completely free of Communist influences.

Nearly 2 years passed before the Communists and their allies dared risk another election—in 1947. In spite of the changed circumstances then the Communist vote was still far from impressive. Aided, however, by the conclusion of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of Allied military personnel, except for a sizable number of Soviet “communication” troops, the Communist-dominated government coalition was able to seize and retain power within a comparatively short space of time.

The presence of the Soviet military and the direct intervention of the Soviet Union in the Hungarian political and economic picture were noteworthy factors in this development.

It is the purpose of this subcommittee to examine the methods by which the Soviet and Hungarian Communists were able to achieve complete control over a country whose anti-Communist feelings were unquestioned. Alone among the countries of East Europe, Hungary had had previous experience with a Communist regime and the vast majority of the population wanted no part of another.

It is heartening to note some continuing signs of resistance to communism, particularly among the Hungarian peasants who have stubbornly opposed all attempts at farm collectivization. The fact that the Hungarian Government recently accepted President Eisenhower's offer of relief supplies for flood victims shows the complete inability of the satellite regime to care for its own. Passive resistance among members of all religious faiths in Hungary is evidenced by the large attendance at the churches.

A word should be mentioned here concerning the Hungarian Protestant clergymen now attending the World Council of Churches Convention at Evanston, Ill. One of these, Bishop Janos Peter, has indicated that conditions in Hungary are favorable for the growth of the churches and that freedom of religion still exists. Testimony is anticipated during the course of these hearings which will show the true picture today in Hungary and how it came about, in religion as well as other fields.

Hungary has survived foreign occupation and domination before in its long and glorious history. It is the expressed hope of this Government that one day Hungary will again be free from alien tyranny. It is the hope of this committee that its work and its findings may hasten the coming of that day.

I personally regret deeply my inability to attend the hearings today, August 20, which appropriately is the Day of St. Stephen, patron saint of Hungary, and I appreciate the willingness of Chairman Kersten to preside over the subcommittee in my absence. I expect to rejoin the subcommittee when it opens hearings in New York next Monday, August 23.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Counsel, may we have the first witness.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before proceeding with Monsignor Varga, we have a message from the former American Minister to Hungary for the years 1947-49, that I ask to be made part of the record.

Mr. KERSTEN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

MESSAGE FROM SELDEN CHAPIN, FORMER AMERICAN MINISTER TO HUNGARY, TO HUNGARIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ST. STEPHEN'S DAY, 1954

Seven years ago I stood on a platform in Budapest amidst a crowd of nearly 200,000 Hungarians massed solidly in the Hero's Square and extending for blocks each way up and down the streets giving on to that square. The occasion was a solemn mass performed by Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty on the Feast of St. Stephen. But the crowd around me consisted not only of Catholics but of Protestants, Jews—all local liberty-loving Hungarian citizens. From the cardinal's lips in his sermon and message to the people that day I heard the last public appeal for a democratic government, an appeal which in my opinion was the direct cause of his subsequent arrest, farcical trial, and imprisonment by the Communists. That appeal, if memory serves correctly, was no narrow call to the

members of his own church, but a wide one to all Hungarians irrespective of religious or political faith to vote according to their own conscience in the forthcoming elections.

From the bottom of my heart I pay tribute to the many, many Hungarians among whom the cardinal is but one although an outstanding martyr, who have suffered for the cause of liberty and democracy. I pay tribute not only to those in exile, but particularly to those whom fate has for one reason or another forced to remain behind the curtain. I applaud their courage and faith through these dark years of oppression and express the fervent conviction that in a not too far distant day of Christian civilization, the four freedoms and all of the ideals which collect around his name will be restored to the land of St. Stephen.

Mr. McTIGUE. The first witness is Msgr. Bela Varga.

Mr. KERSTEN. Will you raise your right hand, please? Do you solemnly swear you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Monsignor VARGA. So help me God.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before proceeding with Monsignor Varga, I would like to read a short biography of Monsignor Varga for the record.

Mr. KERSTEN. Before you do that and at some point in the opening of the session, Mr. Reporter, I wish you would record the presence of Congressman Bonin, of Pennsylvania, and Congressman Thomas J. Dodd, of Connecticut and Congressman Feighan, of Ohio.

Mr. McTIGUE. Msgr. Bela Varga is chairman of the executive committee and president of the Hungarian National Council. He is a canon of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Veszprem, Hungary, with the rank of an archdean. He was appointed canon and archdean by Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty during the time when Mindszenty was the bishop of Veszprem. The rank of an archdean is the second to the bishop in matters of administration of the diocese.

Msgr. Bela Varga is also the exiled Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament. The Hungarian Parliament in 1945 had one chamber. As the Speaker, he is the elected leader of the legislative body chosen by the majority of the representatives. In many respects his rank corresponds to that of the rank of the President of the Senate of the United States.

Monsignor Varga was born as the son of a Hungarian farmer. He became a priest and in the course of his ecclesiastical career rose to the rank of archdean and canon of Veszprem. He was closely associated with Joseph Mindszenty. They studied in the same seminaries and their ecclesiastical careers ran side by side—with neighboring parishes and in the same diocese.

Monsignor Varga entered the political field in the early thirties when the Smallholders' Party stood under the direction of the late Gaston Gaal, Hungarian political leader and a close friend. The Smallholders' Party advocated social reforms, land reform, improvement of democratic institutions, and so on, and numbered many members of the Catholic clergy, as well as Protestants. Monsignor Varga was freely elected to Parliament in the 1939 elections.

During World War II the monsignor helped to save the lives of thousands of Polish and French political refugees and countless persecuted Jews. His rectory in Balatonboglar became the real headquarters for the resistance movement in Hungary. He maintained a high school for the children of Polish refugees and did everything within his power to help and save those who had lost their country and homes. In acknowledgment of services rendered to the Polish

underground, Monsignor Varga was named an honorary Polish citizen.

After the occupation of Hungary by the Nazis in March 1944, the monsignor was sought by the Gestapo and was forced to hide in the country. For a time he was hidden by Cardinal Mindszenty who later sent him to Budapest to help save the Jews of the city.

After the end of World War II he was arrested by the Russian authorities and sentenced to death by an NKVD major acting as judge. He escaped by a mere coincidence. He soon became one of the central figures in Hungarian political life.

At the first postwar elections held in 1945 he was again elected to Parliament defeating his opponent in his district, the present Communist leader of Hungary, Matthias Rakosi, by a huge margin. He was also a member of the National Council founded after the war to take the place temporarily of the chief executive. Monsignor Varga later renounced his post in the Council when refusing to affirm a death sentence. In 1945 he was also elected Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament—a post he never relinquished, not even after his escape from Hungary as a consequence of the Communist coup d'état of 1947. The Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament has the position of the President of the Senate of the United States.

As the legally elected speaker of the Hungarian Parliament Monsignor Varga became president of the Hungarian National Council, an organization of exiled Hungarian parliamentary representatives and statesmen, founded in the United States of America and representing the oppressed and silenced Hungarian nation. The headquarters of the Hungarian National Council are in New York. Its members are the only exiled members of the Hungarian Parliament throughout the world. The Hungarian National Council has representatives in 18 different countries. The function of the Council is to represent the interests of the silenced Hungarian people in every respect.

Mr. McTIGUE. I believe Monsignor Varga has a prepared statement he wishes to proceed with.

Mr. KERSTEN. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MSGR. BELA VERGA, PRESIDENT OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

Monsignor VARGA. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, appearing before this committee as a humble priest from Hungary and speaking in the name of an enslaved nation, I am fully aware of the heavy responsibility of my position as well as of the historic importance of this occasion. May I please thank your great President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, your United States Senate, the United States House of Representatives, and especially your committee in Congress investigating Communist aggression in my country.

Hungary has never had the chance in her history to submit her case before the foremost tribunal of the world, the Congress of the United States. For this reason I am deeply moved by the privilege of presenting to you the crying grievances of my country. They consist of a long series of rape, pillage, and barbarous violences of all sorts committed by the armed hordes of Russian communism, and of a plot

that led to the overthrow of the Hungarian democracy. You granted us a hearing, gentlemen, and in my statement which follows, I propose to pour out to you the tortured soul of the Hungarian nation.

My first thought takes me to the Lord Almighty. We Hungarians render to Him our humble thanks for giving us this opportunity and in our prayer of gratitude we entreat Him to give His blessing to this committee and to the Congress of the United States, this last citadel of freedom and democracy. May He help this young and powerful nation in the fulfillment of its providential task: To save mankind from the greatest evil on earth, from communism, the destroyer of the human soul, and the sworn enemy of freedom.

The Hungarian nation has been fighting a life-and-death struggle since the invasion of the Russian Red army opened her frontiers to communism. She lost her freedom for which she has fought for a thousand years against Tartars, Turks, and Russians. While carrying on this struggle, defending the gates of western civilization, she lost her blood, her wealth, and her position. At the beginning of the 16th century, 5 million Hungarians lived in the Carpathian Basin. The country was one of the wealthiest in Europe with a larger population at that time than England. In the course of the 16th and 17th centuries, however, the Turks occupied two-thirds of the country in a bitter struggle lasting more than 150 years.

This was the historic mission Hungary had to fulfill. With her own body she had to stand in the path of the Turkish advance against the West, which, if not stopped, would have set back progress by centuries. In averting this barbarian threat to our Christian heritage, the nation sacrificed itself. When liberation came from the Turkish rule, the number of Hungarians diminished from the original 5 to a mere 1½ million. Since then, due to the amazing power of recovery manifested by the nation throughout its stormy history, this number has risen to 13 million.

With this historic glance back into the past of my country, I may state with emphasis that Hungary is still carrying on her struggle against a barbarian nation, much more powerful than the Turks and much more subtle in its methods of conquest and of domination. Resisting this new form of barbarism, Hungary suffered cruel deprivations but no matter how dark the immediate future, no matter how dark the very skies above her, she refuses to submit to communism or to accept the fate of a slave of Russia.

The people of Hungary lost nearly 1 million souls in the Second World War. Hitler and his Nazis hated them because they stood in the way of the "Drang nach Osten." Hungarian policy has always been aware of the fact that geographically the country lay directly in the path of German penetration to the east. If Nazi Germany were victorious, Hungary's fate would have eventually been complete absorption into Greater Germany.

For this reason the leaders of the country tried throughout the fatal years of the war, to get in close touch with the West and reach some understanding whereby at some propitious time the Hungarian Army could join the Allied forces. It was all in vain.

When in the spring of 1941 Hungary received an ultimatum from Berlin to allow passage for the German troops on their way to Yugoslavia and Greece, the tragic hour struck. Count Teleki, the

Prime Minister, unable to stem the Nazi tide, yet morally equally unable to violate Hungary's pledge given to Yugoslavia, committed suicide in sheer desperation. It was a symbolic act reflecting the tragic impasse of Hungarian policy. As a Catholic priest I could not condone suicide under any condition, but I may point out that while a man can physically destroy himself, a nation cannot.

Until the Nazi occupation March 19, 1944, Hungary was the free asylum of all the persecuted. Hither fled from east and west the Jews, the Poles, and from German prisoner-of-war camps French, Dutch, and other soldiers. They were welcomed without exception and given an opportunity to settle down and make a decent living, because the nation could afford to lend a helping hand. In the fall of 1939 I personally helped more than 50,000 Polish refugee soldiers to reach the West where they joined the Free Polish Army under General Sikorsky. There was a time during the late war when this small nation supported more than 200,000 refugees, giving them a home and guaranteeing them security and freedom.

Hungary also defended her own Jewish minority of about 600,000 souls and strained every nerve to win the race with the Nazis against time. The whole nation in which every walk of life was represented, made every effort to save lives, but in the last year of the war Hitler placed a Nazi-Arrowcross government at the head of the conquered nation. In spite of such odds, Hungary managed to save the nearly 200,000 Jews living in and around Budapest, the largest Jewish group saved in any territory subjugated by Hitler. As to persecutions outside of Budapest, Hitler and his Hungarian Nazi stooges claimed victims among the Jewish population as well as among the best of Christian Hungarians, many of whom were deported and liquidated in Nazi captivity. No wonder that the people of Hungary, having been so assured by the West and by the United States, looked to the approaching Red army as their liberators. Never was a nation more disappointed. Instead of freedom and independence, the darkest and cruelest chapter of their history began with the arrival of the so-called liberators.

The Russians promised freedom to those Hungarian soldiers who would surrender to them. Instead they carried them to the interior of Russia or to Siberia, where they were swallowed up by the measureless inhumanity of the concentration and slave-labor camps. Such was the fate of men who have fought the Nazis and then joined the Russians, hoping, as they were told, to find allies in them. It staggers the human imagination to go over the Russian record of cruelty, bestiality, murder, rape, violence, and humiliation.

The four horsemen of the Apocalypse rode behind the Red army as it poured its hordes like a dark flood over the Hungarian plain. The 13th century chronicles describing the Tartar invasion pale in comparison to the horrors which the Hungarian people had to suffer while the Red barbarians turned their gardenlike state into a valley of endless wails. They raped and dishonored our women in ways so fiendish that they are unbelievable of decent human beings. It was the most revolting crime which was planned in the Kremlin and executed by thousands of dehumanized beings, new and strange species of the human race, the product of a systematic godless, heartless, and thoroughly diabolical regime. With fire and sword they came to

destroy our public buildings, the monuments of our historic tradition, our museums and their centuries-old treasures, literary and historic documents of priceless scientific value. They were intent upon extinguishing the very fountainheads of our national tradition. They were determined to tear the heart out of the body of the nation in order to absorb the lifeless mass into a Slav ocean stretching from Murmansk to the Adriatic, and from the Sea of Japan to the shores of Scandinavia. Hungary has never had a Communist movement of consequence. From the short-lived terrorist regime established by Bela Kun in 1919, the nation had well learned what communism stood for.

When the Red army invaded the country in 1944 and 160 well-trained Communists of Hungarian extraction arrived directly from Moscow, the detailed blueprints for the liquidation of our social, political, and economic structure and for the complete communization of the country were at hand. Stalin himself sent his personal friend, Marshal Voroshilov, to Budapest to be chairman of the Allied Control Commission. They were quite sure of themselves, because they took it for granted that the country, pillaged and tortured by the Nazis and then by the Red army, would gladly accept Voroshilov as the strong hand at the helm. So confident were the Communists of their success, that of all their conquests in Eastern Europe they singled out Hungary as the first country to hold general elections. Here they expected their greatest victory.

The elections were to be held in two stages: first in the capital and then in the country. They hoped that the results in the former would decisively influence the outcome of the latter. Preparatory to the elections in the capital, the area of Budapest was enlarged by attaching the industrial suburbs to it where the population consisted mostly of factory hands. This measure, they thought, would insure a resounding Communist victory in Greater Budapest.

As an added measure, a sort of double insurance, they compelled the Social Democratic Party to enter the elections on a joint ticket with the Communists. While the two Marxist groups were fused, most of the anti-Communist elements of the population flocked to the Smallholders' Party which decided to enter the contest in Budapest under my leadership as chairman. At first the Communists attempted to force us also into a joint list with the Communist-Socialist ticket and condescendingly offered us 16 percent of the seats. This appeared to some in the party a satisfactory bargain, because from the outset it seemed unlikely that a party whose main strength was based on the small peasantry, would ever have a much better chance in the capital city.

However, I insisted with my friends that the Communist offer be rejected, and with God's help we plunged into the election contest. The future of the whole resistance was going to be decided at the polls in Budapest. Great was our surprise when the final count resulted in my party's winning the absolute majority by polling 50.5 percent of the votes. Nobody expected any party to gain the majority of the Budapest City Council, but the mystery of this miraculous success cleared up when the count in the newly formed suburban precincts disclosed larger majorities of the Smallholders than in the old city. Great was our rejoicing, because this victory won on October 7, 1945,

heralded an ever greater triumph in the national elections to follow a month later. Here the Communists suffered a smashing defeat by being reduced to a minor party. They polled only 17 percent of the total vote, in spite of all the support of the Red army and in spite of all the pressure, terror, and intimidation. The Smallholders captured more than 57 percent of the total vote.

Marshal Voroshilov was furious and left the country in a huff. The whole world took note of small Hungary's defying the Soviet giant. However, this victory, demanding very heavy sacrifices from the nation, merely increased the Russians' wrath. Their occupation authorities, invoking the provisions of the armistice, flatly refused to give us their consent to form a government based on the result of the election. Holding the chairmanship in the Control Commission, the Russians did not even consider the opinion of the American and British members.

In fact, they succeeded in completely suppressing Allied influence in the Control Commission, so that finally the Russians declared that they would accept only a coalition government, or they would order new elections. Marshal Voroshilov, returning to Budapest, insisted that in this coalition government the Ministry of Internal Affairs be given to a Communist. This meant that they would take over the entire police force. There could be no doubt about the future. The days of our parliamentary majority were numbered.

The Communists relentlessly pressed their systematic campaign aimed at the weakening and eventual destruction of Hungarian society, thereby undermining the very foundations of this parliamentary regime. The horrible inflation, later engineered by them to destroy the middle class, was part of their scheme to hasten a shift in the political balance of power which would be favorable to the Communist Party.

The Russian occupation power decided to force the institution of people's courts upon the provisional government of Debrecen. These courts were simple tools of the Communist Party to cow the nation into submission by passing death sentences for political reasons, often based on trumped-up charges. In vain did the nationally oriented members of the government and all decent elements in it try to save the situation. The Russians refused to yield, in spite of the fact that back in Russia capital punishment had been abolished just a short time before.

The terror thus exercised by the occupying power was so great that when I, as a member of the Supreme National Council, resigned from this post because I would not sign death sentences pronounced by the people's courts, I found myself completely alone, unsupported by public authorities in the west.

The Anglo-American representatives in the Control Commission remained silent. All this was an overwhelming proof that Hungary's dark destiny was inexorably approaching. It was not her own Communists, one-half of 1 percent of the population, who contrived this consummation by intrigue and trickery. It was the Russian colossus which by sheer weight flattened out the resistance. We felt deserted and betrayed, and so we harvested the bitter fruit of endless exertions, but at that time we had at least the benefit of the doubt. We learned only years later, when abroad, that Hungary was merely a small item in a bargain between Mr. Churchill and Stalin at the Moscow meet-

ing of October 1944. It is described by the British Prime Minister himself without compunction in the sixth volume of his memoirs which he aptly entitled "Triumph and Tragedy." The triumph, although short lived, was his, the tragedy, with all its endless agonies, was ours. It is small consolation for us that he and through him the West in this bargain rewarded the allies, the Poles, and Yugoslavs, with the same arrangement with which we, the Hungarians, the so-called enemy nation, have been punished. Thus was the Iron Curtain rolled down on friend and foe alike. To sum up, Russian control was an actual fact since the beginning of their invasion of Hungary, and translation of this fact into a final political formula was merely a matter of time.

It came when in August 1946 the Smallholders' Party prevented the nationalization of the flour mills which would have meant that every piece of bread would have been distributed by the Communists. Angered by our resistance, the Red rulers decided to liquidate the political situation which was based on the 57-percent majority of the popular vote. They decided to stage the first mock trial. For this purpose a patriotic organization was selected known as the Hungarian Community. On Christmas Day 1946 its members were arrested, among them Bela Kovacs, one of the most remarkable leaders of the resistance.

Arrested directly by the Red army on February 26, 1947, he was forced by torture to sign a statement in which he accused Mr. Ferenc Nagy, the Prime Minister and myself, Speaker of the National Assembly, with being primarily responsible for a conspiracy directed against the Red army.

At that time Premier Nagy was in Switzerland. The Red army, using the statement of Bela Kovacs, forced the Prime Minister's resignation and General Sviridov, the deputy of Marshal Voroshilov, demanded the formation of a new government. He, being the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, refused to confirm those who were proposed to him as candidates for the Prime Ministry, insisting on the appointment of Louis Dinnyes. This individual, although owner of an estate and member of a former conservative group, had nevertheless completely sold out to the Russians.

It was impossible to prevent his becoming Prime Minister. When I convoked the Political Committee of the National Assembly and announced that I had been officially notified by the conference of the coalition parties that it had designated Mr. Dinnyes as head of the Cabinet, dead silence followed in which nobody dared to utter a word of protest.

In 5 minutes the formalities of the session were over which signified the collapse of the resistance movement. Again the Anglo-American members of the Control Commission kept their silence. Again we were completely left alone.

By this time all means of publicity were in the hands of the Communists, which enabled them to manufacture news favorable to them and damaging to our cause. He who persisted would be stamped a criminal first and then removed. The complex machinery of monolithic totalitarianism of the Soviet, perfected during a quarter century of their rule in Russia, now was working with subtle efficiency in small, isolated, beaten, and deserted Hungary.

It was evident from now on that my own liquidation was merely a question of time. My friends in Parliament as well as members of the diplomatic corps repeatedly warned me of the danger. There were unmistakable signs heralding the end. One day an organized mob marched against Parliament, forced the gates and invaded the building.

The leaders of this demonstration tried to provoke the parliamentary guards into using their weapons against the mob, but I ordered them to yield. My reason for that order was the following: The Hungarian Parliament, according to the constitution of the country, was entirely sovereign. No one, neither the police nor any Government official was allowed to enter its precincts without the permission of the Speaker of the Parliament.

At that time the Parliament building was an asylum for several deputies sought by the Communist police. The Red army tried to create an excuse for invading Parliament by provoking the guard to fire into the mob.

This would have given an excuse to the occupying Russian Army to abolish the sovereignty of Parliament. The invaders crowded the halls, wrecked furniture and installations and insulted the Members. As Speaker of the National Assembly I was powerless to curb the violence of this mob, hired by the Russian Army, to defile this foremost symbol of national sovereignty.

And thus arrived the hardest moment of my life. The statement of Bela Kovacs had made it evident that the Russians would soon arrest me, since allegedly I was part of a conspiracy against their army. They were prepared to charge me, a Catholic priest, with being a spy of the Vatican. Similarly, they wanted to link me with my wartime connections and with my support given to the Polish underground and tried to involve me in other, even more incriminating charges.

Had I been arrested, hundreds of my friends would have followed me in prison. Yielding to their request and following the suggestion of my bishop, the late Leslie Banass, who was one of my best friends—Cardinal Mindszenty was at that time in the United States of America—I made up my mind to take that momentous and painful step of leaving my home, of fleeing from my own country. My usefulness for Hungary at home had ended. By staying I would have merely involved a number of stalwart patriots.

On the night of June 1, 1947, slipping through the vigilant ring of the Red army, the Communist-controlled government, the secret police and the agents of the Communist Party, I fled to Vienna where they least expected me, the city being partly under Russian control. But my American friends were very helpful and they spirited me away literally from the clutches of the Red army. Through this flight I gave up everything I hold dear on earth, save one unalterable resolution: to wage a relentless fight with all my strength against communism, the greatest enemy of the world.

When I escaped I did not resign my position as Speaker of the National Assembly, thereby indicating that by virtue of the national elections there was in being a legal government of Hungary and in consequence the present government is merely usurping power. As a result of this usurpation, however, Hungary has become a minute part

of that vast area which is now controlled by the Kremlin. The fate of Hungary, long before decided in Moscow by victorious Russia, has thus been consummated.

The Hungarians are a tolerant nation. Hungary was the first country in the world to enact the principle of religious liberty in 1566 at the Diet of Torda. Gone is this oldest principle of religious freedom, wiped out in the Red liquidation. The religious leaders of the country, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish, have been silenced. Cardinal Mindszenty was imprisoned, just as was the Protestant Bishop Ordass, and with them hundreds of other priests, ministers, and rabbis. All that was built up by a God-fearing nation in a thousand years was trampled down by an atheistic, world-defying, arrogant power. One should not, however, be misled into thinking that the Communists have destroyed the physical framework of the church. The heavy hand of oppression fell only on those churchmen who became centers of resistance or sources of spiritual inspiration to resist.

Cardinal Mindszenty has become the legendary figure of this historic national resistance. He fought the heathen nationalism of the Nazis just as firmly as he opposed the Asiatic barbarism of Russian communism. As the Nazis were ready to throw him into prison, so the Communists proceeded to silence him and have been keeping him in prison ever since his world-famous trial and conviction. His spirit is with us; his noble example will always fortify all those who took a stand in the defense of truth.

At this occasion I wish to give testimony of my deep gratitude to this man in the name of my nation for his heroic conduct in the face of such overwhelming odds. His personal resistance, which won the admiration of the civilized world, has become the symbol of the nameless struggle of a whole nation.

His endless suffering in prison may also be symbolic of the imprisonment of his nation behind the Iron Curtain, and lastly, may his undying hope in the final triumph of truth be also the reflection of Hungary's unshakable faith in the coming of our liberation.

The visible church, its institutions, its structure were left. Some of the church functionaries who submitted were also left and now are used as tools to mislead the flock of believers at home or those abroad who are still willing to delude themselves into believing that religious freedom is possible under the hammer and sickle. Gentlemen, as a priest and as the leader of a resistance movement not wholly without success, I can assure you that communism and religious freedom are mutually as exclusive as fire and water. He who tells the contrary does not know communism or religion or he is a conscious tool of the Communists.

To own a plot of land makes all the difference in the life of the average Hungarian, be he a villager or a townsman. His happiness is not complete unless he has at least a little garden. Under the rule of the Red army he has now lost even the smallest holding which he had cultivated with almost religious devotion. The little farms and gardens were merged into kolkhozes in order to break the very spirit of Hungary.

Whatever the fruits of Hungarian industry, they are carried away into Russia. The products of the land, the products of the factories are now used to build and strengthen the Russian juggernaut.

The thousand-year-old constitution of the country was also lost. The Golden Bull, proclaimed in 1222, guaranteed the right to the nation to rise against the king, should his rule be contrary to the spirit of the constitution. Hungarian history ever since has been a record of incessant struggle for the preservation of its ancient liberties. The Russians have ground it to dust under the heel of military conquest. Gone are freedom of thought, freedom of the press, and the freedom of assembly. He who would insist on his God-given rights so nobly proclaimed by the American Declaration of Independence, would court certain death. In short, gentlemen, Hungary is a country living in the shadow of national death.

The system of wholesale deportations has reached the proportions of genocide. It is true though, that a year ago the Government abolished this system, this law. But even this seemingly conciliatory measure has become a part of a diabolical scheme to break the backbone of the nation. Because if anyone was deported from the city to the country, the Government took care of the housing problem even though it were only a barn or a stable. With the deportations abolished, such primitive dwellings had to be vacated, but there was no place for the deportees to go because during their deportation their homes had been taken by Communist functionaries or given to informers as a form of political reward. And thus the deportees turned into a homeless mass of wandering beggars, all people belonging to the former educated classes or to the self-made independent elements.

In conclusion, gentlemen, in my capacity as the last legally elected speaker of the Hungarian National Assembly and also as the president of the Hungarian National Council, a body formed abroad from former legislators of all political parties, with the exception of the Nazis and the Communists, I herewith make a solemn indictment against the Red army, Marshal Voroshilov, and General Sviridov on three counts, to wit: (1) That they caused the deportation of nearly 300,000 civilian persons including women and children; (2) that for political reasons they illegally imprisoned and deported Bela Kovacs, a member of the parliament, and his associates, and last, but not least, (3) for having allowed, in fact having encouraged, the Russian Army to commit untold crimes against the defenseless civilian population.

As a result of their acts as head of the control commission, the present Government of Hungary is illegal, usurping public power against the clearly expressed will of the nation. This Communist government, the stooges of the Kremlin, have, with the help of Russian bayonets, deprived Hungary of her freedom, have degraded the population with violence and terror into a condition of serfdom in which Hungarians have to toil for the benefit of Russian military power. I accuse these Communist leaders of Hungary who are conscious and willing tools of the country's enslavement and her ruthless exploitation by Russia.

I had the first personal encounter with communism in 1919. At Csorna, the village next to ours, the best citizens were being hanged on the trees around the church. The memory of this event accompanied me throughout my life, a life dedicated to the fight against communism. In later years, in 1945, 1946, and 1947, I again came into contact with communism and found it the greatest threat to human liberty, dignity, and love.

Now that I have had to leave my own country and live in exile, I can only urge every free nation and every free man to unite against this greatest threat to human liberty, dignity and love. These experiences left no doubt in me that I did the right thing when I dedicated my whole life to fight this greatest evil of mankind.

Now that I have had to leave my own country and live in exile, I can only urge every free nation and every free man to unite against this greatest, most brutal foe of mankind: godless communism that has set out to conquer the entire free world.

On this solemn occasion let me quote the words of Abraham Lincoln, your great American President, who said: "You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today."

Gentlemen of the committee, through you I am relaying to the American Congress and to the whole free world the anguished cries of a nation sentenced to slow death by the crushing power of Soviet imperialism to which I add my humble but urgent plea for help and for final liberation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time. I understand that Monsignor Varga is to resume his testimony when the committee convenes in New York, on August 23, Monday, next.

Mr. KERSTEN. There may be some questions that the members have, based on his statement.

Congressman Bonin—

Mr. BONIN. Monsignor, what do you think the reaction of the people in Hungary would be to a severance of diplomatic and commercial relations with Communist Russia and all the Iron Curtain countries?

Monsignor VARGA. The Hungarian people have resolved to fight against communism. The sacrifice has been borne by the Hungarians themselves. The oppressed Hungarians at home, 90 percent of the population, would always be glad and happy when they see action against Russia. They would see in this action that the world and especially America—the last hope of the free world—has seen and discovered the great danger of communism. It would strengthen hope and resistance.

Mr. BONIN. Do you believe that it would put communism on the defensive to explain to those people why free nations of the world are breaking diplomatic and commercial relations with them?

Monsignor VARGA. Every action against communism helps in the fight against communism. The Communists are planning and attacking and are always positive in action. If there should begin plans of action against communism it would always disturb the Communists.

Mr. BONIN. I notice on page 13 of your statement that you state that the products of the land, the products of the factories are now used to build and strengthen the Russian juggernaut.

In other words, Hungary at the present time is being used as an arsenal to strengthen the Russian system itself within its own borders?

Monsignor VARGA. Definitely. The whole population of Hungary is now working for the rearmament of Russia. There is unimaginable poverty. The people are beggars, they don't have enough to eat. Everything that is valuable is taken to Russia for the rearmament of the Russians.

Mr. BONIN. It is officially reported that there are about 25,000 hard-core Communists in this country. Do you believe that would be a sufficient number of Communists to overthrow the United States Government when the opportune time in their opinion should arrive?

Monsignor VARGA. Lenin wrote in his book somewhere that 2 percent of the population is enough to take over power. In Hungary we only had 160 Communists coming back from Russia and they took over the power in the country with the help of the Red army.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, it seems quite clear that there must be also some additional help from outside of the country before they can actually accomplish their revolution; is that correct?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes. In all of these enslaved countries the Communist parties always had help from outside, from the Russians.

Mr. BONIN. Now, we have made an offer to supply food to Hungary, apparently because of flood conditions and other acts of God in southern Europe and eastern Europe.

What do you think of that offer on our part? Do you think it will be accepted gratefully by the people?

Monsignor VARGA. May I say that Hungary, in my humble opinion, is a little America in the valley of the Danube. My father has been here, my uncles have been here. There is no family in Hungary which does not have relatives here in America. The resistance movement and the hope of the people will strengthen infinitely, when they see that America didn't forget, but the most important thing is to control this help and not give it just to the Communists and Communist agents.

Mr. BONIN. That is my concern. I am afraid the Communists will take the credit for it and the people will think it really came from Russia and not the United States.

Monsignor VARGA. Through the radios—the Voice of America—the people will know that it came from America. It is very important to control it and not to give it just to the Communist agents and Communist Party members.

Mr. BONIN. I wish to compliment you, Monsignor, for the splendid statement you have made here this morning. I think it is a great contribution to the work of this committee.

Monsignor VARGA. Thank you very much.

Mr. DODD. Do you know Bishop Peter who delivered a speech in Chicago 2 days ago?

Monsignor VARGA. I know him personally.

Mr. DODD. Now, if I read his speech correctly, I understood him to tell that great conference of churchmen and through them the whole world, that religious freedom does exist under the Communists in Hungary. Listening to you this morning, I understand you to say that it does not exist under the Communists in Hungary. Have you any explanation for this conflict? What do you know about Bishop Peter, if you know him personally?

Monsignor VARGA. I knew him personally. He was secretary to President Tildy when I was home.

May I make a request, Mr. Congressmen. I am a Catholic priest and I don't want to attack Bishop Peter. The committee will have testimony from Protestants, good, patriotic Protestants. I am not a better Hungarian than my suffering Protestant brethren at home in

Hungary. I can just say something in the name of the Catholic Church. The Communists destroyed the heart of the Catholic Church—not just the Catholic Church, but the whole religious feeling of Hungary. Hungary was dedicated by St. Stephen to the Holy Virgin and a great church stood in the center of Budapest as the symbol of the whole nation and there it happened that the ruthless Communist Russians destroyed this symbol in the heart of the nation, and erected, instead of the church, a huge statue of Stalin. Everybody realizes that a country where the symbol of religion was destroyed and a statue of Stalin is erected—does this country have religious freedom or not?

Here in America, in New York City, is a beautiful Church of St. John the Divine. Had that been destroyed and a statue of Stalin or Malenkov erected, I am sure that America, in this case, would not have religious freedom.

Mr. DODD. I can understand your attitude. I didn't invite an attack on him. I am simply trying to get some information. We stand in this position. Here is Bishop Peter in Chicago telling us one thing and you are here telling us something else.

What I wanted to learn, if I could, was how to reconcile these differences, but I won't press it if you don't care to go any further than you have.

Monsignor VARGA. I knew very well Bishop Revesz. He was ousted and following him, against the will of the Protestants, Bishop Peter was installed by the Communist regime.

Mr. DODD. He succeeded a bishop who was imprisoned?

Monsignor VARGA. He wasn't imprisoned, but he was a man honored by everybody, Bishop Revesz. Peter succeeded Bishop Revesz.

Mr. DODD. What happened to Bishop Revesz?

Monsignor VARGA. I think he is in retirement.

Mr. DODD. Wasn't there some distinguished Protestant bishop imprisoned in Hungary?

Monsignor VARGA. The Lutheran Bishop Ordas, an honored man in Hungary. He was imprisoned even before Cardinal Mindszenty.

Another bishop, his successor, Ravasz. He was the greatest orator in Hungary, esteemed by everybody. When he spoke, both Catholics and the Protestants listened to him. He, the most eloquent Protestant, was also ousted.

Mr. DODD. There are many Protestants and others in this country who are still confused about communism.

Now, when a churchman comes here in our midst and says, "Oh, everything is all right as far as religion is concerned in Communist Hungary," I think it is important that we try to get the facts of the matter. It is unfortunate that he happens to be of one religious group and you of another but I am not concerned about that. If we can get to the truth of the business, that is what we'd better do, and let the American people and the rest of the world know what the truth is. It is too bad that we can't do it here.

Monsignor VARGA. I will make a statement. In Hungary, only a person can leave the country who can get a passport from the Communist Government, and a return permit. I am sure, and I can state that a man who leaves the country with a Communist passport and with a return permit to the country, such a man is an agent and he has

to act and speak according to the words and commands of the Kremlin, through the Hungarian Communist Government.

Mr. DODD. You see how dangerous this sort of thing is. Here is the Italian situation where the Communists have great influence, apparently, in the elections. What do you suppose would be the effect on the average Italian who doesn't have much information, when he reads that a distinguished person in a religious group says religion doesn't suffer under the Communists. That would have a tremendous effect in a country like Italy, it would seem to me and it may have influence in other countries where there is still an opportunity for choice. I don't want to press it any further. I simply wanted to point out this difficulty and I am grateful to you for what you have told us.

Mr. BONIN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DODD. Of course.

Mr. BONIN. It will have great significance upon the American public alone to hear constant testimony before this committee that religious persecution is practiced in all these Iron Curtain nations. And then we have somebody who is allegedly a respectable individual come over here and tell us that actually there is freedom of religion in the nation from which he has just come over. It is almost unbelievable. To me it is that same identical pattern of confusion that is a part of the Communist scheme.

Mr. DODD. Of course, I completely agree with my colleague and I am grateful to him for his contribution. That is precisely why I have raised the question.

We have heard, Mr. Chairman, as you well know, in our hearings in this country and in Europe, an unbroken line of testimony from a great many people who were there. Every one of them has said that one of the first things the Communists do is to stamp out religion. Now, this man arrives on the scene and he says that isn't so. I agree with you, all he can do is confuse and mix up people, when the great need is truth about this situation.

Monsignor VARGA. May I say that the Communists first attacked the churches when they saw that the latter entered into politics. When the Communists became stronger in 1952—first they depoliticized and then they repoliticized the church. Then they will use the Catholic Church as well as the Protestant churches, in the hands of the Communist Government, to make propaganda on the world.

It happened only 3 days ago that 2 Catholic bishops were compelled to join a big religious council of 50 members, and they are sending Catholic magazines, beautiful magazines, proving that the church is free in Hungary. The Catholics, too. They use the Catholic Church as a tool of Communist propaganda. I am sure that they will use the Catholic Church, too, more and more.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think the members who recall the hearings at Munich, can confirm the witness' statement that there were produced at our hearings in Munich some Hungarian Communist Government brochures on the freedom of religion in Hungary, in which they pictured the services of religion and teaching in the schools by religious persons, while the fact was that it was testified there that they permitted a few churches to conduct religious ceremonies and a few religious schools—I believe the number was 6 or 7, whereas they had closed down actually about 3,000, but kept these few open just to take

pictures of, and there apparently is a concerted drive now, on the part of the Hungarian Communist Government, to deceive the world, that there is freedom of religion. I might say further that I can understand your position, Monsignor. You don't wish to be in a position of attacking any other clergyman, but I will say that before this committee at subsequent hearings—I believe in New York, or some hearing of this particular subcommittee—there will be Protestant clergymen who will testify about the persecution of religion in Hungary and testify that religion is not free in Hungary today in the case of Jew, Protestant, or Catholics.

Monsignor VARGA. I can testify on behalf of the Catholics.

Mr. KERSTEN. I think Congressman Dodd's bringing this issue up now is very worthwhile and very important, because as he and Congressman Bonin have stated, there is an attempt to confuse.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Chairman, I feel this way about it. If they deliberately maintain a few churches as show places for visiting dignitaries to that nation; it just reminds me of the same identical thing that happened in Spain. They kept a couple of churches in Spain on open display where it appeared as though people could worship. And in the meantime, they had liquidated almost all the clergy and all the churches that they possibly could. And I believe there is a possibility that this Bishop Peter out there right at this moment, may be an active member in one of those churches that have been left open for show purposes and the result is, he is over here spreading propaganda that all religion is free and people are able to worship as they see fit.

Mr. DODD. I have one more question: Who was the American representative on the Allied Control Commission, if that is the proper title, at the time that you make reference to in your statement?

Monsignor VARGA. The first representative at this time was General Key. The American Minister was Mr. Schoenfeld.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I might add, with reference to the chairman's statement about the presenting of these brochures showing a couple of Catholic churches and schools being open, that that was not printed in Hungarian. It was printed only in other foreign languages, because the people of Hungary were too smart to be taken in by such false propaganda.

Monsignor Varga, from my own experience in Budapest in 1930 and 1945, I am firmly convinced that no decent, self-respecting Hungarian would have anything to do with communism.

Now, I would like you to explain, if you would, how your party got 57 percent of the vote and you still had to have a coalition cabinet, or government, in which the most important function would be carried on by an agent of the Kremlin. It is difficult for me to understand that, especially when we had supposedly an active Allied Military Control Commission. It is inconceivable to me. In America the party who wins determines who will be in the Cabinet.

Monsignor VARGA. Hungary is and was occupied by the Red army. Even in this time we didn't have peace. Everything depended upon the control commission and the control commission was just one person, Marshal Voroshilov. Naturally we were very happy to win the election and we tried to organize our Government, but we were an occupied country and the control commission said, "everything de-

pend upon me and I will not accept such a one-party organization."

At this time, in every country in Europe there was a coalition government and we were not free. We were free just in whatever was permitted by the Russians. If the Russians said, "You cannot do this," you could not do it.

We decided, finally, to resist. We wanted to gain time, and we decided to resist within the Government, and we wanted control and we wanted to govern the country, and therefore we were liquidated. The Russian Army—it was very simple—imprisoned everybody who was in the resistance and we were liquidated, just as Bela Kovacs was deported and I don't know where he is now—one of the leaders of the Smallholders' Party. I was liquidated and if an American friend of mine, a pilot, hadn't saved my life I would have been arrested or hung by the Russian authorities—not by the Hungarians.

MR. FEIGHAN. You said if I understood you correctly, that the Allied Control Commission was General Voroshilov.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Yes.

MR. FEIGHAN. Am I not correct in assuming there were three other members of that Allied Control Commission?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. There were the American and the English members but they couldn't help in anything; anything.

MR. FEIGHAN. Do you mean they were totally ineffective?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Totally. They didn't even have permission to leave the city of Budapest.

MR. FEIGHAN. Did they ever to your knowledge make any protest?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Naturally. Every day we had liaison with the Americans and the British. I visited them, and other honest Hungarians also, to ask them to help me—to help me—but they said at the time it was the Russians who were our great allies, and we had to prove how we could live together with our great allies, the Russians.

MR. FEIGHAN. You just told me about your protest to the non-Russian members of the Allied Control Commission. Do you know whether the American and British members of that Commission made any strong protest?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. I asked them to make protests but I saw no results of protests.

MR. BONIN. Will the gentleman yield?

MR. FEIGHAN. Yes.

MR. BONI. It was General Clark, just last week if I am not mistaken, who stated that the State Department was running the affairs in Eastern and Southern Europe at that time, and so long as they were being operated in that manner, their hands were tied.

If they were unable to accomplish their purpose, if they were stifled in their objective, of course, I can readily understand when it comes to clear light at the present time, why some of these things occurred as they did over there.

MR. FEIGHAN. Monsignor Varga, what do you think of the possibilities of peaceful coexistence?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. In my humble opinion, peaceful coexistence means to surrender everything, peaceably to the Russians. The aim of communism to conquer the whole world. Peaceful coexistence means to leave to the conquerer the whole world.

MR. KERSTEN. In other words, if peaceful coexistence can be had it can only be had inside of the Soviet Bear?

Monsignor VARGA. It means the Soviet will slowly but very surely take over everything in one part of the world or the other.

In 1945 I saw Marshal Voroshilov—and this is not a secret. He told me “What do you want to do here in Hungary? We are going to occupy the whole world. We will occupy next year the country of Italy. You are a Catholic priest, you love America and you believe in America but we will liquidate the whole world in 1946 at the latest or in 1945 we will take over the control in Italy and the Vatican will be sent to an island in Latin America.”

The same words were used by Mr. Rakosi who was a friend of Stalin.

It was no secret that the Russian Army was educated to conquer the whole world. When we asked the Russian soldiers what they wanted to do, they said, “Naturally, we will go to Paris, London, and Washington.”

Their whole education at this time in 1945, was to conquer the whole world and I am sure it is their aim. They cannot give up their aim because in that case they would fail.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Monsignor Varga, in your opinion, in what light do the people of Hungary look upon foreign missions? We'll say, for example, the United States mission in Hungary. Do they feel that it is a recognition by the United States of this government of terror, established by the Communists, or does it feel that it could serve a useful purpose in helping them in any way?

Monsignor VARGA. The Hungarians realize very well that the people of America do not approve of the Communist form of government and they are happy that America has some relationship with Hungary. Because the Hungarians have just one hope, after God—America. And it is very important to strengthen the faith and hope of the people, by just seeing some Americans in Budapest.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Do you feel, Monsignor Varga, that if the United States—in fact, we will say if all of the free countries of the world would sever all diplomatic and commercial relations with all the Russian-dominated countries, including the 15 non-Russian nations within the U. S. S. R., as well as the Baltic States and the Central and Eastern European so-called satellite or captive countries, would the people feel that that might be the beginning of the disintegration of the Red colonial empire?

Monsignor VARGA. No. The Hungarian people are very realistic. They want to see the world become free—not to strengthen the Communist government in Hungary, because the government, and even the Communists, don't have any standing with the people. They are just the guards of the prison. The prisoners never like the guards, especially in this case. They hate the guards. Hungary is in the greatest misery you can imagine, Mr. Congressman. They don't have any clothes, they don't have soap with which to wash themselves. They don't clean their houses because nobody knows tomorrow who will be there. Can you imagine a village where, for 7 or 8 years, nobody cleans the houses—how a very nice, clean Hungarian village would look after that time?

They are fighting with their whole strength and their whole life against communism, and they are convinced, more than 90 percent of the population are convinced, that they will be liberated.

MR. FEIGHAN. If we in the free world are trading with the Red colonial empire, we are enabling the Red conspirators of the Kremlin to strengthen their control over their empire, if we are giving them materials—say, even if we are giving them so-called nonstrategic materials, such as bread and wheat and other commodities. It seems to me that if we are selling those commodities to the Iron Curtain countries, we are thereby giving the Iron Curtain countries, or rather the Red Kremlin, the opportunity to deploy people within their empire who would be working out on the farms and they would bring them in to the factories and make them manufacture munitions of war with which they eventually intend to attain their objective of world domination.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Every dollar that goes to the Russians will be used for the armament of the Russian Army. The Hungarians are convinced of this, and therefore in Hungary the passive resistance of the Hungarians is present everywhere. They don't work. The Communists cannot do anything with the Hungarian peasants, because they are past masters of passive resistance. They don't work, they don't speak. And in the factories, the work has no meaning and therefore they don't work. The country is in such a terrible situation that even the Russians cannot get very much of value out of the country. The people are terribly poor, but they are enduring their suffering in the hope that they will be some time liberated.

MR. KERSTEN. If there are no further questions, thank you, Monsignor Varga, for your splendid statement here, looking forward to the ultimate freedom of your native land.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Thank you very much.

MR. MCTIGUE. General Stokes—

MR. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

GENERAL STOKES. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN H. STOKES, JR.

MR. MCTIGUE. Give your full name for the record, as well as your present command, please.

GENERAL STOKES. Maj. Gen. John H. Stokes, Jr., commanding general, Military District of Washington.

MR. MCTIGUE. You are a graduate of the Military Academy?

GENERAL STOKES. Yes, sir.

MR. MCTIGUE. And you have served in the Army since November 11, 1918?

GENERAL STOKES. That's correct, sir.

MR. MCTIGUE. Until the present time.

Since 1918 you have had a series of assignments and commands.

In 1943, you were chief of staff, Second Division in Europe: is that correct, General?

GENERAL STOKES. That's correct.

MR. MCTIGUE. In July 1945 you became chief of staff of the 15th Corps in the European Theater and in February 1946 you were named deputy American representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Later, in September 1947, you were appointed American attaché at Budapest, Hungary; is that correct?

General STOKES. That's correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, General Stokes has a statement that he would like to make.

Mr. KERSTEN. You may proceed, General. We are very happy to have you here this morning, General Stokes.

General STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, in giving testimony before the committee, I want to assure you that it is my desire to give the committee any information which I may have on the conditions which existed in Hungary during my tour of duty there.

Regarding my duty in Hungary, I was deputy commander of the American element of the Allied Control Commission of Hungary for a little more than a year, and was on duty as military attaché in that country for nearly 2 years. My entire tour of duty occurred between July 1946 and July 1949. My testimony, therefore, concerns events which occurred from 5 to 8 years ago. I still remember very vividly, however, the chain of events, the methods used by the Communists, and the conditions in Hungary during that period. I am, however, a little hazy on some of the details.

Inasmuch as some of the testimony which I shall give has been taken from classified documents which I submitted to the Department of the Army while in Hungary, I have prepared this memorandum which has been cleared by the Department of the Army. I would like to read it into the record and shall be very glad to answer any questions concerning the subject matter of this memorandum.

In the memorandum, I shall discuss briefly the technique used by the Communists in transforming western-oriented Hungary into a Communist police state. In order to show the conditions which existed in Hungary when I was there, I shall also discuss the abrogation of the four freedoms which were enunciated by President Roosevelt—freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom of speech, and freedom from fear. I believe that an explanation of the methods used to eliminate these four freedoms will establish very clearly the conditions under which the Hungarians lived in the years 1946 to 1949.

First, I shall say a word about the political methods used by the Soviets to subjugate the newly established Hungarian Republic. The technique employed in Hungary, I am sure, is well known to all of you. It was employed with equal success in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and the other satellite states in eastern and southeastern Europe. The technique is simple, requiring initially only a small toehold in government, the control of two ministries. Typically, the Communists demand, at first, only the Cabinet posts of Interior and Communications. With these two portfolios, they gain control of the police and propaganda outlets, the newspapers, and the radio. With this meager start, a militant Communist minority, with Russian Army support and by terroristic methods, gradually takes over complete control and establishes a police state in which the liberties of the majority are abrogated.

Hungary, when I arrived there in July 1946, was a free, western-oriented nation, 90 percent anti-Communist. Three years later, by the use of this technique, it was transformed into a Communist police state in which the Communist minority was all powerful and the majority was enslaved.

The events which brought on this condition are as follows:

In the winter of 1945, the Soviet Army moved into Hungary. With the Soviet Army came Mr. Rakosi, Mr. Gero, and a small army of Moscow-trained Hungarian Communists. Rakosi was trained in Moscow to become the head of the Hungarian Communists when the opportune moment arrived. Mr. Gero was also trained in Moscow and had served the Communist cause in Spain. Upon arrival in Hungary with Soviet Army backing, these two Moscow-Hungarians, along with their associates, immediately organized the Hungarian Communist Party, and in the first election, which was a free election, this party received 16 percent of the votes. With the backing of Marshal Voroshilov, the head of the Russian element of the Allied Control Commission, and with the backing of the Russian Army, they became part of the Cabinet of the first elected Government of the newly constituted Republic of Hungary. Rakosi was made Deputy Prime Minister in this Government and Gero was made the Minister of Communications. Along with these two posts, the Communists demanded and received the portfolio of Minister of Interior. Laszlo Rajk, an ardent Hungarian Communist, was given that post. This gave the Communists that small toehold in government which I have mentioned earlier and so, with Soviet Army backing and with control of the police and news media, the Communists went to work. Every terroristic means and fraudulent method was utilized by these men to forward the Communist cause and gain control of the Government. Politicians, churchmen, labor leaders, and publishers who opposed them were liquidated or driven from the country.

By the fall of 1947, the Communist Party had increased its percentage of voters, and was fast gaining control of the Government. In June 1948, the Communists forced the Social Democrat Party to hold with them, what they called, a union congress. At this congress, they forced a merger of the Communist Party and the Social Democrat Party, and formed from these two parties the Hungarian Workers Party. The Communists immediately eliminated all of the right-wing Social Democrats and forced the leftwing Social Democrats to sell out their party to the Communists. A coalition government was then established including all parties and by purges of the political parties of the coalition the Hungarian Workers Party became the strongest political party in Hungary.

The next move of the Hungarian Workers Party was to establish what was known as the Independent Peoples Front. In addition to the Hungarian Workers Party, the new front included all of the so-called opposition parties and all organizations of national scope, such as, the National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions, the National Association of Working Peasants and Farmhands, the Democratic Association of Hungarian Women, and so forth. All of the parties and organizations, in order to remain in existence, had to join the new front and submit to complete Communist domination.

It now needed only the carrying out of the program of this front to completely sovietize Hungary. There were five important Government operations to be concluded to obtain this objective. They were:

1. Establishment of a planned economy within the sphere of the U. S. S. R. and all its satellites.
2. Subjugation of the Catholic Church.

3. Nationalization of all phases of Hungarian economy.
4. The sovietizing of Hungarian agriculture.
5. Establishment of a well-equipped "democratic" army which was loyal to the Communist regime.

The new Hungarian Independent Peoples Front was established on March 15, 1949, and a so-called election was held on the 15th of May 1949. The result of this election, according to the Communists' claims, was an overwhelming majority of 95 percent of the votes for the new front. When I left Hungary in July 1949, all operations of the new front were well on the way to completion.

This, in brief, is the political history of Hungary from July 1946 to July 1949. Now, if you will permit me, I shall attempt to show how this political system abrogated the liberties of the Hungarian people. To do so I shall discuss the four freedoms—freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom of speech, and freedom from fear—and attempt to explain the method used by the Communists to deny these freedoms to the Hungarian people.

FREEDOM OF WORSHIP

First, I would like to discuss freedom of worship and point out how that freedom was taken from the Hungarian people by the Communist Government of Hungary.

When I was in Hungary, the Hungarian Communist would tell you that the Hungarian, under the Communist government, was permitted to worship in the church of his choice and that was true. Even the Kremlin did not dare to take that privilege from the God-fearing Hungarian people. The Communists had once attempted to stamp out religion in Russia and failed. Ten or fifteen years ago they admitted their failure and changed their policy toward the churches. What could not be eliminated had to be utilized for the good of the party. This was the policy used in Hungary. They did not, however, change their basic non-Christian beliefs. The only god in the U. S. S. R. is still head of the Communist Party.

The Communist policy toward the Christian religion in Hungary was to permit churches of all denominations to exist there, but under certain restrictive conditions. Under these conditions that spiritual force which the churches exert had to be put at the disposal of the Communist Party. The churches had to permit themselves to be regimented along the lines of a political party and had to become organs of Communist propaganda and indoctrination.

To bring about these conditions, the Communists established a procedure which was effective. Being realists, they knew that no organization or activity can exist without money. Therefore, the first step in the subjugation of the churches was to impoverish the churches and make them dependent upon the government for financial support. This was accomplished in Hungary by the confiscation of all church property except the churches themselves, and by arresting and imprisoning all wealthy church laymen who, in the last analysis, were the real financial support of the churches.

The next step in the process was to take over the church schools. All schools, therefore, including the church schools, were nationalized. The teachers employed by the churches were discharged, whether

they were laymen, priests, or nuns; and trusted Communist teachers, who would instill in the children the Communist ideology, were substituted for them. The old textbooks, used in the church schools, were destroyed and replaced by new Communist-approved texts.

With this accomplished, the next step was to purge those churchmen who would not conform. This was done in the usual police state manner. Those churchmen who would not capitulate were disposed of by false arrest on framed charges and convicted and imprisoned in Hungarian jails. Deposed churchmen were placed by men who were subservient to the Communist government.

By the fall of 1948, by this procedure, all churches in Hungary, except the Roman Catholic Church, had been forced to capitulate. The Catholic Church, however, under the strong spiritual leadership of Cardinal Mindszenty, refused to surrender and fought every Communist move to subjugate the church to the will of the Government. Cardinal Mindszenty continued to preach the will of God as he saw it, and his priests continued to read to their flocks his anti-Communist pastoral letters. Cardinal Mindszenty, therefore, had to be eliminated. This was particularly true since Hungary is 66 percent Catholic. The Communist Government itself offered him every inducement to leave the country, but he refused to desert his place of duty, although well aware of the ordeal he must face. He was arrested by Christmas of 1948, imprisoned, and, as they say in Hungary, "given the treatment" and then brought to trial before the Peoples Court. The treatment was successful, as always, and even this strong martyr-priest was forced to confess that he was guilty of crimes against the state—crimes he had never committed. He was broken mentally and physically, and is now serving a term of life imprisonment from which he will never return. The imprisonment of Mindszenty broke the last of the Catholic Church resistance, and all churches in Hungary became subservient to the Communist Government. From this time on, no criticism of governmental policy was voiced from the pulpits of the churches in Hungary.

This was the method used by the Communists in Hungary to abrogate that liberty which is so dear to the people of the free world—freedom of worship.

FREEDOM FROM WANT

The next freedom which I would like to discuss is freedom from want. It is hard to realize that in a country such as Hungary was before World War II, that want can exist. The rich farmlands of the Hungarian Danubian Basin provided large excesses of food products. Hungary was known as the "breadbasket of southeastern Europe." Its light industry was small but well organized and produced all the items needed for its population of 10 million. It had no heavy industry since the needed raw materials were not present in sufficient quantities, and because all items of heavy industry were readily available in neighboring Czechoslovakia and Germany. How then, you may ask, were the Hungarians reduced to a condition of want and destitution? The answer is, by the U. S. S. R. and the policies of the Hungarian Communist Party.

Long before the end of the war the Kremlin had decided the fate of Hungary. In their long-range plan, Hungary was to be a buffer

state and a Communist satellite and its economy and manpower were to be exploited to expand the Soviet war machine. The Russian Army, when it arrived in Hungary, gutted the country and shipped most of its industrial equipment and everything else of value to Russia. The Russian Army, also, aided and abetted the inflation of the Hungarian currency in order to bring on economic chaos which would set the stage for the rise of Communist political power and in order to ruin those wealthy Hungarians, who might resist.

As soon as political control of the country was established, a planned economy geared to the then current 5-year plan of Russia was announced for Hungary. A 3-year plan for Hungary was approved by the Kremlin and the Moscow Communists of Hungary attempted to implement it. The first objective was government control of labor. This was accomplished by the usual terroristic means. Labor leaders, who were antagonistic, were liquidated and a council of labor unions was established and made a part of the government. It had its representatives in Parliament, and its chief or his stooge was the Minister of Labor.

The next step in the plan was the control of all production and distribution. This was accomplished by the nationalization of business, large or small. When I left Hungary, any business that employed 10 persons had become a Government-owned enterprise. As a result of these two measures, the Government became the sole employer in Hungary, and the sole producer and distributor of goods and services. Wages for all Hungarian workers were fixed by the Government, and the price of every item, including food, was fixed by Government decree.

With absolute wage and price control, if you care nothing for the standard of living of the masses, it is a matter of simple mathematical calculation to make a planned economy succeed. If you are not making the required profit, you need only cut wages and raise the price of the item to get back into the black.

The U. S. S. R. required items of heavy industry for its war machine and so Hungary, in its first 3-year plan, established a heavy industry. The fact that the small amount of iron ore in the country was of a quality that we would not mine here in America, and the fact that Hungarian coal was of such high sulfur content that it could not be made into the coke needed in the manufacture of steel, made no difference. A heavy industry was necessary for Russian requirements and so it was established. The raw materials for the heavy industry had to be purchased in Western Europe and the plentiful food of Hungary had to be exported to pay for them. It was a matter of little concern to the Communist leaders of Hungary that the people were hungry.

The peasants in the country fared no better than their city brothers. The Communists, with the support of the Russian Army, in 1945 forced upon Hungary a land reform which divided the land into small uneconomical 5-acre farms which were given to thousands of peasants and city workers. These new landowners were very appreciative at first, but soon found that the 5-acre farm would not support a family, and that in order to live, they must join the Government-sponsored farm-cooperative and work their farm as a combined farm with those of their neighbors. The Hungarian peasant had become

a landowner, but he wasn't very happy about it. Under the new deal, the price of his crops was fixed by Government decree and he was required to surrender to the Government, at Government prices, part of his crop so that it could be exported.

The next step in the Communist farm program—and whether it has taken place by now I cannot say—is, of course, the combining of the cooperatives and the formation of the Soviet-type collective farms. Under this system the peasant loses the ownership of his land and becomes a farm laborer, working for the Government.

These Communist economic and agricultural policies are the reason for present-day Hungarian poverty, destitution, and want. When I left Hungary the Government, in order to meet the requirements of the Soviet Union, had fixed wages so low and prices so high that freedom from want had become a myth in once-prosperous Hungary.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Next I would like to say a few words about freedom of speech in Hungary. Freedom of speech is possibly the most obvious freedom in any democratic country. Under Communist rule, however, this freedom must be denied to all. In Hungary, the Communist program called for a concerted attack against freedom of speech and freedom of the press. As the Communists took over the Government, more and more controls were applied and step by step every Hungarian was muzzled. Through an extensive system of informants, which covered every activity in Hungary from the factory to the home, the average man was subject to arrest for any statement he might make, even though it occurred in a private conversation.

Freedom of the press is almost synonymous with freedom of speech, and, therefore, all anti-Communist newspapers and publications had to be eliminated. This was accomplished by the arrest of the editors and publishers on rigged charges, and the confiscation of their property on the grounds that the publisher was guilty of traitorous slander. Soon afterward, the newspaper would be suppressed, and, of course, in a short time reopened as a Communist organ.

Those newspapers and periodicals which attempted to remain neutral and could not be definitely called anti-Communist, were dealt with over the period of 3 years by more subtle means, including withholding of newsprint and Communist-inspired strikes. Eventually, all publications were brought into line and when I left Hungary, no newspaper was permitted to print anything except what was released to them by Government information agencies.

Radio, of course, was equally important to the Communists. Therefore, the Minister of Communications took over all radio stations as soon as the Communists came into power and a purge of the employees of these stations quickly resulted in a Communist-dominated radio.

In the early days in Hungary a few of the more courageous non-Communist representatives in Parliament, who believed in their parliamentary immunity and the right of free speech, attempted publicly to voice their disapproval of the Communist regime. These courageous representatives did not last long. By expressing their disapproval they committed political suicide and before long were either driven from the country or imprisoned.

By July 1 of 1949 no Hungarian in his right mind dared to express in public or in private an opinion on even the most inconsequential subject.

FREEDOM FROM FEAR

The fourth and last freedom, which I wish to discuss, is freedom from fear. I am sure that this committee, which has been investigating communism in the satellite states, knows that there is no such thing as freedom from fear in any Soviet police state. The very existence of such a state is dependent upon instilling in the minds of the people an overwhelming fear of Government.

The Hungarian has remained passive only because of fear; fear of what might happen to him today, tomorrow, next week or next month; fear for the fate of husband, wife, children, or parents; fear of starvation; fear of arrest; fear of imprisonment. Fear is everywhere in Hungary and no segment of Hungarian life has any feeling of security. Even the Communists themselves are afraid. A high party member never knows when someone superior to him might turn against him and denounce him as a traitor to the secret police and have him brought to trial on framed charges.

During my tour of duty I became acquainted with all of the ranking officers in the Hungarian Army. Each and every one of them lived in fear, and rightly so, for today all of the generals I knew have either been hanged or imprisoned. The same applies to the Cabinet members of the Hungarian Government who were in power during my tour. Most of them have been liquidated. Even that ardent Hungarian Communist, Laszlo Rajk, who established the dreaded secret police when the Communists first came to power, has been tried and executed as a traitor to his country. On the witness stand he admitted his guilt and asked to be hanged.

Every means is used by the Communist Government of Hungary to instill fear. The man on the street, the peasant in the country, both are made to realize that their very existence is dependent upon the good will of the Communists in power. The fear of losing this good will influences their every action. They are afraid that something they may say or do will displease the Communists and will result in the loss of their ration card and starvation for themselves and their families; or the loss of their labor-union card, without which they cannot get a job. Perhaps an indiscreet word or action may even bring the secret police to their door in the middle of the night and they will disappear, never to be heard of again.

A police state, in the last analysis, is a government by fear. It is a government by a ruthless militant minority, which, by terroristic methods, has seized control and is maintaining its position because the downtrodden masses are afraid to protest.

The Hungarian will never be free from fear as long as the present Communist government remains in power.

I have described the methods used by the Communists in Hungary to eliminate the four freedoms because I feel that it will give the committee a perfect case history of communism in action.

Are there any questions?

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bonin—

Mr. BONIN. General, I wish to compliment you on your splendid review of the takeover of Hungary by the Russian dictator. I am

somewhat concerned with your statement concerning the subjugation of Hungary and it appears to me to be a severe indictment against communism. Why were the English and American members of the Allied Control Commission, however, unable to do something about these activities, at that time?

General STOKES. I would like to explain to the committee that I was a colonel at the time I was a deputy commander in the Allied Control Commission. I did not establish policy and was not on that level of command. My job as the deputy commander was more that of a chief of staff to insure that the headquarters, which was quite large, was properly organized and run.

I did, however, attend most of the meetings of the Allied Control Commission. And, although that was some 8 years ago, I think I can explain to some extent the difficulties of the American and British element.

I think you gentlemen realize how powerful the chairman of a committee is.

Mr. DODD. Indeed we do.

General STOKES. The items on the agenda are submitted to the chairman, and the chairman brings them before the committee. The chairman of the Allied Control Committee was the Russian, Marshal Voroshilov, and later his deputy, General Sviridov. They were always the chairmen of the Committee. If the Hungarian Government desired anything put on the agenda of the Allied Control Commission, of course they submitted that item to the chairman.

Mr. McTIGUE. If I may interrupt, General, while you are on that point, wasn't the chairmanship, as far as the Allied Control Commission in Hungary is concerned, a peculiar arrangement which did not prevail in the other countries?

General STOKES. In Austria, I know for a fact that at the time I was in Hungary the Allied Control Commission of Austria had a rotating chairmanship. It rotated between the four countries that controlled Austria. In Hungary, however, it was a permanent chairmanship by the Soviet representative.

Mr. BONIN. Now, General, I would like to interrupt you right there to find out how did the Russian become the permanent chairman of the Allied Control Commission?

General STOKES. I have no knowledge in regard to that at all.

Mr. BONIN. Well, I must assume that there must have been some agreement, either in Moscow, Yalta, or some other place.

General STOKES. I would say so. However, I have no personal knowledge, or any reported knowledge, on how that situation happened.

Mr. BONIN. Would you mind continuing to tell why the Commission, as helpless as it was, could do nothing about this?

General STOKES. As I started to say, if the Hungarian Government submitted something, we would get a copy of it. However, it was submitted to the chairman, and the chairman might or might not put it on the agenda for the meeting that day. Usually—and I would say in most cases—where it did not please the Communist policy he would state that "We are very sorry, we are unable to discuss this matter today. We are waiting for further information," And, so, that item could be delayed, day by day by day by day.

Further, if we did get something on the agenda, and did discuss something which displeased General Sviridov, who, during my time there, was always present as the deputy of Marshal Voroshilov. When we pushed Sviridov into a corner he would say, "We must refer that to the chairman, Marshal Voroshilov, who is in Moscow," so we heard nothing further about it.

Have I answered your question?

Mr. BONIN. That is a fairly good answer. It is not right to the point. Nevertheless, that seemed to be a very convenient arrangement for the Russians in all their diplomatic talks. They have somebody conveniently back in Russia in order to delay, procrastinate, and consume time in order to further their own purpose. I noticed that in almost all the conferences that the free governments of the world have been having, sitting down with the Russians, that the plan and the tactics are almost identical with what happened with the Allied Commission in Hungary.

Now, I don't know whether you are in a position to comment on this question that was brought up before, but were your experiences in Hungary over the period of some 4 or 5 years——

General STOKES. Three years, sir.

Mr. BONIN. Three years.

Can you accept the statement of a bishop as published in the newspapers, in the press, and on television, that freedom of religion exists in Hungary today?

General STOKES. I do not believe him. I do not remember Janos Peter particularly, while I was in Hungary. However, I do know that by 1948, the Bench of Bishops of the Reformed Church had completely capitulated and those bishops who were unacceptable to the Communists, who would not capitulate, had been removed, and only those who would go along with the Communist doctrine were allowed to sit on the Bench of Bishops of the Reformed Church. That also went for the Calvinist Church, too. Therefore, I would say if he followed one of those bishops on the Bench of Bishops, one of those relieved, he was there only because he was willing to conform.

Now, the statement that Monsignor Varga made about the passport is a very pertinent statement. Nobody leaves Hungary—no one has a passport that he holds in his hand in Hungary—if everyone had a passport, many of them would get out very quickly. You must go to the Government and get your passport, and it is only given to the trusted Communists that they know will do their bit when they get out of the country and that they know will return. They are very particular about the persons to whom they give a passport because if they gave very many of them out, there wouldn't be very many people left in Hungary, under present conditions.

Mr. BONIN. Well, we have heard testimony that there are very, very few people who try to get behind the Iron Curtain from the free nations of the world, but every one of them would love to get out from behind it.

General STOKES. I am sure you are right, Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. General, I am rather impressed with this statement, here, because it corroborates a lot of testimony that we have had before, in reference to other nations that have been subjugated by communism.

We have an awful lot of Communist sympathizers in this Nation

right today, and I sincerely hope that the message that you convey to the people at the bottom of pages 11 and 12 of your statement can be instilled in the minds of the public, and perhaps their sympathies with communism would evaporate immediately.

Thank you very much.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Dodd—

Mr. DODD. I want to thank you, as well. You have made a fine statement.

I understand your testimony on the Commission. I had a similar experience with the Russians, myself, and I know exactly what you mean. A great many Americans have had to deal with the Russians in the way that you did and there wasn't much we could do but carry out policy made on a much higher level. I think that might help to clarify the situation for Congressman Bonin.

I think that is all I have.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Feighan—

Mr. FEIGHAN. General, it just appears to be that the existence of this military Allied Control Commission is an example of peaceful coexistence with the Kremlin.

General STOKES. You might call it so, sir.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Do you not believe that any peaceful coexistence could be attained only under similar circumstances—that is, the absolute control and domination by the Russian Kremlinites?

General STOKES. I agree with you entirely, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KERSTEN. General, you have given us a very clear-cut, forceful statement, here, from the valuable experience that you had during those 3 critical years and it will be very helpful to the committee.

I admire the plain, forceful way in which you have set it forth, taking the Four Freedoms and showing how the Communists extinguished each one.

There is just one point that I want to ask a question about.

You said that the officers—that is the non-American officers, there, Hungarian and otherwise, lived in fear, and fear of the Communists.

From your experience with the Communists and their methods of terror and control, would you not, as a soldier, feel that the average soldier with any humanity in him, officer or private, would give a great deal to get out and away from Communist control?

General STOKES. I am sure you are right, sir.

Mr. KERSTEN. And, that there is a possible great weakness of the whole Soviet structure, if the proper techniques were applied, to give the armed forces behind the Iron Curtain—say, take the Hungarian Army—some way of getting away from that inhuman Communist control—wouldn't you think that would be a potential which we ought to consider?

General STOKES. It would be a fine thing. I don't know how much you could do it, however.

Mr. KERSTEN. At any rate, the average soldier doesn't want to fight and die for this inhuman system of government.

General STOKES. No, sir. The soldier of Hungary is drafted, just as our boys are drafted, and he does what he is told. He does it with apathy. Now, this is just a personal opinion, but I don't think they would make good soldiers in time of war.

Mr. KERSTEN. Fighting in behalf of communism?

General STOKES. I know they would not want to fight against the West, because they are anti-Communist. However they are attempting and increasing probably through their control of the children, using the Hitler method, they are getting more recruits as these children grow up. Everything is done for the workers' children.

Mr. KERSTEN. I am awful glad you mentioned that, General, because Congressman Dodd, Congressman Bonin, and Congressman Feighan obtained a lot of information along that line of indoctrination of the children. Time is working for the Communists in this regard and this is something we in the West, we in America, have to consider as a very great possibility of danger for the future, when those children might have to face our children.

General STOKES. Then, they might be real Communists. Today, the people who were of age, or were even children able to understand when the Russian Army came in, those people would not fight for communism, I am sure.

Mr. McTIGUE. In order to clear the record, here, as far as the Allied Control Commission is concerned, what was the authority for the Allied Control Commission?

General STOKES. I have no idea of my own knowledge.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is an agreement between the Allies?

General STOKES. It was an Allied agreement, of course. And, whether it came in at Potsdam or whether it came in at Yalta, I have no knowledge.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was its objective?

General STOKES. Our job was to insure that the Hungarians carried out the provisions of the armistice. The Commission operated for some period of time. I don't know exactly but it was started in 1945, and it went out of existence when the peace treaty was signed in September 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. And, it was after that, that you assumed your duties as American military attaché in Budapest?

General STOKES. As soon as the Allied Control Commission folded up, and the peace treaty was signed, then I established the military attaché office in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who is the present Prime Minister of Hungary?

General STOKES. I don't know whether Rakosi—

Monsignor VARGA. Imre Nagy.

General STOKES. It doesn't make any difference who the Prime Minister is. Mr. Rakosi is, for all intents and purposes, the man who is running Hungary at the direction of the Kremlin.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you ever have any experiences with Rakosi?

General STOKES. I know Mr. Rakosi very well. Rakosi has quite a history which I am sure Monsignor Varga knows more about than I, but it seems that he was once arrested and convicted of being an accomplice in the murder of 27 persons. These were political murders, as I recall, and he was sentenced to a Hungarian jail for life imprisonment. He stayed in the Hungarian jail for possibly 10 or 12 years and along about the midthirties or the later thirties, I believe, he was exchanged to Russia for the Hungarian war flags which had been captured by Russia in 1848. He went to Moscow and remained in Moscow and was there trained to become the future head of the Hungarian Government. He is a very clever man, in my opinion and by

far the best man the Communists have in the satellites. He speaks fluently, 10 or 11 languages and he is a man who should not be underrated.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is this the man the Hungarians unaffectionately referred to as "potato head"?

General STOKES. He is called "potato head" because he has very little hair on his head and his head seems to wrinkle up like a potato.

Mr. BOXIN. The only resemblance to a potato is on the outside from what you tell us, if he speaks 11 languages.

General STOKES. He is a very brilliant man; there is no doubt about it. You must give your enemies the credit they deserve, or it may not be too good for you.

Mr. KERSTEN. You say he was convicted of these murders of 27 persons some years ago. Do you know whether it is understood that he was personally involved in those murders?

General STOKES. I know very little about it. That is the story I heard when I arrived in Hungary.

Mr. KERSTEN. There are so many examples of the Communist leaders having been personally involved in crimes such as murder and other crimes, in their early years. Criminal activity. Activities we in the West ordinarily call criminal activities.

General STOKES. I would say, whether it is true, or not, that he is capable of murder. He is a ruthless man, one of the most ruthless I have ever seen.

Mr. BOXIN. Mr. Chairman, he may have been a student of Mr. Vishinsky, the representative in the United Nations from Russia, because he too was charged as the greatest unpunished criminal in the world today, for his involvement in murder, so I assume he must have been a very good student of his.

Mr. McTIGUE. General, is there any such thing as free labor or free labor unions in Hungary?

General STOKES. The labor unions have a rather peculiar position in Hungary. In the New Front which they established, which I spoke of, the labor unions are represented in this national front and have their own representatives in Parliament. They are just the same as a political party. Now, they do not attempt, as our unions do, to assist their people—their leaders do not attempt to assist their people, because they can't. The government is the sole employer of labor and the government is tied to a planned economy which must succeed, regardless of the condition of the masses. Therefore, we have a situation where the labor union, a part of the government, is attempting to lower the conditions of the labor classes. They must, as members of the government, prevent any trend toward the raising of wages, because that would raise the price of the items which they are trying to sell in world competition and, therefore, that wouldn't be good for the planned economy. It is a rather unusual situation where you have the labor union, a part of the government, the employer of labor, and, therefore, fighting every trend which will increase the cost of items which they must export and sell in competition on the world market. It is a very peculiar thing. Their labor unions must support the government. Therefore, they must fight every trend toward higher wages for the laborer.

Did I make that clear?

Mr. KERSTEN. Are there any further questions?

Thank you, General Stokes. You have given us a fine statement here this morning and it will be very helpful to our purposes.

Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Bachkai—

Mr. KERSTEN. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BACHKAI. I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name for the record, Mr. Bachkai, please, and give your present capacity?

Mr. BACHKAI. My name is Bela Bachkai, national secretary of the American Hungarian Federation, Washington, D. C.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bachkai has a statement which he would like to make. May I suggest that he be permitted to proceed with his statement.

Mr. KERSTEN. Without objection, he may.

TESTIMONY OF BELA BACHKAI, SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN HUNGARIAN FEDERATION

Mr. BACHKAI. Mr. Chairman, some anthropologists claim that the Hungarians are a southern branch of the Baltic peoples. In that respect it is quite appropriate that the momentous evidence this committee has assembled during its exhaustive Baltic investigation be followed up by calling eyewitnesses from Hungary.

Having spent most of my life on this continent, I was spared the horrors of Europe during and after the Second World War. Consequently, my sole qualification for appearing here is as national secretary of the American Hungarian Federation, a representative organization founded and maintained by United States citizens. Allow me to convey to you the sincere appreciation of my organization and its membership, comprising large fraternal institutions, for having taken such an active interest in the tragic fate of our people who stayed behind and are carrying on as best they can under formerly unimaginable duress.

With your permission I would like to reflect on a few psychological factors which brought hundreds of thousands of my fellow countrymen to these distant shores, and made them from the lowliest lumberjack to physicist Edward Teller of H-bomb fame, happy and content. There must have been more reasons than the search for adventure that guided Hungarian missionaries to early California.

Colonel Michael Kovach, second in command of the Pulaski Legion, was the one who whipped Gen. George Washington's cavalry into a gallant fighting force. He is known to have come with the specific desire to lay down his life on the battlefield. It was the American air of human dignity and free enterprise that lured them across the high seas.

Preceding the well-known French author, Tocqueville, a traveler from Transylvania, Farkas Boloni, published his glowing impressions of the then fledgling United States. He was the first to point out that the American Bill of Rights appealed to him as the noblest historical document, reminding him of Rakoczi's manifesto, which in the year 1704 was posted on the church doors all over Europe.

By the time Louis Kossuth toured this great Nation which welcomed him as the outstanding foreign statesman of his era, the die was cast: America had become a majestic symbol in every Hungarian's heart. When Abraham Lincoln's genius saved the Union, there were 3,000 Hungarians among his soldiers. There is definitely no more magic word in the remotest Hungarian village than America.

I remember instances in my childhood, when people were voted into the legislature or other high offices because they had spent some time in the United States and their constituents hoped to gain by their experience.

The very fact that this august body of legislators is spending valuable time with an epidemic that has its epicenter on the opposite surface of the globe, verifies the prophecy of Louis Kossuth. Speaking at St. Louis, on March 15, 1852, he emphasized the life-and-death danger confronting the United States once the Russian bear had organized the Eurasian masses against Christian civilization as we know it. Today, when the Maginot lines of yesterday seem like matchboxes, when oceans have shrunk into mere lakes, Kossuth's warnings have an ominous ring of timeliness.

Though not a witness at this hearing in the proper sense of the word, there are two episodes in my life which have some bearing on whatever evidence will be presented by others. The first is that as a lad I lived through the Red terror of Bela Kuhn in 1919, and some of its brutalities I remember quite vividly. To mention but a single incident. A cousin of mine, Louis Horvath, a high-school boy, was strung up on the first tree because no other could be found in a hurry. The execution was carried out by the Roaming Court of Vengeance of Tibor Szamuely, the long-standing colleague of the present boss of Hungary, Matthew Rakosi. There were no court proceedings, of course. In a few months, over 500 Hungarians lost their lives in similar fashion, or even worse. Wholesale murder, as well as calculated torture, had become a political expediency.

Another incident has some relation to the findings of this very committee, although it happened over 40 years ago. You mentioned in your second interim report on Communist aggression, page 7:

The witnesses produced authenticated secret Red army maps, which were printed prior to the conclusion of the Mutual Assistance Treaty.

These maps showed that the Communists had already included Estonia as a new republic of the U. S. S. R.

I cannot produce a similar map relative to Hungary, for at the time I was expelled at the age of 14, despite President Wilson's 14 points, such evidence would have been confiscated by the allied States. But I can testify under oath that years before the outbreak of World War I, I saw maps printed in Moscow planted by foreign agents. These maps showed two-thirds of historic Hungary as a Russian colony. It seems the Kremlin's aims, as well as methods, have not changed much.

Isn't it a great pity that the warnings of 1919 were unheeded and the dangers inherent in infiltration and subversion are finally recognized only after the Eastern European countries, with a long record of heroic struggle against barbaric invaders, have been laid waste. The Iron Curtain instead of being on the Curzon-Carpathian line, where it always belonged, was finally brought to the doorstep of the Western World.

In thanking you for this opportunity, I wish to emphasize that the majority of American Hungarians, the laboring working class, to which I, too, have always belonged, have very definite views on this subject. I wish to go on record that I know of none of our people who are sympathetic to the present state of things in Hungary.

There is not a single Magyar-language newspaper printed in this country—and anywhere on this side of the Iron Curtain for that matter—that would uphold any of the tenets of torture that have been imposed on our poor friends and relatives in the old country. If I may remark, the sole paper which is outspokenly Communist, is no real journal for two reasons: It does not rely on subscribers, being merely a throwaway tract; furthermore, it is produced in the Soviet Russian print shop in New York. Therefore, it can be considered neither American nor Hungarian.

Through our familiarity with the sentiments of our friends and next of kin beyond the Iron Curtain, we are positive of two things—first that our ideals are identical with the American ideals; second, that the hour of liberation must eventually come. No people who have tasted freedom for any length of time can be kept in bondage forever, no matter how ruthless, systematic, and diabolical the tactics used.

On this day, the 916th anniversary of the passing away of Hungary's first constitutional ruler, I wish to express humble gratitude to this committee from my people who have found a haven in this blessed land. Miners, farmers, artisans, and professionals consider being Americans a miracle, especially since the Iron Curtain descended upon their unfortunate brethren.

The statue of George Washington erected in Budapest in 1906 by American Hungarians must stand as a beacon of hope and freedom today to the unhappy and enslaved people of Hungary.

I am confident that this investigation will give renewed courage to the oppressed nations behind the Iron Curtain and will have the wholehearted support of all people who work and strive for justice and liberation.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. I have no questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Dodd.

Mr. DODD. I have no questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I have no questions.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mr. Bachkai, we are grateful to you for making this fine statement here this morning. Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, we have one more witness, Mr. John Montgomery who was American Minister to Hungary for the period 1933-41. He is ill and was unable to be present. He requested of Chairman Bentley of the subcommittee that his statement be read into the record by Mrs. Peter Stephiach, who is here in the room and the chairman granted permission for that to be done.

If there is no objection here, I would like to call Mrs. Stephiach forward to read Minister Montgomery's statement.

Mr. KERSTEN. Without objection she may.

Mr. McTIGUE. I don't think, Mr. Chairman, she will have to be sworn in because the statement she is reading has been sworn to.

STATEMENT OF JOHN MONTGOMERY, FORMER AMERICAN MINISTER TO HUNGARY

Mr. KERSTEN. You are Mrs. Peter Stephiach.

Mrs. STEPHIACH. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. And you have with you the prepared, sworn statement of Mr. Montgomery; is that correct?

Mrs. STEPHIACH. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. You are prepared to present that to the committee?

Mrs. STEPHIACH. Yes.

Mr. KERSTEN. Proceed, Mrs. Stephiach, and read it for us.

STATEMENT OF JOHN MONTGOMERY AS READ BY MRS. PETER STEPHIACH

DEAR MR. KERSTEN: In the 8 years that I spent in Hungary as representative of our Government, I was always mystified as to why Hungary had such a bad press in the United States and was so misunderstood. I came to the conclusion that this was due to the fact that they knew and cared so little about propaganda, of which their neighbors were masters. I am, therefore, very happy that the facts about Hungary are to be brought in your inquiry. I think it is very important that the people of America know the truth.

The end of the First World War found Hungary greatly reduced in size by the loss of more than half its territory and surrounded by unfriendly neighbors. This created great economic difficulties and politically Hungary was alone without a friend. That during the years between the wars she made the advances she did, is a great tribute to the loyalty and tenacity of the Hungarian people. Hungary was a democracy and the Regent occupied about the same position as the Queen does in England. They had labor unions and their advance in industrial labor, considering their handicaps, was as great as ours and in a sense more secure. Their scientific achievements are well known and today many of our top atomic scientists are Hungarian.

They had complete freedom of religion. There was no state church. On the contrary, the state supported all the churches, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and so forth. Their music and operas ranked with that of any other country. There was no racial question. On the contrary, Hungary was a refuge for thousands of Jews during the time of their persecution by Hitler and other countries. More than 750,000 found refuge there. Hungary's sympathy for the Allies was so pronounced that during my stay there I wondered how they dared be so open about it.

When the war started, the Hungarian Government thought that as soon as the allied army came near they would surrender but as it progressed and there was no army to surrender to, they sent missions to Ankara and Rome to try to find some way out but without success. Finally, Admiral Horthy, on October 15, 1944, broadcast an armistice proclamation. This required great courage on the admiral's part, for Hungary was still regarded as part of Hitler's "inner fortress" and it precipitated Horthy's arrest and the taking over of the Government by the German troops. Then came the siege of Budapest and the Russian Army of liberation. Which turned out to be the reverse.

The members of the Swiss Legation reported to their Government on May 24, 1945, that "during the siege of Budapest and also during the following fateful weeks, Russian troops looted the city freely. They entered practically every habitation, the very poorest as well as the richest. They took away everything they wanted, especially food, clothing, and valuables. Looting was general and profound, but not always systematic. It happened, for instance, that a man was deprived of all his trousers, but his jackets were left to him. There was also small groups which specialized in hunting up valuables, using magnetic mine detectors in search of gold, silver, and other metals. Trained dogs were also used. Looting became more general after the Russians had gutted the city, for they did not object to proletarians, who previously had been looted by them, looting the city for themselves. Thus every apartment, shop, bank, and so forth, was looted several times. Furniture and larger objects of art, and so forth, that could not be taken away were frequently simply destroyed. In many cases after looting, the homes were also put on fire, causing a vast total loss.

"Rape is causing the greatest suffering to the Hungarian population. Violations are so general—from the age of 10 up to 70 years—that few women in Hungary escape this fate. Acts of incredible brutality have been registered. Many women prefer to commit suicide in order to escape monstrosities. Even now, when order is more or less reestablished, Russian soldiers will watch houses where women live and raid them at night, knocking down anybody who opposes them. The women generally are not killed, but kept for several hours, if not for days, before being liberated. Misery is increased by the sad fact that many of the Russian soldiers are ill and medicines in Hungary are completely missing. Cases have been reported where Russian women serving in the Red army or in the Russian police force have been guilty of rape. Men have been beaten up by such women for not having submitted themselves to their wishes.

"Only a few political executions are known to have taken place, including those of some extremist officers who have 'distinguished' themselves in the persecution of Jews. On the other hand, complete uncertainty prevails concerning the fate of very many people. The reason for this incertitude is that many persons escaped at the approach of the Russians. Hungarians were evacuated or deported in large numbers by the Germans; many were killed during the siege; and large numbers changed their addresses as their habitations were destroyed. All means for the search of such persons is lacking."

The report is too long to be quoted further but it is full of the incredible brutalities shown by the Russians at that time.

The Russians subsequently held a free election which, to their astonishment was won by the Smallholders Party, at that time anti-Communist, and the Communists secured only 16 percent of the vote. The election was held under conditions which seemed to make it impossible for the opposition to win. Members of our legation wrote me of the tremendous parades the Communists held while the opposition had none. They paraded for the Communists but they voted against them.

Hungary is now behind the Iron Curtain, as is well known, but it is not because of the will of the Hungarian people.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN FLOURNOY MONTGOMERY.

STATE OF VERMONT,

County of Bennington, ss:

At Manchester in said county the 17th day of August A. D. 1954, personally appeared before me the above-named John Flournoy Montgomery and acknowledged the foregoing statement to be his free act and deed.

Before me,

[SEAL]

MARGARET DOUGHERTY, *Notary Public*.

My commission expires February 10, 1955.

Mr. DODD. Is he a retired Foreign Service officer?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct. He was formerly American Minister to Hungary.

Mr. KERSTEN. Mrs. Stephiach, we wish that you would thank Mr. Montgomery for this statement, and we thank you, too, for coming here and reading it for us and presenting it for the record.

The hearings of this subcommittee are now adjourned until next Monday, August 23, at 10 a. m., Room 618, Federal Courthouse, Foley Square, New York City, N. Y. The hearings are now adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a. m., Monday, August 23, 1954.)

INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY

MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 1954

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUNGARY OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION,
New York, N. Y.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:20 a. m. in room 618 Federal Courthouse, Foley Square, New York, N. Y., Hon. A. M. Bentley, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Messrs. Bonin, Feighan.

Also present: James J. McTigue, chief counsel.

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

This is a continuation of the hearings of the Select Congressional Committee on Communist Aggression, Hungarian Subcommittee.

Will you call your first witness, Mr. McTigue.

Mr. McTIGUE. The first witness is Miss Ilona Massey.

Mr. BENTLEY. Miss Massey, will you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before the subcommittee, so help you God?

Miss MASSEY. I do, so help me God.

Mr. BENTLEY. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF ILONA MASSEY

Mr. McTIGUE. Miss Massey, you were born in Hungary; is that correct?

Miss MASSEY. Yes, Mr. McTigue. I was born in Hungary and came to this country at the very end of 1937, so actually I have been in America since 1938.

I came to America before the war, and as you probably all know, I never had any connections with politics and, believe me, I have absolutely no desire to be involved in any shape or form in politics.

I feel that we are the verge of something very, very important and rather frightful, judging from the consequences that have happened to my little country of Hungary, and I think it is everybody's duty to say as much about it from their own experience as they can, for maybe the world is not quite aware of what is going on.

Mr. McTIGUE. I wonder, Miss Massey, if I may interrupt for a moment. Would you be good enough to talk a little louder?

Miss MASSEY. Yes. I am sorry.

Only the people who have lived through it, you see—there is a saying among us Hungarians that our greatest allies are the people who live behind the Iron Curtain, the people who are subjected to communism.

I did not live through it. The only thing I can testify and say is what my mother told me when she came to America in 1947. My mother is a very simple little woman, but she has a rather keen mind and great understanding, due to the fact that she learned it through experience.

When Hungary was taken over my mother lived there, and she encountered all the things that have happened to Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. I wonder if before we get into that aspect, if you would be good enough to tell us something about your childhood and your early life in Hungary?

Miss MASSEY. Yes, Mr. McTigue, I will be very glad to do so.

I don't want to make it lengthy or boring, but my father was in the First World War, and when he returned from the First World War, he was a man shattered in health and everything else. He was a prisoner in Siberia for 3 years. Our family consisted of my father, my mother, my sister, who is 12 years older than I am, and myself.

As a result, when my father returned from the Siberian prison camp he wasn't in perfect health and my mother had to supply us with food and everything else, and we lived in extreme poverty—and when I say extreme poverty, I mean extreme poverty. I didn't know what meat was until I was the age of 7, and my recollections are that my stomach was constantly hungry, and my clothes were always shabby.

My father was a printer in a newspaper, and sometimes he held a job for a while, sometimes he didn't, due to his health. So my mother was our sole support.

I believe it was in 1919—I was in the first elementary class—when communism took over Hungary for a short period. I remember how much we children rejoiced, saying, "Well, now we can have everything. It doesn't belong to one person, it belongs to everybody. We share and share alike."

But strangely enough the hunger became even more apparent than ever before, because the country, Hungary, was completely poor, and in the elementary class which I attended one of our teachers said, "Which one of you children would like to go to Holland?" And the whole class put up their hands because we thought that anywhere but here would be better.

So we were taken to Holland, quite a large group of children. I think that was our salvation from starvation and illness. The Dutch people were extremely kind to us. I happened to go to a family called Yackabas. They were simple farming people, and I spent altogether 2 years there. It restored my health and for the first time I learned what meat is.

I suppose this doesn't mean much to anybody who has never experienced hunger, but to me it was a very big thing.

Therefore I could not understand, even then as a child, what glory or what possible interest can communism hold for the people.

Unfortunately, since I left Hungary—you see, first Hungary was occupied by Germany, and Germany's occupation was a terror to Hungary. I don't have to dwell on it because you know exactly what happened.

For instance, to give you an example, my sister had a boy during the German occupation. My sister's boy was 14, he was a rather sickly boy, but a brilliant-minded child, and he always wanted to be a doctor.

At the age of 14 he was yanked out of school by the Germans and made into a glider pilot, and he became a glider pilot at the age of 14.

So when Germany was out—came our great liberator, the Russians. The first thing, the boy was again in the Red army. So it is sort of a mockery, an irony of life, what your own personal feelings or what your own desires mean, absolutely nothing.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you made efforts from time to time to bring your sister's boy to this country?

Miss MASSEY. Oh, yes. That was my greatest desire, because I have a large family here, most of my aunts, uncles, cousins, and my sister and her husband, and my sister's son, but of course that is a dream that probably will remain a dream forever.

I tried, and in 1947 they let my mother out. You see my mother was about 64 or 65 years of age, so she was practically a physical wreck, and she wouldn't be any use to the party as far as labor is concerned.

Also I had to bribe all the authorities. It cost me about \$1,600 or \$1,800 to get her out, but I succeeded in getting her out.

I tried the same with my sister, my brother-in-law, and my nephew, but I did not succeed in that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Going back for a moment, you told us something about your early childhood, and your first exposure to communism during the period of 1919, and the Communist Bela Kun regime.

Miss MASSEY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thereafter, were you educated in Hungary?

Mr. MASSEY. Well, yes. It was a very strange—I don't know whether I should go into a personal thing.

Mr. McTIGUE. Briefly, because we would like to get this in chronological form.

Miss MASSEY. Briefly I had originally only four elementary classes, because I was a child with tremendous inhibitions. Everybody looked down upon me due to the fact that I was always hungry and always rather dirty and bedraggled looking.

So the principal of the school told my mother to "take this thing out of school, because if you even can make her a chambermaid, you are a very fortunate woman, because she has no brains."

Mr. McTIGUE. You were considered an ugly duckling?

Miss MASSEY. Definitely. So they took me out, and my mother says, "Well, my poor child, I won't let you be a chambermaid, but I shall make you a seamstress. That is a decent occupation." She put me into one of these dressmaking establishments. I worked from 7 in the morning until 7 at night, and after 7 I delivered clothes to the rich ladies and received tips. It was a good education. I faced the fact that I had to make something out of myself, or just be resigned to fate.

So as a result, I started my education, and in 1 year finished 2 classes and I think I have a normal, sort of average education. I studied different languages, I studied music. My big ambition was to become connected with the long-haired musicians, the classics, and I studied opera. I studied in Vienna, I studied in Budapest and I was a member of the Viennese State Opera House in 1937, under the direction of Felix Von Weingarten, who was a great conductor. I was at the opera house when I received the contract from MGM to come to Hollywood.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you first come to Hollywood?

Miss MASSEY. I came to Hollywood at the end of 1937, and I didn't come for a trial. I came because they were offering me a contract which, of course, is everybody's dream over in Europe. In Europe everybody dreams of coming to America.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, at the time that you came to Hollywood did your sister come with you?

Miss MASSEY. Yes, my sister came with me, although she had a young child which she left with her husband, my mother being the old-fashioned mother, she didn't want me to come all the way to this far-away country by myself, so my sister came with me as a guardian, but she went back because she had to return to her husband and her child.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that the sister that is back in Hungary now living under the Communists?

Miss MASSEY. Yes. As a matter of fact, I called up my mother last night and I asked for some information. My mother is out in California. I don't have much communication with my sister because I don't want to get her in any trouble, but my mother writes letters back and forth, and I have information that my sister is running a poor-house for the Government.

The boy, her son, who was in the Russian Army, because of ill health, is now out of the army, but he is still working for the Government in some shape or form.

As you probably know, most of the little people's belongings have been confiscated and I am in that category. Before I left Hungary whatever money I had I gave it to my mother and father to buy a small farm. After I came to America, all my savings I sent home to buy 1 more acre and 1 more acre. So, as a result, I don't know exactly the number of acres—I think it was either 26 or 32 acres—which over there means quite a bit of wealth, because on 26 or 32 acres, you can make a living, you can exist.

My dream was to supply my mother and father with security. Well, it has been taken away and there absolutely is nothing left of it. The only thing that is left is the dwelling that my sister and her husband occupies.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the time of your career in this country and during the period of the Communist occupation of Hungary, did you hear from your mother?

Miss MASSEY. Well, through the Red Cross—this was during the German and part of the Communist occupation—but my mother came in 1947 so she was here most of the time. But I did receive some communications through the Red Cross. It was quite a lengthy thing, because it took about 6 months to receive answers to your letters. But, of course, we send a great deal of packages over and that was, in a way, a communication also.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the period from 1945 right up to the present, as a matter of fact, you have been the recipient of a great many communications from Hungarians asking for different kinds of help; isn't that correct?

Miss MASSEY. Yes, definitely. Not only Hungarians, but people from practically all the satellite countries. Somehow, if your name is just a little bit known, they turn to you. It is rather difficult to refuse a mother who writes to you that "my only child of 14 is dying of tuber-

culosis, won't you please send me this great life-giving medicine called penicillin, or whatever it was." At that time it was rather expensive. It is hard to turn them down, whether you know them or not, whether they are relatives or not. It is just what you people do toward your human fellows.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you helped these people by sending drugs and other supplies, is it your thought that your help got through?

Miss MASSEY. Well, this is my thought. I have no proof of it, but I think some of it probably was lost or confiscated and some of it reached them. It is difficult to say because I know several instances where the people had to write that they have received certain things, which I have learned later that they did not receive, but as I say, I can't say that it is true for every incident.

Coming back to the Communist occupation, I come from very simple, humble, farming people. My father has 14 brothers, 2 sisters, one of them is sitting right there, my aunt. She became a city girl now. She has been with me for a long time—but all those little farmers, Hungary being an agricultural country, it is mostly made up of farmers and a small group of intellectuals.

Somehow a plot of land means more to them than anything else in this world, a plot of land that they can work and the freedom that they can have with that plot of land.

Now, the Communist regime took over and subdivided and gave them—let's say my Uncle John has 2 acres of ground—all of a sudden my Uncle John found himself with 5 acres of ground. So the first reaction was rather startling and a sort of happy one.

When Uncle John found out that for 5 acres of ground he has to work very hard all by himself, and he has less to eat and less to clothe himself with than when he had the 2 acres of ground—I think that that shows what they are trying to prove to the Hungarian people can never be proved, because first of all you have to eat and after that comes a lot of other things.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you received any recent appeals for help?

Miss MASSEY. Yes, yes. I received a letter 2 weeks ago from my ex-singing teacher, who lived in Budapest, Lajos Logassa, and he wrote me a long letter asking me for food. His wife is an invalid. He says that they have to go many times very hungry. So I sent them packages, but that is just like a drop in the bucket. What is a small package where you send a pound of coffee, or a box of sardines? How long does it last?

Mr. McTIGUE. In 1948 while you were in Hollywood, were you approached with a proposition to return to Communist Hungary?

Miss MASSEY. Oh, yes. I was living at that time in Hollywood, and a Hungarian actress was sent to Hollywood to ask me to come back and do a play, which was the life story of a great Hungarian actress who has been deceased 60 or 70 years, and I was to do the life story as a national play in Budapest, which, of course, I refused.

I asked the lady whether she would like to stay here. First, she tried to convince me that actually it is not as bad back in Hungary as I think it is. But I saw her 3 days in succession, and strangely enough on the very last day she admitted that she would love to stay but she can't because she has relatives back there. So she returned to Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. She was acting on behalf of the Communist government of Hungary, you are sure of that?

Miss MASSEY. Yes, I am quite sure.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us something about what your mother told you, either in letters or personally when she arrived in the United States in 1947, about the Communist occupation, how it affected her, her home, and the land which you had bought?

Miss MASSEY. Yes. She told me most in person. She didn't write me letters because the letters are censored.

When she arrived here she looked like a person who wouldn't last more than about 6 months, but I am happy to say that my mother has recovered and she is very happy living in California.

She described to me when the first troops marched in, the Russian troops. First of all, they had before that a short relief when the Germans marched out, but the relief was very, very short lived, because shortly after that the Russians marched in. She said that it was posted all over this little place called Nagykoros, which has about 35,000 inhabitants—it was posted all over the market square that everybody must leave their home and they must cross over the railroad tracks to the forest.

Of course, there was no explanation, so nobody knew where they were going or what they were going for.

My mother said she will never forget the picture of this long procession of carts, men, women, children, all piled up, with a chicken in their arms and a cow in the back of the cart, going across the tracks to the forest.

Nobody knew where they were going or why they were going. Of course, later they found out because the troops had to occupy the homes. They needed the dwellings for that. So they sent the people away.

Mother, having lost my father in 1943—and I suppose you get a certain apathy after a while—you know, you just don't care, especially at her age—so she said to herself, "What am I running for? Why should I go across the railroad tracks to the forest? I have nothing to lose."

So she stayed and when the Russians came in they asked her why she didn't leave? She said, "Well, you can kill me, you can do anything to me. I am not leaving. This is my home."

Strangely enough they didn't bother, but they stationed in the home a large group of Russian soldiers, men and women, because this home that she bought with the money that I sent, was a very old home with a lot of space in it. People were even stationed in her room.

She told me about one specific incident. It was a Russian flier by the name of Nicolai—the last name I don't know. Nicolai was a very, very brusque sort, a very definite person, but somehow friendship and affection developed between mother and Nicolai. It is the irony of life. He had to go off from there to sit in a bomber and bomb Budapest where my sister lived.

When Nicolai returned he was always sort of kind to mother. One day he had to leave. Nicolai confessed to mother, even though he was a Russian soldier, he didn't like to leave civilization. When I say "civilization," that is also an irony, because very few people have bathrooms like we have in America. Everything is a few hun-

dred years back. It is that primitive. But still to the Russian soldiers it was civilization.

Then my mother told me several incidents about my family. One of my cousins at that time was 14, and had a brother of 26 and an older brother of 32. When the Russians came they hid the girl of 14 in a haystack. It was in the middle of winter. They hid her in the haystack and in the dark of night her brother, the 26-year-old, sneaked out from the house to the haystack to give her food. But the Russian soldiers caught him. They clubbed him to death and afterward she was violated. As a result, she has a child by this Russian soldier whom she never saw again.

These are just incidents. I am sure I am not saying anything new. You have heard it before, it is just repetition.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was almost a common occurrence in Hungary; is that correct?

Miss MASSEY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. There has been a great deal of talk here recently, Miss Massey, with respect to freedom of religion in Hungary. I wonder if you have any comments that you would like to make in that respect?

Miss MASSEY. Yes; I have a comment. I was born a Protestant, and just now when we were outside, Dr. Fabian said, "We will have another hearing about the religious group." And he said, "Well, let's ask Ilona; she is Protestant."

I said to Dr. Fabian, "I am not a Protestant, I am not a Catholic, and I am not a Jew. I am not anything. I believe in human decency and that is my religion." I think the ailments of the world could be cured a great deal if we would judge people not by their color, not by their religion or race, but what they represent as human beings.

I have done a great deal of touring all over the United States of America, and I have played in nightclubs, I have given lectures on literature and music. It has nothing to do with politics. I had the pleasure of meeting a great many ladies, ladies from the societies, women's clubs. It seems to me that the women of America have tremendous strength because actually it is their children, their men who are going to suffer whatever the consequences are.

I think if the women of America could sort of group together and take a little more interest in what is going on in this world, I think we could achieve more than we are achieving now.

I recall the story when I was a little girl. I learned that there was an invasion in 1200 something—I don't remember the date—there was a town which was unconquerable. The only reason it was unconquerable was because a woman stood there on the battlements and defended it with her fellow sisters. So you know, being a woman, and since I hate violence, I hate fighting, I hate ugliness—when the time comes we all have to stand up next to our men and maybe a little more—maybe we have to be stronger than the men and we women can be very strong.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you ever have any occasion to help any ministers of the Gospel in Hungary?

Miss MASSEY. Oh, yes; the Hungarian Protestant Church in Nagykoros, and for years we sent packages to the church and also to the poorhouse which embraced all the faiths. All of a sudden, about a

year and a half ago, we stopped hearing from this minister and his whole family. Nobody knows what happened to them. We have a pretty good idea that they have been taken away.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you recently heard from your sister, have you received any kind of communications, photographs which would indicate here present conditions?

Miss MASSEY. Yes. I don't receive many letters from my sister. Once in a while I receive a postcard, once in a while I write a postcard, but in that we don't say very much because I feel that I don't want to jeopardize her. Of course she writes to mother and she does send photos to my mother. Very interesting to see the difference between the photos before the war and after the war.

Well, they are out in California, and if it is of any interest at all I will ask my mother to send these pictures, the family group as it was before and what it is now.

I will try to describe the last picture that I have seen. First of all, they are the most shabby dressed human beings I have ever seen. There is a tremendous, empty, hopeless stare in their faces. A photograph can tell an awful lot. There is absolutely despair that is the deepest and hopelessness that is the deepest. These photographs I should like to bring forth whenever you are interested. I shall write to my mother and I shall ask her to do that.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we request that Miss Massey do that, send us these photographs, on the basis that one picture is worth a million words, according to the old Chinese proverb. I think that would make an interesting part of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will appreciate receiving those photographs, Miss Massey.

Miss Massey. With pleasure I shall do that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your mother is in California at the present time?

Miss MASSEY. Yes, she is in Hollywood, and thank God, she is enjoying good health, between being happy here and the yearnings to see her daughter and the rest of the family, whom I don't think in the near future we will have a chance to see. We can only pray and hope that someday the little country which has been so much abused, has been spoiled by so many elements and so many people, because it is in the middle way. We can only hope that these simple, brave little people someday again can enjoy freedom and dignity.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you Miss Massey.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. Is your mother living with you in your home in California at the present time?

Miss MASSEY. I have a home in California, but I travel a great deal, so I have a chance to go out to California once, maybe twice a year. I was there last in February.

Mr. BONIN. In February?

Miss MASSEY. That is right. I plan to go back this fall sometime, if my schedule allows it.

Mr. BONIN. The House Un-American Activities Committee has established that there are many Communists and Communist sympathizers in Hollywood, and in your profession at the present time.

Miss MASSEY. Yes.

Mr. BONIN. How many of these so-called liberals do you think would like to go to a country and live under the Communist parties?

Miss MASSEY. I was just going to say these people are unfortunately misled. When you read a piece of Communist propaganda it is wonderful, it sounds almost like the Bible, share and share alike. Unfortunately, it has never been practiced, because they believe in extremes more than anybody else in the world. All those people who need to be cured, it would be very well to send them to have a taste of this medicine, what it means to live under the Communist regime.

Mr. BONIN. If they were given the offer, about how many do you think would be willing to go over and live under that regime?

Miss MASSEY. I personally think none. That is my opinion.

Mr. BONIN. The only other observation that I would like to make is the fact that they are either dupes or their mental thinking is completely distorted—

Miss MASSEY. Definitely.

Mr. BONIN. When they are willing to accept some of the things that on the surface appear to be good and completely ignore some of the testimony that committees of the United States Government have reliably established.

Miss MASSEY. Yes. Of course, we all know that there is no stronger and greater and more fantastic propaganda than the Russian Communists put out, the most fantastic network I have ever encountered.

You know—I didn't intend to mention it, but I shall mention it—it happened about 3 years ago. I was invited to different groups in New York, important groups, groups made up of very well-educated people. Not by saying outright, but during the conversation you felt how many of these people are poisoned completely through and through with the idealism of communism. It was fantastic.

I remember in one incident—this was a college professor—and I asked him why doesn't he take a trip and go back there, and he said, "Well, after all, we have our country, we have America, but I think we can make improvements in it."

It is partly stupidity, partly—I don't know what to call it—because when a college professor says a thing like that, you know—of course, everything needs improvement, but when they try to improve it with something which is such an utter and complete failure, and such a ridiculous thing as communism, then I don't understand it. I don't understand why is it that it took us this long to realize how much of that is going on.

Mr. BONIN. I have known some of these people that preach this Communist philosophy and personally I think they are all endowed with an inferiority complex and they feel that is one way of accomplishing a feeling of superiority if they were able to overthrow the Government under which they live.

Miss MASSEY. I think they have, if I say, no chance, because you see traveling through the country—again I have to come back to that—I speak to ladies, sometimes men, but mostly women of America—and I know, I sensed the feeling, what the feeling is. I don't think they have a chance. Sure, certain groups, they might, and it might even look dangerous, but basically never, they can never put a foothold in here, never.

Mr. BONIN. I feel as long as the United States Government has committees willing to continue to expose these people, why, their opportunity to overthrow this Government will never materialize.

Miss MASSEY. Very true.

Mr. BONIN. Thank you very much for your being here.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I merely wish to express my appreciation to Miss Massey for her very straightforward testimony and I have no further questions.

Miss MASSEY. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Miss Massey, I have 2 or 3 questions, if I may. You spoke of the necessity to bribe the Hungarian authorities to obtain a passport for your mother.

Miss MASSEY. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think you quoted an amount of something like \$1,600 to \$1,800.

Miss MASSEY. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. To whom did you have to send the money?

Miss MASSEY. I had to send it to my sister, at the Hungarian bank, and then she went to such and such a person at the government to get my mother the visa and they received a few hundred dollars this time. They said 6 months later. She did this trip over and over again, and every time she went she had to put down more and more money. This is how we obtained her visa and her passport.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was that person to whom she had to pay the money with the police?

Miss MASSEY. Of course; yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. They issued the passports?

Miss MASSEY. Yes, sure.

Mr. BENTLEY. They were just trying to get as much money as they could?

Miss MASSEY. Of course, just as much as they could.

Mr. BENTLEY. There was no reason why your mother should be denied a passport because she had nothing in her background—

Miss MASSEY. No reason, nobody in my family had anything in their background.

Mr. BENTLEY. They just thought it was an opportunity to get dollar currency?

Miss MASSEY. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. When the land was taken away, the land that you had bought for your mother, was that done before she left or afterward?

Miss MASSEY. Afterward. You see, my sister and her husband owned a barber shop and a beauty shop in Budapest, which was bombed out. My father passed away in 1943, and mother was left alone, when I decided that I would do everything to get mother out of the country. My sister and her husband and her son decided to go down to Nagykoros and run the farm because the shop had been bombed out.

It is a very cunning thing. They don't just take it away without some explanation. This is what happened. First they exchanged the land for some far less valuable land. The 26 or 32 acres which was bought with the money that I sent was rich, good soil. First they exchanged it for soil that was much inferior. Then later on they said, "You can't work this many acres, so we will take it away from you."

So they confiscated it under that pretense. Then the house, they took away because they said one family does not need two houses. So that was taken away.

Actually, it is in my name and I have never signed anything, so maybe one day I will be fortunate enough to get back that 26 or 32 acres.

Mr. BENTLEY. There was no compensation for anything that was taken?

Miss MASSEY. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you ever make a claim against the Hungarian Government for that property?

Miss MASSEY. Once I inquired about it and I think it is recorded in Washington that I have certain belongings in Hungary, but I never went any further because it looked like a hopeless case.

Mr. BENTLEY. I would like to ask you just one question about your background: You have spoken of a background of rather extreme poverty and even a certain amount of misery in your early days.

Miss MASSEY. Yes, yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. So often there are so many people that claim that conditions or backgrounds that bred those conditions lead to communism, drive people into the arms of the Communists. How do you think it was that this thing didn't happen in your case?

Miss MASSEY. It is very simple. As I said before, I was hungry all my life, but in 1919 when communism took a foothold and all of a sudden everybody was rejoicing and saying what is mine is yours, what is yours is mine, and so on, and there was a great deal of robbery, all the shops were robbed by everyone.

The only thing that I can recollect is a piece of bread which was made out of corn and it was filled with squash, but that was my steady diet during the Communist regime.

As a child I said to myself, "If this is what they have to offer, this is not for me." And believe me, I have known hunger, extreme hunger before, but that time was the worst because shortly after that we went to Holland to be saved, to save our lives. Otherwise, we would have all died of starvation.

Mr. BENTLEY. Just one more question: As one of the, shall we say, loveliest and certainly one of the most distinguished persons that Hungary has contributed to American culture——

Miss MASSEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. BENTLEY. Have your films been shown in Hungary since the war; do you know?

Miss MASSEY. Since the war I do not know, but I know that my very first picture was shown in Hungary and the rest of it, I really don't know. I think also the Life of Franz Schubert was shown in Hungary, but since the war I don't recollect.

Mr. BENTLEY. The chances are that your films would be banned in Hungary, along with a good many other American stories?

Miss MASSEY. I think so.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you very much, Miss Massey, for taking time out from your busy schedule to appear before us, and for making this very real contribution in explaining the situation from your own personal knowledge and background. We deeply appreciate your coming here.

Miss MASSEY. Thank you very much, Congressman Bentley, and gentlemen.

Mr. BENTLEY. Next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. The next witness is the Reverend Laszlo Vatai.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you swear to tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before this subcommittee?

Mr. VATAI. I swear.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your witness, Mr. Counsel.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VATAI. I should like to ask—I cannot speak English well; my English is poor—and if I give exact answers could I have an interpreter?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes, Professor Kovacs is here; he is an interpreter, and I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that he be sworn at this time.

Mr. BENTLEY. Professor Kovacs, will you swear to interpret faithfully everything that is said by the witness here?

Mr. ARPAD KOVACS. I do.

(Discussion off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF REV. LASZLO VATAI

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born in Hungary on July 18, 1914; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. And at the present time you are pastor of the Hungarian Reformed Church of Buffalo?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were educated at the Protestant Theological Seminary in Sarospatak?

Mr. VATAI. Sarospatak, in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you graduate from the seminary, Reverend?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; I graduated in 1936.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you continue your studies thereafter?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; I continued in Budapest and in Kolozsvár in Transylvania, and I got the doctor of philosophy degree.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you continue your studies after you acquired the doctor of philosophy degree?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir. I became a docent. Later I taught philosophy at the University of Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is, so we will understand each other, one degree higher than the doctor of philosophy degree; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, it is a special degree.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you completed your studies were you assigned to certain duties in the Hungarian Reformed Church?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were they?

Mr. VATAI. I was a minister at the University of Budapest. I was the chaplain of the students of Budapest University.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you also secretary of the Hungarian Reformed Student Confederation?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, I was, the so-called Soli Deo Gloria Protestant Hungarian Youth Federation.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was a very, very responsible position in the Hungarian Reformed Church; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. It was an important position; yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you hold these positions?

Mr. VATAI. From 1938 until 1946.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened in 1946?

Mr. KOVACS. He was sent on leave of absence.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were given a leave of absence from your duties?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; and I became a member of the Hungarian Parliament.

Mr. McTIGUE. What party were you a member of?

Mr. VATAI. The Smallholders' Party.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you serve in the Hungarian Parliament from 1946 until 1948?

Mr. VATAI. From November 1945 until 1947, when I became a prisoner.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was at the time of the Communist occupation of Hungary?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir, this time and after this time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time in January of 1947 when you were arrested by the Communists?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened after you were arrested?

Mr. VATAI. I spent 74 days in the infamous Andrassy Street prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that where Cardinal Mindszenty and others were imprisoned?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir. After that I was in a regular prison, in Marko Street.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were you charged with?

Mr. VATAI. The charge was a so-called conspiracy against the state, but this was not a conspiracy against the state. We worked against the Communists, but in a legal way, in the party.

Mr. McTIGUE. But the official charge against you was that you were a member of the so-called conspiracy of 1946; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, just prior to your arrest in January of 1947, did you have the occasion to visit President Tildy of Hungary?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, I visited him before I was arrested. Two days before, I had asked him to help me.

Mr. McTIGUE. You feared that your arrest was imminent; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. What is that?

Mr. McTIGUE. You went to see President Tildy because you were afraid you were going to be arrested any day?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir, and I asked him to help me.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you went to see Tildy and asked him for help, what did he say?

Mr. VATAI. He told me he would help. That was the meaning of it.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was President Tildy's secretary at that time?

Mr. VATAI. He had two personal secretaries, one a woman, and a man, Mr. Peter.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that the Bishop Peter who is now at Evanston, Ill., for the Council of World Churches?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, he is.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who recently said that there was no persecution of religion in Hungary; is that the same Peter?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. His full name, Reverend, is Janos Peter.

Mr. VATAI. Yes, Peter, yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were conferring with President Tildy, was there some sort of a demonstration going on, was there any kind of a gathering?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, a big crowd came to the house of President Tildy, to demonstrate against the so-called conspirators, against us.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did Tildy tell them?

Mr. VATAI. Tildy told them that they would defeat the so-called plot and they would be strong against it.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, after you left Tildy, and following your arrest by the Communists and your confinement in Andrassy Street prison, what did the Communists do to you? What happened to you, were you questioned?

Mr. VATAI. Yes. They asked many questions about the political circumstances and about the works of our youth organization in Hungary. They wanted to convert me to be a Communist, too.

I was obliged to read many Communist books in my cell and I was asked questions about these books as they wanted to convert me to be a Communist.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me go back for a moment, Reverend. When you were first arrested were you questioned constantly for a long period under glaring lights?

Mr. VATAI. Oh, yes. They questioned me once for 18 hours and a very strong reflector was put before my eyes about so far away [indicating].

Mr. McTIGUE. Thereafter during your confinement at Andrassy Street prison, were you continually interrogated?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; they asked many questions and they would repeat the same question 100 times, 200 times, and I was obliged to write the answer, and they would see whether there were differences between the texts or not. If I did not write in the same vein and in the same order of words, they said, "This is the conspiracy."

Can you understand?

Mr. McTIGUE. When you were describing the reflector, or the lights under which you were sitting during the time of your examination, you made a gesture which shows that the light was about a foot away from your face; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. I would like to have the record show that.

During the course of this various questioning, did the Communists tell you that as a matter of fact that they knew you weren't a part of the conspiracy, but that they had you there for certain other reasons?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir; they told me this in the Andrassy Street Prison, but not before the trial. Before the trial they said I was a conspirator.

Mr. McTIGUE. You mean at the trial?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, yes, but in the Andrassy Street Prison they said that this was not my fault. My fault was that I worked among the

Hungarian youth against the Communists, and I worked in their parliament also against communism.

Mr. McTIGUE. The reason that they were questioning you and were attempting to persuade you to their line of thinking was because of the very prominent position that you held among the youth, the Protestant youth of the country; isn't that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir. They thought that if I would change, if I would become a Communist, a part of the Hungarian youth would follow me. Therefore, they told me that if I would be converted I could be in a high position in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, purely as a matter of supposition at the moment, supposing you had permitted yourself to be converted, supposing you had gone along with the Communists, and did effective work for them later on among the Protestant youth of the country, don't you think that if you had done that and you were in Hungary right now that your rewards would have been great?

Mr. VATAI. I don't know, but I think so.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you feel that your elevation in the church would have probably taken place under the present Communist regime?

Mr. VATAI. I am not sure, but maybe. I think so.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, for how long a period of time were you confined in prison?

Mr. VATAI. For 8 months.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you required to read Communist literature and doctrine?

Mr. VATAI. During this time?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes.

Mr. VATAI. Yes; I read them.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the object of that?

Mr. VATAI. They wanted to convert me to become a Communist.

Mr. McTIGUE. Supposing you had said to them, "I am not going to read this Communist literature," what would have happened to you?

Mr. VATAI. It was not possible to refuse.

Mr. McTIGUE. Going back for a moment while you were teaching at the University of Budapest, you taught philosophy along an anti-Marxist line; is that right?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, of course.

Mr. McTIGUE. So you had, during the period of the Communist occupation, a reputation as an anti-Communist and an anti-Marxist; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, yes; this is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. You testified, I believe, that you were in prison for a period of 8 months.

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you finally brought to trial?

Mr. VATAI. At the end of the 18 months we had a trial.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it 8 or 18?

Mr. VATAI. Eight months. I am sorry.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were tried or charged at the trial with being a conspirator; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were found guilty, as usual?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. As is the usual case?

Mr. VATAI. Yes. I got 6½ months in prison. This was the sentence.

Mr. McTIGUE. After your sentence by the court, what happened to you?

Mr. KOVACS. His lawyer appealed the case.

Mr. VATAI. Yes; my lawyer appealed the case, and before the appeal was heard I escaped from Hungary; I became free.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you go?

Mr. VATAI. I went first to Austria; I was there nearly 3 months. From Austria we went, my wife and I, to Switzerland, and I lived for 2 years in Switzerland, in Geneva, where I was the pastor of the Hungarian Reformed Congregation in Geneva.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you came to the United States in 1950; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; in 1950, in June.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you are now pastor—

Mr. VATAI. I am the pastor of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Buffalo.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is there persecution of the Protestant religion in Hungary?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; the Communist Party and the Communist state persecutes the Hungarian Reformed Church the same as the other Christian churches in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did the persecution against the Protestant religion start?

Mr. VATAI. I think the first step was when they took away a big part of the Protestant press at first in 1945, later in 1946. Of course, there were many Hungarian Protestant newspapers and today there are only 2 newspapers, Protestant newspapers, 1 a weekly paper, and the other I don't know exactly, but it may be a monthly.

Mr. McTIGUE. So the first step was the suppression of the Protestant press?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a consequence of that suppression there are only two papers?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Or publications?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now there is one weekly publication; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir; this is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who is the editor of that; do you know?

Mr. VATAI. The editor, Alexander Fekete.

Mr. McTIGUE. How do you spell that?

Mr. VATAI. F-e-k-e-t-e.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you know anything about him?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; I met him personally in Budapest 2 or 3 times. I think he is a man of the Communist Party in the church.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the second step in the suppression or persecution of the Protestant religion in Hungary?

Mr. VATAI. They took away the Protestant schools. Of course, the Roman Catholic schools, too, in 1948. Then I was not in Hungary, at that time I lived in Switzerland. They were very important for the

state, the schools. The church educated the middle classes in the schools and the Protestant ministers, too.

Now at first the Communists permitted 4 Hungarian Protestant schools and the 4 theological seminaries. Later they broke this agreement and took away 3 schools, and now the Hungarian Reformed Church has only 1 school, a high school and a college together, and only 2 theological seminaries.

Mr. McTIGUE. So the second step in the persecution of the Protestant religion in Hungary was the gradual elimination of Protestant seminaries and schools?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, what was the third step?

Mr. VATAI. My opinion is that they replaced the leaders of the church, first the lay leaders of the church. Now the lay leaders of the church are Communist followers. The president of the Budapest Synod is Roland Kiss. He is a member of the Hungarian Government today. The president of the synod is Ferenc Erdei. He is a member of the Hungarian Government, too.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is he the president of the lay group?

Mr. VATAI. He is the president of the Debrecen Synod, another synod in the church.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is Debrecen the center of this synod?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; this is the greatest synod in the Hungarian Reformed Church.

Mr. McTIGUE. Isn't Bishop Peter, who is at present in Evanston, the bishop of Debrecen?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; he is the bishop of Debrecen.

For example, in the Hungarian Lutheran Church, the president of one synod, Darvas, is a member of the Communist government, too. Now, the Communists wanted to put their lay candidates in the church and from these positions they wanted to direct the life of the church. The Reformed Church did not want these men, and the church tried to resist against them. For example, in Budapest at first John Kardas was elected by the church as the president of the synod—

Mr. McTIGUE. Before you get into that, Reverend, if you will, please, was the third step in the elimination or the persecution of the Protestant religion the elimination or the reduction of the synods?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; they eliminated 1 synod and now the church has only 3. Before this time the church had four synods.

Mr. McTIGUE. Briefly, what is a synod?

Mr. VATAI. It is an area of the church. Of course, every synod has more little areas. Now the old areas in the synods were changed and they made new areas, and larger areas than before because this is an easier way to direct the church from a higher point. If there are fewer areas, as before—

Mr. McTIGUE. It is easier to keep control in that fashion?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, will you tell us briefly how, for example, a bishop is elected in the Hungarian Reformed Church, or how a high lay officer is elected. Is he, for example, appointed to office, is he elected to office? Briefly, how does he get the office?

Mr. VATAI. The so-called elderships—every congregation has an eldership—the so-called elderships elect their bishop or their lay presi-

dent of the synod, and a few minutes ago I told you that the church tried to resist against the Communist followers.

For example, in Budapest the elderships elected John Kardas. He is an old church man, a very good man, but this election was cancelled.

Mr. McTIGUE. This election was vitiated by the bishop, was set aside?

Mr. VATAI. Not only by the bishop, by the bishop and the higher church.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was Kardas?

Mr. VATAI. Kardas was an old churchman, he was a true Christian man, and the congregations wanted to elect him.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he a lawyer?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; he was a lawyer.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he the lawyer that defended you?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. So you knew him well?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; I knew him well.

Mr. McTIGUE. So John Kardas was elected as the lay leader?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, as the lay president of the Budapest Synod.

Mr. McTIGUE. And thereafter his election was set aside?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. By whom?

Mr. VATAI. By the highest council of the synod.

Mr. McTIGUE. Would it be by the bishop?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; the bishop is the president of this council.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was the bishop?

Mr. VATAI. Then in Budapest it was Bereczky.

Now, I should like to tell——

Mr. McTIGUE. Before we get away from that point, or were you going to speak further on that?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir. I should like to tell how the church tried to defend itself but it was not possible. This is the same way. The Hungarian people elected, for example, Monsignor Varga or Mr. Nagy, the leaders of the political life in Hungary, and they are now here in America, and Rakosi Imre Nagy, and other Communists are the political leaders today in Hungary.

This happened in the church, too. The congregations wanted to lead their own Christian lives, but this was not possible because the Communist pressure was so great they could not elect the leaders whom they wanted to elect.

Mr. McTIGUE. In other words, there were no free elections in the state or in the church?

Mr. VATAI. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. After Bishop Bereczky had set aside this selection of your well-known lawyer friend, John Kardas, who was then elected?

Mr. VATAI. Roland Kiss.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is he a Communist?

Mr. VATAI. He is a member of the Communist government, I think even today. A few years ago he was. I think he is a member of the Communist government.

Mr. McTIGUE. It would be reasonable, do you think then, to assume that the Communists are rigging the church elections as well as the state elections?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir; in the same way.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you happen to know whether the ministers of the Gospel in Hungary are permitted to deliver their sermons without censorship of any kind or without difficulty of any kind?

Mr. VATAI. In the Hungarian weekly Protestant paper I read that the minister must rehearse his sermon before Sunday with the so-called true man of the congregation, and only after that is he able to give his sermon on Sunday.

Mr. McTIGUE. By the true men of the congregation, who do you suppose are meant?

Mr. VATAI. I think in every congregation the Communists direct and control the life of the church.

Mr. McTIGUE. What you are saying is that in Hungary now, by their own admission, by the admission of their own publication, that sermons must be delivered in advance to the so-called true party followers before they can be delivered on Sundays before the congregation at large?

Mr. VATAI. I read this order in the newspaper, but I don't know how they carry it out; I don't know.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was in the Hungarian weekly?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Which is edited by the Communists who you described previously in your testimony; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. Reverend Vatai, in your honest judgment, do you feel that there is a religious persecution going on at the present time in Hungary?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; in the same way that I said, but I should like to say that the Hungarian Reformed people love their church and it is true that many more people are in the churches every Sunday than before.

Mr. BONIN. The reason I am interested in this particular phase of your testimony is that I read in this morning's newspaper a release from the United States Information Agency in Washington that the Communists have stepped up their demands to wipe out religion in the satellite countries. To me that is rather inconsistent with the statement of Bishop Peter in Chicago this past week that there are all forms of religious freedom in Hungary.

Personally I believe somebody must be lying, either the United States Information Agency or else Bishop Peter is lying.

Mr. VATAI. The Communists want to annihilate the churches. Now the churches' defense—it is possible to go to church and the people go to church today, too, but the Communists want to annihilate the churches, and they can do this step by step.

Mr. BONIN. I think perhaps we ought to check into this to find out the source of the United States Information Agency's information and if this is a misleading statement made by the United States Information Agency—and I have my doubts because we have heard too much testimony about religious persecutions in all the satellite countries and therefore it is a pattern by which they intend to liquidate the church and religious freedom—and I am of the opinion that

the good bishop out in Chicago did a little bit of lying, because he is subject to the control of the Communist Party, his passport was issued by the Communist Party in Hungary, he has got to return to Hungary and he probably has some relatives, and if he doesn't return to Hungary, the relatives will probably be persecuted in his place.

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONIN. Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps we ought to check the source of that United States Information Agency release this morning that the activities of the Communists have been increased to wipe out religious freedom in the satellite countries.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, the news release itself and any supporting evidence that the USIA may wish to give, can be inserted in the record at this point.

Mr. BONIN. That is correct. No further questions.

(The information referred to is to be inserted at this point.)

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Washington 25, D. C.

Advance Release: For Monday Morning Papers, August 23, 1954

Moscow is continuing—without letup—its relentless new propaganda drive to stamp out religion from one end of the Soviet Union to the other, the United States Information Agency said today.

The Information Agency's press service, in a wireless dispatch for use by its overseas posts, said that the Soviet regime is using every conceivable means to destroy religious faith and create, instead a "scientific, communistic approach" toward life.

The dispatch cited an August 18 statement of the Vatican as follows:

"A new antireligious campaign, the most intense and best organized since that of 1930, has begun in Russia. Booklets, leaflets, books, and continuous radio programs all show that the Soviet Government considers religion as a growing threat which must be fought by all possible means. * * * The old Marxist theory that religion is the opium of the people is now translated into other terms by the Communists. They consider religion as an emotional vice, of which the masses must be cured immediately."

The press service commentary reports that Communist writers are turning out stacks of antireligious pamphlets, the latest, *In Satan's Service*, pictures Vatican history as one of oppression. New atheistic books are filled with scorn against church marriages and Christian, Jewish, and Moslem rites. Soviet lecturers are using such topics as Marxism-Leninism on the Reactionary Substance of Religion, and *The Vatican in the Service of Warmongers*. Earlier this month, the Odessa radio commented, "In all, 3,490 lectures on scientific and antireligious themes were delivered for the workers of the oblast (region) in the first half of the year."

The Communist radio in Ashkhabad, capital of Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, has called for an unrelenting campaign against Islam and Muslim practices. In a broadcast titled "Islam and Its Reactionary Role," Islam was described as reactionary and the concoction of seventh century Arab feudalists. The broadcast went on to say, "The Communist Party has fought ruthlessly against religion with all the means at its disposal, and it is still doing so * * * our party is carrying on an uncompromising campaign against all forms of religious ideas * * * one of the most pernicious remnants of the past is religious service."

Schoolchildren in the U. S. S. R. are also a target in the Kremlin's antireligious drive. The Communist press is voicing strong criticism against the attendance of schoolchildren at church and is calling for Communist youth organizations to wage a struggle against "religious prejudices and superstitions," the press service dispatch reports.

Radio Moscow devoted a long review recently to a new book, *Religious Superstitions and Their Harmfulness*, which, among other things, complains about religious remnants, including church marriages and baptisms.

The Agency's press service observed that throughout the Soviet Union, Communist organs are echoing a July 24 editorial in Pravda which sounded the call for an intensified antireligious campaign.

Mr. VATAI. The Communists want to speed up the liquidation of the churches. That is true, of course, but they go step by step.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, at the present moment if they are increasing their tempo to wipe out religious freedom, they must feel that secure that they can take another step against it?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, they want to make a new step and they will always make a new step.

Mr. BONIN. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you, Reverend Vatai, for your very excellent testimony which is a real contribution.

I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Before I begin my questions, I have received a telegram from Congressman Dodd that he regrets his inability to be here today and he will be with us tomorrow.

Reverend Vatai, the members of the Hungarian delegation to the World Council of Churches Convention at Evanston this month are the following: Bishop Albert Bereczky, Bishop Veto, Bishop Laszlo Dezsery, Bishop Janos Peter, and one Dr. Papp. How many of these men are unknown to you personally.

Mr. VATAI. Only the Lutheran bishop. I do not remember his name.

Mr. BENTLEY. The two Lutheran bishops are Bishops Veto and Dezsery.

Mr. VATAI. I don't know Reverend Veto, but I know all the others.

Mr. BENTLEY. With regard to Bishop Bereczky, he was, I believe, nominated or appointed as the successor to Bishop Laszlo Ravasz; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is in your church?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you say that the nomination or the appointment of Bishop Bereczky was because Bishop Ravasz, his predecessor opposed an agreement between the Reformed Church and the Hungarian Government?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir. Bishop Ravasz tried to oppose the Communists.

Mr. BENTLEY. My question was, Did he oppose the agreement between the church and the Government, the state?

Mr. VATAI. Bishop Ravasz wanted an agreement, but not this agreement.

Mr. BENTLEY. Not the agreement that was reached?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. At a later point I will insert in the record the text of the agreement as reported by the Hungarian papers of that particular date, which I have in my possession.

That particular agreement, among other things, took all of the Reformed Church schools away from the church with the exception of a very few, as you have said.

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. And placed them under the complete control of the state?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And made all the teachers of those schools state employees?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. And provided that all textbooks used in the schools were to be printed by the state?

Mr. VATAI. In the church schools.

Mr. BENTLEY. In the denominational schools that formerly belonged to your church all of the text books were to be supplied by the state?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir; yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And the question of religious teaching in those schools was a matter to be entirely determined by the state, the matter of religious instruction?

Mr. KOVACS. The state left it to the individual churches whether they would submit to its control or not.

Mr. BENTLEY. That was not my question, Reverend. My question was with regard to the schools that belonged to the church and that were taken over by the state, what happened to the teaching of religion in those schools?

We will pass over the question for the time being. We have mentioned, however, other points in this particular agreement between the Reformed Church and the Hungarian Government and you have said that Bishop Ravasz was put out of the way, gotten rid of because he wouldn't agree to the terms of this agreement, and presumably then Bishop Bereczky was appointed his successor because he would go along with the Hungarian Government and sign this particular agreement; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. And that is the same Bishop Albert Bereczky who is head of the Hungarian delegation to the World Council of Churches at Evanston, Ill.; is that correct, sir?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. You have testified with respect to another member of this particular delegation, Bishop Janos Peter. Bishop Peter was formerly an employee in the household of ex-President Tildy of Hungary; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; he was.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know whether at that time or since he was considered an employee of the police?

Mr. VATAI. I don't know, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know any reason, Reverend, why when Bishop Peter was admitted to this country his visa, his permit, was strictly limited to go to Evanston and return, limited by the State Department, unlike the other members of the delegation?

Mr. VATAI. I don't know exactly, but I think—

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you please give me the benefit of your opinion?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; I heard the United States Government thought that he was or he is an informer of the Communist police.

Mr. BENTLEY. Of the Hungarian Communist police?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. It might be very possible that Bishop Janos Peter is a member of this delegation for the sole purpose of advising the Hungarian Communist police as to the activities of his colleagues; is that possible, Reverend?

Mr. VATAI. I don't know, but maybe this is possible.

Mr. BENTLEY. It is possible?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, but I don't know.

Mr. BENTLEY. With regard to the two Lutheran bishops who are members of the Hungarian delegation at Evanston, you do not know Bishop Veto?

Mr. VATAI. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. You know Bishop Dezsery?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you remember when Bishop Dezsery was made a bishop?

Mr. VATAI. In 1948 or 1949.

Mr. BENTLEY. That was about the time the Lutheran Church in Hungary also signed an agreement with the Hungarian Government pretty much along the same lines as the agreement between the Reformed Church and the Government; is that correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes. Of course, I was not in Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. But according to your understanding the Lutheran Church also signed an agreement with regard to the schools, etc., that we have been talking about.

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would it be very possible then that if Mr. Laszlo Dezsery was made a bishop at this time that he was brought in because he would participate in making such an agreement with the Government?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; I think so, but I was not in Hungary at that time. I don't know personally these things.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know if Bishop Dezsery was appointed as a successor to Bishop Ordass?

Mr. VATAI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And Bishop Ordass was imprisoned by the Hungarian Government; am I correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir; this is correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. Bishop Ordass was imprisoned by the Hungarian Government for resisting the agreement between the Lutheran Church and the Hungarian Government?

Mr. VATAI. This was the real reason.

Mr. BENTLEY. The charge was a currency violation.

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. But the real reason was because Bishop Ordass resisted putting the Lutheran Church under the thumb of the Hungarian Government?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. This Bishop Laszlo Dezsery who is now in Evanston was made a bishop to take the place of Ordass when he was imprisoned?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. In other words, we can more or less assume that the members of the Hungarian delegation at Evanston have been chosen for their position and their mission because of their willingness to collaborate with the Hungarian Government; am I correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes; it is possible.

MR. BENTLEY. I think it is more than possible, sir. I think we have brought out that they participated in the agreements between the Hungarian Government and the churches.

MR. VATAI. Yes; I assume.

MR. BENTLEY. As has already been pointed out, Bishop Janos Peter, a member of this delegation at Evanston, stated recently that the freedom of religion in Hungary is increasing all the time. Would you say from your own knowledge that he is telling the truth or is not telling the truth?

MR. VATAI. I told what I knew of the situation in Hungary and this is not the same.

MR. BENTLEY. In other words, your testimony directly contradicts that of Bishop Peter; would you admit that?

MR. VATAI. Yes, sir.

MR. BENTLEY. Thank you.

MR. VATAI. Can I tell—

MR. BENTLEY. You may contribute anything you wish.

MR. KOVACS. And he wishes me to translate.

MR. BENTLEY. Surely.

MR. KOVACS. In Hungary the Reformed Church is a national church. It has no international background. It has an autonomous organization in regard to electing a bishop or electing members of the synod or higher councils or presidents of these councils.

It is fighting communism singlehanded. The situation of the Roman Catholic Church is much easier because it has the support of Rome.

They put leading members of the church into high offices without consulting the church. Therefore, the church, the body of the church and most of its leadership are not identical. The church, the Protestant Church is now resisting Communists inside of the congregation. The proof of it is that the churches are full.

The Reformed Church is fighting communism. What Bishop Peter said is not the true situation of the church. The church never turned Communist and never supports the government, the Communist government.

It is impossible to describe the church according to Bishop Peter's statement. There is a parallel between the organization of the Roman Catholic Church insofar as there are so-called "peace priests" in the Roman Catholic Church.

MR. BENTLEY. Excuse me. We are going to have testimony later on the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, and I think, if you don't mind, Reverend, I will ask you to stick strictly to the Reformed Church, please.

MR. VATAI. May I add only this sentence—

MR. BENTLEY. All right.

MR. KOVACS. The representative of the so-called "peace priests" of the Catholic Church made a statement in Vienna recently, and the reverend wishes to establish a parallel between the statements of Bishop Peter and this Viennese statement, and he wishes to point out that just as this Viennese statement was not truthful, so the other statement is not truthful.

MR. BENTLEY. Have you completed your statement?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. I have one more question along that line. You said that the Reformed Church of Hungary had no international background and was fighting communism singlehanded; am I correct?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. But the Hungarian Reformed Church is a member of the World Council of Churches; is it not?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir; but this is not the same. This is not the same organization as, for example, the Roman Catholic Church.

Mr. BENTLEY. I understand, but it is a member of the World Council of Churches?

Mr. VATAI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you say in its efforts to fight communism your church has had any support from the World Council of Churches?

Mr. KOVACS. Only moral support. It cannot interfere with the internal organization.

Mr. VATAI. It is not possible.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am also intending to insert in the record certain material furnished me by Dr. Franklin Clark Fry, president of the Lutheran Church of America, with respect to actions previously taken by the World Council of Churches regarding communism, and that will be inserted subsequently, at this point? I also intend to insert at this point certain articles on the persecution of the Protestant religion in Hungary.

SECOND ASSEMBLY OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES—THE FIRST 6 YEARS, 1948-54—A REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND SECRETARIATS OF THE COUNCIL

Appendix A-1

STATEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, CHICHESTER, ENGLAND, JULY 1949

The central committee of the World Council of Churches, meeting at Chichester, is deeply disturbed by the increasing hindrances which many of its member churches encounter in giving their witness to Jesus Christ. Revolutionary movements are on foot and their end no man can foresee. The churches themselves must bear no small part of the blame for the resentments among the underprivileged masses of the world, since their own efforts to realize the brotherhood of man have been so weak. But justice in human society is not to be won by totalitarian methods. The totalitarian doctrine is a false doctrine. It teaches that in order to gain a social or political end everything is permitted. It maintains the complete self-sufficiency of man. It sets political power in the place of God. It denies the existence of absolute moral standards. It moulds the minds of the young in a pattern opposed to the message of the Gospel. It sanctions the use of all manner of means to overthrow all other views and ways of life.

We call statesmen and all men who in every nation seek social justice to consider this truth: a peaceful and stable order can only be built upon foundations of righteousness, of right relations between man and God and between man and man. Only the recognition that man has ends and loyalties beyond the state will ensure true justice to the human person. Religious freedom is the condition and guardian of all true freedom. We declare the duty and the right of the church to preach the word of God and to proclaim the will of God. We appeal to the churches to interpret and apply God's will to all realms of life. We warn the churches in all lands against the danger of being exploited for worldly ends. In the countries where the state is antagonistic to the Christian religion or indeed wherever full religious freedom is denied, we ask all Christians to remember

that the liberty which they receive from their Lord cannot be taken away by the violence or threat of any worldly power, or destroyed by suffering. Therefore, we urge the churches to bear clear corporate witness to the truth in Christ and their ministers to continue to preach the whole Gospel. We urge all Christians to stand firm in their faith, to uphold Christian principles in practical life and to secure Christian teaching for their children.

All who bear the Christian name must be true to the living God. God calls us all to pray earnestly for one another and to be faithful at all seasons in our personal witness. In loyalty to the word that sounded forth from Amsterdam we shall "stay together," in the certain knowledge that Jesus Christ is Lord. "Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ has made you free."

Appendix A-3

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, TORONTO, CANADA, JULY 1950

Whereas the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council have formally adopted a declaration on religious liberty wherein they set forth the conditions which are essential to the full exercise of religious freedom;

Whereas in many countries restrictions upon the exercise of religious freedom are variously imposed by totalitarian governments, by dominant religious majorities, or by religious groups seeking dominance;

Whereas the central committee of the World Council of Churches in July 1949 adopted a statement condemning restrictions upon religious freedom particularly in countries where the state is antagonistic to religion and its manifestations;

Whereas the attention of the central committee has now been called to serious infringements of religious freedom in certain countries in which the Roman Catholic faith is the dominant religion and in regions in which the Moslem faith is the dominant religion;

Whereas from countries where the Protestant or Orthodox churches are dominant, reports have been received concerning discrimination against religious minorities; and

Whereas even if religious liberty is safeguarded by constitutional processes, it may easily be neutralized by social and economic pressures.

The central committee of the World Council of Churches resolves:

(1) To declare its opposition to all practices by which governments, churches, or other agencies curb the exercise of religious freedom; to call upon the churches to disseminate information and to take individual and collective action for promoting in their own countries conditions under which religious freedom may be fully practiced; and further, to approve representation regarding infringements to governments or to the United Nations and to the religious authorities which have jurisdiction or influence in the countries concerned;

(2) To encourage the development of a comprehensive and coordinated program of action, national and international, and thereby to pursue affirmative, preventive, and remedial measures for promoting the observance of religious freedom for all men.

The central committee of the World Council of Churches also:

Emphasizes the vital importance of incorporating within national constitutions adequate guaranties of religious liberty;

Welcomes the recent enactment of such constitutional safeguards in various countries;

Urges all governments when drafting or amending constitutions or laws to secure for all people within their jurisdictions the fundamental right of religious freedom; and

When adequate standards have been enacted stresses the necessity of bringing local administration and practice into conformity with them.

Appendix A-5

STATEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE KOREAN SITUATION AND WORLD ORDER, TORONTO, CANADA, JULY 1950

The conflict in Korea reveals the precarious nature of peace and security in the world today. The World Council of Churches expresses its deep concern

and calls upon its members as a worldwide Christian fellowship to pray for Korea, where guilty and innocent suffer or perish together, and to bear witness to Christ as Lord of all life and as prince of peace.

An act of aggression has been committed. The United Nations Commission in Korea, the most objective witness available, asserts that "all evidence points to a calculated, coordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy" by the North Korean troops.

Armed attack as an instrument of national policy is wrong. We therefore commend the United Nations, an instrument of world order, for its prompt decision to meet this aggression and for authorizing a police measure which every member nation should support. At the same time, governments must press individually and through the United Nations for a just settlement by negotiation and conciliation.

The enforced division of a people in Korea or elsewhere is a bitter result of the divided world. It violates fundamental rights and increases the threat to peace. The United Nations has attempted to establish a free, united, and independent Korea within the community of nations. Every opportunity which may arise from the present tragic situation must be used to gain this end.

The Korean situation need not be the beginning of a general war. We must not regard worldwide conflict as inevitable. Any tendency to irresponsible fatalism should be resisted. We stand for a just peace under the rule of law and must seek peace by expanding justice and by attempting to reconcile contending world powers.

Postwar totalitarianism relies not only on military pressures but also upon a policy of exploiting the distress of the poor, the resentments of subject peoples, discriminations on grounds of race, religion, or national origin, the chaos of badly governed nations, and the general disunity between nations. The Korean attack may well be one of a possible series of thrusts at such weak points in world society. Since the world is still filled with these injustices and disorders, a mood of complacency is both wrong and politically dangerous. Overcoming these evils is therefore the most important means for rendering the world morally impregnable to totalitarian infiltration.

Such methods of modern warfare as the use of atomic and bacteriological weapons and obliteration bombing involve force and destruction of life on so terrible a scale as to imperil the very basis on which law and civilization can exist. It therefore is imperative that they should be banned by international agreement and we welcome every sincere proposal to this end. However, the Stockholm appeal, which demands the outlawing of atomic weapons only, without effective international inspection and control, both immediate and continuous, must be regarded as a strategy of propaganda rather than a genuine peace proposal. We must seek peace by cultivating mutual confidence and work for an increasing devotion to common moral principles.

We see the judgments and warnings of God in the things which are now being wrought. As Christians it must be our purpose to "redeem the time because the days are evil." Every temptation to ease and social indifference in so tragic an age, and every tendency toward hysteria amidst the perils about us, must be resisted. We must encourage each other to bear the burdens and face the tasks of our age in the faith of Him who abideth faithful, leaving what lies beyond our power to Him whose power ruleth and overruleth the actions and passions of men and nations.

The executive committee of the World Council, in August 1953, wrote the following minute in its records regarding the persecution of Czech Baptists.

"Dr. Payne voiced the concern of the world Baptist circles about the recent trial and sentencing of four Baptist pastors in Czechoslovakia. In the trials it had been claimed that the Baptist World Alliance had served as an agency of the United States State Department. The Baptist World Alliance had rejected such accusation. Certain attacks by the press had also linked the W. C. C. and other organizations with the United States State Department. The committee felt that some action was undoubtedly called for but felt that caution should be taken to ensure that the wisest policy was followed and after considerable discussion it was

"Agreed: that the chairman be authorized to send a letter of deep concern and inquiry to the Czech Foreign Ministry about the recent trial and sentencing of a number of Baptist pastors in Czechoslovakia."

COMMUNISTS CRUSH CHURCHES IN EASTERN EUROPE—R. H. MARKHAM, EDITOR
Pages 85-92

COMMUNISTS DEBASE THE PROTESTANTS

Hungarian Protestant Christians were subjected to the same persecution as Catholic Christians, but their leaders succumbed more readily. At the beginning, there has been a common Christian front of Catholics and Protestants. Cardinal Mindszenty, Laszlo Ravasz, principal Bishop in the Calvinist Church, and Lajos Ordass, principal Bishop in the Lutheran Church, worked together. Facing a common foe that was bent on destroying all the churches, the leaders made similar statements and took similar measures. For a time, Protestant leaders offered considerable resistance to Communist attacks.

Protestantism, consisting mainly of Lutheranism and Calvinism, has a long and glorious history in Hungary.

The Reformed Church, from the time of the Reformation, had cherished the ideal of complete ecclesiastical freedom. Its leaders had traditionally sought independence from state support and from state condogma and in practice the Reformed Church became largely dependent upon the state, which paid the salaries of teachers in the parochial schools and granted other official favors. Thus, the main practical struggle of the Reformed Church, in this field, was to seek as favorable a situation in relation to the state as the Catholic Church enjoyed.

However, some leaders of the Reformed Church considered that Protestants should struggle for far more than equal state favors and, from time to time, launched movements aiming at spiritual revival. They sought true religious freedom and more evangelical power rather than equality in state support. They stressed freedom from the state.

One such movement, which had started during the Second World War, came to be known as The Free Council of the Reformed Church. Inasmuch as it advocated changes or progress, and dared criticize the official church leadership, the Communists considered they might use it as a tool in their anti-Christian fight. Consequently, they tried to seduce some bolder members of the Free Council. They thought the free Calvinists might fall for the Communist slogan of "separation between church and state." But this attempt at splitting the Reformed clergy failed; in consequence the Communists directed their blasts against individual Protestant leaders hoping to seduce or terrorize them. And they partially succeeded.

The first notable victim of such pressure was Calvinist Bishop Ravasz. He didn't recant or change camps or consent to sing hallelujah to Stalin, but he did yield to Muscovite pressure and stepped aside, opening the way for an apostate successor.

Communist pressure on Bishop Ravasz was of several forms. They threatened to bring him to trial for his alleged past attitudes toward former regimes and former laws restricting Jewish rights. In addition, they threatened him with prison and told him his family would be deported, as later happened with the Bulgarian Protestant pastors. Up to that point the bishop resisted; so the Communists adopted a different sort of threat, and it worked. Rakosi, himself, told Ravasz that if he didn't withdraw from his church post, the salaries of all reformed teachers would be cut off, and the whole educational work of the church stopped. Bishop Ravasz had passed through many years of intense strain, and this prospect of his colleagues being plunged into penury because of him, and of religious institutions being closed on account of his personal stubbornness, overwhelmed him.

Two other factors also entered into the situation. One was the extreme weakness of the President of Hungary, Rev. Zoltan Tildy, a Calvinist leader, and the other was the influence of the distinguished Swiss Protestant theologian, Karl Barth. Barth often visited Hungary and at the moment when reformed resistance was at its height, he was understood insistently to urge the Hungarian reformed leaders to accept Communist demands. At a great historical turning point for Hungarian Protestantism and for Christianity in general, Karl Barth weakened the resistance of hard-pressed Hungarian pastors, according to these pastors.

After the veteran revered shepherd withdrew, an unworthy clergyman, Albert Bereczky, took his place. From that moment, the Reformed Church, as an official body, became a weapon which Communist atheists used against other Christian churches.

The Hungarian Lutherans did not yield so easily. Their leaders offered splendid resistance. They, more than the leaders of any other Protestant group behind the Iron Curtain, saved the honor of the Protestant church. As atheistic tempests from the Bolshevik steppes swept over Eastern Europe leaders of some Protestant groups bowed without glory or spiritual grandeur, eliminating themselves from the roll of high honor handed down from century to century, but the foremost Lutheran leaders in Hungary preferred prison and calumny to surrender.

The Communists subjected the chief Lutheran bishop, Lajos Ordass, and the moderator of the Lutheran church, layman Albert Radvanszky, to their customary threats, but without success. Finally, they arrested these two top Lutherans and charged them with black marketeering, a terrifying indictment for churchmen. But both men stood firm, accepted the shame attending such a charge, and went to prison. Protestants Ordass and Radvanszky are bright lights in the darkness of Eastern Europe.

With these heroic leaders securely in jail, the Communists succeeded in putting men who would serve their regime at the head of the Lutheran Church. Lutheran leadership is now a Communist instrument.

The Hungarian Unitarians submitted without a fight.

Hungarian Protestantism comprising more than a fourth of all Christians in the land was prostrate before foreign masters. When the Communists wished Protestant leaders to praise the Communist regime, some Protestant leaders did. When Communists wanted Protestant leaders to denounce the west, some Protestant leaders did. When Communist chiefs wanted Protestant Christians to berate Catholic Christians, some Protestant leaders did. Some of them called totalitarian despotism, freedom for the people; and enslaved schools, free education.

Fortunately, this did not appeal to the bulk of Protestant laymen, many of whom still honor Christ in their hearts and crowd into churches whose pastors have not lowered their heads to the Kremlin. Many Protestant pastors also have remained firm, attesting their loyalty by accepting imprisonment rather than make concessions to enemies of Christianity.

Hungarian Protestant lay Christians gave a notable example of resistance to Communist pressure when the presidency of the largest of Hungary's four Calvinist dioceses became vacant and a new president, a layman, had to be elected. The Communist Party, exercising state power, and the chief Calvinist Bishop, Albert Bereczky, who had become Rakosi's tool, made great efforts to force the Calvinist delegates to vote for a fellow traveler, Roland Kiss. Indeed, the Communist authorities and their tools refused to permit the presentation of any other candidate. Nevertheless, the delegates elected Janos Kardoss, a courageous anti-Communist lawyer, by a large margin.

This act enraged the Communists and they required to annul the election, after which a new election was held. Again, the people defying both the Communist Party and their own leaders, chose Kardoss. Then he was arrested and a Communist tool was made president.

One needs not add, that the Protestants won no permanent privileges by making concessions to atheistic totalitarianism. Their leaders brought no favors for Christ by serving the enemies of Christianity. The Protestants' press is stopped or enslaved, their schools are closed or rigidly supervised, their youth is snatched away; in front of their churches march line after line of coerced Communist workers, holding fists aloft and shouting "long live Stalin," who with Lenin, has called all religion evil.

The following quotations from recent numbers of Hungarian Communist papers show how Communists treat the churches in both thought and action.

The chief Communist daily, Szabad Nep, recently cited the Swiss Protestant Press Service as attributing the following sentiments to Lutheran Bishop Lajos Vetos, as taken from a speech made by him at a general meeting of his diocese:

"Only charity can guide the church when settling problems arising between church and state. The Hungarian Lutheran Church can thus act more easily toward the state of the People's Democracy, because the state, based on Marxism, guarantees the freedom of conscience and religion. The Lutheran Church has become the equal of the other churches for the first time in 400 years. The agreement concluded between state and church was achieved through charity. This agreement aims at the separation of state and church. The Lutheran Church receives aid amounting to 4 million forint from the state yearly, plus 750,000 forint for reconstruction."

Thus Hungarian and Swiss Protestants are quoted by Communists as praising the atheistic Communist dictatorship.

The same week Szabad Nep wrote:

"The Minister of Cults and Education notified the Roman Catholic, Calvinist, and Lutheran Churches, he had authorized religious textbooks for the general schools. The total number of authorized textbooks is 27." Atheist Communists decide how Christianity is to be taught.

Again from the same Communist paper:

"The presidency of the Calvinist Church notified the Calvinist communities that the Minister of Cults and Education convoked the representatives of the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches concerning the new textbook for religious instruction * * * The printing of the textbook will be completed in 4 to 6 weeks."

Another Communist-edited daily, Nepszava, wrote (October 8):

"We will not permit our children to be set against the People's Democracy under pretext of religious instruction, the worker-parents of Kispest say in answer to the mental terrorism of parish priest Solyom. The flats of the workers of Kispest were visited by nuns and old women for weeks. These forced printed forms into the hands of the parents requesting that their children receive religious education, and the nuns demanded that the parents deliver these forms at the school.

"Especially active was a teacher of religion, Sandor Solyom. The leaflets that were distributed in the vestry and in the church were the result of his intrigues.

"Freedom of religion, equal rights, freedom of conscience are notions unknown to the Rev. Sandor Solyom. He makes every effort to confuse the children. When the pioneers (Communist youth society) plan a trip, he orders the children to attend mass or organizes another trip. * * *

"Kispest is a town of industrial workers, that is why clerical reaction attacks there so desperately. But priestly intrigues are frustrated by the vigilance of the party and the labor class. Letters are received by numerous schools, in which the parents demand that the names of their children be canceled from the list of those who reported for religious instruction."

When clergymen urged parents to request that their children be given religious instruction in the state schools, and when clergymen asked children to go to church even though the Communists had arranged an excursion at the same hour, a Communist daily raged that religious freedom was being violated. Communists proceeded forthwith to intimidate workers into withdrawing requests for religious instruction.

Suppose an American pastor were accused of terrorism because he presumed to request children to attend Sunday school on a Sunday morning when the Government had arranged an atheistic parade.

RELIGION BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN—GEORGE N. SHUSTER

Pages 180-181

The first effect of the treaty on religious activities was the subjugation of the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches. Lutheran ranks had been seriously depleted by the expulsion of German ethnic groups. During the autumn of 1948 Bishop Lajos Ordass, undoubtedly the ablest and most courageous Lutheran leader, was brought to trial and sentenced to 2 years in prison. The Calvinists, on the other hand, were led intellectually by Dr. Albert Bereczky, who seemingly assented to every demand made by the state. Soon this Hungarian Protestant church heard Bishop Imre Ravecz say that "the most important and significant ordinances of the Hungarian form of society are in complete accord with Holy Writ." These developments were interpreted in some quarters as meaning that whereas the Protestant churches enjoyed complete freedom under Communist rule, the recalcitrant Catholic Church was having a difficult time because of the bigotry and lust for power which characterized its hierarchy.

As a matter of fact, the Calvinist Church in particular was feeling the knout, not merely in outward persecution but also in inner conflict. Prior to the signing of the treaty and the Communist seizure of the Government the dominant group in it was one who opposed the Nazis. These men, notably Bereczky, were persuaded that the traditional interdependence of church and state had been evil, and that only separation could advance the cause of the Gospel. The

coming of the Communists was interpreted as being in part a punishment visited upon the church for sin. Drastic reform was therefore needed, and above all missionary effort to bring the masses to a realization of the true meaning of Christian teaching. Yet at the same time the gifted and realistic Bishop Laszlo Ravasz pointed out firmly that freedom was possible to the church only if society recognized the value of freedom and insisted that religious education was a duty no parent could shirk if he hoped to remain a Christian. An ultimatum by the Government to the church, presented during the early months of 1948, resulted in the resignation of Bishop Ravecz as president of the general synod and as a member of the hierarchy. The synod protested against this high-handed action, but in the end Bereczky gained the position of greatest prominence in the church.

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Protestants also viewed the condemnation of the cardinal with profound alarm. Who was to carry on the struggle? Pastor Albert Bereczky, now well past 50, and ministered during most of his service in the church to a congregation of working people. He had made a conscientious study of the writings of Prof. Karl Barth, renowned Swiss theologian. This intellectual relationship gave rise to a strange and revealing episode.

During April of 1948, Barth accepted an invitation to come to Hungary. But to the astonishment in particular of his Swiss and American admirers, who respected him both for his vigorous reformulation of Protestant theology and for the manner in which he had exposed the errors of nazism, Barth continued to refrain from criticism of the principles on which the Communists based their bid for political power. It is difficult to do justice to his argument in a few words. Perhaps, however, it can without gross unfairness be interpreted as follows. Hitler, said Barth, was an incarnation of evil because he misled many, not the least among whom were those German churchmen who thought that the Nazi cause was noble and invigorating. Stalin, on the other hand, was the exponent of a view of life which every follower of Christ knows full well is contrary to the gospel. Accordingly (he went on) there is virtually no reason to suppose that Christians will be led into temptation by the Stalinist-Leninist doctrine. Indeed, it might rather be that they would be led astray by the materialistic West, notably the United States. Barth's conclusion therefore was that a Christian ought to refrain from committing himself to either side in the debate between East and West.

This teaching deeply shocked many persons on both fringes of the Iron Curtain. When Barth appeared in Hungary, his opinions were challenged by large numbers in the audiences which he addressed. More than once his reply to a query was difficult to fathom. For example, he professed to believe that a Christian faced with the problem of living in a state which did not respect the law should above all not lose his sense of humor. For, he said, while no government will prove to be worthy of Christ, it is unlikely also that any will be of the Devil. It seemed to him that evangelical protestantism was called upon to take up a position far more spiritual in character than that adopted by Roman Catholicism. For had not the Papacy succumbed to the anxiety which had become the existentialist quality of the West? The true follower of Christ can entertain no fear save that for the salvation of his soul.

It is against this background of Barthian theory that the collaborationism of Bereczky and his associates must be seen. From one point of view seems to be abject servility becomes in another perspective an abstruse, highly problematical, but possibly by no means dishonorably entertained desire to imitate St. Paul by accepting whatever government has been willed by heaven. At any rate the Bereczky group began by lauding the Russian peace offensive, but soon went so far toward complete acceptance of the Communist position that fellow churchmen entertained grave doubts as to his fitness for the important post of Bishop of Budapest. Nevertheless Barth, in a letter from Switzerland on May 23, 1948, contended that these doubts should be put aside because the church, fearing no one save the Lord, should not be afraid to accept a bishop a clergyman who was a favorite of the Government. He added: "It will be manifest in the fact that you rid yourselves of this minor anxiety that you have no anxiety whatsoever." But as time went on Barth must have begun to question whether Bereczky was not proving his own original assumption—namely, that every Christian will realize that Stalinism is incompatible with Christianity—to be false. At any rate, in a private letter to Bereczky dated September

16, 1951, he wrote: "It seems to me that you are on the way toward making your affirmation of communism a part of the Christian message." This would, of course, be the same error of which the German Christian movement had been guilty under Hitler.

At any rate, the Protestant churches in their turn were compelled to negotiate an agreement with the Government, accepting the whole of the Communist program dealing with finances, education, and appointment of clergymen and other church dignitaries. When Bishop Ravasz resigned in protest, the Calvinist Synod attempted to elect a worthy man to be his successor. The Government refused to endorse the choice, and finally succeeded in gaining acceptance for Pastor Roland Kiss, well known as friendly to the Communist position. Only a few indications of the extent to which infamy and outrage prevailed thereafter can be adduced here. The grossest kind of interference in the work of the pastorate was resorted to, so that in the end notorious and criminal Communists were installed in ecclesiastical offices, while worthy churchmen were dismissed, deported, and imprisoned. Only eight church schools survived the drive for the nationalization of education. Relief and welfare organizations were forbidden; and the press was reduced to impotence by censorship and suppression. Toward the close of 1951, two theological seminaries were closed. Even more dire, if that be possible, was the fate of the small Lutheran minority. Its leaders were hounded, ousted from office and imprisoned.

THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN HUNGARY

(By Alvin M. Bentley, Member of Congress)

During the 2 years (1947-49) which I spent in Hungary I witnessed the takeover by the Hungarian Communist government of the three leading Protestant faiths. Reformed (Calvinist), Lutheran, and Unitarian. The following memorandum tells in brief of my observations on this theme during this period.

The Hungarian Government early took advantage of the fact that there had been much war damage to church buildings and property and that the churches by themselves were unable financially to effect the needed repairs. In return for its assistance, the Hungarian Government demanded a "true democratic spirit" on the part of the churches.

The part played by the Unitarian Church may be disposed of quickly. After the departure of its leader, Bishop Szentivanyi, for the United States early in 1947, this church found itself too weak and small to resist the demands of the Government. The agreement which it signed on October 7, 1948, was similar in context to that signed by the Reformed Church leaders which will be discussed later.

Following the elections of August 1947 both the Reformed and Lutheran Churches addressed strong protests to Prime Minister Dinnyes against the widespread disfranchisement which had taken place among the church members, both religious and lay figures. The Lutheran Church even appealed to the Prime Minister to secure the four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter to all Hungarian citizens. These protests were never publicly acknowledged or answered by the Hungarian Government.

On October 1947 the Reformed Church also protested the new Government decree relating to censorship of the press, especially as it referred to religious publication and objected to nonchurch authorities censoring printed material designed for religious instruction. This protest also went unanswered. It was approximately at this time that the Hungarian Government began tentative negotiations for agreements with the Protestant Churches.

These discussions continued in secret throughout the winter of 1947-48 with leading figures of both Protestant churches considerably divided as to the proper attitude toward the Hungarian Government. Some persons spoke out for the freedom of the churches and rejected all charges of reactionary tendencies, others expressed a willingness to conform and cooperate with the so-called peoples democracy. It was at this time that Presbyterian delegates from the United States, including Dr. Vissert Hooft, visited in Budapest.

On March 20, 1948, the Lutheran Church issued a statement to the effect that "its religious tasks had not been hampered up to the present." It acknowledged that relations between the churches and the Government had become strained

and urgently demanded that negotiations be undertaken openly to achieve an agreement and peaceful cooperation. The Communist press generally applauded this statement while warning against the "disturbing elements in all churches who supported reaction rather than democracy." Opinions were general on both sides as to the necessity for reaching an agreement.

However, Lutheran Bishop Ordass laid down certain conditions which would have to be met before an agreement could be reached. These included, freedom of religion, freedom of worship, free religious education by the church, and a guaranty that the church would not be obstructed in carrying out social-welfare work. Bishop Ordass was sharply attacked for this statement by (curiously enough) the Socialist press for even daring to presume that the Hungarian Government did not safeguard freedom of the religious schools and freedom of worship.

It was at this time that two disturbing elements came to light: Resignations of leading church personnel were announced and other prominent churchmen began to indulge in self-criticism, especially with regard to the attitude of the churches in the past.

Negotiations between the Lutheran Church and the Hungarian Government commenced in April 1948. Talks also got underway with the Reformed Church. However, strong hints were given by the Government that Reformed Bishop Ravasz and Lutheran Bishop Kapi should first resign even though the reasons given were innocuous. Ravasz resigned on April 29 and a Socialist paper stated "the key position held by him can now be allotted to a man who is also a good democrat in conformity with the true spirit of the Reformed Church."

Communist leaders spoke with growing confidence of the nearness of a rapprochement between the churches and the Government. Meanwhile, on April 30, the Reformed Church issued a statement expressing its willingness to negotiate for an agreement and making known its approval of the Government's land reform and reconstruction program.

On May 8 the newly formed Hungarian Workers' Party (resulting from a merger of the Communists and Social Democrats) issued its draft program. This program included a demand that Government-printed textbooks must be used in all schools and that all denominational schools must be nationalized. It also demanded that the churches sever all connections with the former large landholders and also with the capitalist system "in order to cooperate peacefully with the state." Energetic measures were threatened against those elements of "reaction" who remained in the churches. By this time both Reformed Bishop Ravasz and Lutheran Bishop Kapi had been ousted from their positions.

On May 15 Gyula Ortulay, Hungarian Minister for Cults and Education, openly stated that the denominational schools were to be nationalized. He promised the maintenance of compulsory religious education and said that all teachers would be taken into Government employment. He demanded, however, that the churches take up an open stand "for the people's democracy." The negotiations between the Protestant churches and the Hungarian Government were now drawing to a close but Government spokesmen still protested against certain church negotiators, notably Albert Rodvonszky, of the Lutheran Church.

By June 1 negotiations had been concluded with the Reformed Church since Albert Bereczky had replaced Bishop Ravasz and evidently proved himself more amenable to Government demands. Another new figure, Under Secretary of Defense Roland Kiss, also emerged as a prominent lay leader of this church. Bereczky and Kiss were most active in concluding the negotiations between their church and the Government. The election of Bishop Bereczky, incidentally, was strongly supported by the famous theologian, Prof. Karl Barth, of Basle University in Switzerland.

Further "purges" in the Lutheran Church hierarchy took place in June but the chief obstacle to a conclusion of negotiations seemed to be Bishop Laszlo Ordass. Ordass himself became the subject of severe attacks by the Government press. The changes in the Lutheran leadership were commented on by one paper which said "such changes are needed in order to reach an agreement with the state. To date the same persons have directed the Lutheran Church who held these key positions during the Horthy era and fascism." Bishop Ordass himself was finally ousted on June 15, 2 days before Parliament passed legislation for the nationalization of schools. Five Reformed Church schools and four Lutheran schools in Budapest alone were then taken over by the Government.

Government attacks on the Lutheran leadership grew more and more bitter. Erno Mibalyfi said on August 29: "The leaders do not stand unreservedly for

democracy. The Government cannot tolerate any longer that such persons should be the leaders of the Lutheran Church. Mihalyfi then went on to describe in detail the 'Fascist and reactionary' backgrounds of several of these leaders and added bluntly: "All without exception must retire." He also attacked Bishop Ordass for "opposing the propagation of social justice." These attacks were echoed by a conference of so-called Lutheran Church leaders which demanded fundamental changes in the lay leadership of the church. The attacks, incidentally, were spearheaded by one Laszlo Dezseri.

On September 9 the Hungarian Economic Police announced the arrest of Bishop Ordass, Radvanszky, and Sandor Varga, former secretary general of the Lutheran Church, on charges of violating foreign-exchange regulations. Specifically they were charged with having embezzled currency collected abroad for the relief work of the Hungarian Lutheran Church. A protest against the arrest of Ordass from the Bishop of Cicester was strongly rebuffed by Prime Minister Dinnyes.

The trial of these church members commenced in September 28 and concluded on October 1. Bishop Ordass bravely pleaded not guilty and told the court: "In these 5 weeks I have often asked myself and my God whether I am guilty. I had time enough for meditation. And now standing here before my judges, I must say that I have never enjoyed such peace of mind as during these 5 weeks." The workers' court nevertheless sentenced him to 2 years imprisonment while Varga received a 3-year sentence. Both men were also heavily fined. Rodvanszky was not tried at this time since he "fell sick" while in prison and had to be removed to the hospital.

The Hungarian Government signed agreements with the Reformed and Unitarian Churches on October 7. These agreements pledged the Government to respect freedom of religion as well as certain enumerated church activities. Government subsidies to the churches would be continued on a progressively reduced basis. The churches accepted the nationalization of all denominational schools with a few exceptions and the transfer of all religious teachers into Government service. Meanwhile talks between the Government and the Lutheran Church continued, culminating on October 30. The purge was complete, Zoltan Thuroczy had replaced Kapi and Ivan Reok, a deputy of the Small Landholders' Party replaced Rodvanszky. As Mihalyfi exclaimed: "The reactionary leaders of the Lutheran Church have all quitted their posts." Men such as Lajos Veto and Dezseri were moving to the forefront of the church now. Incidentally it was on December 7, that the Hungarian Government concluded an agreement with the Jewish Community and the Lutheran Church followed suit a week later. Veto and Dezseri were both installed as bishops during the winter of 1948-49.

The takeover of the Protestant churches was complete. Bereczky and Janos Peter now became the new leaders of the Reformed Church while Dezseri and Veto were similarly elevated in the Lutheran Church. All these men, for example, followed the Government leadership in bitterly denouncing Cardinal Mindszenty during the time of his arrest, imprisonment and trial. All of them began to "represent" their church abroad in so-called peace conferences. All of them sang the praises of the achievements of the Hungarian Government which had found its true and faithful servants at last within the two great Protestant churches.

ALBERT BERECKZY

Elected a deputy of the Small Landholders' Party in the August 1947 elections. On May 25, 1948, stated "Hungarian Protestantism approves of the separation of church and state and we can only be glad if this separation will be carried into effect on the grounds of a mutual agreement."

On May 26, 1948, nominated as candidate for the position of Bishop Ravasz. Supported for this position by Prof. Karl Barth, of Basle University.

On July 11, 1948, declared that the agreement recently concluded between the synod of the Reformed Church and the Hungarian Government means the extension of the freedom of religion from the Protestant point of view.

On July 18 was elected as new Bishop of the Dombian Reformed Church district, succeeding Bishop Ravasz.

On August 6 appointed to represent Hungary at the Amsterdam Reformed Churches Synod.

On August 23 departed for Amsterdam to attend the World Council of Churches conference as official representative of all Hungarian Protestant churches. Installed as bishop on September 25.

On September 29 stated, "Our church accepts the new situation created by Hungarian democracy which progresses toward socialism."

On October 1 elected deputy president of the universal council of the Reformed Church.

On October 5 criticized what he termed political activities on the part of the Roman Catholic Church and Cardinal Mindszenty.

On October 8 signed the agreement between the Reformed Church and the Hungarian Government. He resigned as a Deputy in Parliament.

On November 2 again criticized Mindszenty.

On November 26 said, "We endeavor to establish a true peace with the Government of the young Hungarian democracy."

On January 3, 1949, expressed gratitude "that every possibility for preaching the gospel freely in Hungary has been given."

On March 23 signed a statement addressed to the London headquarters of the Evangelical World Association which denied that Christianity was endangered in Hungary.

On March 24 announced as delegate to Paris Peace Conference.

On April 10 publicly approved of Hungarian Government's 5-year plan.

On April 14 publicly approved of reforming of the constitution of the Reformed Church.

Departed for Paris Peace Conference on April 20.

On April 22, speaking at Paris, he sharply attacked Mindszenty and stated that the cardinal's attitude was contrary to the Scriptures.

He said further, "We must, therefore, stand up boldly for the truth of socialism * * *. Christianity has long enough been a companion of the capitalist system and of idolized traditions * * *. In contrast to the great enterprise of socialism, the protectors of the social order of old can only display a negative attitude, devoid of any programs."

LASZLO PAPP

Member of Hungarian delegation to World Council of Churches meeting at Amsterdam in August of 1948.

LASZLO DEZSERI

On September 8, 1948, stated that the domestic policy of the Evangelical Church was not based on democratic principles.

On October 25 bitterly attacked Mindszenty and stated "the Hungarian Republic is based on the historical traditions of this country. This form of the state is in conformity with the Protestant ideology and with the organization and humanitarian spirit of the Protestant Church."

On February 8 was installed as Lutheran bishop and said that the Hungarian people's democracy will come to an even deeper understanding with Christians of the Lutheran Church.

LAJOS VETO

A clergyman of Diosgyer, who had a parish of ironworkers. Nominated as a Lutheran bishop on November 13, 1948, in the Lisza district.

On December 14 he was elected as bishop.

On January 8, 1949, he was received in audience by the President of Hungary and expressed his loyalty to democracy.

On January 19, he signed a statement which said that "Our ministers are not restricted in carrying out the spiritual service according to the ideology of the church." He bitterly attacked Mindszenty.

On April 3 appointed as delegate to Paris Peace Conference.

On April 10 publicly approved of the 5-year plan.

On April 20 he left for Paris.

JANOS PETER

On April 21, 1949, was appointed a delegate to the Prague Peace Conference.

JULY 14, 1952.

The Protestant churches were forced to sign an agreement with the state in 1948, i. e., 2 years earlier than the Catholics. The reason for this was that the number of the Protestants in Hungary amounts to only one-quarter of the

total population and thus the regime expected smaller resistance. The Protestant churches were not supported by the West as the Catholic Church had been supported by the Vatican. In fact, they were decidedly encouraged by the West, e. g., by the well-known Swiss theologian Barth to come to an agreement with the state. Furthermore, their resistance was rendered all the more difficult by the fact that Communist propaganda demanded pro forma what the Protestants had long been clamoring for—to make the churches independent of the state. However, in spite of all the regime attained, its aim only by resorting to forceful means—arresting Bishop Ordass and other Lutheran Church dignitaries, forcing Calvinist Bishop Ravasz to resign and by directly interfering in the new church election.

Following the agreement the Protestant churches were able to function for about 3 years fairly, normally, and peacefully. Also the leading bishops had to laud the new order and participate in the peace movement and many crypto-Communists infiltrated the ranks of the lay leaders; the intermediary and lower clergy was able to function relatively undisturbed and religious life became intensified throughout the country.

This state of affairs lasted only until the Gleichschaltung of the Catholic Church was achieved. Following the Mindszenty and Groesz trials, the agreement between the Catholic Church and the state, the bishops' oath of allegiance, and the strengthening of the peace priest movement the proletarian dictatorship again has turned his attention of the Protestants.

Since the fall of 1951 many important events have taken place: Of the 4 Calvinist theological seminaries 2 have been closed down; the 1 at Pápa and the ancient seminary at Sarospatak at which instruction was carried on partly in English; transfer of ministers was rendered easier; significant personal changes were effected in the leadership of the Lutheran Church. On April 12, 1952, issue of the Calvinist weekly *Az Ut*, the chairman of the state office for church affairs demanded that the Protestants intensify the struggle for peace.

"The world is divided into two camps; there is no third camp. The person who wants to side with neither camp, automatically joins the camp of those who are preparing war. * * * We must take a firm stand against the so-called neutrality of certain parishes and ministers."

The above quotation is tantamount to an announcement of another forceful interference in church affairs. In the spring a drive was started to bring about personal changes among the ministers and elders of the Calvinist Church. The Calvinists constitute 21 percent of the total population of the country.

One of the most effective weapons was the reorganization of the Calvinist dioceses and church districts. In every district of which the boundaries were changed new elections are to be held. The new elections will take place under higher supervision on June 21, 1952. The Calvinist weekly, *Az Ut*, wrote:

"In the new church districts entirely new staffs must be elected and in several districts the reelection of certain officers has been ordered. * * * In the new districts the election of the new officers will be conducted by committees sent out by the dioceses."

The paper even gives the names of some persons who will be elected to important church offices.

The position of the Hungarian Protestant churches under complete Communist rule was best illustrated by Lutheran Bishop Veto at the synod meeting May 20, 1952:

"The question is: Do you want life or death? We have chosen life and not death. The life and not the death of our church.—*Az Ut*, June 7, 1952."

II

The March issue of *Társadalmi Szemle* (Social Review, Budapest) carried an article by secretary general of the Hungarian Communist Party, Mátyás Rákosi. The following quotation is very typical of the Communist attitude toward the churches:

"Under circumstances prevailing with us the struggle waged against reaction hiding behind the cloak of the churches constituted serious difficulties in winning over the peasant and petty bourgeois masses; in fact, in some instances, even in winning over the workmen. However, as our foothold among the rural population gradually strengthened, we were able to intensify our struggle against this obstacle. First of all, we broke up the unified Catholic and Protestant front of church reaction. By taking advantage of certain democratic possibili-

ties in the Calvinist and Lutheran churches, we were able to mobilize the parishioners who sympathized with us and at their request in 1948, in the spirit of mutual compliance and understanding, an agreement was reached which rendered possible the peaceful coexistence of the Peoples Democracy and these churches.

In spite of all, however, Rákosi and his regime have so far not succeeded in polarizing the churches or in inciting one against the other or in compelling them to serve Communist purposes. In fact, it seems that the stronger the pressure on the part of the regime, the stronger is the resistance of the priests and the parishioners. The repeated liquidation of the Protestant ministers and laymen proves that Rákosi was unable to realize the peaceful coexistence in 1948.

However the changes effected in the Lutheran Church were not restricted to the dismissal of certain church dignitaries. At the church service opening the synod in February 1952 Bishop Dezserly openly announced:

"Our church laws will be drawn up in a country building socialism. By passing these laws we prepare ourselves for the mode of life, for the new order of a people's regime which are represented by the Hungarian People's Republic"—*Az Ut*, February 10-16, 1952.

Simultaneously with the drive against the Lutheran Church, the Calvinists, too, have been forced to make new concessions. According to a resolution passed by the synod toward the end of 1951, ministers may be ordered to be transferred for reasons of public interest. In 1952 the pressure was intensified. The first sign was the resignation of bishop of the Cis-Tisza district, Andor Enyedy. Bishop of Debrecen, Janos Peter, in his talk the tasks of church administration announced that "in accordance with the people's democratic point of view" certain superior and intermediary church officials would be relieved from their posts.

"Those who are not able to watch with understanding the agreement between the people's democracy and the Hungarian Calvinist Church * * * are not fit to fill an administrative position in the Hungarian Calvinist Church."—*Reformatus Egyház*, February 1, 1952.

At the 3-day conference February 5 to 7 of the Cis-Danubian district the following announcements were made:

"The conference regards as urgent the reformation of the parish presbyteries in a manner that will enable the presbyters [church elders] in their private life as well as in their church activities to serve truly the resolution accepted in faith by our church" (the road recognized by our church).

What is meant by "resolution accepted in faith" was indicated by Bishop Bereczky:

"The only justifiable church activity is that which also serves peace and the developing Socialist society of our people."

III

AUGUST 20, 1952.

Despite church-state agreement to the contrary, the Hungarian Communist government succeeded in taking over all the schools of the Calvinist Church in the country leaving it with only one academy for the training of ministers. The Calvinist Church has voluntarily offered its schools to the state, says the July issue of the official organ *Az Ut*—the *Pass*. The move nullifies agreements made between the state and the Protestant Churches at the time of the Mindszenty trial. The agreements were signed in order to demonstrate the complete freedom the state offers those churches supporting it.

The salami tactics with which Rakosi boasted the other day again proved its effectiveness. With false promises the Red terrorists first separated the various Hungarian churches from each other then they turned to the Protestant Church. As a result the Calvinist Church has now voluntarily offered its schools to the state. The official organ of the Calvinist Church, *Az Ut*, writes the following:

"The board of directors of all Protestant schools have considered and discussed all theoretical and practical problems concerning the maintenance of the schools and arrived to the conclusion that the high school for boys at Pápa, its Budapest branch for boys and girls, the Protestant high school for boys at Sárospatak, the Protestant high school for girls at Debrecen should all be turned over to the Government of the Hungarian Republic, with the request that these schools be incorporated into the school system of the state. The dioceses of the various districts * * * as well as the advisory council of the Budapest diocese

unanimously approved the decision of the school directorates. The general council of the Protestant churches endorsed the decision stating that to assure the necessary training for our future ministers a high school for boys will be maintained at Debrecen.

Mr. BENTLEY. I believe that is all, Reverend. Then the committee will adjourn until 1:30 p. m. at this place. The committee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m. the subcommittee adjourned until 1:30 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

The first witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Belso.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Belso, you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Mr. BELSO. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your witness, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF JULIUS BELSO

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born in Hungary; is that correct, Mr. Belso?

Mr. BELSO. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. In what year?

Mr. BELSO. 1918.

Mr. McTIGUE. And where?

Mr. BELSO. In Keranta.

Mr. McTIGUE. I understand that you were a member of the Hungarian Parliament from 1945 to 1949; is that correct?

Mr. BELSO. That is correct; yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were also a small landowner and farmer in Hungary; is that correct?

Mr. BELSO. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where are you living now?

Mr. BELSO. I am living in New Britain, Conn. I am a gardener at the New Britain General Hospital.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us how and when the collectivization program started in Hungary?

Mr. BELSO. Yes, sir. My English is very bad and I would like very much if somebody could help me.

Mr. McTIGUE. You will proceed in English until you need the help of the interpreter?

Mr. BELSO. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Briefly tell us when the collectivization program started in Hungary.

Mr. BELSO. Yes, sir. In 1945 there was an agrarian reform in Hungary. I think 35 percent of the country's territory was under the land reform and 3,259,000 acres was given to the farmers, to the poor farmer workers, 42,000 landless people, each had 5 acres.

Mr. McTIGUE. Each was allowed 5 acres?

Mr. BELSO. Yes. Many had perhaps 7.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us, if you will, how this collectivization program could be enforced upon the people of Hungary who are so deeply attached to the soil. Is it enforceable?

Mr. BELSO. I must ask to use an interpreter. I think that is a very interesting question and I want you to understand me better.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed through your interpreter, Mr. Witness.

(This witness then testified through Mr. Arpad Kovacs, who had previously been sworn in as the interpreter.)

Mr. KOVACS. After the land reform of 1945, 42,000 families received land. Generally 1 family received 5.1 acres. The people who received land through the reform were usually farm hands before. During the land reform it was impossible to give them equipment and animals because these had been taken either by the Germans or by the Russians.

For this reason these people had to perform even the heaviest farm-work with their own hands. But just the same they were very happy that at last they had their own land and could work it themselves.

In spite of great initial difficulties they succeeded quite well from the outset. But in spite of all difficulties, the Communist Party tried to exploit the situation for purposes of propaganda. They were told by the party that if they banded together and would cultivate their lands in community, they would succeed much better.

The Communist Party also tried to get the credit for the land reform but this was not true because in the provisional government every party had had a land-reform program.

Mr. McTIGUE. You say that each individual was given 5 acres of land; is that correct?

Mr. BELSO. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could a man make a living on this land?

Mr. KOVACS. He could make a living only with great difficulty, and for this reason at least one member of each family worked as an industrial worker.

Mr. McTIGUE. How about the small farmers who did not join the collective movement?

Mr. KOVACS. Collectivization program began only in 1947. Up to this time the main purpose or the main method of the party was to lure the people in through propaganda and by misleading them.

After 1947, seeing that mere propaganda methods brought no results, they began to promise great benefits to those who would join the collectivization program.

Those who joined the Kolkhoz received seed, equipment, machinery, stock, favors, and loans, while those who refused to enter the Kolkhozes were forced to surrender large amounts of produce and pay much higher taxes.

There are some, and among them my own parents, who, although they had 18 acres of land, were unable to buy clothes for 5 years, because they maintained that the main thing was to have enough cash to pay the taxes with, and, therefore, they didn't buy clothes because the least arrears in taxes would bring about very heavy fines.

After all propaganda methods failed they proceeded to force the peasantry into the Kolkhozes by the most drastic methods, their flying committees going to the villages, consisting of party representatives, of judges who would bring to court those who were recalcitrant, and

then after long hearings and third-degree methods these people were told that unless they would voluntarily enter the Kolkhoz and sign accordingly they, or even their families, would be deported, eventually sent to Siberia.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to your holdings?

Mr. KOVACS. Of my family holding only the best part was incorporated in the Kolkhoz, which was replaced by land of much less value.

Mr. McTIGUE. What, in your opinion, briefly, has been the net result of this collectivization in Hungary?

Mr. KOVACS. According to my best opinion, the result of the collectivization was that agricultural yields have gone down considerably. Up to 51 percent of the population of Hungary works on the land, and, as a consequence of the general decline in yields, the Government was forced to import foodstuffs.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was this the first time that Hungary had had to import foodstuffs?

Mr. BELSO. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you remain in Hungary?

Mr. BELSO. 1949, March 29.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were able to escape?

Mr. BELSO. I escaped only with great difficulty. Although I enjoyed immunity as a member of Parliament, about 10 to 12 of the secret police followed me constantly.

On December 23, 1948, I was accompanying the mother of Cardinal Mindszenty to see her son, and this was my last meeting with the cardinal, who had been my professor in school. He took care of my expenses as a student, because I came from a poor family of peasants.

When I returned from this visit I found that about 10 to 12 secret policemen were following me. They did not arrest me yet, because I still enjoyed parliamentary immunity, and it was during the Christmas season, but on January 6, when I went back to Budapest to attend the opening of Parliament, 4 policemen joined me in the railway compartment, 2 on each side, and said that I shouldn't even try to escape or move.

From 7 to 9 I had to sit there, when I said I had to go to the washroom. I managed to open the window and jump out of the window of the express train. Peasants picked me up later, took me in, and called a doctor.

After that the police searched all over the district, while I, disguised as a priest, was wandering from one village to another.

Finally on January 7, 1949, I received advice that through Yugoslavia it was possible to reach the West, and I took this direction because there was a closed frontier on the western border of Hungary.

After 2 days of hiking, the Yugoslavia police picked me up close to the Yugoslavia-Austrian frontier. They took me back to the Yugoslavia-Hungarian border where they put me into a bunker. There I was in prison for 3 weeks. I was submitted to constant interrogation with third-degree methods, in consequence of which I lost some of my teeth.

The Yugoslavs kept asking me why I was an anti-Communist. They asserted that they were the real Communists.

On January 29, after 3 weeks of imprisonment, 2 Yugoslav policemen put me across the frontier to Hungary.

I was in hiding up to March 25, going from one friend to the other, until I succeeded in crossing the Austrian frontier on March 27, arriving in Graz.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you arrive in the United States, Mr. Belso?

Mr. BELSO. In 1952, the 11th of March.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you relatives still living in Hungary?

Mr. BELSO. Yes; my mother, who is 76 now, and 2 sisters and 1 brother.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. No further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I have no questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. I just want to ask 1 or 2 questions, Mr. Belso. You stated that one method of getting the new small landowners out of business was to require them to give large amounts of their produce to the Government. Am I correct?

Mr. BELSO. Yes; you are correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were they paid for the produce that they had to surrender?

Mr. KOVACS. Very little.

Mr. BENTLEY. Could you give one example, let's say, of how much produce a man would have to surrender from so many acres of land to the Government?

Mr. KOVACS. I am able to give a concrete example only by referring to the letter of my mother who wrote to me that out of 18 acres she had to surrender more than she could produce and the rest she had to purchase at a much higher price on the black market.

Mr. BENTLEY. That was one of the methods which the Communist government used to force the small landowners in Hungary out of their private holdings of land into these collective farms?

Mr. BELSO. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know, or have you heard in recent times, whether the Communists have successfully collectivized most of the Hungarian peasants, or is there still a great deal of resistance to it?

Mr. KOVACS. They did not succeed.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Hungarian peasants proved too stubborn?

Mr. BELSO. Very hard.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Mr. BELSO. I thank you, too.

Mr. BENTLEY. You are excused.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. BENTLEY. Call your next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. The next witness is Monsignor Varga.

Mr. BENTLEY. Monsignor, will you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Monsignor VARGA. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your witness, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF MONSIGNOR VARGA—Resumed

Mr. McTIGUE. Monsignor, you testified in Washington before this subcommittee on August 20; is that correct?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was last Friday. At that time you gave the committee a statement in which you traced the history of the takeover and the occupation of Hungary by the Communists?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. At that time you answered some questions concerning your own personal activity at the time of the Communist takeover; is that correct?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You are now resuming your testimony here, and the testimony that you will give from here on in will be related to your personal experiences while in Hungary as the leader of the Parliament and as the outstanding figure in the Hungarian Government at that time?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, Monsignor, can you tell us how you became the central figure in anticommunistic resistance?

Monsignor VARGA. I dedicated my whole life to the fight against communism. My father is a farmer, and during the first Communist regime in 1919 I experienced personally, as a young man, how the Communists oppressed, tortured the backbone of the nation, the peasantry of Hungary. I saw the best peasants hanged, the best people in the neighboring village of Csorna.

When I became a priest I sought to strengthen the peasantry of the country because I believed that only a strong peasantry can resist communism.

During the war when the Nazis occupied Hungary I was a member of Parliament; I became a member of the Parliament as a member of the Smallholders' Party. This party was a democratic party and fought especially for land reform and especially for better democracy in Hungary.

During the war I had personal connection with the Polish underground and through them I knew that the Communist danger against Hungary was greater than it ever was. With my friends, the leaders of the Smallholders' Party, especially Ferenc Nagy, we organized the peasantry of the country and tried to cooperate with everybody.

I tried to strengthen and I tried to gather together all the real strength of the country through religious cooperation. I was a very good friend of the Protestant bishops and the Lutheran bishops, and I proved to the other party, the Jews, that the most important time or age of our country would come. We cooperated and we saw very well the future of our fight, and on this basis we organized the country against communism.

And with perfect cooperation of all religions—the Protestants, Catholics, Jews, city people and the village people, peasants and workers—we won the election after the war, and the Communists got just 17 percent.

Hungary was occupied in this time by a big Russian army. In spite of this we got a very good percentage, and the Communists got just 17 percent.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your first impression of the Soviets, Monsignor?

Monsignor VARGA. When the Communists occupied Budapest, when the Russian Army occupied Budapest, I had cooperated with the Polish underground, and my friend, the minister of the Polish Government in London had been imprisoned. The Germans found our box in the bank and the Russians found again this box where all of our secrets were.

The Russians got the secrets of the Polish underground and they saw that I was the liaison between Warsaw and London, and I was imprisoned immediately. The Russians occupied Budapest, I think on January 16, and they imprisoned me, after some days of looking for me everywhere. I was imprisoned in a military prison. I was tried by the NKVD, by an NKVD judge, and it is a miracle that I escaped. How did I escape? A Hungarian Communist was interested in me. He was shot. He saved my life with his own life.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your sentence?

Monsignor VARGA. The single judge, the Mongolian major, condemned me to death because I had helped the Polish underground and cooperated with the underground.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were awaiting execution at the time of your escape?

Monsignor VARGA. I don't understand.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you awaiting execution at the time you escaped?

Monsignor VARGA. When I escaped, I knew that Bela Kovacs, my best friend—

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me go back a moment, Monsignor. You said that you were sentenced to death?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were awaiting execution?

Monsignor VARGA. I was awaiting execution, and this man—it is a long story—who was a war prisoner in the First World War, was an orphan. A Catholic priest had helped him when he was an orphan child. When we met in the prison it was a dramatic thing.

He told me that I was just like the Catholic priest who had helped him and who was good to him. Only one man had helped him in his life, he told me, and that was this Catholic priest. Because of the similarity, he decided to save me.

When I was condemned to death by the single major, by the single judge, a major of the NKVD, he appealed to the colonel of the NKVD. He was an interpreter and he had translated what I had said. I knew a little Russian along with some understanding of the Polish language. He told just part, that I had helped the Polish underground, but he didn't translate what I told him, namely, that I had really helped with weapons and with everything.

The broadcast—I had the short wave in my house—said that I had a cancellation of the first trial before the colonel. After that he and another man told me that I must go back immediately to Budapest and wait for 2 weeks somewhere, in hiding, because if the NKVD realized that I had a real connection with the Polish underground they would kill me.

I went, with their help, back to Budapest, and I was waiting when the Russians occupied the other part of the capital. All of my friends who led the resistance in Hungary then met. When the rest of the NKVD came to Budapest, they didn't bother me. But this man was shot.

When the suburban part of Budapest was freed and I had time to go out I wanted to thank this man who had saved my life, and I went and found the house where the trial had been held, and I asked this other Hungarian who owned the house, "Where is this man?" And he told me that the Mongolian judge, a Mongolian major, had shot him the next morning when he heard he had helped me to escape.

Mr. McTIGUE. You happened to mention Mikolajczyk's name. Were you responsible for whisking his son to safety?

Monsignor VARGA. I can tell you that Mikolajczyk was the greatest hero along with General Sikorsky for the Polish Nation during the war. When I had connections with the Polish underground he was accepted and was loved in Poland, and throughout Hungary. I had a connection with him, and even his son was imprisoned by the Gestapo. We infiltrated the Gestapo, and the son was freed. We bribed them.

The son came to Budapest with the help of my Hungarian and Polish friends. He was in my house for 6 months. In 1943 when I heard and when everybody thought that Hitler would occupy Hungary, I sent him through our underground—I can say it now—through Turkey to London to his father. I was responsible for his life because if he had remained in Hungary he would have been executed.

Mr. McTIGUE. Isn't it true that in your capacity as the underground leader during the war against the Nazis that you provided for the safety of thousands upon thousands of Jews?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes. Our party, the Smallholders' Party, especially during the war, felt that it was the Christian duty and humane duty to help all the persecuted people. We helped especially the refugees, Jews who came from Austria and from Germany. Later we saved many who escaped from Poland.

It is very difficult, naturally, to explain here in America now that we forged papers for these persecuted people and we helped them through Hungary to the West, or to the East, to escape, and we saved, we helped about 20,000 Polish Jews through Hungary with my organization. We helped more than 50,000 soldiers in the fall of 1939 to get to France and to the free army of General Sikorsky.

Mr. McTIGUE. There was a price placed upon your head by the Gestapo; is that correct?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

During the war there was this Polish parachute officer who is now in Munich. He went to Poland and he was parachuted, he was dropped in Warsaw. During this time—it was in 1942, in May or in June—Hitler began to build these gas chambers. This man got photographs.

I helped him to Switzerland, I went with him to Switzerland. Naturally the Germans knew many things about my work and, therefore, I was persecuted and I was condemned to death when the Germans occupied Hungary.

Cardinal Mindszenty, who was at this time our bishop, and an old friend of mine, saved my life by hiding me in an old monastery.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us at this point how many times, as between the Nazis and the Communists, you have been condemned to death?

Monsignor VARGA. I was condemned to death by the Nazis and I heard on the radio that I had a price on my head in 1944 when the Nazis occupied Hungary. If I had remained in Hungary I am sure the Communists would have liquidated me, executed me as they did Bela Kovacs.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now going back to the period when the Communists took over, the period of the Communist occupation, what can you tell us about the elections which were held in Hungary in 1945?

Monsignor VARGA. In 1945 the Communists and the Russians thought that in Hungary, tortured and trampled, the people would be very weak and therefore they organized and ordered the first elections after the war.

Stalin sent his best friend, Voroshilov, to be the head of the Control Commission. Everybody was convinced that the Communists would win the first election. Municipal elections until now had not been held. The first election was in the capital, Budapest.

The Smallholders' Party in Budapest had a branch. I was the head of the Budapest organization. Naturally the Russians tried to compel us to have a common ticket with the Communists. Finally the Smallholders' Party entered the election in 1945, October 7. It was a miracle that we succeeded. It was by the cooperation especially of all the religious people.

I have to say here that I am very grateful to the Protestant Bishops, Bishop Ravasz, and the Lutheran Bishop Ordass, as well as the Catholic organizations and the Jewish Organizations. They worked together miraculously. And we won.

Nobody imagined that in Budapest that the Smallholders' Party would win the election, but we did win it, and the Communists got just 17 percent, and it was very important to influence the country by this election because the country was at this time without trains, without cars and the roads were in very bad condition.

It was very important to strengthen the resistance of our people in the villages, and I am sure that the Budapest elections strengthened very much the resistance of the whole country. We got in the country elections a month later more than 57 percent, and it means that in the Parliament we had 60 percent of the seats, the Smallholders' Party.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Communists prevent the formation of a Smallholders' Party government after this great victory?

Monsignor VARGA. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. How?

Monsignor VARGA. We were very happy and the country was very happy that we had won the elections, and that we would have a government, our own democratic government with a majority.

As General Stokes in Washington told, in Hungary at this time the dictator of the whole country over everybody, even the Americans, was Marshal Voroshilov and everything depended upon his will. He didn't accept our plan.

We got an order from him that we had to build up and organize a coalition government. We had to do that, and slowly we lost.

Mr. McTIGUE. What, Monsignor, was the National Supreme Council?

Monsignor VARGA. This National Supreme Council had a government in Debrecen. We named this government the generals' government because three generals were in this government. It was just a temporary government before the elections. At this time we didn't have a head of state, and it was decided in Debrecen that we would have a triumvirate instead of one head of the country.

It was a coalition party too, and I was a member of this government just a very short time because as a priest—I had thought that something would happen—I said that I would not sign death sentences, and I resigned from this position.

Mr. McTIGUE. Because you wouldn't affix your signature to death sentences?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes; I wouldn't sign any of them.

Mr. McTIGUE. Monsignor, under what circumstances did you assume the post of Speaker of Parliament?

Monsignor VARGA. We saw in 1945 when we had won the election that the Communists wanted to destroy our majority, and we were told that they were trying to liquidate us. So we organized our resistance, and Ferenc Nagy became Premier of the country.

Then it was decided among us that I should go into the Parliament to be Speaker of the Parliament and Ferenc would fight in the Government for what we could do; I would fight in the Parliament, and Bela Kovacs resigned as Minister for Agriculture and went back to the party and he was to organize and we would help from our two very important positions, help him in the organizing and strengthening of the party.

I became in this way the Speaker of the Parliament, and I naturally tried to keep the Communist dictatorship away from our Parliament. Thank God, when I was in the Parliament I saved the Parliament.

When I was there the mob attacked the Parliament once or twice, but the Communist police couldn't come in, and I saved some members of the Parliament. They received asylum in the Parliament because the Hungarian Parliament was at this time an independent and sovereign body of the country.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Soviets try to prevent in any manner or in any way your activities as Speaker?

Monsignor VARGA. Naturally, the Soviets tried to interfere, and tried to compel me to put everything, including the sovereignty of the Parliament, under the so-called Party Conference. The Communists and the other joint parties with the Communists sent 2 or 3 men into the Parliament, and they tried to control everything, but I was strong enough at this time, and I saved the sovereignty of the Parliament.

Naturally the hireling mob attacked the Parliament, and even the furniture was devastated. It was a sign that they planned to liquidate me.

Mr. McTIGUE. At the time the Soviet was attempting to interfere with the legislative processes of the Parliament did you as Speaker or did you, through Prime Minister Nagy, convey any protest to the Allied Control Commission?

Monsignor VARGA. Usually Ferenc Nagy, who was Premier in this time, went to the Allied Control Commission. I went with him at times, and we tried to save the sovereignty of the country in every way.

We asked the representatives of the Western Powers to help us in our resistance, but they couldn't. As General Stokes said in Washington, the country was under the complete dictatorship of Marshal Voroshilov.

The measure of freedom was whatever they, the Communists, wanted to give us. However, regarding the elections I can say that they were free, and then the Communists permitted and allowed 100 percent freedom.

Later on we didn't enjoy such freedom, only what was given us from the Russian commander, Marshal Voroshilov.

Mr. McTIGUE. General Stokes testified in Washington that the permanent chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary was peculiar to Hungary since that was the only case where a permanent chairmanship existed.

Monsignor VARGA. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. He testified at the same time that the Allied Control Commissions, that their chairmanship in other countries was on a revolving basis. Do you happen to know why Hungary was selected to be the exception.

Monsignor VARGA. I am sure it was a result of the conferences at Moscow, Yalta, and Potsdam. In other places the presidency of the Control Commission was changed every 3 months, I think.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us what kind of relationship prevailed between the Communist Party and the Soviet or Russian Army?

Monsignor VARGA. It is no secret that we didn't have many Communists in Hungary; very, very few.

Mr. McTIGUE. You are now talking about before the war?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes, and even during the war. When the Communists came, the Russian army brought to Hungary 160 well-trained Moscow agitators, and all of them were Russian citizens, not Hungarian citizens. Everybody in the Communist Party had high rank. The leaders who guided the Communists and later became the leaders of Hungarian communism all had high rank, such as that of a general in the Russian Army. I saw it with my own eyes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Monsignor, what were your personal experiences regarding the brutality and the indignities committed by the Communists? It is my understanding that you had a great many personal experiences in that respect. I wonder if you could tell the committee about some of them.

Monsignor VARGA. Yes, I saw many sad things, and I have heard and I know personally how the Russian soldiers raped even old women over 70 and those women died. I heard and I know personally that they raped 8- and 10-year-old children, little girls, and I saw how they destroyed everything. They didn't just rob and take things to Russia; I saw what they destroyed.

It is my personal, strong belief that the Russian soldiers got an order from their commander to destroy especially our old buildings. They wanted to destroy the spirit of the Hungarian tradition in villages and in cities.

Mr. McTIGUE. Does that include the churches as well?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes, and nowhere in Europe did there happen what happened in Hungary, where they destroyed the symbol of the Catholic religion, the Regnum Marian.

All of the Hungarians are Christians, and St. Stephen offered the Holy Virgin the whole country and it was symbolized in one church in Budapest. It was in the center of Budapest, a big church. The Communists had never destroyed a church in these countries behind the Iron Curtain, and it was a great shame what happened with that church in Budapest, how the Regnum Marian was destroyed, and in its place a huge statue of Stalin was erected. The symbol of the religious spirit of Hungary was destroyed and in its place there is now a big statue of Stalin. There was no similar humiliation in any of the other countries.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, Monsignor, on the basis of your experiences in Hungary and on the reports that come to you, as they must, have you the slightest reservation of any kind that there is persecution of all religions going on in Hungary at the present time?

Monsignor VARGA. I am sure that it is a Russian decision and that the persecution of all religion is going on. I can make a statement that all Hungarian religious people are resisting. I was a patriot and my friends are patriots, my Catholic friends, but we are not any better than my Protestant brethren in that country who are resisting as well as the Catholics are resisting the persecution of the churches, the persecution of religion.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in the room this morning when Reverend Vatai testified?

Monsignor VARGA. I am terribly sorry. I tried to listen because I was very interested in his statement, but I couldn't hear because his voice was weak.

Mr. McTIGUE. He testified with regard to the persecution of religions in Hungary as far as the Protestant religion is concerned. It started slowly at first in 1946 with suppression of the press and the closing down of the schools and the taking away of church property.

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that the same pattern that was followed as far as the Catholics are concerned?

Monsignor VARGA. Just the same way.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is there any comment that you want to make as far as the persecution of the Catholic religion is concerned?

Monsignor VARGA. The persecution of the Catholic religion is ruthless everywhere. They are compelling the Catholic priests to join the Communist organization as they have compelled Archbishop Stepanac and Bishop Havabach and Monsignor Barastozzi to be members of a big committee for reparations after the new elections in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. They are Catholic bishops?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes, two Catholic bishops are on this committee. It is just a week-old committee and I am sure that they are obliged to be there and that it is against their own will that they are members of this committee.

Mr. McTIGUE. You testified several minutes ago about your close relationship with Cardinal Mindszenty when he was Bishop.

Monsignor VARGA. Yes, I worked together with Cardinal Mindszenty during the war against the Nazis. He was imprisoned by the Nazis. We were parish priests in neighboring parishes. He became bishop and we cooperated very closely. I went to Budapest in 1944 in his car. He sent his friend and his secretary and he gave me

forged papers to go to Budapest to organize the resistance against communism, to organize the country; to help me find my friends, Ferenc Nagy and Bela Kovacs during this time in Budapest and the rest of the country.

He helped me and he helped even in the elections; he helped with all his strength in our elections, to have a strong party in the first election, to unite and to organize together all of the strength of the country.

I was glad to be his best friend, and when I told him we were to be liquidated—it was in 1946 in August—we resisted and we didn't permit, tried not to permit the nationalization, communization of flour mills in Hungary, and I told him it was true, it was certain that the Communists would liquidate us, would dissolve our Government and would do away with me, and he came to visit the Parliament officially, and with great show, he came, and he thanked me with his whole heart for what I did in the cause of the country and the church.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Communists took over and occupied Hungary how was Hungarian life undermined by the Communists from that period on?

Monsignor VARGA. The Communists used their own tactics for the infiltration, and it was perfect in Hungary. They infiltrated us. Our secretaries were compelled to be Communist spies. In my case I knew seven friends of mine who were spies, even the rector of our university who is now in America. One of my secretaries and a newspaperman who visited me every week I knew were Communist spies. They were obliged to be spies. If somebody didn't do that he was deported to Siberia.

The whole country became a big prison and everybody was controlled, and the Communists controlled even the ideas and the thoughts of man.

Mr. McTIGUE. There was spying in the churches, there was spying in the schools?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes; everywhere. The children became spies on their parents. You have heard perhaps that somewhere behind the Iron Curtain there is a statue of a child who was a traitor in that parish. The children were encouraged against the parents, to betray their parents.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was the youngster who testified in court against his father who was subsequently executed.

Monsignor VARGA. Yes; you are right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Monsignor, when did you escape from Hungary and under what circumstances and for what reason?

Monsignor VARGA. It was the saddest moment in my life, the most tragic moment in my life. Bela Kovacs, our friend, who was one of the leaders of the resistance, was imprisoned by the Red Army in 1947 in February, and Ferenc Nagy was in Switzerland—he was Premier at this time—and he was obliged to resign while in Switzerland. I know if he had returned to Hungary he would have been liquidated as Bela Kovacs was.

Bela Kovacs signed a confession in prison, and he said that Ferenc Nagy, Bela Kovacs, and myself, that we are responsible for the conspiracy against the Red army and against the state. The Communists started attacking the so-called instigators, and we were the

instigators, and I am sure that if Ferenc Nagy had returned to Hungary he would have been liquidated. If we and our other friends had not escaped from the country I am sure we would all have been tried and convicted.

I was watched and controlled. With the help of my underground friends I escaped to Vienna, and in Vienna my American friends saved my life.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it your feeling, Monsignor, that the spirit of resistance is still alive and effective in Hungary?

Monsignor VARGA. I am sure that the resistance is just the same, perhaps stronger than it was in 1945 when we won the elections and the Communists got just 17 percent even with the help of the Russian Army. I am convinced in my spirit and in my heart that the resistance is as strong as it was. Perhaps the younger generation are under more control of the Communists, but the resistance of the religious people and the resistance of the workers, the resistance especially of the country people, the peasants, is still alive and will always remain alive against godless communism and against the greatest enemy of man, of humanity, of mankind, and the personal liberty and freedom of man, communism.

Mr. McTIGUE. I am sure that since you left the country, Monsignor, and certainly since you have been here that you are under constant attack by the Hungarian Communists because of your efforts in behalf of a free Hungary.

Monsignor VARGA. Yes, the Communists started attacking, watching, following me everywhere. When I was in Switzerland one, Tarr, was a Communist spy. It was a great scandal. When I was in Switzerland he went everywhere. I was once, with the help of the Swiss Government, in a monastery. It was very far from the city. This Tarr came and found me there. He found me later in another monastery. They are watching me even here in America, and I am sure they want to liquidate me.

As General Stokes said, he is a very clever man, and he is one of the best experts abroad and he tried, naturally with the best tactics of the Communists, to infiltrate, and to divide our exiles because they are very unhappy about our work in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you say "divide our exiles," you mean split the immigrant groups into factions fighting among themselves?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes. It is a Communist tactic to divide friends or parties and not to let them join. Thank God, the Hungarian movement is united without Communists and Nazis. We felt many times that the Communist infiltration is very strong among us.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Monsignor Varga, having worked as you have with the underground forces of resistance, not only in Hungary but being familiar with the activities in other countries such as Poland, with that as a preface, I want to ask you: Are you familiar with this Kersten amendment which provides for the establishment of national military units which would be associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces which would be set up for the purpose of enabling people to escape from behind the captive satellite countries as well as the 14 or 15 non-Russian captive nations within the U. S. S. R., to fight for the liberation of the countries enslaved by Communist aggression? Are you familiar with that?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. I have heard about it, but I am terribly sorry that I am not completely familiar with this Kersten proposal, but I am sure that the best friends of America and the best friends of freedom are behind the Iron Curtain and the best soldiers of freedom of our common cause are behind the Iron Curtain.

MR. FEIGHAN. Do you feel that if these friends behind the Iron Curtain had an opportunity to escape and then join these national military units, if they were organized under the flag of the country of their national birth that they would be glad to join that to fight to liberate their enslaved nations?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Yes, it is my conviction that 90 percent of them would in my own country and in the other countries. I know Poland well. I know they want to be liberated.

Life is cheap in these countries. I know in the case of my father he does not want to live because it is not human what they are suffering there. You cannot imagine how miserable and poor life is in our country and how the Communists lower, under pressure from the Russians, the living standards of our people.

Life has no meaning for the workers, for the peasants, for the intelligentsia, life in a prison. They want to be liberated, they want to work. I am sure Hungary would not have been Communist if it had not been occupied by the Russian Army.

MR. FEIGHAN. What reaction do you think there would be in Hungary when the people learn that these national military units were organized?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. I am sure that in Hungary everything like that strengthens the people when they hear that the people of Hungary are not forgotten behind the Iron Curtain.

MR. FEIGHAN. Monsignor Varga, you mentioned that the elections were free. I think you are referring particularly to the elections in 1945 when the Communists got such a small vote.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Yes; just the elections in 1945 because in 1947 the results of the elections were forged by these so-called blue slips.

MR. FEIGHAN. Thank you, Monsignor.

MR. BENTLEY. Monsignor Varga, we have heard about people in Hungary, such as yourself, who fought and resisted both the German and the Soviet totalitarians. What can you tell us about the people in Hungary who collaborated and cooperated with the Nazis during the war and now are doing the same thing today with the Communists?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. It is sad to confess that some Hungarians cooperated with the Nazis. Before the war we didn't have a Communist Party. Rakosi, who is a strong leader behind the Iron Curtain, organized the Communist Party from the so-called Nyilas people, and I can prove, Mr. Chairman, that the Communist Party was organized from these people, because the first pogrom was against the poor persecuted Jews. They escaped from the Nazis, and during the occupation of the Russians, Rakosi was naturally the representative of the Russians, and these Nazis who were organized in the Communist Party made the pogrom against the poor persecuted Jewish people.

MR. BENTLEY. You said when the Russians came into Hungary they brought about 160 Communists with them. Were they Russians or Hungarians?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. They were of Hungarian origin, but they had become Russian citizens. All of them had Russian citizenship. They were not Hungarians and they are not Hungarians because they are Russian.

MR. BENTLEY. They came in and they organized the Hungarian Communist Party and, as you say, they actually began the Hungarian Communist Party out of what had been the Hungarian Nazi Party.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Yes; that is correct.

MR. BENTLEY. In the 1945 elections the Hungarian Communist Party got about 18 percent of the vote?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Seventeen percent of the vote.

MR. BENTLEY. How did the Communist Party in Hungary attract members into its ranks?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. I said and I repeat that freedom is not perfect because people under the occupation are not perfectly free. The people were intimidated, and many people thought that the Communists would know who voted against them and, therefore, they got this 17 percent. Otherwise, they could only have gotten 5 percent maximum.

MR. BENTLEY. Many people who voted for the Communist ticket in 1945 did so through intimidation?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Yes.

MR. BENTLEY. From the time the Russians came until you left, which was around the 1st of June 1947, can you give us any examples of how the Russians directly intervened in the internal affairs of the Hungarian Government, of which you were a part?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Many times the Russians intervened. The Hungarian Government, as my friend Ferenc Nagy will testify, was under permanent, continuous pressure from the Russians.

For instance, in the case of Bela Kovacs, and before in the case of the conspiracy, and before that when we resisted against the Communist demand to nationalize the properties, the flour mills, the Russians went to Ferenc Nagy as Premier and ordered and demanded from him grain or flour or something.

MR. BENTLEY. We will get that testimony, I imagine, when Mr. Nagy takes the stand. As I understand, the Smallholders' Party was the dominant party in Hungary following the 1945 elections, and was controlled or run or managed by the three of you, Mr. Kovacs, yourself, and Mr. Nagy.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Yes. Before the election we were four—Mr. Tildy was with us. For instance, when we met Cardinal Mindszenty in a monastery, Tildy was there, Nagy was there, Bela Kovacs was there. We represented the Smallholders' Party, but later we were just three.

MR. BENTLEY. Now, Mr. Tildy, of course, is in Hungary under house arrest?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Yes.

MR. BENTLEY. Mr. Kovacs has disappeared.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. He was imprisoned by the Russian Army, and we don't know where he is now.

MR. BENTLEY. The other two members of your group are yourself and Mr. Nagy.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Why was Kovacs arrested by the Russians rather than by the Hungarian Communists?

Monsignor VARGA. Because the Hungarian Communists couldn't arrest him. Bela Kovacs was a member of the Parliament and he had immunity. There was a big fight in the Parliament, and we didn't suspend his immunity in Parliament. The Hungarian police couldn't imprison him. Therefore, the Russians imprisoned him.

Mr. BENTLEY. They arrested Bela Kovacs on a charge of conspiracy, and his so-called confession implicated both you and Mr. Nagy?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Just what conspiracy was this supposed to be?

Monsignor VARGA. This conspiracy, I was told, was against the Red army, and in the statement of Bela Kovacs it was against the state, out of our party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was Bela Kovacs the first one arrested in connection with the conspiracy?

Monsignor VARGA. No, no. The first ones arrested were some members of the Parliament. For instance, Reverend Vatai was arrested.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was that the same conspiracy?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes. Bela Kovacs wrote in this letter in a Russian prison that Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Nagy, and myself were responsible for this conspiracy.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was this a conspiracy against the Russian Army or against the Hungarian Government?

Monsignor VARGA. When I was at home, they claimed and I heard that they said that this was against the state.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is, the Hungarian Government?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. But you were part of the state, weren't you?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes; and even the Russian Army was in this part—they explained this—that the Russian Army is part of the state, and we were in a conspiracy against the Russian Army.

Mr. BENTLEY. They claimed that the Russian Army was part of the Hungarian state; therefore when you conspired against the state you conspired against the Russian Army?

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think that is all, Monsignor. You have made a very great contribution, both last Friday in Washington and today in your testimony. I might ask one more thing; that is that you have never resigned your position as Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament; is that correct?

Monsignor VARGA. You are correct. I didn't resign, and on this basis I am now the head of the Hungarian National Council. We proved that we once had a legal government in Hungary, and we have tried to be good spokesmen for our Hungarian cause in America.

Mr. BENTLEY. As I say, your contribution to these hearings has been all that could be expected.

Mr. McTIGUE. Monsignor, I hand you a statement which is in Hungarian, and I understand it is a description of, first, The Communization of the Hungarian Foreign Office.

Monsignor VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you wish to enter that into the record of this proceeding?

MONSIGNOR VARGA. May I read it first?

MR. McTIGUE. Oh, surely.

MONSIGNOR VARGA. I hand you several papers. This is, second, The Persecution of the Church in Hungary; third, The Abolition of Freedom in Hungary; fourth, Communization of Our Economic Life; fifth, This Is the Destruction of Hungarian Capital by the Soviet. This is, sixth, How Free Employment Has Generally Been Transformed Into Forced Labor in Hungary, and if you can use it, I will be glad. Seventh, Memo on Prisoners of War in Hungary; eighth, Memo on the Disintegration of the Hungarian Army; ninth, The Bolshevization of Our National Culture; tenth, The Bolshevization of Our Economy; eleventh, The Bolshevization of Our Agriculture; finally, twelfth, The Genocide of Our Nation.

I will read what you have given me, and if possible, I will send it to you.

MR. BENTLEY. You can submit that at a later date.

MR. McTIGUE. As far as the series of documents which you have just submitted to this committee and which you have identified, may I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that they be marked for identification and admitted as committee exhibits.

MR. BENTLEY. It shall be so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "New York Exhibits 1 through 12, inclusive.")

MR. BENTLEY. Our next witness, Mr. Counsel.

MR. McTIGUE. The next witness is Mr. Ferenc Nagy.

MR. BENTLEY. Mr. Nagy, will you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

MR. NAGY. I do.

TESTIMONY OF FERENC NAGY

MR. BENTLEY. Mr. Nagy, you have submitted to the subcommittee here this statement of some 26 pages, and I believe it contains various topics, various paragraphs, about 24 different topics; am I correct, sir?

MR. NAGY. That is right.

MR. BENTLEY. Was it your intention to read this at the time or to submit this for the record, or just what?

MR. NAGY. Mr. Chairman, I decided not to make any personal statement. I thought that I would prepare these memorandums in order to prove how the Russian authorities interfered in Hungarian policy in order to support the Communist Party.

If you are interested about these stories I wrote in my memorandum, I am here to read them or to talk about it.

MR. McTIGUE. May I suggest this, Mr. Chairman, that the statement which we have before us and which has been prepared by Mr. Nagy, be made verbatim a part of the record.

MR. BENTLEY. All right. If there is no objection, it is so ordered.

MR. McTIGUE. And that we question Mr. Nagy from the statement which we have here before us.

MR. NAGY. All right.

MR. McTIGUE. In other words, your statement will be put in the record verbatim, just as if you spoke it word for word here. We will

save some time in that it wouldn't be read word for word, but we would like to question you from the statement.

Mr. NAGY. All right, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will that be satisfactory?

Mr. NAGY. Fine.

(The statement referred to by Mr. Nagy is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF MR. NAGY

1. How the Communist Party obtained the central leadership in the various political parties

There was no Communist Party in Hungary before World War II, because it was outlawed by the Hungarian Parliament. There were a few hundred underground Communists, while the Communist leaders lived in exile in the Soviet Union. When the Red army occupied Hungary, these exiled Communist leaders accompanied the troops and were given by the conquerors their first opportunity to prepare the country's reconstruction. Among the first to return were Erno Gero, Jozsef Revai, Mihaly Farkas, old-time, well-trained Communists many of whom fought on the Communist side in the Spanish civil war and sought refuge in the Soviet Union after the defeat; some of them were new Communists who were captured during the war and underwent special training in the Soviet Union. To this group belonged Istvan Kossa, a former Social Democrat who was trained in Moscow in the dictatorial management of trade unions.

The leading Communists returning to Hungary with the Red army had instructions to organize the political and economic life in the occupied country. They sought out in their homes those democratic leaders—members of the Smallholders' Party, the Peasant Federation and the Social Democratic Party—who formerly played a role in these political groups and who through their anti-Nazi attitude seemed to be suitable to participate in the country's new political life.

Anyway, the Communists were not strong enough to reorganize the administration in the communities and municipalities without the cooperation of the opposition, since there were scores of cities and villages where they were unable to find a single Communist.

In order to start the new political life and the new administration, the Red army equipped these Communists with the necessary means. They were given cars, money, and food. Thus, since they were the only ones who could travel and who were free from the chores of providing for their daily livelihood, it was only natural that they were able to keep their control over Hungarian life against those anti-Communists whom they admitted into the occupied country's political life.

2. The circumstances under which the provisional government was established

The idea of a provisional government was first brought up in Moscow. The exiled Hungarian Communist leaders, first among them Matyas Rakosi, were staying in Moscow and in September 1944 a secret delegation arrived in Moscow, sent by Regent Horthy to negotiate the armistice. Members of this delegation were Geza Teleki, Domonkos Szent-Ivany, and Gabor Farago, joined later by a few high-ranking army officers who had refused to serve after Ferenc Szelaszi's Nazi government took over, and went over to the Russian Army.

Among these were Gens. Bela Dalnoki-Miklos and Janos Veres. According to my information the first discussions about the establishing of a provisional government were started between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and the exiled Communist leaders regarding the armistice commission.

The setting up of a provisional government, however, was not announced until the Red army occupied the eastern part of Hungary, and the city of Debrecen could be named as provisional capital of the country. Eager to give a semblance of constitutionality to the provisional government, its formation was officially announced in Debrecen in 1944, after a provisional national assembly had been convoked. Moscow was aware of the fact that it was impossible to set up a purely Communist government in a country where there was not even a Communist Party in existence, and thus a coalition government was decided upon, comprising certain members of the armistice commission, some of the military persons who went over to the Red army and 2 representatives each of the 3 leading political parties: The Smallholders' Party, the Communist Party, and

the Social Democratic Party, as well as one member of the newly organized National Peasant Party.

Naturally, the Russians made good use of the fact that the provisional government was founded under their protection, and they endeavored to give the impression that it was the Russians who restored to the defeated Hungarian people its right of self-determination.

3. The setting up of the provisional national assembly

The Red army and the leading Communists arriving with it were eager to establish a showcase parliament in addition to the provisional government, and therefore resolved to establish one.

This was impossible through regular elections because of complete lack of administrative and transportation facilities, as well as communication between the various parts of the country. A plan was drawn up therefor, giving the number of deputies to be called in from the different parts of the country. It was also decided that the deputies would be elected at hastily summoned mass meetings. The past political attitude of each electorate was naturally taken into consideration at the time the number of deputies to be called in from the various districts was decided upon. Thus it was decided that Oroshaza, a city of 30,000, where a small clandestine Communist group existed before the war, should have 14 deputies, while the city of Pecs, with a population of 80,000, together with county Baranya counting 300,000 souls, would have only 7, since in this region there never was any Communist movement. The deputies of the national assembly, thus elected practically in the streets, were brought to Debrecen, the provisional capital, in Red army trucks borrowed by the Communist Party.

4. Russian interference in government functions

The provisional government had no means to launch its administrative activities. The cabinet members had no cars, and no telephone, so that they were unable to contact the administrative officials surviving in the various parts of the country; they were unable to control in their particular fields of office the activities of the Communist Party and the Red army. Naturally, the Red army provided first the Communist members of government with the necessary facilities to pursue their governmental tasks. Thus Imre Nagy, the Communist Minister of Agriculture, was given the opportunity to obtain the cooperation of Communist experts scattered around the country in drawing up the blueprints of the land reform, but Gabor Farago, Minister of Public Supply, had no means of stopping the Red army from looting the remaining food supplies, from seizing the reserves, and confiscating food from the starving population. The Red army, seizing all available food reserves, used them for its own purposes and relinquished the remainder not to the Minister of Public Supply, a non-Communist, but to the Communist Party. This was intended to give the impression that it was the Communist Party that came to the assistance of the starving people, intent on alleviating the sufferings of the population.

5. The armistice agreement

Following the example of Rumania, the Allied Powers offered an armistice agreement to Hungary. The provisional government signed the armistice agreement on January 20, 1945. The agreement stipulated that Hungary should declare war on Germany and participate in the last phases of the war.

Hungary was eager to participate in defeating the Germans, especially since we knew that Rumania and Bulgaria had already taken part on the Allied side, and it was important for us to be in the same position with these countries at the time of the peace conference. The technical prerequisites were also at hand, since at the time the majority of the disarmed Hungarian Army was still in Hungary, detained in huge prisoner-of-war camps. It would have been easy to equip them, and the Russians actually promised their assistance in this field. This promise, however, was never kept, and thus the Russians prevented Hungary from participating in the last phases of the war.

In addition to defining Hungary's obligations, the armistice agreement also contained certain restrictions concerning the rights of the army of occupation.

It must be stated here that the Soviet Union brutally violated the stipulations of the armistice agreement, and continuously misused her rights set forth in the agreement to interfere with the internal affairs of Hungary and to obstruct our efforts to reestablish the country's political independence. More details on this later.

6. *Trade unions as a means of Communist expansion*

As I have mentioned in the foregoing, Istvan Kossa was trained in Moscow in the dictatorial management of trade unions. Upon the pressure of the Communist Party and the Red army, he was actually appointed to head the Hungarian trade-union movement. Kossa then, arbitrarily and in a dictatorial manner, himself appointed the leadership of the trade unions and managed to run the trade unions into a menacing power whose influence the industrial workers were unable to shake off. Whenever the Communists wanted to exert pressure on the Smallholders' Party or the anti-Communist elements of Hungarian society, they ordered noisy demonstrations to intimidate their enemies. These demonstrations sometimes went so far that the mob broke into the Parliament building and personally threatened the anti-Communist Members of Parliament who refused to comply with their demands.

The unlimited power of the trade unions over the workers was a powerful weapon in the hands of the Communists, since there was always the danger that the workers might violently take over the government and hand it to the Communists.

It was impossible to count on police protection against such an attempt, since the reorganizing of the Hungarian police was in the hands of the Communists. This came about when the Russians insisted that Ferenc Erdei, a member of the Peasant Party and a tool of the Communists, be appointed Minister of Internal Affairs in the provisional government of Debrecen.

In Hungary the Minister of Internal Affairs has the authority over the police force. The situation was not much better regarding military protection, even though Gen. Janos Vorbas(?) was the first Defense Minister and later the Ministry was controlled by the Smallholders' Party. The reorganization and the location of the Hungarian Army, however, was under strict Soviet supervision from the very beginning, and only one company was allowed to be stationed in Budapest, where the danger of mob violence was most likely to be expected.

It was characteristic of the trade-union policies of the Soviets and of the Communist Party, that while the leaders were always freely and democratically elected in the trade unions of white-collar workers dominated by the Smallholders' Party, there were no elections at all in the Communist-controlled industrial trade unions, whose leadership was always appointed according to the wishes of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

7. *Russian intervention in the land reform*

The great majority of the Hungarian population agreed that the most important reform was a land reform. The political parties, especially the Smallholders' Party, and various groups of intellectuals have fought for many years for a just redistribution of the land. The Soviet leaders naturally were well aware of this desire of the Hungarian people and did everything within their power to carry out a most radical land reform. Counting upon the gratitude of the Hungarian people for the land reform, the Soviet placed every means for its launching and realization into the hands of the Communists.

One of the first steps was that at the time of the formation of the provisional government, the Soviets insisted that the Ministry of Agriculture be controlled by a Communist. This was a most unnatural demand since the few Communists in Hungary almost without exception came from among the industrial workers or leftist intellectual groups, but not from the peasantry.

In March 1945 the provisional government summoned the party leaders to Debrecen in order to discuss the land reform decree. Previously I had prepared the Smallholders' Party's blueprint for the land reform. I was determined to carry through my views at the conference. When, however, I submitted my recommendations regarding the execution of the land reform, the indemnification of the owners and the recompensation of the churches, I found that none of the parties was willing to support me. Very soon I found out that Marshal Voroshilov, chairman of the Allied Control Commission, fully endorsed the plans submitted by the Minister of Agriculture, and declared to the party leaders the preceding day that he, on his part, insisted on the acceptance of that decree. Thus it became clear to me that my recommendations for a more considerate and more legal execution of the land reform were rejected by the political parties on express Russian orders.

8. *Civil servants in the political parties*

Prior to World War II the civil servants, as well as the members of the army and police force, never belonged to political parties in Hungary. They were, of

course, allowed to vote, but were not permitted to do party work. After World War II the Communist Party insisted that the civil servants also join the political parties. We, in the Smallholders' Party, objected with the explanation that a civil servant has to be at the service without discrimination of members of all political parties and therefore should not bind himself to any particular party. Later we found out that this Communist demand was an imitation of the Russian system, where the civil servants are the first to be "honored" with admission into the Communist Party. Eager to prevent the Communists from monopolizing the civil servants, we Smallholders also opened our doors to them and, indeed, the overwhelming majority of the civil servants joined our party instead of the Communists.

9. Economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Hungary

In August 1945 the provisional government dispatched a commercial delegation to Moscow in order to secure raw materials for the rehabilitation of Hungarian industry. At that time Hungary had no opportunity whatsoever to resume economic relations with the Western World. The delegation was authorized to draw up a \$33 million contract with the Soviet Union for the import of wool, iron ore, and other industrial raw materials.

Shortly before the end of the negotiations one of the leaders of the delegation, Minister of Industry Antal Ban, flew back to Budapest with an important economic offer of the Soviet Union. In the course of the negotiations the Soviet Government had suddenly demanded that Hungary sign a 20-year economic pact with the Soviets.

Within the framework of this agreement the Soviet demanded that mixed Hungarian-Soviet companies be set up in every field of Hungarian economic life, banking, shipping, air transportation, oil industry, manufacturing, and mining, etc.

As Minister of Reconstruction in the provisional government I recommended that the Government reject this Soviet offer with the explanation that (1) so soon after the end of the war it was as yet impossible to estimate the country's economic potential and that it would be difficult to enter into an economic agreement with a foreign power without knowing our own economic capacity; (2) I suggested that the Government declare that preparations were underway for general elections in Hungary and that accordingly the mandate of the National Assembly and that of the Government was running out and that under the circumstances they were unable to enter into long-range agreements.

The Prime Minister accepted my suggestions and thus for a short time, at least, the threat of binding economic agreement with the Soviets was averted. A few weeks later, however, the Soviets again brought up the question, and since we received no support whatsoever from abroad in our efforts to prevent this Soviet-Hungarian economic agreement, the Government was forced into complying with the Soviet wish and forming mixed Soviet-Hungarian companies. Into these companies the Soviet brought those former German assets that, according to the Potsdam agreement, passed into Soviet hands after the war. This was the first Soviet step toward the penetration of Hungary's economic life.

10. Elections in Hungary

There was a universal demand in Hungary for general elections that would definitively regulate the country's constitutional and administrative life. The question of elections first came up in June 1945, and the Soviets did not object. Obviously with the intent of influencing the population, the Communist Party demanded that the municipal elections in Budapest should precede the general elections.

Since the former middle class was almost completely liquidated or had fled abroad, Budapest after the end of the war could almost be called a city of workingmen. The Communist Party and the Soviets were confident that in Budapest the Marxist parties would receive a great majority of the vote and that this result would greatly influence the outcome of the general elections. The Smallholders' Party did not maintain party organizations in Budapest before the war. The organization of the party in Budapest only started after the war and preceded the planned elections only by a few months. The theory of the Communists that the oldtime labor organizations would reap a resounding victory over the newly formed city organizations of the Smallholders' Party, seemed well founded.

We, on the other hand, well knew that these elections would not influence our party organizations throughout the country, just as in the past our party

organizations were never influenced by Budapest politics. Therefore, we were confident that even if we should be defeated at the municipal elections, we would receive the majority of the vote at the general elections. The municipal elections in Budapest had surprising results. The Smallholders' Party, relatively new in the city, obtained the majority of the vote over the Marxist parties, and thus the city administration passed into our hands. The results baffled the Soviets and the Communist Party. They decided to do everything in their power to prevent a similar defeat at the national elections, and Marshal Voroshilov launched personal negotiations with the party leaders with the intent of entering the elections on a joint ticket. This would have meant that the various parties would not enter the elections on their own platforms, but would agree to run on a joint ticket, according to the Soviet system.

The Smallholders' Party was against this antidemocratic system, but was under daily pressure by Voroshilov. At that time I was chairman of the Smallholders' Party, and as such I was of the opinion that the central committee of the party could not make such a momentous decision, and therefore summoned the national committee of the party for a meeting. Being aware of the fact that the national committee of the Smallholders' Party would positively reject the idea of a joint ticket with the Communists, Marshal Voroshilov dropped this plan the very same day the national committee was to start its deliberations.

It has to be mentioned here that in the course of the daily negotiations in this matter, Marshal Voroshilov first offered the Smallholders' Party 40 percent of the candidacies, and this number was raised day by day to 42, 45, and 47½ percent, until the plan was eventually dropped. The Smallholders' Party received close to 58 percent of the vote at the national election.

11. Russian intervention in the establishment of the Cabinet

If it had been possible to follow the parliamentary procedure, the election results would have entitled the Smallholders' Party to form its own government. Marshal Voroshilov, however, made it clear that the Allied Control Commission would only accept a coalition government, so that this was the basis of our negotiations from the very beginning.

In the light of recent experiences the Smallholders' Party decided to use its power as the majority party to take hold of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, which in Hungary controls the police force. After lengthy interparty negotiations lasting several days, the Communist Party finally gave up its resistance and agreed to yield the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Smallholders' Party, for which post we already had a candidate in the person of Bela Kovacs, secretary general of the Smallholders' Party.

On the last day of the negotiations the Communist Party suddenly announced that it could not, after all, yield this position to the Smallholders' Party, since this would be the first case in all eastern Europe where the Minister for Internal Affairs would be a non-Communist. This could only be interpreted as the official Soviet program to retain control over the police in every central and east European state. Thus we were forced to give up this post and as a consequence the control of the police force passed, according to the Russian program, entirely into Communist hands.

The Smallholders' Party resolved that it would participate in the Government only to the extent of 50 percent and not according to its majority. The reason for this was that we found it would be dangerous to take over the majority in the Government and thereby accept the responsibility for its every action when the country was under Russian occupation and in a very precarious situation. New ministries were also organized, and I, who was in charge of the negotiations aiming at the formation of a new Government, suggested that a Ministry for Cooperatives be set up, headed by a Smallholders' Party minister. There seems little doubt that already at that time the Communists intended to collectivize the Hungarian economy on the basis of cooperatives and that they were going to set up the kolkhoz system on this basis, too, because Marshal Voroshilov flatly denied permission from the Control Commission to our plan for setting up a Ministry of Cooperatives under Smallholders' Party control. Instead he suggested that we organize a Propaganda Ministry.

This Soviet interference had grave consequences on the Hungarian economy during later years, because the Hungarian people demanded the setting up of cooperatives throughout the country, and thus the country's commerce was operated to a great extent on this basis. Had it been possible for the Smallholders' Party to set up a Ministry of Cooperatives it would have been able to counterbalance, through them, the economic expansion of the Communist Party and the Russians.

21. Russian support of Communist political demands

On February 1, 1946, the newly elected National Assembly altered the country's form of state, abolishing the monarchy and proclaiming the Hungarian Republic. The Parliament elected Premier Zoltan Tildy as President of the Republic, and I had to accept the Prime Ministry. The country was in an extremely difficult situation, there was raging inflation and we were not sure whether we could survive until the new harvest. Before accepting the Prime Ministership I took out a solemn pledge from the leaders of all parties that they would desist from presenting new political demands until after the new harvest, and that they would not endeavor to disturb the country's peace that was difficult enough to maintain as it was.

Of course, the Communist Party broke this pledge by demanding, a mere 6 weeks after I took office, that the Smallholders' Party exclude from among its members those who opposed the coalition, or, to use the phrase that was in vogue at the time, the "reactionaries." The list contained about 30 names. This demand obviously aimed to deprive the Smallholders' Party of its parliamentary majority. I rejected the demand energetically and when it was repeated, I even rejected it in public, at political meetings and in the press. This brought about a crisis in the Government during which the Soviets intervened in support of the Communist demands. One day I received a letter from the Russians to the effect that Hungary was behind with her reparation shipments, and indicating that the Soviet Government would have to consider grave steps should the Hungarian Government fail to meet its obligations within a short time.

This would have meant that the Russians would dismantle and carry off for reparations the machinery so necessary for our slowly recovering industry. A few days later another letter arrived from the Russians in which I was instructed immediately to repay the food loaned by the Russians to the starving population of Budapest in 1945.

It must be mentioned here that the food supplies in question actually consisted of food that had been seized by the Russian Army from the Hungarian people and then magnanimously offered as a loan to the population of Budapest.

In March 1946 the Government was not in a position to repay even a bushel of grain or a pound of sugar to the Soviets. Again a few days later another letter arrived, charging the Hungarian Government with sabotaging the surrender to the Soviet of former German assets in Hungary ceded to them in the Potsdam agreement. It was indicated in the letter that should I fail to take immediate action, the Russians would take the matter into their own hands.

When meanwhile, at a Smallholders' Party conference, I sharply criticized the Communist demand to oust a few of our members, another letter arrived from the Russians charging that the Hungarian authorities did not satisfactorily supply the Red army in every part of the country, and indicating that should I fail to rectify these complaints, the Red army would in the future take care of its own provisioning. This would have meant requisitioning from the peasants. The fifth letter from the Russians charged us with failing to meet our obligations contained in the Soviet-Hungarian trade agreement signed in August 1945 and declared that the Soviet on its part would discontinue all deliveries to Hungary.

This meant that Hungarian industry would have to close down and dismiss its workers which could have brought about a revolution. In spite of the fact that these letters set forth rightful claims of the Soviets, it was impossible not to see that they were aimed to exert political pressure on us at certain particular times.

Ambassador Pushkin once declared to me that the attitude of the Hungarian Government and the Smallholders' Party prevented the Soviets from showing any leniency. Realizing that the Soviets stood behind the Communist demands, and in addition to keeping the country occupied, unlawfully controlled the entire political situation, we finally gave in to the Communist demands and ousted 20 deputies from the Smallholders' Party.

13. Soviets prevent American air traffic over Hungary

In the spring of 1946 a representative of the American legation called on me and suggested that Hungary start negotiations with the United States concerning Hungary's participation in American air traffic between the United States and the Far East.

This would have meant that Hungary would relinquish an airfield for the use of American civilian air transport and thus become a part of the world's greatest

air-transportation system. I greatly welcomed the idea but had to inform the American representative that until the peace treaty was signed every airport and even the airspace over Hungary was controlled by the occupying Red army. I offered to see the Russians personally in the matter.

Ambassador Pushkin obviously already knew about the offer, because he had the answer ready as soon as I brought up the matter. This is what he said: "Tell the Americans that if they want an airfield for their Far Eastern routes, it would be much easier for them to obtain one in Russia than in Hungary."

Thus the Russians openly prevented Hungary from becoming part of the American air-transport system.

14. Communists obstruct Hungarian peace preparations

Being aware of the fact that sooner or later a peace conference would deal with our defeated country, and that the signing of the peace treaty would at last end the state of uncertainty we were living in, the international experts of the Small-holders' Party in April 1945 began to compile the necessary material for the peace conference. Since, however, at the peace conference we wanted to expound the views of not only one party, but that of the entire country, we were intent on including all the other parties in our preparatory work.

The Communist Party, however, consistently refused to take part in the negotiations and did everything to obstruct the Government's efforts to prepare the peace talks.

In April 1946, I was invited to Moscow and since it was one of my main objectives to gain Soviet support for Hungary's peace aims, the Communists were unable to keep away from the negotiations any more. Their entire attitude, however, clearly indicated that they were led by Soviet instructions. For example, they tried to reduce to a minimum Hungary's demands on the neighboring nations, so much so that their views did not represent the general feeling in the country at all, nor the traditional Hungarian sense of justice.

After my trip to Moscow I had the impression that the Russians had previously informed the Communist Party of the fact that they were not going to support the Hungarian peace aims, and that this was the reason why the Communists only seemingly and reluctantly agreed to the minimum demands to be presented on the Hungarian side.

While in Moscow Stalin admitted that the armistice agreement concluded between the Great Powers and Rumania rendered it impossible for Hungary to bring up the question of Transylvania. On May 12 in Paris the Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers decided among themselves to give all of Transylvania to Rumania. A few weeks later in Washington I found out that this decision was brought about upon Russian recommendation and was told that in case we could persuade the Soviets to abandon the resolution of May 12, the Americans would gladly support the Hungarian standpoint.

On my way back from Washington, I met Molotov in Paris and told him that it was up to him to carry out most of the Hungarian peace aims. Molotov, however, flatly refused to support the Hungarian interests.

15. Soviet interference with the Hungarian Army

In the early summer of 1946 Defense Minister Tombor called on me and said that General Konratov, head of the Military Department of the Allied Control Commission, informed him of the fact that in the future the Allied Control Commission intended to enforce more rigorously its right guaranteed in the armistice agreement to supervise all military promotions and assignments.

He also informed the Defense Minister that the Control Commission wanted the number of frontier guards increased to 10,000 and Colonel Palfy-Osterreicher placed in command. Palfy-Osterreicher was a member of the Communist Party and head of the infamous military-political police, and it was widely known that he was an ardent Communist. Tombor immediately replied that in his opinion the armistice agreement did not entitle the Soviet command to advance such demands and that besides, he considered Palfy-Osterreicher unreliable from the standpoint of Hungarian national interests. He flatly refused to comply with the Russian demand, and after reporting to me he tendered his resignation. I told Tombor that obviously it was impossible to reject the Russian demand since there was no authority to turn to in case of Soviet violations of the armistice agreement.

I also told him that the new Defense Minister would undoubtedly comply with the Russian demands without any hesitation, and I asked him to remain, since I could not find a more reliable soldier to head the Defense Ministry. Tombor

considered this a personal request and withdrew his resignation, but from this time on the Soviets interfered with every military measure, criticizing every move and even presenting direct demands, as in the case of the promotion of Generals Illy and Revay and their assignment to important military positions, which was carried out on express Russian demand, as well as the relieving from important commands of certain outstanding Hungarian military men such as Colonels Kery, Hetszegy, and Furjessy, also carried out on Russian pressure.

16. Soviet interference in Hungary's political and social life

It happened during my stay in the United States that a Russian officer was shot and killed in Budapest, probably by drunken Russian soldiers. Searching the surrounding buildings the Russians found a Hungarian youth in an attic and charged him with the murder of the Russian officer. As a consequence of this incident, the Soviets demanded extraordinary measures from the Hungarian Government that seriously affected various organizations of Hungarian society.

On July 2 I received a note from the commander of the occupation forces demanding the dismissal of Zoltan Pfeiffer, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice, and the removal of Lord Lieutenants Daniel Andrasy, Pal Szoke, and Istvan B. Raos whose attitude, the Russians charged, made it possible for terroristic actions to take place in Hungary against the army of occupation. In addition, General Sviridov demanded that the Hungarian Government disband the Catholic youth organizations, the Boy Scout movement, and reorganize the Independent Youth, an affiliate of the Independent Smallholders' Party. Naturally, I did not start proceedings against the politicians mentioned by the Russians, and did not remove Zoltan Pfeiffer. The three lord lieutenants voluntarily tendered their resignation, since in the meanwhile Parliament passed legislation on parliamentary incompatibility and the three concerned fell under it, and could not keep both positions. The Minister for Internal Affairs, however, disbanded the Catholic youth organizations and the Boy Scout group which was later reorganized under a different name and new leadership.

17. The Russians demand the removal of leaders of the national bank

While I was in the United States in June 1946, Deputy Premier Szakasits received a letter from the chairman of the Allied Control Commission asking that Imre Oltvanyi, Laszlo Farago and Arthur Karasz, governor, general director and director, respectively of the Hungarian National Bank, be removed from their positions. The charge was that they had made payments from the rubles collected by the national bank which were supposed to be handed over to the Russians.

The leaders of the national bank proved that the ruble payments were made to Soviet soldiers, on Soviet military orders and very often upon armed pressure, but the Chairman of the Control Commission nevertheless insisted upon their removal. Upon my return from America, I personally contacted General Sviridov and Ambassador Pushkin in the matter, trying to explain to them that the charges against the leaders of the national bank were unfounded. My efforts were in vain. The three had to be removed on express Soviet demand.

18. Soviets prevent peasant demonstration

Since it was the custom of the workers' parties to organize mass meetings in order to demonstrate their strength, we decided to stage, together with the peasant federation, a mass meeting of the country's peasantry in Budapest. The meeting was planned for August 20, the anniversary of the first Hungarian king, since on that day the country's peasantry traditionally always came to the capital. However, Soviet permission was necessary for any such demonstration, and General Sviridov informed me that he could not give his consent because he had news that the peasants would come armed with sticks and full of wine and intended to intimidate in that way the population of the capital.

I told Sviridov that I considered these suspicions a very bad joke, and insisted upon his permission for holding a peasant meeting. When Sviridov consistently refused, I told him that the Government would resign in protest over the unjust attitude of the Control Commission. Thereupon Sviridov changed his tactics and informed me that he would agree to a mass meeting at a later date. The reason he gave was that the Soviet Union would like to participate at the agricultural exposition planned concurrently with the meeting, and that there was not enough time to transport their material to Budapest. The real reason behind this proposal was that Sviridov well knew that the peasants traditionally rallied to Budapest on August 20 every year, and that they would not or could not come

again a few weeks later, thus he was hoping that the mass meeting would be a failure. In spite of the fact that at that time transportation in Hungary was poor, very few trains running and even less buses or trucks being available, and although the few means of transportation were controlled by the Communist Minister of Transportation, the Peasant Day of September 8 in Budapest became the world's greatest peasant demonstration, drawing a half million peasants from all over the country to the nation's capital.

19. Conspiracy on the Soviet pattern

In December 1946 the Communist Party, obviously on Russian orders, launched a trumped-up conspiracy charge against the patriotic and democratic-minded elements of Hungarian society. The military-political police arrested a great number of Hungarians who had been active in the anti-Nazi resistance movement during the war and who were now endeavoring to bring about a truly democratic regime in Hungary. All of these persons were anti-Communists and most of them belonged to the Smallholders' Party. The charges against them at first seemed ridiculous to us who at that time were not yet familiar with the Soviet methods of questioning.

The Russian-trained leaders of the political police used such methods of questioning that the arrested patriots gave handwritten confessions regarding subversive activities which they never committed. These confessions were then used to implicate and arrest an additional number of loyal Hungarians. Soviet interference was not noticeable at the beginning of the conspiracy trial, but appeared soon afterward.

Since the first arrests were made by the military-political police, I instructed the Defense Minister to visit the prison in person and himself question the accused. Colonel Palfy-Osterricher prevented the Defense Minister from entering the prison, claiming to have express Russian orders from General Sviridov. Thereupon, I personally called on General Sviridov and asked him whether he really gave such orders and if so, by what right or authority.

Sviridov energetically denied having given orders to Palfy-Osterricher to prevent the Defense Minister from interviewing the prisoners. I then instructed the Defense Minister immediately to suspend Palfy-Osterricher from his command and to start an investigation against him.

When the investigation was started General Konratov called on me and delivered a message from General Sviridov saying that he, Sviridov, was amazed at my action since Palfy was innocent in the whole affair. He, Sviridov, had not ordered Palfy to prevent the Defense Minister from seeing the prisoners, but the interpreter had made a mistake and translated Sviridov's order that way, and accordingly, Palfy had been justified in his action. Sviridov also indicated that the interpreter has already been punished. I told Konratov that I acknowledged the general's message and that its contents would be weighed in the course of the investigation. Upon this Konratov declared that Sviridov insisted on the immediate suspension of the investigation and should I refuse, he threatened to have the whole conspiracy trial handed over to the Russian military police.

Realizing that this would mean that all the accused would again be tortured and maybe even deported to Russia, I suspended, on direct Russian pressure, the investigation against Colonel Palfy-Osterricher.

There were other instances when Russian interference was evident in the conspiracy trial. Thus when a defendant was trying to withdraw his confession made under duress while a prisoner of the Communist Hungarian police, such a defendant would be handed over to the Russian military police and after a few days of Russian "treatment" he would be ready to confess to anything.

The most flagrant Russian interference in the conspiracy trial, however, was the arrest of Bela Kovacs, secretary general of the Smallholders' Party. Bela Kovacs, not being a member of the Cabinet and thus free from the obligations of the coalition, became the real leader of the anti-Communist resistance in the eyes of the population. His speeches and newspaper articles served as a great encouragement to the Hungarian people. The Communists wanted to eliminate him from Hungarian public life at all costs, and the occasion presented itself with the discovery of the conspiracy, in the course of which incriminating confessions were extorted from many victims, heavily implicating Bela Kovacs. But Kovacs was a member of Parliament and therefore could not be arrested by the Hungarian police, and the National Assembly controlled by the Smallholders' Party refused to extradite him. Bela Kovacs, under the protection of his im-

munity rights, voluntarily submitted to questioning by the Hungarian police. The Communist police, however, were not satisfied with Kovacs' statement, and therefore on the second day of his interrogation Soviet soldiers invaded the police station and kidnaped him. This prominent Hungarian peasant leader has been detained at an undisclosed place ever since, and no one knows of his fate.

20. More Soviet pressure on Hungarian economy

At the beginning of 1947 the chairman of the Allied Control Commission informed me that according to the terms of the Potsdam agreement not only the former German assets in Hungary, but even the former German claims against Hungarian companies or individuals, were to pass into Russian hands. These claims represented a sum of \$240 million according to the arbitrary Soviet mark-dollar exchange ratings; that is, a higher sum than our total war reparations owing to the Soviet Union. I protested against this new demand and against the arbitrary figures and offered the Soviet Union \$5 million instead of the two hundred and forty they requested. This sum was later raised to \$10 million by the Cabinet Council. The Soviet authorities did not accept this offer and invited the Hungarian Government to Moscow for negotiations in this matter. Finance Minister Nyaradi was sent to Moscow on behalf of the Hungarian Government, and after many months of negotiations and even after my resignation as Prime Minister, was able to settle this new Russian claim for a sum close to \$40 million.

21. Soviet interference with legislative activities

Although the armistice agreement did not entitle the Red army to interfere with the work of the permanently elected Parliament, General Sviridov nevertheless did just that in 1946. Deputy Sandor Kiss of the Smallholders' Party submitted a bill to the House on the formation of a new agricultural corporation. The Communists opposed the bill, but since it was submitted by the majority party it was expected to pass. One day General Sviridov invited me to his office and informed me that the Control Commission was of the opinion that the bill submitted by Deputy Kiss was similar to the Italian system of corporations and was therefore considered a Fascist bill whose enactment the Control Commission did not approve. I told the general that Hungarian agriculture had always had a legal system of corporations, and that this was always a democratic setup. The new legislation would provide for an even more democratic system, since its leadership would be in the hands of the widest stratum of Hungarian society, the peasantry. Sviridov declared that he would not allow the discussion of the bill, and demanded its removal from the agenda. Thus the bill submitted by Deputy Kiss never reached the agenda of the House.

22. Soviet interference with the expulsion of ethnic Germans

In 1945 the Provisional Hungarian Government was notified by Marshal Voroshilov that according to the Potsdam agreement Hungary had to expatriate the ethnic Germans living in the country. As it later transpired, Voroshilov distorted the terms of the Potsdam agreement, because this pact did not require the Hungarian Government to expel its German population, but merely authorized the Government to do so.

The matter was discussed in the Cabinet meeting, where no one except myself was familiar with the problem, since I had grown up in a region where a large group of ethnic Germans lived. I submitted a counter proposal to the Russian demands, recommending that the Hungarian Government refuse to be a party to any collective measure, but instead would settle the problem of the German population on an individual basis, expatriating only those who were individually disloyal to their Hungarian fatherland. Those categories were the following: (1) German-speaking citizens who at the plebiscite of 1940-41 declared themselves to be not only of a German mother language but also of German nationality; (2) those who belonged to the "Volksbund," an anti-Hungarian subversive organization; (3) those who voluntarily joined any German armed body such as the SS, SA, etc.; (4) those who had previously changed their names to Hungarian-sounding names and later switched back to their German names. The Cabinet Council accepted my recommendations, but they were never carried out in practice. The question again came up after the 1945 elections, at the time of the Tildy Cabinet, when the resolution of the Provisional Government was changed and the Russian demand for the expulsions was accepted.

The actual expatriation of the Germans was delayed by technicalities until the time I took over the Government. One of my first steps was to start nego-

tiations with General Sviridov concerning the modification of the Cabinet Council's resolutions with the idea of revalidating the earlier resolution of the Provisional Government. After lengthy deliberations Sviridov finally agreed that the Minister for Internal Affairs would issue a confidential decree instructing the authorities in charge of the expatriation to include only those belonging to the above-mentioned groups. Naturally, there were numerous abuses, but while I was in office I did everything in my power to rectify the mistakes, and very often we took off the expatriating trains Germans who were being deported unjustly. After my resignation the Communist government deported the ethnic Germans without discrimination, and it often happened that those who formerly belonged to Nazi organizations and later joined the Communist Party were allowed to remain, and loyal, pro-Hungarian ethnic Germans were deported in their place.

23. Mass abductions by the Soviets

After the Soviet occupation of Hungary a practice heretofore unknown in military history was introduced in our country. Able-bodied men and women were rounded up in the streets and deported to the Soviet Union. In some regions every able-bodied man was deported, such as in the city of Tarpa in County Bereg, where none but the very young and the very old were left behind. This practice was continued in Transdanubia and even in Budapest. For many weeks it was dangerous to appear on the streets because of the risk of being arrested by a Soviet patrol, taken to a concentration camp and deported to Russia. The number of nonmilitary persons thus abducted is about 150,000.

24. Communist coup d'etat with Soviet assistance

After the arrest of Bela Kovacs it became evident that the Soviets aimed to liquidate the entire democratic political front in Hungary. It was also evident that only a few persons stood in the way of the Communist takeover, and therefore the Soviets, through the Communist Party, did everything within their power to eliminate these few anti-Communist leaders. During the conspiracy trial I had occasion to read a few confessions from which it appeared that the Communist police were endeavoring to gather evidence against me in order to be able to eliminate me at a propitious moment on the basis of this incriminating evidence. I was convinced however that the Communists would not be able to carry this out.

On the one hand, I had a great parliamentary majority, and on the other, I was, through the party, the leader of the largest stratum of Hungarian society and my liquidation seemed impossible without provoking a national scandal.

On May 14, 1947, I left on vacation that I intended to spend in Switzerland. Although the Communists made a solemn promise that they would not bring up any political questions in my absence, they immediately set out to prepare their coup d'etat. Two weeks after I left Hungary the Russian authorities officially replied to my request to release Bela Kovacs to the Hungarian authorities. In my absence their reply was delivered to Matthias Rakosi and it indicated that they would not release Bela Kovacs because the investigation was not yet closed. Enclosed with the letter was a handwritten statement by Bela Kovacs in which he, undoubtedly under brutal duress, claimed that not only he, but myself and Bela Varga, speaker of the Parliament had taken part in the conspiracy that was being investigated. The Communists took the matter before the Cabinet Council where I was branded a conspirator, and my immediate return to Hungary was demanded in order to face prosecution.

Ferenc Kapocs, my secretary, was arrested on that same evening, my office was searched and ransacked and all my papers were seized by the Communist police.

I decided to return to my country to face the charges. I was about to depart when I received a warning not to leave the territory of Switzerland. In spite of this I had decided to return when one of my assistants informed me that I would never be able to reach the Hungarian frontier since I would probably be arrested as soon as I reached the Russian zone in Austria. Only after this did I give up my plan to return to Hungary. Thereupon the Communists demanded my resignation from abroad. I was willing to comply on the condition that my 4½-year-old son whom I had left behind in Hungary be allowed to rejoin me in Switzerland, and that my secretary be released and allowed to leave the country.

My son was brought to the Austro-Swiss border on June 2, where I handed over my resignation in exchange for his release. Before my son arrived, a Communist secretary at the Berne Legation tried to obtain my resignation, which I flatly refused. A few days after my resignation I was granted a visa to the United States and since that time I have been living at Herndon, Va.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Counsel, will you proceed?

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you describe briefly your background, that is your place of birth, your background in brief, political and otherwise, and the last position you held in the government in Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. I was born in Bisse, a small village in South Hungary as a poor peasant boy. I was about 20 years old when I started to write articles for different papers, and a few years later I got into politics, always on the side of the Hungarian peasants.

In 1930 a few friends and I established the opposition Smallholders' Party which, after the war, became the majority party in Hungary. I was elected as general secretary the very same day when the party was founded in 1930, October 12.

In 1939 I was elected as a member of Parliament, and in 1944, April, when the Nazis occupied Hungary, because of my anti-Nazi attitude, I was imprisoned by the Gestapo. I was held in prison for 6 months, and I was released in 1944, October 10, on an agreement between the so-called Lakatos government and the German Government that all legislators would be released from the German prison.

We who were in Budapest, six of us, including Bacszizilinski, who was later executed by the Nazis, were released, but when we left the prison it was the very same day the pro-Nazi government took over, so we had to hide immediately.

I spent months in Budapest and finally the Soviet Army captured the city and I was free. I started immediately to reorganize the Smallholders' Party. I wanted to dedicate all my time and energy to this work, but in May 1945 I had to accept a government job and I became Minister of Reconstruction.

In August of 1945 I was elected as the president of the Smallholders' Party, and Bela Kovacs succeeded me as general secretary of the party. After the elections held in 1945, November 4, I was elected as speaker of the Parliament. I held this position until 1946, February 3, when we established the new form of state, the Republic of Hungary, and Prime Minister Tildy was elected as President of the Republic. I had to take the Prime Ministership.

I was Prime Minister till 1947, June 2, when I had to resign. I resided in Switzerland after my resignation. I soon got a visa from the Government of the United States, and I came here, arriving in 1947, June 14. Since that time I have been living here. In September of the same year I bought a farm in Herndon, Va., and I am still living there, in Herndon, Va.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is your family here with you now, Mr. Nagy?

Mr. NAGY. All my children and my wife are here, but my father-in-law and my mother-in-law are in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. From time to time during the course of our hearings, Mr. Nagy, we have received testimony concerning certain exiled Communists, exiled from the various countries before the Soviets took over, who have been sent to Moscow for certain training and who, after the Communist takeover, returned to the country which

had been taken over and hold high administrative positions. Did you find that to be the case in Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. Absolutely.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us briefly some of the so-called luminaries who were involved?

Mr. NAGY. Those Communists who escaped from Hungary after the failure of the first Communist movement in 1919 went to Moscow led by Matthew Rakosi. Among these so-called leading Communists, the most outstanding were Erno Gero, Mihaly Farkas, Imre Nagy, and Zoltan Vas.

There were several lesser people. Many of them went to Spain and took part in the Spanish Civil War, but after they lost that war they returned again to Moscow.

Mr. McTIGUE. Hungary was no exception to the general rule?

Mr. NAGY. No, no, no.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time when a provisional government was established in Hungary following the end of hostilities?

Mr. NAGY. The idea of the temporary government came up in Moscow. Secondly, by those Hungarians, Communists of Hungarian origin who were living in Moscow. It was negotiated, as far as I know, first with those leading armistice delegation sent by Regent Horthy through the front lines arrived in Moscow, and finally with those generals who didn't want to follow the new Nazi regime, and went through the front lines to Moscow. So the Communists took part in the negotiations of establishing a provisional government immediately when the idea came up in Moscow.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your statement, Mr. Nagy, from the circumstances under which the provisional government was established which you have just briefly described takes us step by step along the way in describing the setting up of the provisional assembly, the Russian interference in the Government function and the armistice agreement.

I want to remind you again that this is all in the verbatim testimony. This is right up to the elections of 1945. I am for the moment going to go over to the elections in Hungary in 1945 and ask you briefly to describe those elections, and your subsequent ascendancy in 1946 to the position of Prime Minister of Hungary.

Mr. NAGY. So I can abandon the question of the provisional government and the other questions and come to the elections?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct for the moment, but it may be that the chairman and the committee members will want to go back to that.

Mr. NAGY. I agree with the testimony given by Monsignor Varga on the question of the 1945 elections. I would just like to add something to his testimony. As he said, the Communist Party and, naturally, the Russians thought that if they held the election first in Budapest, by the results of the Budapest election they could influence the country for the general election.

It was a hopeless technique on their part. After the Soviet occupation many people of the so-called middle classes left Budapest. Many of them had been arrested. Many of them had been impoverished. So Budapest became a workingman's city. They were sure that the majority of the workers of the whole population of Budapest would join the Communist Party.

We got advice from abroad, from the West. Don't enter that Budapest election, because if the Smallholders' Party loses the election in Budapest, it will make a bad impression in the West."

But our opinion was that even if we lost the election in Budapest it would not influence the country because before the war the Smallholders' Party had never organized itself systematically in Budapest, and we thought if we got only 25 or 30 percent of the total vote of the Budapest population, it would mean a victory for a newly organized party.

So we accepted the challenge, and we entered the election. At that time Monsignor Varga was the chairman of the local party organization of Budapest. I can say here that the final result, which won us more than 50 percent of the total votes, resulted mostly because of the work of Monsignor Varga and his associates.

Naturally the results of the Budapest election deeply influenced the country people. We got about 52 percent of the total votes in the general election from the whole country outside of Budapest and, as Monsignor Varga testified, we got 58 percent of the total votes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, Mr. Minister, isn't it true that this was the first time that an election had been won by a government whose territory and country was occupied by the Soviet Army?

Mr. NAGY. That is correct, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. It never happened before and it has never happened again?

Mr. NAGY. It never happened in Hungary; it never happened before in central and eastern Europe.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead. I just wanted to make that point.

Let me ask you this: After the election, with the tremendous success of the Smallholders' Party, did the Smallholders' Party then attempt to form a government?

Mr. NAGY. According to the rules of democracy, we had the right to establish a majority government in Hungary because with a 58-percent majority, any party is in the position to establish its own government.

But it was understood by the Allied Control Commission that the Allied Control Commission would not agree to establish a party government; the Commission would recognize only a coalition government.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Counsel, may I break in there?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Nagy, you say the Allied Control Commission would not recognize a one-party government but only a coalition government after the 1945 elections. How was that knowledge conveyed to you; how did you know that they would not do that?

Mr. NAGY. Before the elections we had daily negotiations with Marshal Voroshilov. After the Budapest elections he didn't want to allow a free election in which all parties would participate independently. They wanted to force a joint list on us. There were negotiations every day.

First, Marshal Voroshilov proposed that the Smallholders' Party would have 40 percent of the candidates on the common list.

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me. You were taking a personal part in these conversations with the marshal?

Mr. NAGY. Every day.

Mr. BENTLEY. Go ahead.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did any other members of the Control Commission sit in on these?

Mr. NAGY. No, no; never.

Mr. McTIGUE. Just Marshal Voroshilov.

Mr. NAGY. Yes. I will say something in connection with this. At first Marshal Voroshilov wanted to give us 22 percent. The third day 25 percent. Finally, 37½ percent for the Smallholders' Party.

During these negotiations he made it absolutely clear that we had to establish a coalition government in any event; that even though the Smallholders' Party won in the election it could not establish its own government; and that it would be better to make a joint list before the election and save the country from the excitement of the fight between the parties.

You asked, Mr. Counselor, whether other members of the Allied Control Commission participated in this discussion. My answer is definitely "No."

I have more to say. Later when I was Prime Minister I got an order from the President or the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission to make contact with the other members—which meant with America and with Great Britain—only through the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission. He wanted to prohibit any direct contact with the American and British members of the Allied Control Commission.

Mr. BONIN. Who was the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission?

Mr. NAGY. Marshal Voroshilov, who is now President of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BENTLEY. And later his deputy, General Sviridov.

Mr. NAGY. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Nagy, I would like to hear again, From whom did you receive that letter and in what capacity?

Mr. NAGY. From Marshal Voroshilov, who as the head of the Allied Control Commission told me that I could have connections with the British and American members of the Allied Control Commission only through him, not directly.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did he write that in his individual capacity?

Mr. NAGY. No, as the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did he indicate in that letter that that was the agreement among the three members of the Commission?

Mr. NAGY. It didn't mention anything about an agreement, but it mentioned the right as coming from the Armistice Agreement. I don't believe, I didn't believe even at that time, that he had the right to prohibit direct connection with the western members of the Allied Control Commission, but it was official; the directive from the Allied Control Commission was naturally the official way we accepted for an official connection. We accepted this order but we always found a way to inform the other members of the Allied Control Commission of anything that happened between us and Marshal Voroshilov.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Will you repeat again, About what date did you receive that letter?

Mr. NAGY. I cannot say. It is very difficult to give you, Mr. Congressman, any dates because when I went for my vacation I really went for a vacation and planned to return, and I didn't even take a small piece of paper with me. So I have to base all the dates on my memory alone.

Mr. FEIGHAN. May I ask you this: Did you receive that letter before the November 1945 elections?

Mr. NAGY. No; I was already Prime Minister.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Was that before the formation of the government in which the Communists were given the Minister of Interior?

Mr. NAGY. No; after that.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Continue, Mr. Nagy.

Mr. NAGY. So it was clear that the Allied Control Commission would not allow a party government; we had to establish a coalition government.

It was the hardest time in our life because the negotiations to form a new government lasted just about 2 weeks. We decided not to take more of the government jobs than 50 percent, because we thought if we took 58 percent according to the votes of the election, we would have to take all the responsibility for the activities of the government, which was very difficult under Soviet occupation with a coalition government.

It would have meant that we had left the Communists and other members of the government free from the responsibility because we had the majority in that government. So we divided the jobs: 50 percent was held by the Smallholders' Party, and 50 percent was divided among the other three parties—the Communist Party, the Social Democrat Party, and the National Peasants' Party which participated with one member.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Nagy, did the Russians insist that all four parties be in the coalition?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Social Democrats, the Peasants Party, and the Communist Party?

Mr. NAGY. Yes. They didn't permit the inclusion of the other small parties: for example, the Citizens Democratic Party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did the Russians ever tell you or did Marshal Voroshilov ever tell you what would happen if you didn't agree to the coalition government?

Mr. NAGY. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. He never did?

Mr. NAGY. No; never.

Mr. BENTLEY. Never made any threats?

Mr. NAGY. No. He just told me the Allied Control Commission would not recognize it; that was enough.

Mr. FEIGHAN. When you referred to the distribution of jobs, were you referring to the jobs of ministerial stature?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. The cabinet?

Mr. NAGY. Yes; because in the European countries the Minister of Interior takes control over the police forces, and we had had very sad

experiences from the time of the provisional government. Naturally we wanted to keep most of all the post of Minister of Interior.

The Communist Party wanted to have this job from the very beginning, but at the end of the first week when we didn't agree with this, finally they gave up their demand for this job and agreed that the Smallholders' Party would have it.

We had our candidate for this job, Mr. Bela Kovacs. One evening I even reported it to the party, that that was the agreement. Finally the Communist Party agreed upon the Smallholders' Minister of Interior.

Then we went and we negotiated on other jobs, other ministers, and at the end of the second week the Communist Party came back and said they could not keep the agreement because there was no country in central and eastern Europe in which the Minister of Interior wasn't a Communist.

There was another question. I saw that the Communist Party wanted to take over the entire economy, and I made an attempt to divide the economic questions inside of the cabinet, and I wanted a Minister of Cooperatives in the hands of the small landowners because the armistice agreement provided that I had to negotiate regarding this new job with Voroshilov.

When I went to Voroshilov and told him that I saw it would be very practical to establish a Minister of Cooperatives for the Smallholders' Party and at the same time I mentioned that the Communist Party had made an agreement saying they would not demand the job of Minister of Interior, then Voroshilov just repeated what Rakosi said:

Just look around, Mr. Nagy, can you find a country in central and eastern Europe in which the Minister of Interior is not a Communist?

So it was evident that the Communist Party broke the agreement under the influence of Marshal Voroshilov. So we had to give up this job as well as the Minister of Cooperatives because Voroshilov declared he would never agree to establish a Minister of Cooperatives.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who became Minister of Interior?

Mr. NAGY. Imre Nagy, who is now Premier in Hungary.

Mr. BONIN. No relation to you; is he?

Mr. NAGY. No. It is a very common name. Thank God he is no relation.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you assume the Prime Ministership, on what date?

Mr. NAGY. It is quite a story. I didn't want to talk about it but because I did not read the prepared statement maybe we can have more time to talk about it.

Mr. Tildy, who was Prime Minister after the election, became a candidate for President of the Republic. There was some effort made to force me to accept this job, President of the Republic. I decided to make use of the fact that some people did not want me to be Prime Minister. So finally I told Mr. Tildy that I would support him for President of the Republic if he would assure me that I did not have to follow him as Prime Minister.

So we made an agreement to accept a third party as Prime Minister because I wanted to remain in a job in which I could take care of the party. Unfortunately, when the question became very serious,

the agreement failed, and I had to take the job of Prime Minister. It was February 4, 1946.

Mr. McTIGUE. Right after you became Prime Minister, did you receive a series of letters from the Soviet making certain demands upon you?

Mr. NAGY. Yes. When I agreed to head the Government I asked for a solemn promise from the leaders of other parties that until the harvest they would not bring up any political questions because the food situation in Hungary was very serious and I was afraid that if any political question would come up, the Hungarian people would have a revolution.

They promised to avoid any political questions until harvest, but about 6 weeks later, or 5 weeks later, in March, the Communist Party demanded a purge of the so-called reactionary elements from the Smallholders' Party. We refused this demand and we refused again when the demand was repeated.

Then one day I got a letter from the commander of the occupation army that the Red army had given a lot of food to the population of Budapest in 1945; now they needed this food, and asked me to return it in 8 days. We hadn't any food, nothing. The Soviet knew that very well.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was this the following day that you got the second letter?

Mr. NAGY. Sometimes the very next day, or 2 or 3 days later. Then I got another letter in which the Russians said that the Hungarian Government hadn't fulfilled the reparations quota for Russia; if I did not fulfill the rest, they would have to take care of this question themselves, and they let us know that they would take our machinery from the factories for reparations.

The third day I got another letter in which the Russians said that while in 1945, August, the Hungarian Government delegation had made a so-called trade agreement with Russia and according to this agreement the Soviet Union had delivered 12 million rubles of assets to Hungary while the Hungarian Government had delivered only one and a half million, they informed me that the Hungarian Government would stop the materials, the raw materials for Hungary if the Hungarian Government did not start immediately—

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Soviet Government would stop it?

Mr. NAGY. Yes. It would have meant that all our factories would have had to be closed without the raw materials. Naturally it would have caused riot or unrest on the part of the workers who would have been in a position to take over power, with the support of the Red army, any day.

They said that the Potsdam agreement authorized the Soviet Union to take all the goods owned by German citizens located in Hungary, and that the Hungarian Government was sabotaging deliveries, therefore the Russians would have to take them directly.

Finally I got a fifth letter in which the commander of the occupation army said that the food supply of the Russian army wasn't satisfactory and that if I did not take measures to improve it immediately the Russian army would requisition the food directly from the peasants.

After the fifth letter we expelled 20 of our deputies from the Smallholders' Party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Could you tell me for approximately how many Russian soldiers the people of Hungary were required to provide food?

Mr. NAGY. We were never told.

Mr. BENTLEY. But you were told how much food you had to supply?

Mr. NAGY. Yes; how much food we had to deliver, but we were never told for how many soldiers.

Mr. BENTLEY. Could you estimate the number of Russian soldiers in Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. It is very difficult. It was said there were 600,000, but this is an opinion, not an exact figure.

Mr. McTIGUE. So your answer to the series of requests made upon you was the expulsion of 26 Smallholders' Party deputies?

Mr. NAGY. Yes; we could do nothing else.

Mr. McTIGUE. That settled the issue then with the Soviet?

Mr. NAGY. For the time being. That was the salami or bologna tactic, the first slice!

Mr. McTIGUE. Just about that time or shortly thereafter, did a representative of the American Legation approach you regarding the setting up of certain airfields in Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, Mr. Counsellor. He was Mr. Kerenstead, a member of the legation or an attaché of the air——

Mr. McTIGUE. He was a civil air attaché?

Mr. NAGY. Yes. He came to see me and raised the question whether the Hungarian Government would be ready to start negotiations with the American Government to connect Hungary into the Far East air line with an airfield in Hungary.

Naturally it was much more than we could hope for at that time to be part of such a great communication line. I was very happy to have this question raised, but I immediately told him that in Hungary not only the airfields but even the air space was under the control of the Soviet army, so I had to start negotiations with them first.

I asked Mr. Pushkin to see me and I told him that it would be in the interest of Hungary if we could connect with these airlines. Mr. Pushkin's answer was, "will you tell the Americans that if they want an airport for their Far East line, they can get it much easier in Russia than in Hungary."

Mr. BONIN. Who is Mr. Pushkin, Mr. Nagy?

Mr. NAGY. He was the Soviet Minister to Budapest. Now he is Ambassador to East Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. It was just about this time, Mr. Minister, that negotiations were proceeding as far as the ultimate peace treaty was concerned, the signing of the peace treaty?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. In April of 1946 did you receive an invitation to Moscow?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. In connection with the peace treaty which was near the signatory stage?

Mr. NAGY. It was suggested by the Russians that we visit Moscow, but naturally officially we had to raise the question ourselves. We decided to go to Moscow for several reasons. First to ask for Russian support for Hungary's peace aims. Second, to release the prisoners of war. Third, to lighten the reparation load, and to eliminate some

Russian economic demands. For example, they had asked for \$15 million from us because they said they had repaired the Hungarian railroads.

We were received in Moscow and we negotiated first regarding the Hungarian peace aims.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, Mr. Nagy. Who went with you to Moscow?

Mr. NAGY. Mr. Szakasits the Deputy Prime Minister, from the Social Democratic Party, Mr. Gero, Minister of Communication.

Mr. BENTLEY. From the Communist Party?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, and Mr. Gyongyosi, from the Smallholders' Party.

I must mention that the Communist Party did everything in Hungary to put obstacles in our way in trying to work out a peace treaty. The Smallholders' Party started to work out a Hungarian peace treaty under Mr. Paul Auer in April 1945, but we never had the Communists or the Socialists participating in working out a peace treaty. But when we got an invitation from Moscow, naturally the Communists had to take part in establishing a basis for our demands in Moscow.

We had some demands on Rumania concerning Transylvania. We had to plan for the Czechoslovakian intention to expel the Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. So we had to have some basis to negotiate with the Soviet Government.

When I brought up the question about Transylvania, Mr. Stalin asked me, "What is your reason for bringing up this question? You know that there is an armistice agreement with Rumania in which the great powers have obligated themselves that if Rumania would fulfill all the conditions of the armistice, Rumania would be given all of Transylvania or the larger part of Transylvania."

I said, "The basis of the title of our claim is the second part of this sentence. The great powers have not given all of Transylvania to Rumania, but there is a reservation regarding all of Transylvania or a larger part of it."

Mr. Stalin acknowledged that we had the right to raise the question of Transylvania and he acknowledged we had the right to protest against the Czechoslovakian intention to expel the Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.

The next day I met Mr. Molotov. Mr. Molotov made a suggestion, saying, "It would be better if you would make direct contact with Mr. Groza and try to negotiate about Transylvania with him."

Mr. McTIGUE. The Prime Minister of Rumania?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, at the time. He was later President of the Republic.

Mr. FEIGHAN. He was the Communist leader that took over after the visit of Vishinsky, subsequent to which, on March 6, 1945, the Communists took over Rumania?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, Mr. Congressman. He was placed directly by Vishinsky into the position of the Prime Ministership.

I told Mr. Molotov at once, "That is absolutely hopeless. Mr. Groza has an election coming up. What political leader would agree to give up part of his country before elections?" But he suggested that we make direct contact with him. I finally accepted the idea with the condition that they would suggest to Mr. Groza, as well, that he had to make contact with us. I sent our representative to Bucharest, but Mr. Groza just threw him out.

In 1946—May 12—the 3 Foreign Ministers of the great powers—perhaps 4, because the French had just started to participate in the international negotiations of the 4 great powers—had a meeting in Paris in which they decided to give all of Transylvania to Rumania.

I protested against this decision to the Russian Minister in Budapest, but, naturally, he could do nothing.

When I came here in June 1947 and met Mr. Byrnes, at that time Secretary of State, I learned that the May 12 decision of the Foreign Ministers in Paris had been proposed by Mr. Molotov. In spite of the admission of Mr. Stalin that we had the right to raise the question about Transylvania, Mr. Molotov had proposed in Paris to give all of Transylvania to Rumania.

At the same time Mr. Byrnes had said that if we would convince Mr. Molotov about new negotiations to reconsider the May 12 decision in Paris, America would be ready to support the Hungarian aims.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was it to this meeting in Moscow in 1946 which you have just described that your wife accompanied you?

Mr. NAGY. Oh, yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did your wife report any conversation to you that Mrs. Molotov had with her?

Mr. NAGY. Yes. One evening when we met each other after the affairs of the day, she asked, "Do you know what Mrs. Molotov said today?" I said, "Yes, I know." "How do you know that?" she asked. "Because Mrs. Molotov told me something, too, and I think it is the same thing. They are inviting our son to Moscow."

My son, my oldest child, at that time was 20 years old. Mrs. Molotov suggested to my wife, and Mr. Molotov suggested to me, to send him to Moscow for a few months to study life inside of the Soviet Union.

When we got back to Budapest I told my son, "You have an invitation from Mr. and Mrs. Molotov." Then my son said, "Father, I never asked anything since you have been in this position, but now I would like to ask you to send me to the United States." I did.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were in the United States did you see President Truman?

Mr. NAGY. Oh, yes; I saw him.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the purpose of your visit?

Mr. NAGY. Just to pay him a visit and to ask the American Government to support the Hungarian peace plan, and there were several other things. Among them, the most outstanding was that the Nazi Government had taken the gold of the Hungarian National Bank to Germany. The American Army was in charge of this gold. We wanted to have it be a basis for currency stabilization. We were living at that time with very great inflation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Inflation was running wild in Hungary at that time, wasn't it?

Mr. NAGY. Absolutely. One morning the Minister of Finance came to me, and said, "Mr. Prime Minister, we cannot afford to print the currency unless we leave out one color." Another day he came, and said, "We cannot afford to print the bills unless we leave out the number on them." I said, "Leave it out."

The situation was bad, so bad that the so-called economic superintendent every morning had to have a meeting and fix the wages

and prices for that day. In the morning when the council held its meeting, we fixed the wages of the workers and officers.

Money was just about 22 percent of the prewar value one morning. That evening when people got their money and went to the market to buy food, the value was only 8 percent. That was how fast the inflation was. So it was very important to have stabilization. Therefore, we needed the gold of the Hungarian National Bank which was in the hands of the American Army.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Under whose authorization was the printing of the bills done?

Mr. NAGY. The Hungarian Government.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Was that under a ministry that was controlled by a Communist?

Mr. NAGY. No; it was the Finance Ministry, which was in the hands of the Smallholders' Party.

The Government of the United States immediately returned the gold. We got a promise from the American Government about the 10th of June in 1946, and a few weeks later the gold was in Budapest, and on August 1 we had our stable currency.

Naturally gold was not the only basis. The confidence of the people was just as important as the gold, but fortunately we were able to stop the inflation.

Mr. BENTLEY. You changed the medium of exchange also, didn't you?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now after your return from Washington in December of 1946 the Soviet launched a trumped-up conspiracy charge; is that correct?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, sir; it is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. To what extent were you personally involved in those charges?

Mr. NAGY. It became clear later. The conspiracy case naturally started on a Soviet pattern. It started with the action of the military secret police. These police, under the direction of Colonel Palfy-Oesterreicher, who was later hanged as a Titoist by the Communists, captured good Hungarians and accused them of planning a conspiracy against the state and against the Hungarian democracy. About 15 or 20 persons were charged.

I called the Defense Minister, General Bartha, and asked him to visit the prison and ask the prisoners personally about their activities. He immediately went to do that, but Colonel Palfy-Oesterreicher refused, saying, first of all, "They are not here now; they are in the hands of the police." And then he said, "Secondly, General Sviridov, the deputy head of the Allied Control Commission, has forbidden anyone to see these prisoners."

When I heard this I immediately went to General Sviridov and asked him whether it was true that he had given an order to Colonel Palfy forbidding anyone from seeing the prisoners. General Sviridov answered, "It is not true. Colonel Palfy was here. He told me something about these conspiracy cases. My answer was that it is purely a Hungarian case and I will not interfere in this."

I went back, immediately called General Bartha again, and ordered him to dismiss Colonel Palfy and start an investigation of him. The

very same day, that afternoon, General Kondratov, head of the Military Department of the Allied Control Commission, came to see me and said, "General Sviridov has heard you have ordered an investigation of Colonel Palffy. He would like to say that it is a great mistake. It is true that General Sviridov didn't say anything to Colonel Palffy about seeing the prisoners, but the interpreter misunderstood and translated the wrong words to Colonel Palffy." He said, "So Colonel Palffy just misunderstood the thing. He is innocent."

I said, "Thank you very much. That is all right. During the investigation this question will come up." The general said, "That is not enough. General Sviridov wants you to stop at once the investigation of Colonel Palffy." I said, "No. If he is innocent, he will have no trouble."

Then Kontratorov said, "If you don't stop the investigation of Colonel Palffy, the whole conspiracy case will be taken over by the Red army police."

I naturally immediately stopped the investigation of Colonel Palffy.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Nagy, let me ask you one thing: Were the Russians permitted to or did they communicate with any branch of the Hungarian Government or did they have to communicate with every ministry through you or were they allowed to communicate with anybody at any time?

Mr. NAGY. They abused the terms of the armistice agreement and they made contact with anyone they wanted to.

Mr. BENTLEY. What did the armistice agreement provide?

Mr. NAGY. The armistice agreement provided for control of the conditions under which we lived.

Mr. BENTLEY. I mean as far as communication is concerned.

Mr. NAGY. Nothing.

Mr. BENTLEY. It didn't provide anything?

Mr. NAGY. Nothing.

Mr. BENTLEY. And the Russians would establish communication with any part of the Hungarian Government they cared to at any time?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENTLEY. They didn't have to go through you?

Mr. NAGY. No. They were in a position to order me to communicate only through them, but I did not have the power to tell them that they could contact Hungarians only through me.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was the conspiracy investigation completed and when was the trial started against the so-called conspiracy?

Mr. NAGY. I think the work of the police never stopped before the trial. The arrest of persons stopped with Bela Kovacs. Bela Kovacs, as Monsignor Varga said, was taken by the Red army because the Hungarian Parliament wouldn't remove his immunity, but the police worked on the people, not only before the trial but during the trial, with the support and cooperation of the Red army police.

For example, there was the case of Balint Arany, one of the most wonderful Hungarian gentlemen, who had participated in the resistance against the Nazis and, naturally, against Communists, too. When he was put on trial he said he withdrew all his confession made before the police because he had been tortured, but now he would withdraw all the confession since he was innocent.

He was taken immediately from the courthouse back to the police and from the Hungarian police to the NKVD building, and 1 week later he confessed everything. So even during the trial—the court trial—the police were working on the people who were accused in the conspiracy case.

Mr. McTIGUE. From some of the evidence, so-called, which was admitted at that trial and from some of the confessions that were read at the trial, did you start then to get the very definite feeling that it wouldn't be long before you yourself were on the list?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, sir.

The police tortured those who were imprisoned and they got confessions from those people, not only against themselves but against those who hadn't been arrested yet. So that was the system—to arrest the best part of Hungarian society—to get a confession from those who were already in against those who were still out.

For example, Bela Kovacs, when he went under immunity to the police to defend his case, came back at noon after a few hours of interrogation and he said, "Bourljatzo (?) was there and he told me to my face that I was wrong and that the confession he was making was a true one."

Mr. McTIGUE. Just about the time of the trial, did you have occasion to leave Hungary for a brief vacation?

Mr. NAGY. I was very tired after 16 months of this kind of work, and I wanted to rest for 2 or 3 weeks, and I decided to go on a vacation. I felt that after the conspiracy case there might be a few weeks in which I could leave the country, so I decided to go to Switzerland.

It was impossible to rest in Hungary because my situation was very different from prewar prime ministers. All the people who voted for us had the right to see us any time they wanted, so I had to go somewhere abroad.

My daughter at that time was a student at the University of Geneva, and we thought that it would be best to rest a little in Switzerland and at the same time to visit our daughter.

Before I went there I again asked for a promise from all leaders of the parties, not to bring up any kind of political question. Naturally they didn't keep the promise because a few days after I left Hungary they brought up the nationalization of the banks. But it wasn't important. The people who stayed could handle this question. But the Soviet took opportunity of my absence.

In March, the early part of March, a few weeks after Mr. Bela Kovacs had been arrested by the Russian Army, I had officially requested his return to the Hungarian authorities. They didn't answer until May, but when I was out of the country they found the time appropriate to answer.

They sent a letter to the Hungarian Government in which they said they could not release Bela Kovacs because they hadn't completed his investigation, but they enclosed his confession about the conspiracy case.

In this confession Bela Kovacs said that not only he but Monsignor Varga and myself were involved in the conspiracy too. When the Communist Deputy Prime Minister got this letter, he immediately called a cabinet meeting and decided to ask me to return, but the very same day they arrested my secretary, took all correspondence and papers from my office, and formally demanded that I come back.

I wanted to go back. I told Mr. Tildy and other members of the Cabinet who talked with me by phone, that I would return. On the very morning I wanted to leave, I got a call from Berne, from the Hungarian Minister to Berne, saying that Mr. Gyongyosi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had telephoned him and asked him to send this message to me, "Don't leave Switzerland."

I answered the Minister, "I will leave Switzerland in any event and I will return to Hungary." I tried to telephone Budapest to ask the President of the Republic whether he knew something about this message or not.

In the evening I reached Berne and the Minister said he had had the opportunity to talk to the President of the Republic who had said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs telephoned this message with his knowledge and agreement. I said, "in spite of this I will go back to Hungary."

Then another gentleman from my office telephoned to the Minister in Berne that if I tried to return, I might get back to Budapest, but it was not very probable; it was much more likely that something would happen in the Soviet zone of Austria through which I had to pass.

Then I decided not to return to Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. At that time or right after your decision not to return, they nevertheless wanted a resignation from you, is that correct?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the condition attached to it?

Mr. NAGY. They telephoned me through the Minister and asked for my resignation. My wife was with me, but at that time our youngest child, a 4½-year-old boy, was in Hungary. I said, "I am ready to resign if they will send out the boy and release my secretary and leave him free to go abroad."

Then the secretary of the Hungarian Legation in Berne came to me and said he had authority to ask me to sign my resignation before the boy was out of Hungary because they wanted the resignation. I said, "I will not sign my resignation before the boy arrives in Switzerland."

Then on June 2 they sent the boy out, and I resigned.

Mr. McTIGUE. One more question, Mr. Nagy. Were you in the room this morning when the Reverend Vatai testified?

Mr. NAGY. Yes; I was here, but I couldn't hear anything because it is absolutely impossible to hear from the benches anybody who is facing the committee.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you know him in Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. Oh, yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your estimate of him?

Mr. NAGY. Of Mr. Vatai?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes.

Mr. NAGY. An excellent, very reliable, very loyal Hungarian, a very able man who years before the war was regarded as one of the best Hungarian philosophers.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all.

Mr. BOXIN. Mr. Minister, I would like to ask two questions of you. When did you first make application for a visa from our State Department in Switzerland?

Mr. NAGY. I never did; really, I never did, but as I understood, the Hungarian Minister to Switzerland went to the Embassy, the American Embassy, and they negotiated about a visa for me and for my family. So I can say I never asked for it and it was a very great surprise for me when I got the American visa.

Mr. BONIN. How long did you have to wait before you got it?

Mr. NAGY. Oh, I can say not at all. I had to wait for airplane passage but not for the visa. Frankly, when I got the visa I wanted to get to the United States immediately because the Swiss Government refused to let me make a declaration, make a statement. So I wanted to get into the United States to be free and to say what had happened and how.

Mr. BONIN. In other words, you were not permitted in Switzerland to give a statement as to what actually happened about your relinquishment of the post of Prime Minister of Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. No, sir, except on the very last day I was to leave Switzerland the Minister of Foreign Affairs allowed me to make a statement and to hold a press conference.

Mr. BONIN. The first time you had an opportunity to make a full statement concerning the——

Mr. NAGY. It was in the United States.

Mr. BONIN. I was very fascinated by this story of the formation of the coalition government in Hungary, and I had the opportunity in July of being in Rome. I was amazed when I was told by an official authority over there that our United States Government had compelled the Italian Government at the time they were creating a government for Italy after the war to take Communists into their government too.

It was something that was very surprising to me, and I believe at this time part of the trouble in Italy is the fact the Communists were given recognition in their government, for it helped to give them a foothold and dignity and respect which I don't believe they should have had.

Therefore it is a pattern following itself all the way through in all these different countries.

I think you have made a very splendid contribution to these hearings and I want to thank you very much.

Mr. NAGY. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. There was a gentleman who went to China and insisted upon a coalition government there too.

Mr. BONIN. Right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Nagy, with reference to the reaction of the Allied Control Commission to your efforts to form a cabinet which, under ordinary circumstances, would be a cabinet of the choosing of the Smallholders' Party, did you ask the United States member of the Allied Control Commission about what you were going to do; that is, how you were going to plan to set up your cabinet?

Mr. NAGY. No. Eventually we told everything to the representatives of the United States. But in such formal negotiations as we had with the Russians there were no Americans or British present because the negotiations were always initiated by the other side. We took care every day, naturally, to inform the American and British representatives.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did you mention to the United States member of that Allied Control Commission the contents of the letter of General Voroshilov in which he said that you were not permitted to deal directly with either the British or the French or the Americans?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, I mentioned that, and maybe the result was that at that time General Weems started to write letters directly to me, not through the head of the Commission but wrote letters direct to me.

I just remember the contents of one such letter. Maybe it was a reaction, maybe if Marshal Voroshilov hadn't brought it up, hadn't brought up this question of indirect communication, General Weems would have continued to go through the head of the Commission. But since that time he wrote his letters always direct to me.

For example, I remember one letter. When the Russian member of the Allied Control Commission insisted on the expulsion of the German population from Hungary and they consequently used the requirement that the Hungarian Government had to expel the German population from Hungary, one day I got a letter from General Weems in which he wrote:

"I would like to correct the interpretation of Marshal Voroshilov about the expulsion of the German people from Hungary. The Potsdam agreement does allow the Hungarian Government to expel the German population, but the Hungarian Government does not have to expel, the Hungarian Government isn't obliged by the Potsdam agreement to expel them, except those categories which are covered by the armistice agreement."

Mr. FEIGHAN. You are familiar, are you not, Mr. Nagy, with the Kersten amendment passed by the United States Congress which provides for the establishment of national military units to be an adjunct to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization armed forces?

Mr. NAGY. In connection with the \$100 million?

Mr. FEIGHAN. Yes.

Mr. NAGY. Yes, I know something about that.

Mr. FEIGHAN. What reaction do you think it would have on the people of Hungary if those national military units were established?

Mr. NAGY. I can give, Mr. Congressman, only an opinion on this question and not facts because I do not believe anybody knows the facts about the intensions of the people. It would be very desirable if the oppressed Central and Eastern European countries could have their own free, small or large, military units among the liberation army if the time could come.

However, I am afraid that the situation is the same as I heard one of the American generals report on the Chiang Kai-shek Army. Those soldiers who are in the free world became old. But I feel that our real military forces are behind the Iron Curtain. I am sure if the spirit of those who would lead some smaller or larger national military units, if they are real democrats, the people, the soldiers behind the Iron Curtain would take the first opportunity to join these units.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Do you think that if those units were established that by virtue of the people behind the Iron Curtain being encouraged, that there are people of their own blood and nationality in the army who are willing to fight for their freedom of their own land?

Do you not think that that would create in the minds of the Russian Communist oppressors who have their headquarters in Moscow a hesitancy about entering into a war because they might feel that the people in the Iron Curtain countries that are oppressed and subjugated would not fight against the free West?

MR. NAGY. It would be a very fortunate thing if the authorities of the NATO army could find a possibility of establishing these national units, but I would like again to emphasize, Congressman, that we have to follow in all our dealings with the Iron Curtain countries those sentiments and feelings which are in the soul of the people at this time.

Times have changed very much. We cannot have an army 20 years old which would be a menace toward the Hungarian people. It is very difficult to find here in exile those real democratic military leaders who could show a modern and reasonable understanding for the present Hungarian, Polish, or Czechoslovakian people.

MR. FEIGHAN. Mr. Nagy, perhaps I misinterpret your answer or you misinterpret my question. I was not referring to the establishment of the national military units only for people who have already escaped from behind the Iron Curtain or who may have been here under orderly procedure, but to use them as an instrument of encouragement for the people to escape to join these national military units, whether the escapees may be ordinary civilians or members of the armed services within the Iron Curtain.

MR. NAGY. I agree with this idea, Mr. Congressman. Really I misunderstood you. I agree with this idea because I am informed that most of those people who are escaping from the Iron Curtain countries are young people who do not want to be soldiers under the Red flag.

I am sure these people would immediately join a so-called liberation army because they are eager to do something for liberation.

MR. FEIGHAN. One further question. Do you think peaceful coexistence is possible of attainment between the free world and the communism as espoused by the madmen in the Kremlin?

MR. NAGY. No, sir; I do not believe so. I do not believe so simply because the word "communism" does not want coexistence with the free world. Coexistence would mean giving up the final aim of communism, and communism will never give up its final aim, world domination.

I believe in coexistence between the Western World and Russia and China if the conditions of coexistence could be dictated by the Western World.

MR. FEIGHAN. I assume you have in mind in coexistence with Russia you mean Muscovy, that is eliminating from the Russian Empire the 15 non-Russian nations that, along with Moscow, comprise the U. S. S. R.

MR. NAGY. I didn't want to go so far, Congressman, because it would take very careful study, but it is my opinion—and I am under oath and I give only my opinion, not the facts—that by these diplomatic results or successes that communism has had recently, like Indochina, the diplomatic victories of the Chinese Prime Minister, we didn't lose too much.

However, if once the underdeveloped people everywhere in the world make a mistake and accept communism as the ideology of

national independence for the people, if the underdeveloped people accept communism as the ideology of social justice and social equality and as the ideology of better living standards, we may lose everything.

Mr. FEIGHAN. You are talking about communism in theory which has no relationship whatever to communism in practice, which means the most brutal, inhuman treatment of the human mind and body and the most reprehensible slavery known to mankind.

Mr. NAGY. Yes, Congressman, I am speaking of the mistake, first of all, of the Asiatic peoples. They are mistaken when they believe communism will liberate those who are still under colonialism, will bring social justice among them, will raise and increase their living standards.

I am speaking about them. I think it is our duty to fight communism, not only in the field of diplomacy and not only in the field of armaments but in the field of people, the working people. We have to convince those underdeveloped nations that all their desires, national and personal desires, may be fulfilled only by democracy, and first of all by the American sort of democracy.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Then you would advocate, would you not, a continuation through the whole world of the policy upon which our own United States was founded, that is the policy of self-determination?

Mr. NAGY. That is right, but the trouble is, as I found it in Japan, that the so-called underdeveloped nations are getting information on communism and on America from the same sources, from the Communist side, and those who are informing them about communism and about America are not telling them the truth—not about America.

Mr. FEIGHAN. You mean the war of propaganda for the United States and the free world should be increased because our propaganda is the propaganda of truth, whereas the Moscovite propaganda of the Russian Communists is a propaganda of untruth?

Mr. NAGY. Absolutely, that is correct, Congressman.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Would you care to say who in the West advised you and your associates not to enter the Smallholders' Party in the elections in 1945 in Budapest?

Mr. NAGY. Mr. Sterling, a member of the British Legation in Budapest.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Nagy.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Nagy, we are at the end of a long day and maybe we are all a little tired, but I would be remiss, having heard all that you have suffered at the hands of communism, if I didn't ask you if you would mind telling the subcommittee of the thing which you possibly suffered most, and that is the fate of your mother at the hands of the Russians. Would you object to telling the subcommittee briefly what happened?

Mr. NAGY. My mother was a peasant woman. After the war she took some small articles to the market of the county seat to sell, and to buy some shoes for the young boy. When they started to go back from the city, sitting in a peasant carriage, a Russian tank met them.

They left the road and went, not on the side of the road, but right into the ditch to avoid a collision, but the tank ran over them, and my mother died there.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Russian tank deliberately ran them down?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

A brother-in-law of mine was held in a prison of the Russian police. He told me that the driver of the tank was taken to prison, and he heard he was sentenced to 7 or 10 years.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think, gentlemen, we have all kept Mr. Nagy long enough. If there are no more questions, I will express the appreciation of the subcommittee to you for your very fine presentation. Thank you.

Mr. Counsel, we have one more witness to present a statement?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct. Is Mr. Vince Nagy here?

A VOICE. He was here, but he left.

Mr. BENTLEY. You have no more witnesses tonight, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. McTIGUE. No more witnesses tonight.

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning at this same place.

(Thereupon at 5:10 p. m. the committee adjourned to Tuesday, August 24, 1954, at 10 a. m.)

INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1954

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUNGARY OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION,
New York, N. Y.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment at 10:20 a. m., room 618, Federal Courthouse, Foley-Square, New York, N. Y., Hon. A. M. Bentley, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Messrs. Bentley, Bonin, and Feighan.

Also present: James J. McTigue, chief counsel.

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Call your first witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, the first witness is a woman whom we prefer to have unidentified. She has been subjected to terrible brutalities by the Communists during the period of the Communist occupation of Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair would like to announce, Mr. Counsel, that in that respect the person in question has been identified by the committee, and the committee wishes to state that it expects complete cooperation with regard to her wishes to respect her anonymity and her privacy, and the Chair is confident that every person in this room will cooperate in respecting her desire to remain nameless, but she has been completely and satisfactorily identified for the purposes of the hearings.

You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you.

When Monsignor Varga testified in Washington last Friday, he made this statement:

They raped and dishonored our women in ways so fiendish that they are unbelievable of decent human beings.

Now, Mr. Chairman, these statements are all right in the record, people read them, but they wonder if these things really happened. I talked to this witness and she agreed to relive the horrible experiences that she suffered at the hands of the Communists and the Soviets in the hope that her story would get over to the American people the terrible ravages of communism, the brutalities that they inflict with reservations of no kind whatsoever.

That is the reason for calling this witness, Mr. Chairman. It is not with a view to publicity, or anything on that score. Rather it is with a view to letting this woman tell her story, the experiences she went through, so that each and every one of us can understand the terrible atrocities of communism in this specific example.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair will administer the oath to the witness.

Madame Witness, you may remain seated while you are taking the oath. Will you please raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Madame X. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your witness, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF MADAME X

Mr. McTIGUE. Madame Witness, will you tell us where you were born, please?

Madame X. I was born in Austria.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you speak up just as loudly as you can, please, so that all may hear.

Madame X. I was born in Austria.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you live in Austria?

Madame X. I lived in Austria for 18 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time when you went to the University of Budapest for your education?

Madame X. Yes. That was in 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us how long you studied at the University of Budapest?

Madame X. I studied there for 4 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you meet your husband while you were studying at the University of Budapest, your present husband?

Madame X. Yes. We met at a student dance. He was studying to be an engineer, and I was studying dancing.

Mr. McTIGUE. And I suppose life during the period of 1940 to 1944, while you attended the university, was much the same as life at any university, that is, you were able to select your course of studies, attend dances, and so forth? In other words, it was the average kind of college life.

Madame X. It certainly was. It was wonderful, carefree, and we were young.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you finish your term at the University of Budapest?

Madame X. I finished my term a little earlier than was prescribed, in 1944, because the bombs were already falling on Budapest, and the term closed just about 2 or 3 weeks earlier.

Mr. McTIGUE. So you finished your 4-year term a little ahead of schedule, because of the war conditions; is that correct?

Madame X. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was it about some time around May of 1944, then, that you and your husband left the University of Budapest?

Madame X. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you and your husband go to the home of your people?

Madame X. Yes. We went out to the farm they had, which was located about 50 miles south of Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was this town where you and your husband went and where your family lived in the path of the advancing Soviet Army?

Madame X. It was, and it was actually for this reason because we thought we would rather be nearer to the liberating armies than in Budapest where the Germans still were holding out.

Mr. McTIGUE. Had you or the people of Hungary been warned in any fashion about the activities of the advancing Red army?

Madame X. Yes. We were warned, but it was apparently just the poor people who took the warning to heart, because we didn't even believe the German propaganda, but we did believe the British radio and the Voice of America, which we were listening to, which was strictly forbidden, and they told us, and we knew in our hearts, anyway, that we were going to be liberated. Why should we leave?

Mr. McTIGUE. In other words, you and most of the people of Hungary thought that this was a true liberation, that you would greet the Russian armies, since they were allies of the Americans, with open arms, and that you had nothing to fear; is that correct?

Madame X. We certainly did, and we certainly were prepared to greet them with open arms.

Mr. McTIGUE. But the peasants, you say, of Hungary, for the most part had some reservations on that score?

Madame X. Well, they were, as I said, rather ignorant people, and perhaps they also remembered what had gone on during the first Communist regime after the First World War, which of course I didn't know anything about. My parents hadn't been there. So they seemed cautious, and also, of course, they listened to the German radio, and of course the newspapers, which were all German controlled. So naturally they believed what they heard, and did not stay there.

Mr. McTIGUE. So they took certain precautions and as a consequence of this precaution, or the precautions which they took, a great many of their women, wives, daughters, and loved ones, were saved; is that correct?

Madame X. Well, at that time which was around about August and September, just before the Russians came in; I mean there was a whole long trek of simple little carts and perhaps more pretentious carriages, carrying all the belongings of the peasants, the poorer and richer ones alike, toward the west, toward Austria, where they hoped to be saved from the oncoming Russians.

Mr. McTIGUE. It is true, isn't it, that in October and November the Russian troops started advancing through the village where you and your husband and your family were living?

Madame X. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. On toward Budapest?

Madame X. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us your first experience as far as the Soviet troops were concerned?

Madame X. Our first encounter was really rather exciting and nice in a way. Somebody knocked at the window, and in Russian demanded to know whether there were any German soldiers there, and my husband, who spoke Russian, let him in, and he seemed to be hungry, so we gave him something to eat and something to drink.

We told him we were very glad that they were coming, and he was very nice, and after about an hour he left. And so we knew by that time, because there was just a lull of about 1 day before that where

there was no shot heard, and we just weren't quite sure what was going to happen. So this had happened, they had come in, and here they were.

Mr. McTIGUE. These were the advance fighting elements of the Soviet Army; is that correct?

Madame X. Yes, and they passed through very quickly. They had cars with them, and tanks, and trucks, and soldiers on foot. They were just marching through.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the first combat elements of the Red army passed through, did the rear echelons of the Red army come to your village?

Madame X. Well, I wouldn't actually know whether they came on that night. I think it was the 2d of November, 1944. Whether they were real combat troops or just passing through, I don't know. Anyway, there were about seven of them who came and demanded food and drink, the usual thing. We didn't think anything about it. And naturally we gave it to them.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you please tell us what happened on that night, Madame Witness?

Madame X. We gave them food and drink, drink consisting of wine, which we had on our own farm, and after they had been there for about an hour or so, they suddenly all stood up and two of them drew their pistols, and indicated to us to put up our hands. We were there in a big farm kitchen, my husband, my mother, my father, a lady whom we had hidden from the Germans—she happened to be Jewish—and two of our maidservants and their father, an old Hungarian peasant, and myself.

We had to put our hands up, and they pointed their guns at us, and I didn't understand what they said to each other, only my husband told me afterward what they had said. It was perhaps just as well I didn't know at the time.

So when we were standing there, a small cry escaped me, just instinctively. So one of the soldiers dropped his gun, and he took me out, and he raped me. And I must say that I did not, at least I tried not to get hysterical, or to defend myself. In the first place, I was too stunned, and in the second place, I felt I couldn't help whatever was going to happen.

Besides, he told me in a very friendly way that the family inside was "kaput" anyway, "kaput"—well, he used the same word in German, and the Russians used the same word. It means just, well, they were to be killed. So while he was telling me in a friendly way that the people inside were going to be "kaput" he raped me.

Then he took me in, and while they were still there, I didn't see too much. I was rather in a daze. So the next one took me out and did the same thing. And this went on for seven times.

Then they seemed to have got rid of their obsession to kill us, and they asked my husband to play on the accordion, and they asked me and my mother and the servant girls to have a dance with them. Then after about an hour or so they left, and told us they would be back in the morning.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they come back in the morning, Madame Witness?

Madame X. They came back in the morning, and I realized I should have hidden, but I felt it wouldn't help much, because they knew I was

in the house anyway. So they came back, and 2 or 3 raped me again.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then on the morning when they returned to your home, you were again raped on 4 or 5 occasions; is that correct?

Madame X. I cannot quite remember that. I know it was at least 2 or 3 of them. It wasn't the entire group again. I know that because they were too busy picking up everything they saw in sight, including fountain pens, watches, mattresses, coats, glasses, dishes, catching chickens, taking out barrels of wine, picking apples. So they were rather busy.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you ever violated thereafter, Madame Witness?

Madame X. No, I was not; because from that time on when we heard Russians approaching I went out the back door and hid in the vineyard, just as the other peasant girls did.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a consequence of these terrible experiences that you underwent, did you contract any disease?

Madame X. Yes. I contracted gonorrhea, and my husband contracted it also, because he didn't know of this sickness and it was after about 10 days or 2 weeks that he found out. Then, of course, there was the question of finding a doctor. We lived about 10 miles from the nearest town, and there was nothing else to do but to walk to that town, because the train of course wasn't running. We could not take a carriage. In the first place, most of the horses had been taken away. In the second place, the one horse we had left would have been taken away if he had been seen out in the street. So we walked there.

We came to a completely desolate town. Everybody had left voluntarily, had been evacuated and told to leave the town, because the Russian occupying forces were there. Everything was plundered. All the apartments were open. I remember we went into some of them just to look around on our way. Books were strewn all over the place, and pianos were ripped open, leather chairs cut up. Oil paintings the same thing. Procelain all in pieces. Debris on the floor.

So we proceeded in search of a doctor, and finally we heard that one of them was at the hospital, practicing there as best he could. We went there and he was very sympathetic. He said all he had left was six sulfa shots. He would gladly divide it up between the two of us, but he couldn't give us any more. So he gave us a shot, and then he told us to come back the next day, or day after next, and get some more.

From that time on we went into town every second day, and after that when he had no more shots left, he treated us locally. And it was not until a few months later when an American mission was set up in Budapest, when Budapest had already been occupied by the Americans, that through the American mission I was able to obtain some penicillin, and I brought it to my own doctor, who didn't know what to do with it. We had to translate the directions on it. He had only heard of penicillin. That was in 1944. And of course, there was no icebox or anything like that, so, well, he just did the best he could, and gave us the shots.

He was just as excited as we were about it, because that was the first shot of penicillin he had ever administered. And I think we finally got well. Of course, there were further examinations later on.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your parents are still living in Hungary; isn't that correct, Madam Witness?

Madame X. I still have a mother there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you communicate with your mother or do you hear from your mother from time to time?

Madame X. Very rarely.

Mr. McTIGUE. On the occasions that you do hear from her, does she say anything about conditions in present-day Communist Hungary?

Madame X. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you and your husband, after your terrifying experiences under communism, succeed in leaving Hungary?

Madame X. We succeeded in leaving Hungary in the autumn of 1946.

Mr. McTIGUE. How?

Madame X. Well, I might add at this point that a little later on, after these happenings out in the country, we went to live in the nearby town where my husband worked for the Hungarian mayor of the town, as an interpreter, because he knew Russian very well. This way he came into very close contact with the occupation forces, because all they did and wanted to do and wanted to get done went through him as official interpreter.

Sometimes we were lucky, sometimes they even brought us a little sugar or a little bacon for some translation services he had done. But sometimes they threatened him and called him a Fascist, especially the commandant of the town, who was sick and tired of my husband going there and bringing peasants to him, who presented their complaints about rape of women, stolen pigs, stolen cows, robbed homes. And he sort of made my husband responsible for that, telling him the Russian soldiers would never do such a thing, and he was just a Fascist.

So I never knew whether my husband was coming home at night or whether he wasn't. So one fine day fate was kind to us, and there was a Russian major who had come from Vienna to collect some apples for the Russian troops in Austria, and my husband was forced to get these apples for him, and talk to him. He knew Russian very well. He asked him whether he would like to serve as his interpreter on going back to Austria. And that position he got the following week.

So my husband knew that this was the time. He told me about it, and within 2 hours I got packed—I mean I packed the most important belongings we had in rucksacks which I had sewn before out of old sugar bags with the hope that one day we might get out and we would have something to put our belongings in. And, well, we got these rucksacks and a little suitcase, and some books which I was very fond of and didn't want to leave behind, and that is how we started out toward the apple truck.

We were lucky the major wasn't there, but the driver was. So he just told us to get on, and he talked to my husband. So we got on, and buried our belongings underneath the apples. Then we got under the apples, and they came out, and we moved out. That was about 9 or 10 o'clock at night.

It would have been very nice if the truck hadn't broken down all the time. It was an American truck—which doesn't mean that these trucks weren't good trucks—but the Russians didn't know how to take care of them. Every 10 or 15 miles we had to stop and pump up the

tires, not that we had a pump with us, but we had to borrow one from another truck.

This went on. The last time we broke down, unfortunately, was right in front of the border guards. Of course, they were very much interested in seeing an apple truck with insignia on it. They inquired, so my husband explained to them, he was interpreter to the Russians, we were going to Austria. They told us pointblank we couldn't do that, we were not allowed over the border without the proper papers, which we didn't have.

So there was some conversation. Finally they saw that we couldn't move anyway because we had broken down. So they went back to their quarters, and went back to their drinking and dancing as they had been doing before.

Meanwhile my husband was able to locate a pump, and we were there for about 1 or 2 hours trying to get this tire pumped up. I still remember I put my thumb on a leak in the pump. My husband put his fingers where the pump was put up to the tire, and they had to pump for all they were worth. And in this way we finally got on our way by 3 o'clock in the morning. The border guards were asleep by that time. They had told us before that at the turnstile they would have men on the lookout for us, because we were not going to cross the border.

So we went on for another 3 or 4 miles, to where the turnstile was, and I never prayed so much in my life, because if we had broken down in those 4 miles, in no-man's land, I don't think we would gotten across. They would have gotten us.

So we reached the turnstile, and the Hungarian guard there called out and asked whether there were any civilians on the truck. My husband was talking with the major on top of the apples, and he shouted down in Russian that there certainly were no civilians, and did he want some apples? The guard was quite interested in the apples, and forgot to look beside the driver where I was sitting huddled. And he let us go through.

The next stop were the Austrian guards, and they were satisfied with a few apples. They weren't much interested in who was in the truck, and then we were in Austria. That was still in Russian-occupied territory, but it was a little step further into freedom.

Mr. McTIGUE. The fact Madame Witness, that you were raped 7 times on 1 occasion and 5 times on another occasion wasn't the exception, isn't that true, in Hungary?

Madame X. It certainly was not.

Mr. McTIGUE. It was rather the rule, is that right?

Madame X. It was—I should say it was the rule. And I mean, if you met any friend of yours, any young girls or young women, or older women, for that matter, and if she said she hadn't been raped, you looked at her in a sort of a way, there must have been something wrong, because everybody was raped, one knew, around there.

And it was something one even talked about freely. Nobody was ashamed of it, because it had happened to everyone.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Madam Witness. That is all the questions I have.

Mr. BONIN. Madam Witness, did they ravish any of the other occupants of the home the first evening that you were ravished?

Madame X. No.

Mr. BONIN. They did not?

Madame X. No.

Mr. BONIN. Did they leave then after they had committed their acts of rape?

Madame X. Yes, after they wanted my husband to play on the accordion for them, after having a little dance, they left.

Mr. BONIN. And of course they were fully armed with rifles and side arms?

Madame X. Yes. They had I think what you call submachine guns, and small weapons, guns.

Mr. BONIN. Did I understand you to say that there were seven of them?

Madame X. There were seven of them.

Mr. BONIN. What was the highest ranking officer among them?

Madame X. I wouldn't know, and I don't think there were any officers among them. But there was one thing, in the Russian Army it was very difficult to recognize officers and enlisted men, because one day you would see a soldier dressed with an officer's cap and the next day he wouldn't wear one. It was all very, very much without discipline. Perhaps they had a sort of purpose in it, but I was not able to see through it.

Mr. BONIN. Prior to their departure that night that they committed their acts of rape, did they threaten you in any way?

Madame X. No; they were very nice. They just ate, and drank, and we talked to each other. There was no reason whatsoever why they should suddenly do a thing like that.

Mr. BONIN. But I mean, after they had committed their acts of rape, did they make any threats about making any outcry, or report to superior officers or anything?

Madame X. No.

Mr. BONIN. They said nothing?

Madame X. No.

Mr. BONIN. But they did return the following day?

Madame X. They returned the following morning.

Mr. BONIN. Did the same group come back?

Madame X. Yes. It was the same group who came back.

Mr. BONIN. Did they ravish anybody else in the morning?

Madame X. No, no, except myself again, as I said, 2 or 3 of them, I don't quite remember. It wasn't all of them again, because they were too busy looting.

Mr. BONIN. You mentioned that you were taken out by them. Do you mean that you were taken out of the home, into——

Madame X. No, just out of the kitchen.

Mr. BONIN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I have no questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair has no further questions of the witness. He would like to commend her for her bravery and her courage in coming before this committee and telling of this awful personal ordeal which happened to her.

The Chair would like to say further that, of his own personal knowledge, such tragedies were repeated not even hundreds but

thousands of times in Hungary, and throughout all of the Soviet-occupied areas of eastern Europe, even extending in some cases to similar acts of violence on the part of Russian women soldiers. It happened thousands of times.

As I say, the Chair commends you, Madam Witness, for your bravery, and your courage. We appreciate your coming before us to tell of this terrible tragedy, and the Chair expresses the gratitude of the committee to you at this time.

Madame X. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. The committee will take a brief recess while the witness leaves the room, and while the room is rearranged.

(A recess was taken.)

AFTER RECESS

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will be in order. Call your next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. The next witness, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. Paul Ruedemann. Is Mr. Ruedemann here, please?

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Ruedemann, stand and raise your right hand. Will you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF PAUL RUEDEMANN

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Ruedemann, you were born here in the United States; is that correct?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No, sir; born in Germany.

Mr. McTIGUE. When and where?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. I was born on the Rhine in a small village. Our people came to the States when I was 7 months old.

Mr. McTIGUE. You have lived in the United States a good part of your life; is that correct?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Practically all my life.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Ruedemann, I understand you are an executive in the production department of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey; is that correct?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And that you were the manager of the Standard Oil properties in Hungary from 1945 to 1948.

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that correct?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And it was in that capacity that you were present when the Communists took over the property of your company; is that correct?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us, Mr. Ruedemann, something about the taking over of the properties which you were managing for Standard Oil by the Communists?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. It was obvious from the time that we got back there—there was another American, in fact there were two other

Americans and myself, of the company, who went back there in 1945, and we got back there in November—it was obvious from the start that the Soviets would like to get hold of these oil properties, which were producing all the oil that Hungary required and had some oil for export.

The Russian Army was occupying our oilfields. We had no access to the oilfields except by permission of the Russian Army. It was a month after we got back before we could go down and look at the oilfields, and they were managing the operations in the fields with the committee they had appointed of Russian officers. So that when we would go around to the fields we would go from place to place with an escort of Russian officers.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you are on that point, Mr. Ruedemann, let me ask you this: When you were having these difficulties as far as your properties were concerned, when you were taken on the guided tours, as it were, by the Russians, did you ever complain to the Allied Control Commission?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Oh, yes; we complained to the Allied Control Commission. And they said there was no definite proof that they were managing our properties in the field. So we went down over New Year's in 1946-47, and went to the fields and tried to give orders to the men as to how they should produce the wells, run the operations, but the Russian officers stopped us, so we knew that they were running the fields.

Then early in 1946, early in January, when I was back in the Budapest office, 3 Russian officers appeared 1 day, a colonel and, I think, 1 was a major—I don't know what the other 1 was—and they said they had an order—they didn't show me the order—from the Allied Control Commission. Of course, the Russians were the occupying forces, and they were the head of the Allied Control Commission. They said they had an order from the Allied Control Commission that they were to manage these oil properties, and that they were appointing a captain by the name of Soprakean to come in and take an office and manage the properties.

I told them that I was an American businessman; I was there to look after the properties; that I wasn't taking any orders from any Russians; if Soprakean came around to the office, I would throw him out.

They said, well, their orders came from Marshal Voroshilov, and would I disobey his orders? I said, yes; I would disobey his orders, because I couldn't take any orders from him. These things were not approved by the other elements of the Allied Control Commission, the American, British, and French, who were there also. I said I wouldn't take any orders.

So they left, and then later it was arranged that Soprakean could come to the office to gather certain data on production rates, and I gave him a key to a room, and every time he came up he would ask for the key, and he would use that room, and then when he left he gave the key back. After about three times, he kept the key, and then I had a carpenter come around and put a new padlock on the office so he couldn't get back in, and then he quit coming around entirely. So that was the end of the Russians.

Mr. FEIGAN. Mr. Ruedemann, would you tell us exactly how long after you came back into Hungary in 1945 it took until you got back actual control of the operation?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. We didn't get actual control. I would say we never did get actual control, but we got the Russians off the property. I won't say we got them off, because they didn't get off until the peace treaty was signed, which I think was the end of 1946 or beginning of 1947. Then they left.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did you have administrative authority to operate the entire fields?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes. But technically they operated the properties in the field. They had their own staff, the Russians. There was a Colonel Veolosov, who was the head officer of the whole bunch, and then in one field they had a major by the name of Kereskean, and they had a colonel by the name of Kerlooka. They had a whole group of officers who were technically running the fields. They even had a civilian Russian geologist and some engineers.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were they well qualified, Mr. Ruedemann?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, to our way of thinking, not; no. They seemed to have methods of operating properties that we would consider technically obsolete. But probably in their way, why, it might be all right. But we don't produce oil the way they would produce it.

Mr. McTIGUE. After some time did they bring civilian experts in, or was it purely a military assignment?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No; they had civilian experts in there, who came in.

Mr. McTIGUE. You take a rather dim view of their civilian experts as far as our standards are concerned, don't you?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, it is difficult to say. Some of these technical men were not as highly qualified as technical men would be who had been schooled in our country, but there were others who seemed to be very highly qualified. But, of course, they had to work under a certain system, and they worked under that system. They did what they were told from higher up.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was the expropriation of the properties of Standard Oil a gradual procedure? Was it done on an overnight basis? Exactly how did it happen?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, there were three steps in this whole thing. First, the Russian Army tried to get control. When the peace treaty came and they didn't have control then there came the Communists into power in Hungary, and the Communists came into power economically by appointing what they called a supreme economic council, on which they appointed Zoltan Vas, who was 1 of the 4 Communists who had come in, who had been sifted into the country as soon as the Russians liberated the country. And Zoltan Vas became the head of the supreme economic council.

That was a sort of a side thing that was supposedly going to be advisory to the Government, but as the thing grew, over the whole year of 1947, it grew into something pretty big, and took control of all industry, the operation of it.

Well, that was the period in which they were trying to strangle our company, trying to take it away economically. We got very low prices. We didn't have the money we needed to do any work, and they tried to throw us into bankruptcy, because under our contract which we had made with the Hungarian Government before the war for this concession, if the company went bankrupt it went into the

hands of the government. So they tried then to throw us into bankruptcy and make us insolvent, but we fought that off over the year.

Then the next step was political strangulation by sending in these goons to commit purges and purge the people out of the organization.

Then after the purges the final step of course was the expropriation, which was the thing they had tried to avoid. They wanted to get the company without that if they could, but they finally expropriated and took it over.

Mr. McTIGUE. All during this period I presume you were protesting?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Oh, yes, we were protesting. Washington had protested to Moscow, too.

Mr. McTIGUE. What very frankly did the higher representatives in the Allied Control Commission tell you at the time you were protesting?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, the representatives of the Allied Control Commission, of course, they were only in there until the end of 1946. They did the best they could on it, being only one element of the thing, and the Russians doing a lot of things without the approval of the other members of the Commission, why, of course you could see how weak the whole setup was.

Mr. McTIGUE. They listened but there wasn't very much they could do about it?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Not too much.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time when you were arrested by the Communists?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. That was the climax of the whole thing at the end, when they accused the Americans of sabotage, and that we were not working in the best interests of the Hungarian state, and they put us into prison or into the dungeons of the secret police.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you say "us," who do you mean?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Mr. Bannantine, who was assistant to me.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was your assistant?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Robert Vogeler was over there at the same time, wasn't he?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No, he wasn't in the country.

Mr. McTIGUE. He wasn't in the country then?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did he come in later on?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. He came in off and on, just in connection with his company's affairs.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something about what happened to you as far as your arrest was concerned?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Prior to the arrest, they had taken people from our company, a former manager and purchasing agent, and my secretary, and a lawyer, chief engineer, chief geologist—all those people had been arrested, and disappeared. We finally located them as being in the headquarters of the secret police. Some of them had been in there a number of weeks when it was rumored that the Americans might be picked up too.

We went to the American Legation and made arrangements that we were going to leave the country, and it was on the same day we

had talked this over that they picked us up—it was on a Saturday afternoon late—and took us in.

Of course, we went through the usual thing that you go through with the secret police. There is constant questioning around the clock in 8-hour shifts, day and night, and betweentimes you are put down in a dungeon, and there are other things, just to wear you down, until you sign something that they have written out. They write it all out. They have it all typewritten for you to sign, and when you sign it, why then the next step is that you have to copy it in longhand so it looks like your own thing.

Mr. McTIGUE. The fact that you protested you were an American citizen didn't make the slightest difference?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No; not to them.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you able to communicate with our State Department?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No; we weren't able to communicate with anybody. Not when you are in there.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you confined?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Seven days.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were given the usual treatment, the lights, and the constant interrogation?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Constant interrogation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Threats?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, of course, threats. That is part of the whole system.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us a little something about it? Here you are an American citizen. We have had a great deal of testimony on this subject from the nationals of various countries. But we haven't had any testimony, as I recall, from American citizens who have been subjected to this kind of thing, so in this respect, Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Ruedemann's testimony is very, very important. We would appreciate it, Mr. Ruedemann, if you would be good enough to tell us some of the details.

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Of course, they work on the system of, I don't know what you would call it, probably psychological; they wear you down. They just get you so tired and so weary that you are completely exhausted. They first start out by——

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you give us, as Congressman Feighan suggests, a personal narrative. This is happening to you. Now, how did it happen to you? Can you give us a blow-by-blow description, as it were?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, the first thing we did when we arrived, they took us down to a dungeon. Well, of course, in the dungeons down there, they are underground, and they are very closely guarded. You go down a narrow stairway, and there would be a man with a rifle at the top of the stairs, and the bottom of the stairs, and about every 10 feet there would be another one. They would call numbers. Each one calls his number, and as you go down this long corridor, one man calls his number—let's say 31, the other one says 22, and the other one says 33. That means the coast is clear until you finally get to the room you are going to be thrown into. And then these dungeons are just very narrow, about, I would say, 4 or 5 feet wide, and about 6 or 7 feet long. There is a wooden bunk in it that is about chest high,

no blankets, no nothing, no light, except a very small bulb, probably 10-watt, set into the wall. The place is cold and wet, and a solid steel door, and you are just there in the dungeon; that is all.

They left you there for about a day until they begin the first questioning. Then the first questioning starts out, and these men who do the questioning, why, they are very expert at it. They are organized for that sort of thing; they have trained themselves. They will question you 8 hours at a time, without looking at any notes. They have evidently gone through everything; they have gone through the files; they have gone through everything you have in your home; they have got all of your records, pictures or diaries, if you had foolish things like that, but they have got everything they could get ahold of.

They do this in different groups. The first day's questioning had only to do with the people I had known in the country, prewar and after the war. They brought up photographs; brought up all sorts of things they had taken from my room, because some of my possessions had been left behind when the war started. Before the war started we had a home there and we left a lot of things behind.

The first day they asked about all these different people, and each individual would be called a Nazi. Then they proceeded from that into a different kind of questioning, and along about the second day they were asking us all day long what the orders had been that we had received from our people in New York when we were sent over in October 1945. They claimed that it was inconceivable that an American would be sent over to rehabilitate these properties. It must have been that we were sent over there to commit acts of sabotage, because, as they put it, both to myself and from the evidence of Mr. Bannantine to him also, that these properties were valuable oil properties, would be very useful to the Soviets in case of a war between the West and the East—as he put it, the inevitable war, he said.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was it that said this?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. The questioner was a colonel of the police who was questioning me at this time.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was in 1945?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No; this was 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. And he referred to it as the inevitable war?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes. He said we knew the war would be inevitable, and we were trying to sabotage these oil properties, because these properties would be very useful to the Soviets. Therefore, he felt we had some kind of instructions, and he wanted to have those instructions. Of course, we told him there weren't any instructions. The question for about, I would say, 8 or 12 hours, something like that, was on nothing but that one point, over and over and over again.

Then I think—I don't remember the entire sequence—I believe I was then put back down in the dungeon again for a while and then brought up after that, and again questioned, but this time the questioning was about the different acts of sabotage that they accused us of. They said that we hadn't brought in the equipment we should have brought in; that we hadn't drilled the wells properly; that we hadn't furnished the company with the money from America that we should have furnished it with.

They accused me of these acts of sabotage, and then finally they brought in some of these former Hungarians of ours; I mean the

manager and others. They brought them in one at a time, and before they brought these men in, why, they let me read their confessions. These men had written their confessions already, and in their confessions they had accused the Americans of sabotage, and had named different things we had supposedly done.

Mr. McTIGUE. Had they ever implicated you personally?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Oh, yes; personally and Mr. Bannantine personally. So they had a pretty strong case against us. It was quite evident that they could convict us of anything they wanted to on what these men had said. Of course, these men couldn't help themselves.

So they showed us these confessions, and showed me the confessions, and I told them that that was their version of how these things were done, but it wasn't our version.

Then they brought the two men in, first one, and he, of course, being a Hungarian, was terribly surprised to see an American also in the secret police, and he was so shocked he could hardly talk. He just verified the things that they had said.

Then they brought in the second man, an elderly man who must have been about 66 or so, and he wasn't too strong physically, and this man was already a weeping wreck when they brought him in. He was just crying his head off.

They asked him a question, and he answered it. Then they would take him out of the room, they would coach him, and bring him back in, and then ask him another question, of course. They did that 4 or 5 times, took him out of the room and coached him and then brought him back in, and the poor old fellow, he just cried and cried.

Then they asked me, would I want to say anything to Mr. Abel? I said, "Mr. Abel doesn't speak any English and my Hungarian isn't too fluent. But he does speak some German and I speak German, and I would like to say a word to him." They said, "That is all right."

So I said to Mr. Abel, "I am awfully sorry for you, that you had to say the things you did say, but honestly I don't hold it against you." And the old man, he started to cry some more.

Then this colonel of the secret police who was in at the time, he kind of got wind of what was going on, and he just took Abel out, and this man died in prison here just a year ago; never got out.

Mr. McTIGUE. He never got out?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No; he never got out. This other man that they questioned, he never got out either. He is still in there.

Then after these men had told their version of things, they asked me to write a confession, and I wrote one and told them our side of how these things happened, that the company had no money, that the Communists were fixing prices and we were paid so little for the oil that we couldn't get material.

As a matter of fact, in war-torn Europe no factories were operating after the war. We couldn't get materials in the war; we couldn't get them in America, either, too readily.

But when they looked at this version, this questioner for the police came back, and he just put his thumb down. He said, "You are going back downstairs. This isn't what we want." And so they took me back downstairs again, and then I think I came up again, and the same kind of questioning continued.

I think it was about the fifth day, about 4 o'clock in the morning, when a certain captain, who was questioning me, brought in a type-written sheet and said, "I want you to sign this."

I said, "No, I am not going to sign anything."

He said, "You better read it." Well, I don't know, I suppose there is a certain process of disintegration that sets in in all these things. I started to read this thing, even though I said I wasn't going to sign it.

Then I started to criticize the thing. I said, "I wouldn't say these things the way you say them."

They said, "What would you say?" We went through, paragraph by paragraph, the whole thing. Then he said, "Well, you know, we are all tired of waiting on your confession. You are either going to make it now or you are going to go downstairs and we are going to give you the works." And I knew what the works was, because I had heard from other people what they have gone through. And so I decided, well, hell, time is on their side, they can go as long as they want.

No man has ever gotten out of there without making a confession. When I was down in the dungeon I could see that people who had been in there ahead of me had scratched with their thumbnail their name, and then they would put in there, "I was here alone," and then they would log the days. And you know some of those poor suckers, the longest you could count was in there 22 days. He was just in there 22 days, that is all; they got his confession at the end of the 22d day.

But they always get what they want, because time is on their side. So about the fifth day—I have heard since that the average is even lower than that; 3 or 4 days they get most of these confessions.

So then they kept me another couple days because they had a lot of other confessions they wanted to have signed. By that time you will sign everything they bring up. So the last couple days they just brought up all kinds of things.

Then on the seventh day they came up and said they were transferring us. That was the first time I saw George Bannantine. He came in, and they said they were taking us somewhere. I just said, "Well, George, this looks like we are going to prison now."

He said, "Yes, I guess we are going to be moved over." Then a fellow brought in our passports and our papers and everything they had taken away from us, and they took us upstairs to a great big room, and here was the general of the secret police, in his room, Gabor Peter.

He said, "It has been decided to release you," and arranged with the American Government that we would be released, and we were going to be given an hour to go back to our quarters and pack up, take what we could. They did; they gave us an hour.

They started south with us about 7 o'clock in the evening, and we learned from a member of the American Legation that was accompanying us that we were being taken up to Czechoslovakia, to a place called Bratislava, where we would be given to the American consul there. This was Saturday night, and we got into Bratislava about midnight, and the police there wouldn't even let us get out of the car. They said that they had no arrangement to leave us Americans in there, and we were saboteurs and they didn't want us in the country.

So then the Czech secret police joined with the Hungarian police that were with us, and we had quite a convoy, and they took us back into Hungary, took us to the Austrian frontier, where there was a long argument, because they said we would have to go over into Austria.

Well, Austria meant we would have to be thrown into the Russian zone. We had no papers for going through the Russian Zone, and if you were picked up by the Russians you would be a spy sure enough. We didn't want to go over the frontier, and we argued there for about an hour. Finally one of these fellows pulled a revolver and said, "You are either going to go back with us to prison or you are going over this frontier."

So we decided we better take a chance on the frontier. We had this car that belonged to the American Minister, Selden Chapin, and then there was this fellow from the Legation with us.

Of course, you know between these frontiers there is always a no-man's land of about 300 yards between the frontier stations. They threw us over. We drove around beyond the bend where they couldn't see us any more and then we got out of the car and walked up to the Austrian frontier station to see if any Russians were around there. We didn't see any. Then we looked in and saw nothing but Austrian police officers, and we knew that it was up to us to throw ourselves upon their mercy. We went in and told them we were American refugees, we had to cross this Russian zone, we had been in prison and been thrown out by the Soviets, by the Communists, and that we wanted to find out how to get to Vienna. They said, "That is impossible, because there are so many Russian roadblocks."

Then they did tell us how we could avoid these Russian roadblocks, but they didn't know how we would avoid the last one, which was just outside of Vienna. Fortunately for us, it turned out to be a foggy night, and we knew those roads very well in that part of the country, because we had drilled some wells in there before the war, so George and I had been all over that countryside pretty much.

We finally avoided the Russian roadblocks, and then got in to where there was a British airfield outside of Vienna, outside the last roadblock, and we put ourselves in their care, and they hid us until the next morning, which happened to be Sunday, and then they carried us through the roadblock Sunday morning and got us into the American Legation in Vienna and that was the end.

Mr. McTIGUE. All American properties were confiscated; is that correct?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes. They took it without any payment, no provision for any payment at all.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. I simply wish to commend Mr. Ruedemann for his explicit narrative on this subject matter. I am convinced that we have a lot of mental idiots in the United States who probably could do the same identical type of thing to innocent victims of ruthless government. Nevertheless, though, it is amazing to think of the splendid constitutional rights that you had over there in Hungary, and the protection to life and freedom that you were given over there as compared to the protests that are made even by simply asking some of these individuals who admire and adore this Communist philosophy, and still they raise protests that their rights are being infringed upon.

I wish your story could be broadcast much further than it is in this hearing room, Mr. Ruedemann, because it is typical of the hundreds of witnesses that have appeared before this committee.

That is all.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Ruedemann, was there not some arrangement or agreement made whereby the Hungarian Government was going to compensate for taking over the fields?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No, the Hungarian Government has at no time made any provision for compensation for these expropriated properties. Actually we figure the properties would be worth about \$63 million, that is the value of the ground and everything. When expropriation came, when they took away all Hungarian property, they made no provision for paying for it. When they took away the land from the big landholders they made no provision for paying for it. They never do.

Mr. FEIGHAN. How were your meals in the dungeon?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, there is no provision for feeding people while you are in the office of the secret police. They don't feed you. Somebody has to find out you are there and get some food to you.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Speaking of sabotage, the efficiency of your methods as compared with the Russians, did you drill any dry wells, and could that have been considered sabotage?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Of course. You see, under their system they have these different year plans. They had a 3-year plan which started in 1947. Every one of these year plans carried with it a lot of decrees under which the individuals of the country have to favor the plan, work for the plan, and then they have punishment if anybody objects to the plan, 5-year plan or whatever it is. If anybody in any way obstructs the plan, why, they can be punished. And they have such vague laws that they can do to you just about anything they want to.

They tried to show that we were operating against the natural interest. Of course, in drilling wildcat wells in any area, and especially in an area like that where geological conditions were very difficult, your average of finding oil would maybe be 1 in 15 or 20 tries. You drill 20 wells maybe before you find 1 that has any oil in it.

Well, they claimed that because we were getting dry holes that we were putting locations in places where we wouldn't find oil. Of course, nobody ever does that.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Ruedemann, what has happened to the Standard Oil properties there since your departure and Mr. Bannantine's departure?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. They are still operating the properties, and as we understand it they have divided it up in typical fashion. They have divided it up into various units, the pipelines into 1 company, the producing into 1 company, and exploration into another company. That gives them a chance to have a lot of different managers.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know anything about the production they have achieved since they took over the property?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. We understand the production has been increased since we left there.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you say it has been increased in excess of the normal civilian requirements?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes, sir; they are probably producing considerably more now than the country needs.

Mr. BENTLEY. Have you any information on the oil production either of Soviet Austria or Rumania?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No. We have just indirect information. From what we can find out Rumania is producing something over 100,000 barrels a day, and Austria somewhere in the neighborhood of about 55,000 barrels a day.

Mr. BENTLEY. And practically all that consumption is presumably either for military or official use, there is no civilian use?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Practically. The civilians get very little because they have no cars they can use.

Mr. BENTLEY. In this confession that you were required to sign during that week in the dungeon, were you required to implicate the Hungarian employees that you had working for you?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes; we were required. They always—every confession leads up to somebody else who is going to get caught, and the next fellow comes in, and his confession also has somebody in there they want to catch up with. They always name somebody, like these Hungarians who were in ahead of me, they named George and me as having done certain acts, and then our confession in turn had to say that these men had committed certain acts. Of course, their own confessions had already confessed to these things.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Hungarian employees that were arrested either with you or before you, you say one of them died in prison. Were the others tried and sentenced?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes. They were all sentenced. The chief engineer was sentenced to, I think it was 15 years, and that was commuted to 7 years, and he got out. Then the chief geologist was only in there I think for a couple of years when he got out. And of course, the 1 man died in prison, and 1 man is still in prison.

Mr. BENTLEY. What sentence did he receive?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. He got life imprisonment.

Mr. BENTLEY. What was the charge?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Just sabotage.

Mr. BENTLEY. He got life imprisonment for sabotage?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Actually all he was doing was obeying instructions from I suppose you and Mr. Bannantine, his normal activities, I mean?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, he hadn't committed any crime, under our eyes. As a matter of fact, if they were honest about it, he hadn't committed any crime; I mean only these fictitious things they claimed he had done.

Mr. BENTLEY. He was a geologist, wasn't he?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes; he was a geologist by training. He was a Hungarian.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was he responsible for locating the wells or sinking wells?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And because he wasn't successful in increasing the oil production is why they accused him of sabotage?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And he has received life imprisonment for that?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes.

Mr. McFIGUE. I would like to ask a question.

Mr. BENTLEY. Surely.

Mr. McFIGUE. Did there come a time when they tried to persuade you, before your arrest, to put in new machinery?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes. In this process during the period they said there was a lot of new equipment needed. We felt there was about \$5 million worth of equipment needed, because, you see, the 2 armies had been over these oilfields, and between the Soviets and the Germans they had taken away all the cars and trucks we had. There were about 300 cars and trucks they had taken away from us. And a lot of machine-shop equipment was taken away; all the casing, all the pipe. We figured out that the Soviets alone took \$3 million worth of equipment away from us when they went through there. So that the properties were pretty much ravaged.

They felt we ought to bring that in from America, but when we tried to make arrangements, if we brought it in from America, we would be allowed to get our money out again, through profits; why, they said that we daren't think about that, that is a capitalistic idea about profits, but we should think about bringing in the money for new equipment.

Then they had another step where they said we ought to take credits from the state; since we didn't have the money to buy this equipment we ought to take credits from the state. Of course, that was another trick of theirs to throw companies into bankruptcy, because the state at that time was Soviet controlled and they controlled your price. Therefore, if you took any credits from the state they would lower your price so that you would be losing money, and you couldn't pay back what you owed the state, and the state would take over your properties.

We refused to take any credits, and of course that was another thing they accused us of, that we didn't want to get the help from the state when the state offered it to us.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Ruedemann, did the Communists give you any explanation of why you and Mr. Bannantine were released and not held for a so-called trial?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No; they didn't tell us anything. They just said we were being released, as I remember it.

Mr. BENTLEY. You don't have any idea why you were so personally fortunate, I suppose, do you?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Well, I do know that the State Department at that time made negotiations, through Selden Chapin and Secretary of State Marshall, that all the Hungarian consular offices in the United States would be closed up if we were not released, and of course the Hungarians weren't ready and the Soviets weren't ready to have the Hungarian consulates close up, so they released us.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you think you would have been released even if you hadn't signed a confession?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. No, no; they wanted a confession. They want that. Because they already had prepared, and had published what they called the gray book, which was about 40 or 50 pages of their version of all our acts of sabotage.

This gray book was in print and was received in this country and was already distributed to libraries in this country within 5 days after I arrived back here, and I arrived back here by air from the time they released me.

Mr. BENTLEY. In other words, for the purposes of verifying their own propaganda they had to get the confession out of you or else?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. They have to have that propaganda.

Mr. BENTLEY. So you took the very realistic attitude that so long as you were down there you might as well sign the confession and get out?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Nobody ever gets out without signing it.

Mr. BENTLEY. I don't believe there are any more questions.

Mr. Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. You were in Hungary during the height of the inflation; weren't you?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. How often did you pay the employees during that inflationary period?

Mr. RUEDEMANN. During the latter part of the inflation we had to pay them every morning for the wages and salary for that day's work that they were going to give us, because at 8 o'clock at night the radio would announce what the value of the new currency was going to be, and then we would have the payroll section working all night, and by morning we would be around at the National Bank where they printed the money and pick it up and get a whole carful of this paper money.

Then we would take it down to the fields and get it out to them in time so they could spend it before noon, because by noon the money never had any value any more.

So we did that for several months. Then of course it came to the point where money had absolutely no value. The last month of the inflation there was no money at all, and everything was on barter. By that time we had already built up quite an organization. We had 300 of our people who did nothing but scrounge around the country looking for food. They would gather food, and then we would give that to our people. We had 4,000 employees to feed.

So that last month we were getting enough food together so that the people had one meal a day, which they thought was a lot, because a lot of them weren't getting that much.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Ruedemann, for taking the time to come down here and tell your story. The committee appreciates it very much.

Mr. RUEDEMANN. You are welcome.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Pfeiffer.

Mr. PFEIFFER, will you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before the committee, so help you God?

Mr. PFEIFFER. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your witness.

TESTIMONY OF ZOLTAN PFEIFFER

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you give your name for the record, Mr. Pfeiffer, your full name?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Zoltan Pfeiffer.

(At the conclusion of Mr. Pfeiffer's testimony, the Chair directed that his previously prepared statement be incorporated at the beginning of his testimony, and it is as follows:)

I was born in Hungary, at Budapest, and upon completing my studies was admitted to the bar in 1927. I specialized in common law, and so came into contact with political life. I represented the democratic movements before the courts.

In 1932 I joined the Independent Smallholders Party; in 1934 I was appointed the party's chief legal counselor. From this time on, until my flight from Hungary in 1947, I undertook various political roles. In 1939 I was a leader in the election campaign of the Smallholders Party.

After the Germans occupied Hungary on March 19, 1944, I went underground, representing the Smallholders Party in the underground movement consisting of the representatives of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish Churches, the anti-Nazi parties and the Marxist parties. After the Soviet occupation of Budapest I became national chairman of the Smallholders Party, took part in the November 1945 elections and was elected to Parliament as a deputy from Budapest, and that same month as a member of the majority party, joined the Cabinet in the capacity of State Secretary of the Ministry of Justice.

I left the Cabinet late in December 1946, and early in March 1947, gave up my membership in the Smallholders Party in order to lead an opposition group in Parliament that bore my name. On July 1, 1947, I founded the Hungarian Independence Party. Entering the August 31, 1947, elections on a sharply anti-Communist platform, I directed the party's election campaign and in the new Parliament continued my opposition role with the aid of my party's 50 mandates.

In September 1947, I attacked the completely Communist-dominated coalition government in the courts for its use of terror, falsification, and ballot stuffing, and demanded the voiding of the election. Upon my having assembled and presented suitable evidence, the Government, under false pretexts and with fabricated documents, launched a criminal process against me, and, on November 4, 1 day before the suspension of my parliamentary immunity, hoodwinking the detectives who kept me under strict surveillance, I fled Hungary together with my family.

On November 16, 1947, the Government disbanded my party and voided its 50 mandates, whereby the composition of Parliament was altered: the 208-member majority of the civic parties became a 158-member minority in the face of the 203 representatives of the leftwing Marxist parties. This change in the parliamentary balance made possible Moscow's unlimited encroachments.

On the basis of the two roles I played after 1945—as a member of the Government party and of the opposition—I can give evidence of countless cases of arbitrary Soviet encroachment in Hungary.

Through my experience as State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice I can demonstrate that the Communist Party in Hungary was the patron of murderers merely that it might the more easily attain its political goals. I can prove this statement through the three flagrant cases described below.

GYOMRO

In April 1945, the advancing Red army occupied Gyomro, a community 40 kilometers from Budapest. There, under Russian encouragement, a "national committee" was formed, consisting exclusively of Communists. This committee set up a police force composed of surviving adherents of the 1919 proletarian dictatorship. Both the committee and the police began making arrests. Thus, they seized all the intelligentsia of the region, including pastors, teachers, former officials, and small-land owners; among them, too, was the nationally famous philosopher, Count Joseph Revay. Between 40 and 50 men were jailed and then, within 2 or 3 weeks, executed without a court trial, despite the fact that not a single one of the victims could be charged with any crime.

I took office in November 1945, and soon afterward relatives of the victims complained to me, as State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice. They protested that the authorities had not begun proceedings against the murderers, whose identity was known throughout the whole district. They also requested that the authorities allow them to exhume and decently bury their relatives who had been interred in such inhuman fashion that here and there an arm or a leg was found sticking out of the ground.

I looked into the matter and found the papers relating to the case, which Minister of Justice Riesz, the Social Democratic fellow traveler, had declared closed. Riesz stopped the investigation on the basis of a report from the political police. But that report, signed by the notorious head of the political police, Gabor Peter—liquidated last year—was false. The investigation was handled by Peter, but so clumsily that the death and disappearance of many victims antedated their arrest by the Communists.

Riesz accepted Gabor Peter's nonsensical and transparent explanation to the effect that the victims attacked the police, who thereupon used their weapons, and that this was how they died or disappeared. Riesz, a faithful vassal of the Communists, issued an order that action in this case could only be taken with his written permission. I, however, refused to let the matter rest. In Riesz' absence, while I headed the ministry, one night I made a surprise arrest of the known murderers and brought them to the Pest County jail, where they admitted their guilt. Of this the public did not learn, because the Communist Minister of the Interior, the later likewise liquidated Laszlo Rajk, issued an order banning any newspaper that wrote a single word about the case.

The Communist Party Premier Matyas Rakosi at once summoned a cabinet meeting, there calling me to account for starting proceedings against the Gyomro murderers. Rakosi, Rajk, Gero, and Zoltan Vas, the cabinet's Communist members, angrily demanded the freeing of the murders. I categorically refused, and from that day on became a constant target of Communist attack. The Moscow Government in a demarche demanded my dismissal.

When Minister of Justice Riesz returned to his office, at the request of the Communist Minister of the Interior, he handed the prisoners over to the political police on the pretext of supplementary investigation, and the latter at once released them without questioning. The Gyomro murderers are still at large in the country.

KUNMADARAS

In the summer of 1946, Communist-incited crowds staged a pogrom at Kunmadaras. It may sound unusual that the Communist Party should have taken part in open anti-Semitic propaganda. In Hungary the Communist Party had very few adherents. They recruited members where they could, and thus many former Nazis gained immunity for themselves by joining.

This was so openly done that Communist Party organizers made the rounds of the internment camps, promising immediate freedom, full immunity, and a career to those who joined up and solemnly pledged blind obedience.

I brought the seven perpetrators of the Kunmadaras murders before a court-martial. At the trial it turned out that all seven were Communists.

Thereupon, Rakosi and Arpad Szakasits, the fellow-traveling leader of the Social Democratic Party, demanded that I also put the Smallholders Party in the defendant's stall. This demand was made in the corridors of Parliament, whereupon I flatly declared that I could form no coalition there.

A few hours before judgment could be pronounced, the head of the Communist political police, in order to rescue the Communist defendants, announced that they had caught the instigator of the deed, and consequently, the whole proceeding had to be brought before a people's court. The Communist Party thus succeeded in saving the murderers of Kunmadaras from the gallows. Before the people's court the desired coalition was achieved, a Slovakian member of the Smallholders Party being named as one of the instigators.

MOSCOW'S VICEROY, MATYAS RAKOSI, INSTIGATES THE MISKOLC POGROM. LASZLO PIROS, NEW MINISTER OF INTERIOR, CARRIES IT OUT

In August 1946, at Miskolc, one of Hungary's largest trade centers, Rakosi gave out the slogan: To the gallows with the black marketeers. That was when they interned the factory managers and the directors of big business with the aim of intimidating Hungarian civic leaders. Laszlo Piros was the organiza-

tional secretary of the Communist Party among the workers at Diosgyor. After Rakosi's speech, Piros mobilized his forces. On the walls of the iron works of Diosgyor near Miskolc appeared his appeals: The Piros letters (Piros, incidentally, means "red" in Hungarian). On to Miskolc. Death to the black marketeers.

Piros organized the march; 2,000 moved on Miskolc. They beat to death a Jewish miller, and nearly killed many others. The pogrom threw a scare into the Communists. Communist Minister of the Interior Laszlo Rajk arrested the culprits, but not the instigators.

Next day Piros and his associate, Ferenc Dusek, again led a demonstration. They freed the culprits and beat up the Jewish officers of the police. Captain Fogarasi died of his wounds. The crowd released the internees, naturally also those for whom they had demanded the gallows: the black marketeers. This caused an even greater alarm in the Communist Party; Matyas Rakosi, the chief instigator, laid low.

The Russian Army and the NKVD came to their rescue, and with the aid of Communist Minister of the Interior Rajk and the Communists' true lackey, Minister of Justice Riesz, the case was hushed up.

The perpetrators and instigators of the Miskolc pogrom did not even come before the courts, because it turned out that the pogrom was prepared and executed by Communist Party functionaries under the influence of Rakosi's rabble-rousing speech at Miskolc.

One of the organizers of the pogrom, Ferenc Dusek, was elected to Parliament on the Communist lists in 1947. Laszlo Piros, too, found the road to advancement wide open. He became party secretary for the county, then head of the frontier guards, succeeding the notorious chief of the political police, Gabor Peter. Not long afterward, he became deputy minister of the interior, and finally, in June of this year, assumed the place of the No. 2 Communist, Erno Gero, and took over the portfolio of the ministry of interior, living proof that today murder is a permitted instrument of politics in Hungary.

In breaking down national resistance, one of Moscow's tools is the so-called people's court. The temporary Hungarian Government—formed with the help of the Red army in December 1944 at Debrecen—under Soviet pressure referred political cases to the people's court. Such people's courts were headed by a judge and consisted of representatives of the Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, and the Peasant Party, comprising the so-called left-wing bloc, plus representatives of the Independent Smallholders Party and the Civic Democratic Party.

So long as the majority party, the Smallholders Party, could exert its influence on the Government and public opinion, the people's courts, despite all Soviet pressure, refrained from legal murder, though meting out stiff sentences.

Russian military and civilian authorities, particularly the NKVD, often complained about the work of the people's courts. General Beljanov, Eastern European chief of the NKVD, often accused me of allowing the courts to deliberate too long. (Though this was under Riesz's jurisdiction.) He would have liked the death sentence to be pronounced right after the charge was heard.

The consequence of my arguments with Beljanov was that both the Soviet Government and the Communists demanded my dismissal. In the late fall of 1946, as well as subsequently ascertained, the Communists planned through the so-called conspiracy trial to break up the Smallholders' parliamentary majority and pave the way for the full seizure of power. Beginning late in October, practically in accordance with a fixed schedule, delegations of a hundred or more workers daily demonstrated at the ministry of justice, demanding my dismissal. The demonstrators' slogan was characteristic of the situation. "Cabbage is dear, down with Pfeiffer." I had nothing to do with food supply or the price of foodstuffs, but this served the purpose of setting me up as a scapegoat in a country despoiled by the Red army.

Since the Government, that is, its majority party, did not have enough strength to stem these demonstrations, and since in the meantime my office secretary was also arrested on suspicion of conspiracy, I announced my resignation.

They could not involve me in the conspiracy trial. My elimination from political life was postponed until the fall of 1947, by which time they had no regard even for appearances, and forced me to flee by bringing false charges.

Early in 1947 both the Soviet authorities and the left-wing bloc exerted great pressure on the Smallholders' Party to the end that it get rid of certain members, me among others. My relationship with Bela Kovacs aggravated my situation.

It was I who protested against his appearance at political police headquarters, in fact went there personally, having previously proposed the setting up of a parliamentary committee of investigation.

The main task of opposition groups and politicians behind the Iron Curtain was to prevent the intimidation and silencing of the people, even at the risk of their own security. The weight of this task was particularly onerous for participants in the political resistance, when, after what amounted to a putsch against the Smallholders' Party, its new renegade leaders gave up the battle against Communist encroachment. We were all under unremitting surveillance. After the August 1947 elections this surveillance became physically almost intolerable.

In consequence of my opposition, there were already droves of political police on my trail. Despite my parliamentary immunity, I was a prisoner. Dire police threats prevailed upon my household servants, my daughter's governess and the neighbors to report my every step.

From September 1947 on, some 25 members of the political police were assigned to follow me, and it often transpired that upon conferring with parliamentary colleagues at the home of some member, when we reached the street we found that the number of political police exceeded our own. It was impossible to shake off this escort. Two curtained jeeps equipped with radios trailed me through the streets. In streetcars and buses, in public places, and even in Parliament, plainclothesmen pressed so close that I could only confer in whispers.

After the putsch against Ferenc Nagy's administration, and the voluntary disbanding of the till then embattled Freedom Party, my parliamentary group continued to uphold the policies of the intransigent, western-spirited democratic opposition. My participation in the August 1947 elections became a virtual steeplechase handicap by virtue of the new election law that prevented free organization, campaigning, and assembly.

Luckily it proved possible to fool the Communists as far as my party's prospects were concerned. In view of the terror by then in full swing, there were few in the field of politics who were willing to risk running for Parliament and being persecuted by the regime.

As members of the opposition our task was rendered difficult by the need for gathering two to five thousand signatures per district in order to show minimum support for the aims of the party. The Communists hoped that this obstacle would prove insuperable, and that without a party organization or campaign funds I would not be able to face up to the regime and its limitless resources. And in truth it was only the heroic sacrifice of the Hungarian people that made possible the resounding vote of a million no's to Communist encroachment.

Though I received a party permit, along with permission to publish a weekly (by way of affording a semblance of equality in the struggle), still, for 6 weeks they blocked the setting into type, the printing and the distribution of my paper, and only through a ruse was it possible to publish Ellenzek [the opposition] and arrange for its distribution in the great rural centers.

The other parties were free to campaign. The participation of the Hungarian Independence Party depended upon whether it could gather the required signatures in each district by August 14, during the extremely short 1-month election period (August 1 to August 31). Only thereafter could we campaign full steam.

But already on the basis of our success in the first few days, the regime realized its miscalculation, for in spite of all the difficulties, the crowds were reacting to our campaign. It was especially chagrined by our success in the so-called storm center of southern Hungary, this being a region with a disproportionately large number of the underprivileged, a hotbed of radicalism, where the Communists had achieved their greatest victory in the 1945 elections, regarding it as an impregnable fortress.

I launched our campaign at Mako, the storm center's key city, with a success that provoked the regime's full violence. At Hodmezovasarhely the Communist Party, aided by police, dispersed our first meeting. The police interned us in the courtyard of the city hall, and only by giving them the slip could I go on with the campaign.

At Szentcsanak they resorted to more violent measures. When the crowd made a living phalanx round the podium, protecting us against the assaults of Communist groups, the police with rifle butts made way for Communist storm troops who drove us from the hustings with stones, bricks, and clubs.

For that same afternoon we had scheduled our main meeting in Csongrad, and in order to put an end to repeated violence, this time I did not write or telegraph, but phoned the Minister of the Interior himself, requesting that he end the disturbances and assure our safety.

Laszlo Rajk, in the hearing of witnesses, declared that he had ordered the police to quell the disturbances, using arms if necessary. At the same time, he personally assured both me and other party members with me that the Csongrad meeting would not be interfered with. But the sequel showed that he had ordered exactly the opposite. The Communist list in this area was headed by Josef Revai, the Communist Party's Moscow-trained and Moscow-imported chief ideologist who later became a Cabinet member, and the district secretary was Sandor Zolo, the ruthlessly fanatic Communist who later became Minister of the Interior, and was also liquidated.

In the vicinity of Csongrad are many day laborers, among whom the regime had distributed 600,000 forints (\$60,000) as a cash subsidy some days previously. The local Communists ordered out their so-called activists to Csongrad, and for days had been intimidating the populace, saying that anyone who went to the meeting could expect the worst. I couldn't deliver my talk at the scheduled meeting place, because the radio and microphones had been disconnected. I set out for the city hall and asked the crowd to follow me. Some 500 laborers and others did—persons financed from the 600,000 forints fund, as it turned out.

Since the Communist mayor would not allow me to speak from the balcony of the city hall, I announced, in the name of the four parliamentary candidates who were with me, that we would hold our meeting on the steps of the city hall.

About 35 police armed with guns lined up at the meeting quite near us, but the moment I announced the start of the meeting they moved off about 30 paces and simultaneously the crowd rushed at us with shouts of: "You won't speak here. We'll beat you to pulp." In a matter of moments they made good their threat, overwhelming us with clubs and staves and bricks, then leaving us for dead, lying in our own blood. The police failed to come to our aid, didn't even budge at the sight of the Communist Party's organized assault. This happened on the afternoon of August 25 and, as the news spread, the Independence Party was denied permits to hold meetings in other parts of the country.

That did not end the persecution of the party, however. At the voting urns the all-present power of the Communist Party was manifested in the mass falsification of election results.

A provision of the election laws provided that a voter could vote even if absent from his voting residence. In order to exploit this provision the Communist Party had more than 400,000 blue "absentee ballots" printed. Reliable members were organized into groups of 50 to 100, who journeyed from one election district to another, multiplying the Communist vote. The falsification reached such proportions that in the Szeged election district 84,388 persons voted as against 81,950 entitled to vote. That is how it went everywhere. Certain poll watchers tried to check on the absentee vote, but gave up their investigations on orders from the Minister of the Interior; in fact, even those were released of whom it was proven that they had voted several times in several places under various names.

The Communist Party even went so far as to add up the votes incorrectly, falsifying the results especially in favor of the Communist vote and to the detriment of the opposition, and most particularly of the Independence Party.

In the dawn hours of September 1, 1947, it was already known, on the basis of already received results, that the greatest number of votes was received by my party, the Independence Party. At the city hall in Budapest the chief election commission of the national committee already had told newsmen waiting there that official results indicated that the Independent Party already had more than a million votes. Still, in the regime's first announcement, comprising only a portion of the returns, only 710,000 votes were conceded, while 24 hours later in the final report only 670,000 votes were listed, so that the full returns showed less votes than the partial ones.

The Communist Party's election frauds were protested both by the parties in alliance with it and the opposition parties. With the aid of threats by the political police and the Soviet authorities, the Communists succeeded in patching up the disintegrating coalition, and, after some days of crisis, no more was said of the falsified elections. My party alone continued industriously to collect the evidence, and Cardinal Mindszenty was the only one to stigmatize the foully acquired mandates.

The political police found out that I was keeping the evidence at my summer home. They forged a letter in my name and in my absence succeeded in getting hold of a complete list of the August election frauds. But in vain, for we still had time to reassemble the evidence. Before the legal deadline, I was able to appeal to the election courts, demanding that the elections be voided owing to manifest fraud. Our evidence and list of witnesses was legion, and we demanded an investigation of all the election books and of the documents of the Ministry of the Interior—with the aid of these letters, especially, it would have been easy to prove the number of absentee votes and to correct flagrant errors in addition.

Unfortunately, such was the regime's terror that all political elements, even the opposition parties, kept their distance. The western press reported these falsifications and intimidations that amounted to an election putsch; but western governments did not intervene. We stood deserted before the election courts, left to carry on the unequal struggle alone.

Meanwhile the attacks of the Communist press and regime intensified. Rakosi's postelection threats gave us to understand that our very lives were in danger and made it impossible for us to play an opposition role. Only in Parliament could we raise our voices, and even there only until the October meeting of the Cominform in Warsaw resolved to throttle all democratic movements behind the Iron Curtain. Some weeks after the execution of the Bulgarian opposition leader, Petrov, came the arrest of Maniu, the expulsion of Mikolajczyk and the outlawing of the Hungarian Independence Party—all almost simultaneously.

On November 1 the Lajos Dinnyes government issued charges against me, requesting my arrest. The charges contained the usual baseless Communist accusations. That same day in Parliament the Moscow agent Mihaly Farkas accused us of seeking to change the democratic political situation by force of American arms. My parliamentary secretary had already been under arrest for weeks, and indubitably the Communist political police and the regime were preparing my "guilt" in connection with the espionage case of the American newspaperman, Guinn. My case was scheduled to be heard November 5 before the parliamentary committee on immunity, and the leaders of the parties made no secret of the fact that the intimidated committee would suspend my immunity as of the moment of my arrest. I thus had no choice but to elude the ring of detectives and flee my homeland. This was successfully accomplished. I fled on the afternoon of November 4, taking my family with me.

On November 15 the national committee declared that I was an enemy of democracy and revoked the Hungarian Independence Party's right to engage in political activity. The Election Courts threw out the party's appeal to render the elections null and void, declaring that the party lodging the complaint had ceased to exist as a legal entity. Whereafter the Speaker of Parliament, taking note of the decisions of the national committee and the Election Courts, announced the revocation of the Hungarian Independence Party's 50 mandates and, by barring 50 opposition members opened the way to total Communist rule.

Some of my parliamentary colleagues escaped. Charges of treason and other criminal activities were brought against those who remained; they were interned or deported; there was not one whom the regime did not persecute. Thus was crushed the last openly democratic movement behind the Iron Curtain. Its courageous rank and file were likewise persecuted. Thousands upon thousands of "Pfeifferists," undefended by an immunity that at least offered the possibility of flight, felt the regime's heavy hand, suffered all the misery a Sovietized government can inflict. They were the true heroes of this national war for liberty. The Lord God grant that their suffering and sacrifice may soon achieve Hungarian freedom!

MR. MCTIGUE. You were born in Budapest, is that correct, in 1900?

MR. PFEIFFER. Yes.

MR. MCTIGUE. You lived in Hungary all your life until 1947 when you escaped, is that correct?

MR. PFEIFFER. Yes, in November.

MR. MCTIGUE. Mr. Pfeiffer, when did you first become associated with the Smallholders Party in Hungary?

MR. PFEIFFER. I was a member of the Smallholders Party in 1932, and after 2 years I was the chief counsel of this party, because in

my studies I specialized in common law. And with this contact I had the opportunity to protect the people before the courts.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you Deputy Minister of Justice at any time in Hungary?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes, I was Deputy Minister in 1945, November, after the first election following the Second World War.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do during the war years, 1939 to 1944; that is, the war against Germany?

Mr. PFEIFFER. From 1939 to 1944 I was in very close contact with politics through the Smallholders Party. After the Germans occupied Hungary the leaders of the Smallholders Party went underground, along with representatives of the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, the Jewish Church, and all anti-Nazi parties.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were in the underground during the war against Nazi Germany, did you meet Gabor Peter?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes. At that time he was the representative of the Communist Party, composed of only a few men. He had ruled after the so-called liberation of Hungary. First of all—

Mr. McTIGUE. What is his present job? What is Peter doing at the present time?

Mr. PFEIFFER. He has been liquidated now. About 6 or 8 months ago he was sentenced for life, for a connection with the Beria case.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was head of the political police?

Mr. PFEIFFER. He was at this time, in the underground, in a watchdog role. He took over the leadership of the Communist underground movement, and after the so-called liberation, he was the chief of the political police.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, at the same time in the underground did you have occasion to meet Laszlo Rajk?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes; Laszlo Rajk was—for instance, in his background, he was a very good student in the Hungarian University. So he was elected to it. This is the leading school in Hungary, where the eminent students learned and taught. This was probably about 1913. But he was connected at this time with the Communists. The police discovered his activity, and he fled from Hungary. He was arrested before the liberation. He was going to the Spanish civil war. At this time, all the leaders were going in the Spanish war, and we knew later, there was quite a conflict in the two groups of Communist leaders. He was trained in Moscow. In Hungary we were told there is no difference in these two groups, but after some years the difference in the two groups was obvious.

And there is another difference among the Communist groups. I can mention three groups within the Communist Party. One group had no foreign contacts; they were not in Moscow, nor were they in Spain during the civil war.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to Rajk eventually?

Mr. PFEIFFER. This is very interesting. Rajk was in the Spanish civil war. He led a group, a regiment.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Pfeiffer, I wonder if you care to avail yourself of the interpreter for explaining some of these details?

Go ahead, Professor, if you will. Help him out on it, please.

(The following testimony was taken through Prof. Arpad Kovacs, interpreter.)

Mr. PFEIFFER. In the Spanish civil war, Mr. Rajk was the leader of the regiment which bore the name of Matyos Rakosi. And in spite of that, Mr. Hakosi liquidated him in 1949.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Russians or the Soviet occupied Hungary, Mr. Pfeiffer, did you have the occasion to meet a General Beljanov?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Can you tell us something about that?

Mr. PFEIFFER. General Beljanov was in the NKVD and he had the role of watching the so-called work of the people.

Mr. McTIGUE. In spite of the fact that this was within the jurisdiction of Riesz?

Mr. PFEIFFER. The Social Democrat fellow traveler.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think it would be better, Mr. Pfeiffer, if you make your complete statement in Hungarian and have the professor repeat it in English, because it is making it harder for the reporter to follow you.

Mr. PFEIFFER. He ordered me to come to him, and report about happenings in my ministry.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, who was this general? What really was his capacity?

Mr. PFEIFFER. His task was to lead the NKVD troops in Eastern Europe, and in this capacity he was also in charge of directing Hungarian internal affairs.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he really Voroshilov's boss, or was his position more important, or a higher one than that of Voroshilov?

Mr. PFEIFFER. In spite of the fact that Marshal Voroshilov played one of the most prominent roles in Russian history at this time, we had the impression that he was definitely under the control of the NKVD.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you Deputy Minister of Justice?

Mr. PFEIFFER. From November 1945 to the end of the year 1946.

Mr. McTIGUE. During this period did General Beljanov have the occasion to discuss certain matters with you?

Mr. PFEIFFER. General Beljanov used to insist that it was unnecessary to have prolonged examinations or trials. The best thing, he suggested to me several times, was to proceed quickly and do away with formalities.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the General make any distinction as far as the enemies of the people were concerned? Did he break that down into classes?

Mr. PFEIFFER. He made no distinction. Anyone who was suspect by the Russians was declared to be a Fascist.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were your orders from Beljanov to do more shooting and less talking?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes. When I suggested to General Beljanov that legal procedure is necessary, he cut me short, insisting that it is enough to read the indictment and then proceed with the sentence.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was the Minister of Justice when you were the Deputy Minister of Justice?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Stephen Riesz, the Social Democratic fellow traveler.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Communists have confidence in him?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us anything about the former followers of Bela Kun the Communist leader of 1918, and how they acted when the Russian Army entered Hungary?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes. There were cases where those Communists who were in the party under Bela Kun thought in 1945 when the Russian Army was approaching that the new Communist regime would begin.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Communists occupied Hungary what did they do?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes, those who participated in the Communist movement in 1919 immediately took part, or were ready to take part in 1945; 26 years elapsed between the two Communist regimes. And the people who under the Bela Kun regime played subordinate roles on account of their youth now returned as mature men, with more important positions.

As far as I can remember, from the older generation of the Bela Kun period, only one commissar was living at that time in 1945, and that was Nyisztov, of the old generation, only Nyisztov. But there were Rakosi, and Vas and Revay, the so-called Moscow team. These were all young chaps in 1919.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they, or some of these people, ever engage in atrocities upon their return to Hungary, after the Communists took over? If that is the case, did you cause an investigation to be made in your capacity as Deputy Minister of Justice?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you make the investigation?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes. There are three outstanding cases which prove that to Communists even common ordinary criminal acts are used as political devices. The first was the so-called case of Gyomro. The short background of this case is that in April 1945, the Russian Army approaching Budapest reached the village of Gyomro. The political groups of the Russian Army insisted upon taking over new areas, and that committees immediately be set up in the villages.

It so happened that several people lived in this village who had taken part in the Bela Kun regime. And upon hearing the Russian announcements, they believed that a new proletariat dictatorship on the pattern of the old one would begin.

They immediately went around and gathered up prominent bourgeois of the district, like small holders, industrialists, shopkeepers, merchants, intellectuals, ministers, and priests, and among them was a writer of national fame, Joseph Revay.

Within a few days these people were all executed. When I took over my post as Deputy Minister of Justice in November 1945, I received many people from Gyomro. They were the relatives of the executed victims, and they came with petitions for receiving permission to have the bodies exhumed. They were badly intimidated, so it took some time to get the story out of them. They gradually told the whole story.

I ordered a search and found out that the political police, directed by Gabor Peter, had already conducted investigations in the case.

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me just a moment. If I am correct, the name of Peter is the family name?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. So you should actually say Gabor Peter?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Gabor Peter; yes. After a brief study of the papers left behind by the Communist police, I found out that they were falsifying the case. They reported as if a local riot had broken out in the village where people who were ordered out to do public work had rioted and attacked the police. The police used their weapons and the result was these deaths.

I also found that in these papers the dates were antedated so that people apparently had died long before they were actually executed.

I reported the case to Mr. Riesz, but his reply was that this case was rather delicate, and he wouldn't advise me to continue it. And aside from that, he pointed out he had issued an order, according to which it was impossible or not permitted to take up the case without his permission.

However, when Mr. Riesz went abroad, and I became the actual Minister, I decided to reopen the case. I led a raiding party to the village of Gyomro, where we then arrested many of the people involved in the atrocities.

These people, upon being arrested and brought to Budapest, and grilled by the police, very soon admitted the whole story. Their whole defense was their insistence that when the Russian Army was approaching, they were under the impression that the days of Bela Kun had come back, and therefore they acted upon that assumption.

This story spread rapidly in Budapest through the grapevine, but the papers didn't dare to publish it because Minister Rajk had forbidden any publication concerning the case.

Very soon afterward the Council of Ministers met. I was invited to attend the meeting. The agenda did not include the case of Gyomro, but Mr. Rakosi, who was at that time Deputy Prime Minister, led me aside and told me that he would like to have the whole case quashed.

I asked him for his reasons, and he told me that if this case were ever published, the Communist Party would suffer greatly in its prestige.

The other Communist members of the cabinet naturally supported Mr. Rakosi's point, but I told them that when a criminal admits his crime openly, and they all did so, it is impossible according to my legal concepts to let them go free, or quash the case. They immediately began threatening me but I told them that I couldn't help it.

Immediately the main organ of the Communist Party, the Szabad Nep, attacked me, saying that I was undermining the standing of the Communist Party in the country.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did Rakosi demand that you release these confessed murderers?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you tell him?

Mr. PFEIFFER. I emphasized that according to Hungarian law it would be a sheer impossibility to turn criminals free, actual murderers, who had admitted their crime.

From that time on I was a marked man by the Communist press. Every official measure of mine was misrepresented by them.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did Rakosi ever suggest to you that you arrest a certain number of Smallholder Party members?

Mr. PFEIFFER. This was a different case.

Mr. McTIGUE. But he did make that suggestion to you at one time, isn't that correct?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes. This was in another case. But it is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who is the present Minister of Interior in Communist Hungary?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Laszlo Piros.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you know him?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us anything about him?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us how you knew him, and what you know about him, will you please?

Mr. PFEIFFER. In the autumn of 1946, in connection with the stabilization of the currency, the Communist Party proceeded to undermine Hungarian society. Under the pretext of reducing prices, they declared that the bourgeois elements of society would be sternly dealt with, notably mill owners, industrialists, and merchants, who were, so they said, deeply engaged in the black market.

This new campaign was launched by Rakosi in the town of Miskolc, one of the regional centers of the country. His slogan was "Death to the Black Marketeers." In connection with this campaign the members of the Communist Party carried around small gibbets, showing what the fate of the black marketeers would be.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that restricted to the black marketeers alone?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes. But it was evident from their previous procedure and attitude that they would lump everybody together under this name.

Near Miskolc is the largest steel mill of Hungary, at Diosgyor. The leaders of the Communist organization in this steel mill were this Laszlo Piros, and Ferenc Dusek. They immediately took up Rakosi's slogan and decided to march at the head of the steel-mill workers into the town of Miskolc.

This Commissar Piros organized a campaign by posting announcements on the walls of the steel mill. Piros means in Hungarian "red." Therefore, these posters were called red letters.

The campaign had quite a success, since about 2,000 millworkers marched into town and began demonstrating against the so-called black marketeers. The result of this demonstration was that one Jewish merchant was beaten to death. Several other Jewish merchants were rounded up, put on wagons, and then taken into the center of town.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did that happen to only the Jews?

Mr. PFEIFFER. It appeared to all concerned that the demonstration had a decidedly anti-Semitic flavor.

The Communist Party in Budapest began to worry about the anti-Semitic character of his demonstration, so Minister Rajk went to Miskolc and ordered an investigation. The result of the investigation was that several people were arrested, but not the Communist leaders. Commissar Piros, however, was dissatisfied with the results of all this and decided to organize a new demonstration.

The purpose of this second demonstration was directed against the Jewish members of the Miskolc city police, who were primarily responsible, as they thought, for the arrest of the leaders of the previous

demonstration. They also paid a visit to the concentration camp nearby, opened the gates, and freed everybody. Naturally, all the arrested people who were accused of being black marketeers were also set free.

In the subsequent attack against the Jewish members of the city police several were wounded and one lieutenant of the police force was killed. The evidence was quite clear. We knew very well who the instigators were, who were the leaders, and who were those who immediately carried out the program.

They refused to give me permissoin to investigate the case myself, because the Minister of the Interior reserved it to himself. But since reaction was very strong, particularly in the city of Miskolc, and throughout the whole nation, they felt they had to do something. The NKVD itself took up the case, but eventually Rajk and Riesz, the two Ministers, succeeded in covering it up completely.

Perhaps some of the reasons why such excesses occurred were that the Communists at the beginning, who had very few followers, often went to the concentration camps and persuaded former Nazis to join their ranks.

MR. BENTLEY. Right there I want to ask a question. Mr. Pfeiffer, do you know of any specific individuals who were formerly in the Nazi Party who joined the Communist Party?

MR. PFEIFFER. Yes.

MR. BENTLEY. I mean names, now.

MR. PFEIFFER. One is Csikos Natjosh. He had an eminent role in the economic life under the Nazis.

MR. BENTLEY. What position does he occupy today?

MR. PFEIFFER. After the war he was assigned to the council of Mr. Vas, who was at the time the Chairman of the Economic Council.

MR. BENTLEY. What position does he occupy today, was my question.

MR. PFEIFFER. He still is the Deputy Minister of Economics.

MR. BENTLEY. Do you know, Mr. Pfeiffer, or did you know a man by the name of Vilmos Olti?

MR. PFEIFFER. Yes.

MR. BENTLEY. What position did he occupy under the Nazis?

MR. PFEIFFER. He was a judge.

MR. BENTLEY. Under the Nazis?

MR. PFEIFFER. Under the Nazis.

MR. BENTLEY. What position did he occupy under the Communists?

MR. PFEIFFER. He was one of the most important members of the Communist judicial organization, because, after all, he presided over the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty.

MR. BENTLEY. He was the chief judge at the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty, this Hungarian Communist, formerly a Nazi judge; am I correct?

MR. PFEIFFER. Yes.

MR. BENTLEY. Are there any other individuals you can think of at the moment?

MR. PFEIFFER. Other prominent members in Communist life were Geza Losonczi and Alexander Zsolt.

MR. BENTLEY. I am talking about people who were former Nazis.

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes; they were all former Nazis. Alexander Zsolt, he was Minister of the Interior in Rackeve, the capital. And Mike Kovacs, who was Secretary of State for Justice.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you. Mr. Pfeiffer, you have only mentioned, of course, 3 or 4, but there were large numbers of the so-called rank and file that went over from the Hungarian Nazi Party into the Communist Party; am I correct?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes. The recruiting of former Nazis went on quite openly by the Communists in the concentration camps. They promised these people complete remission of their crimes or sins and a career in the Communist Party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

One moment, please. Mr. Counsel, I believe, if you have no objection, and the committee members have no objection, that the subcommittee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. Is that satisfactory?

Mr. Witness, you will return at that time then, please. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the subcommittee recessed until 2 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Pfeiffer, will you take the chair?

TESTIMONY OF ZOLTAN PFEIFFER—Resumed

Mr. BENTLEY. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Pfeiffer, when we recessed, I think at the time you were testifying on the circumstances that surrounded the incident in this village, the so-called anti-Semitic move; is that right?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before you gave some rather substantial testimony on that point. From your experience in that respect, can you say that communism is anti-Catholic, anti-Protestant, and anti-Jewish?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Communism everywhere, and especially in eastern Europe, was antireligious. But it should be noted that at the beginning there were many cases of pogroms in Hungary.

I can explain this phenomenon with the fact that as I have explained before, many of the cadres of the Communist Party in the field were former Nazis.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who were some of the Nazis? Can you name any?

Mr. PFEIFFER. I shall give a list of those who played prominent roles in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. You will submit that for the record later on?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is all right. Getting back to the question I asked you and the answer you gave, has communism been directed against all religions in Hungary, including the Jews?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And these pogroms that you talk about started as early as 1946?

Mr. PFEIFFER. It should be noted that communism changes its tactics continuously. At the beginning they were trying to win the good will of the churches in Hungary, and now that they have strengthened their position they are suppressing the churches more and more.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you leave Hungary, Mr. Pfeiffer?

Mr. PFEIFFER. November 4, 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. You came to the United States when?

Mr. PFEIFFER. On November 12, same year.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. No questions at this moment.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Pfeiffer, you mentioned about the Russian Communists gathering up many of the people in a certain village of Gyomro; was it?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Roughly how many people were rounded up and eventually executed?

Mr. PFEIFFER. About 40.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Where were they buried? Were they buried in a mass grave?

Mr. PFEIFFER. These executions took place nightly, and the victims were interred in shallow graves so that the relatives coming to me complaining about the situation told me that their limbs stick out often, and are visible. But they were so intimidated, due to the proximity of the Russian Army that they didn't dare to proceed on their own and disinter these people.

Mr. FEIGHAN. They were killed by being shot?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did the relatives take up the bodies and give them a more proper burial; do you know?

Mr. PFEIFFER. No; they didn't dare, and that was the reason why they came to Budapest to see me and get permission to exhume them and bury them decently.

Mr. FEIGHAN. That permission was given; was it?

Mr. PFEIFFER. The permission was given after this raid undertaken by me and after the murderers were taken to Budapest.

Mr. FEIGHAN. As I understand it, the people were killed on succeeding nights, but the death record of all of those people was as of the same time, namely, the time when they were supposed to have rioted; is that correct?

Mr. PFEIFFER. The record was taken afterward, but antedated, so that the record appeared as if it had been taken simultaneously with the sentence.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Pfeiffer, this statement that you have submitted to the committee, I presume you wish to place in the record; am I correct?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection that will be done at this time in the record.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, if I may, wouldn't it be better to relate that back to the first part of his testimony, and have the questioning follow it?

Mr. BENTLEY. All right, without objection then it will be inserted at the beginning of Dr. Pfeiffer's testimony this morning.

I am going to try in a few minutes to avoid the material that is contained in here, but I want to ask you 1 or 2 questions about the time that you formed your own political party in Hungary. You formed a political party known as the Hungarian Independence Party, which stood for the elections in 1947. On August 25, 1947, approximately a week or less before the date of the elections, you were having a political meeting at Csongrad?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. At the time of this political meeting, you and other candidates of your party were addressing a crowd when you were attacked by a group of Communist sympathizers; is that correct?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And during the attack, during which you failed to receive protection from the police who were present, you and other members of your party were severely beaten; is that correct?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you indicate to the committee what injuries you suffered during that time?

Mr. PFEIFFER. A concussion of the brain.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you point out to the committee exactly where you were struck; if you recall?

Mr. PFEIFFER. I can describe the whole event.

Mr. BENTLEY. No; we have the event, you see, in the record. I want to know where you were hit.

Mr. PFEIFFER. I was hit all over my body, with heavy sticks, so that in a few seconds we were down on the——

Mr. BENTLEY. Where were you struck to receive the concussion?

Mr. PFEIFFER. The top of the head.

Mr. BENTLEY. Point to it, please. [The witness indicated.]

Mr. PFEIFFER. My head was swollen up so badly that it was impossible to ascertain the exact location of the blow.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were struck on the head with what kind of an instrument?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Sticks and bicycle pumps and anything they could lay their hands on.

Mr. BENTLEY. What other injuries did you receive besides that to your head?

Mr. PFEIFFER. My body was full of blue spots, bruises, and swellings. Likewise my companions suffered similarly.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were beaten all over then, in other words?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. How long did you remain in the hospital?

Mr. PFEIFFER. My family was afraid to send me to a hospital, so they took care of me at home.

Mr. BENTLEY. How long were you under care?

Mr. PFEIFFER. More than 2 weeks.

Mr. BENTLEY. And during that time then the election took place, while you were still under medical care?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Then after the elections and after your party had received its votes, a certain number of votes which entitled it to a certain number of seats in Parliament, did you then attempt to hold other meetings, after the elections?

Mr. PFEIFFER. We couldn't even attempt to hold meetings because the party organization had to be disbanded completely, so strong was the pressure brought upon us by the Government.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see.

Mr. PFEIFFER. At the mass meeting held at Budapest the week following the election, Rakosi announced that my party didn't even have the right to existence.

Mr. BENTLEY. Yes; I think that statement may be in here. I believe it is. But you say your party was unable to hold any public meetings at all after the election?

Mr. PFEIFFER. The press was so hostile that people wouldn't dare to participate in any meetings.

Mr. BENTLEY. Approximately when was your party dissolved?

Mr. PFEIFFER. November 16, 1947.

Mr. BENTLEY. And what date did you leave the country?

Mr. PFEIFFER. November 4.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see. Now, to get back for just a moment to this meeting prior to the elections, did your party hold other meetings before the elections which were also attacked and broken up by Communists?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. About how many meetings would you say were broken up by Communists? Just how many? I don't care about the places.

Mr. PFEIFFER. I can't state for sure but I can maintain that everywhere in the country around this time the members of my party were exposed to vicious attacks of all kinds. And there were long lists of injuries suffered by—

Mr. BENTLEY. A great many people in your party, in other words, were physically attacked and beaten?

Mr. PFEIFFER. About a hundred people, approximately.

Mr. BENTLEY. How long before the elections had your party been in existence?

Mr. PFEIFFER. There were only 2 weeks in which I could organize the party.

Mr. BENTLEY. And in 2 weeks of election campaigning your party suffered approximately 100 casualties, including yourself, from trying to hold political meetings?

Mr. PFEIFFER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see. I think that is all. There is a great deal of other information which you have contained in this statement and which of course, as I say, will be entered into the record at the beginning of your testimony.

If there are no other questions, then we appreciate your coming and appearing before us, and you are excused. Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Peyer.

Mr. BENTLEY. I will swear the interpreter in because he has to repeat the testimony.

Will you swear to interpret faithfully everything the witness says?

Mr. PAUL VAJDA. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you translate my statement to the witness. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES PEYER

Mr. PEYER. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you be seated, gentlemen?

(At the conclusion of Mr. Peyer's testimony, the Chair directed that his previously prepared statement be incorporated at the beginning of his testimony, and it is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF CHARLES PEYER

Three times Minister in Hungary since 1919. (Minister of the Interior, Minister of Labor and Public Welfare, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.) General secretary to the board of trade unions. President of the parliamentary and metropolitan section of the Social Democratic Party. Member of the board of directors of the International Labor Office, etc.

Was born in Varoslod (Hungary) on May 9, 1881. His father was a sculptor who left his native village early. Mr. Peyer spent his younger years in different villages, undergoing hard trials and much struggle for his daily bread. He became a master locksmith, worked in various factories until 1905, when he was elected as a member of the board of the iron workers union.

Simultaneously he acted as a clerk with the sick relief fund until 1907. At that time the iron workers union appointed him as secretary, and in 1911 he became secretary general to the board of trade unions. After World War I, Mr. Peyer, in his capacity as acting government commissioner of the mine workers union, issued the highly important decree concerning the 8-hour workday for the very first time in Hungary.

Having been opposed to the Communist regime of Bela Kun, the new government appointed him Minister of the Interior. In the next, so-called coalition government, Mr. Peyer occupied the position of Minister of Public Welfare and Labor.

At the beginning of Nicholas Horthy's rule as Regent of Hungary, Mr. Peyer experienced a year of exile in Vienna. Immediately after his return from exile he started to reorganize the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions. For his sharp criticism of the Government at that time, he was sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment.

From 1922 on Mr. Peyer was a member of Parliament without interruption and also acted as chairman of the parliamentary fraction of the Social Democratic Party, right up to the time when the German Army marched in and occupied Hungary.

Since he had fought continuously for democracy and humanism, his speeches caused wide acclaim both in Hungary and abroad. In his speeches, Mr. Peyer took a firm stand against war, against any collaboration with the Germans, and against the persecution of the Jews. He never ceased to demand a higher living standard for the working class.

As a direct result of Mr. Peyer's work in Hungary, the 8-hour workday, an old-age insurance law, family allowance, and other humanistic decrees were codified. He also acted as an executive of the International Organization of Trade Unions and the Socialist International and a member of the board of the International Labor Office.

When the German Army occupied Hungary Mr. Peyer was arrested, together with many other Hungarian politicians, and was later sent to the concentration camp of Mauthausen where he was detained for 14 months. Seriously ill from starvation he lost 65 pounds by the time the American Army liberated him on August 5, 1945.

The sick old man had to undertake a very dangerous journey to get home, using trains, boats, automobiles, and even haycarts. Hungary at that time was already occupied by the Russian Army, and Mr. Peyer found his former seat as General Secretary to the Trade Union Council occupied by a Moscow-trained person.

Both postwar elections brought an increasing number of votes to the Social Democratic Party. Mass meetings held by Mr. Peyer were always well attended. He created a strong front against the Russians, criticized them for their ruthlessness and trickery, and demanded energetically the termination of the occupation.

As a consequence he was regarded as an enemy by the Russians and the Communists. Notwithstanding the dangers Mr. Peyer continued his work and in

1946 issued a sensational memorandum in which he demanded the restoration of liberty for the country and for the Social Democratic Party.

Unfortunately for the country, Mr. Peyer's political predictions came true. Mr. Peyer, having a wide knowledge and experience of politics, clearly saw the future and did his best to prevent the Communists from taking over the country; however, he was defeated by forged ballots and the traitors of social democracy as well as the fellow travelers of communism finally obtained the upper hand.

In 1947, at the time of the scandalous election in Hungary, Communist pressure canceled Mr. Peyer's official candidacy, regardless of the fact that he was elected by a unanimous ballot. No other way remained than to start with an independent party. As the candidate of an independent party, Mr. Peyer, in spite of the enormous Communist terror, gained more than 100,000 votes, and was himself elected in 5 districts.

After the election he set up the Independent Social Democratic Party, comprising a great number of workers and middle-class people. The Government and the collaborating Social Democratic Party decided to finish with him. They were afraid that if the new party became strong enough, the fusion of the Socialist and Communist Parties might become obstructed, because most of the oldtime Socialists would join Peyer's Independent Party.

An open fight started between the two parties. As in the case of other politicians of the opposition, the Government brought a so-called charge of conspiracy against Mr. Peyer, accusing him of being a fellow traveler of the American imperialists, and of inducing the United States to overthrow the "People's Republic" by the force of arms. Another charge was that he had communicated with foreign Social Democratic Parties in order to have the Independent Social Democratic Party recognized.

The fellow traveling Hungarian Government requested the suspension of Mr. Peyer's parliamentary immunity, and ordered his immediate arrest. This was decreed by a government which had Social Democratic members like Szakasits, Ban, Riesz, and Ronai, and even one of Mr. Peyer's party secretaries, Mr. Szelig. Not one of these so-called Social Democrats protested against the ridiculous charges, even though all knew that they were untenable. The reason for this was that they were eager to get rid of their old leader, who stood in the way of Communist-Socialist fusion.

It soon became evident that in case Mr. Peyer was arrested he would have to face the same fate as Mr. Bala Kovacs, who was kidnaped by the Russians. The Government tried to trick Mr. Peyer and offered him free passage to the West. Their plan was to allow him free passage until the frontier where the Russians were to arrest him and spirit him away to some unknown destination. Mr. Peyer, however, got wind of this plan and outwitted his persecutors. He spread the news that he was going to stay in the country and meanwhile disappeared from the capital and crossed the Austrian frontier on the night of November 18, 1947. After a short stopover in Austria he went to live in Switzerland where he stayed until his emigration to the United States. In his absence a "People's Tribunal" sentenced him to 8 years in prison, confiscation of his property, and deprivation of his Hungarian citizenship.

During his exile Mr. Peyer visited the Austrian, French, English, Belgian, Italian, and Swiss trade-union leaders, giving full information on the political and economic situation in Hungary. He wrote several articles, delivered radio addresses, held mass meetings, and seized every available opportunity to fight against Communism.

His family, left behind in Hungary, was in a very precarious situation, and it was feared that they might be interned. So a few months later they joined Mr. Peyer in exile and since then his wife, his daughter, and son-in-law have been living with him.

Mr. Peyer is considered by the present Hungarian Government and the so-called Workers' Party as their most dangerous enemy; he is mentioned almost weekly as a traitor, but his authority and popularity with the Hungarian people are unchallenged.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Peyer, you were born in Hungary in 1881; is that correct?

Mr. PEYER (through Mr. Paul Vajda as interpreter). Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Until 1911 you worked for various employers and took an active part in labor activities; is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. From 1907.

Mr. McTIGUE. And in 1911 you became Secretary General to the Board of Trade Unions: isn't that correct?

Mr. PEYER. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. And after World War I, you, Mr. Peyer, in your capacity as Acting Government Commissioner of the Mine Workers Union for the first time issued the decree providing for the 8-hour workday?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And it was from that decree, and it was as a consequence of that, that we here in America got the 8-hour day?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. But that is where it had its origin?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were the first one to promote it; is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And not only the first 8-hour day, but also other reforms which later were developed in the United States?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You are in internationally known labor leader, aren't you, Mr. Peyer?

Mr. PEYER. I was a member of the International Trade Union, and represented my country abroad over a period of 25 years.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think you will have to speak a little louder.

Mr. McTIGUE. You represented your country, Hungary, at various international trade conferences and meetings?

Mr. PEYER. And for a period of 12 years I was Director of the International Labor Bureau in Geneva.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the time that you were a well-known labor leader in Hungary, and during the time that you were putting these new labor reforms into motion, were you in touch with the labor leaders here in the United States?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. I have met them on various occasions abroad, at international labor conferences.

Mr. McTIGUE. Since you have been here you have addressed some of our labor conventions such as the American Federation of Labor, and the Congress—

Mr. PEYER. Yes, at St. Paul, about 3 years ago, roughly.

Mr. McTIGUE. In brief, Mr. Peyer, you are an internationally known labor leader?

Mr. PEYER. In March of this year I attended a conference at Washington of the machinists' union.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a speaker at that convention?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You spoke at the convention?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. They accepted a motion of mine asking for the liberation of the labor leaders who are under arrest in Hungary at present.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it true that you were three times a minister in Hungary, Mr. Peyer?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the first time?

Mr. PEYER. The first occasion was after the fall of the Bela Kun regime in 1919, after which there was a coalition cabinet where I occu-

pied the post of Minister of the Interior. And in 1947 the Government made me a Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, but I refused that commission.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was under President Tildy?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you refused the award, or the office?

Mr. PEYER. The office; that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you minister for the second time?

Mr. PEYER. First I was Minister of the Interior in 1920. That was after the fall of the Bela Kun Communist regime. Then after that there was a coalition government in which I became Labor Minister.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was it?

Mr. PEYER. Immediately following that I became Labor Minister in a coalition cabinet.

Mr. McTIGUE. But what was the year?

Mr. PEYER. 1921.

Mr. McTIGUE. In 1921 you were Minister of Labor?

Mr. PEYER. Of Labor.

Mr. McTIGUE. All right. What was the third cabinet position you held?

Mr. PEYER. I considered the third one—actually it is not a cabinet job.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in Hungary during the Nazi occupation of Hungary, Mr. Peyer?

Mr. PEYER. No. The Germans occupied Hungary in 1944, and the following day I was arrested and taken to Maulhausen in Germany where I spent 14 months in a concentration camp.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is the infamous Maulhausen?

Mr. PEYER. That is right, that is the infamous prison camp.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you released from internment?

Mr. PEYER. On August 5, 1945.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you then determine to go back to Hungary?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. My family was back in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you returned to Hungary, what did you do?

Mr. PEYER. By the time I came back, all the posts had been filled by the Social Democratic Party, including my post of general secretary of the party. The secretary general that was put in in my absence was a man, Janos Cosa, a favorite of Moscow. Actually Moscow had him nominated.

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me just a moment. Will the record show that Congressman Dodd, of Connecticut, has entered the room at this point.

Mr. McTIGUE. You may proceed, Mr. Peyer, please.

Mr. PEYER. I was sick, and had to spend several months in a hospital. I lost about 65 pounds in weight.

Mr. McTIGUE. After your return to Hungary, and after you attempted to resume your very prominent position in labor, did you thereafter communicate with the labor leaders in the United States and the labor leaders in England?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were in constant touch with the labor leaders in the United States and in England and other countries; is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. That was the accusation against me later on.

Mr. McTIGUE. I see. That was one of the bases for the charges against you later on?

Mr. PEYER. Yes, when I was tried in absentia. It is included in the sentence.

When I got back I looked around me and found that the party had been flooded by unknown people, and while in the hospital my friends told me that great changes had taken place.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were some of the changes that had taken place?

Mr. PEYER. There were a number of changes. After my recovery I made courtesy calls on several leaders of the party. Among them was Matyas Rakosi, whom I had known in 1919 already, under the Bela Kun regime, the Communist regime, where he was a man who had a very minor position.

A few minutes after I called on him Rakosi turned to me point blank and asked me what my plans were. He declared that I could no longer engage in politics: should I have any wishes I should jot them down on a piece of paper, they would see that they were carried out, but the only condition was that I was not to engage in politics.

He said that he had such a great interest in the Socialist Party even then that "I can carry through anything I want." He immediately offered to send me abroad, to go to Moscow as Ambassador or Minister.

Mr. McTIGUE. Rakosi?

Mr. PEYER. Rakosi.

Mr. McTIGUE. Had offered you the position as Ambassador to Moscow?

Mr. PEYER. Ambassador to Moscow. I refused it. Rakosi said it would be better if I went to Moscow, a Social Democrat, as Minister of the regime.

When I refused Moscow, he enumerated several other countries, England, France, and so forth. I said, "It is up to my party to stipulate where I am to go, and it is not up to a political factor to determine it."

At the time I was still a member of the party executive, but at the next elections I was struck off the list of the party executive: I mean they actually forged my name. Although I was a member of Parliament, I had no role whatsoever. Although I had been elected at one time to the foreign committee of Parliament, the Communists demanded that I be struck off the list.

I was very well known to all workers in the country as general secretary of the party. They kept on inviting me to the factory meetings. At these meetings I criticized vehemently the leadership of the party. Therefore, the party instigated an investigation. As a consequence, I was barred from visiting factories and holding meetings.

At about this time I held weekly meetings with the labor leaders in the various factories, in the heavy industrial works and in the utilities, and discussed with them the method of resistance against the Communists. The Communists demanded that half of the executive be filled with Communists in the Labor Party.

Mr. McTIGUE. In the Labor Party?

Mr. PEYER. At the trade unions.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead.

Mr. PEYER. They could not carry this out in the factories, because the Communists had lost their commissions, their assignments in the factories, at the elections.

At that time there was an incident at Csepel, which is the greatest heavy industry plant in Budapest, which employed at that time about 25,000 workers. There at one time the Communists got hold of one Social Democrat and threw him out of the factory, bodily.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me ask you this, Mr. Peyer: After your return to Communist Hungary, upon your release from the Nazi concentration camp, you attempted to resume your high position in labor; that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were unable to do that at that time?

Mr. PEYER. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is there any such thing as free labor or free labor unions under communism?

Mr. PEYER. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Because you tried to promote free labor organizations upon your return from the Nazi concentration camp you were compelled to flee the country; isn't that correct?

Mr. PEYER. That is right. Today the trade unions are an organ of the state.

Mr. McTIGUE. And the trade unions are used against the worker rather than on behalf of the worker; is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. I have a detailed account.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you leave Hungary, Mr. Peyer?

Mr. PEYER. On November 18, 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you come to this country at that time?

Mr. PEYER. To Austria and to Switzerland, and arrived in this country in 1949.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you since your arrival in this country been telling labor organizations such as the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations and others what happens to labor under communism?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. I gave several lectures on this matter and spoke directly to the labor leaders, such as Mr. Meany and others.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you address the Ohio State Federation of Labor, for example? Is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. In about 30 or 40 cities. I have spoken also.

Mr. McTIGUE. Last year you were in Stockholm, is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And it is my understanding that while you were in Stockholm you had a very interesting incident as far as present-day Hungary is concerned, is that right?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us something about it, will you please?

Mr. PEYER. At Stockholm I met some of the Hungarian football team.

Mr. McTIGUE. This last year in Stockholm?

Mr. PEYER. This was last year in Stockholm. I am worried about this because, I might get these people into trouble. They are still back home in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. You don't have to name any names, or identify anybody. Just a general description of what happened, because I think

it is interesting. If you don't want to tell about it here in public we will forego it.

Mr. PEYER. Since I live in a free country, I can speak about this case, but the only drawback is that I am afraid that these people might—

Mr. McTIGUE. I won't pursue the point and I have no further questions.

Mr. PEYER. I sent word back to Hungary through one of these sportsmen and told him to tell the people that it is not true that once we go back to Hungary, after the country is liberated, that we will wreak revenge on them. On the contrary, what we want is to create a democratic order.

Mr. McTIGUE. In other words, what you are interested in is liberating the country, Mr. Peyer, and not seeking revenge, once the opportunity presents itself.

I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Bonin.

Mr. BONIN. No questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. No questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Peyer, you have been in the labor movement a long while. Could you describe very briefly the conditions that had obtained in the labor movement in Hungary up till the time you left there, that is, just before the war? I mean with reference to the right of a man to join a labor union of his own choice, and the right of the labor union to bargain with the employer.

Mr. PEYER. I worked in a factory from 1890 to 1907. There was a time when I worked from 6 o'clock in the morning till 10 o'clock at night. It was at that time that trade unions began to be formed, and I became a founding member of the iron workers. I built up this organization and later on became its secretary.

At that time the labor unions had no influence whatsoever with the government or with any other body, including the employers' body.

Already during World War I there were strikes organized by the labor unions, but after 1914 they began to function properly.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Excuse me. What I would like to have, Mr. Peyer, is to have you tell us the exact condition in which labor was in Hungary before the Second World War, or during the Second World War before it was occupied, by the Nazis and subsequently by the Communists.

Mr. PEYER. During World War II the Hungarian workers were completely organized, and the Social Democratic Party had a great deal of influence. They had parliamentary representation and the trade unions had adequate influence in the country.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Excuse me. What I would like to have you tell us, Mr. Peyer, is this: Was a man who joined a labor union free to join that particular union?

Mr. PEYER. Yes; he could, but there were several factories where the employer would not accept workers who were members of labor unions.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Well, that is the problem of the open shop and the closed shop which we even have in this country. The labor unions were able to represent the membership of their union in bargaining with the employers, were they?

Mr. PEYER. Yes; there were even collective agreements between workers and employers. For instance, the printers had such arrangements. Certain iron foundries worked on a collective contract basis.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Before the Nazis came into Hungary, the condition of the laboring man was very high compared to at least the situation before World War I?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. And much of that improvement was due, I take it, to the efforts of the labor unions as well as legislation in Parliament?

Mr. PEYER. The 8-hour day went through, was enacted during that time, and the so-called family allowances were granted.

Mr. FEIGHAN. During that time?

Mr. PEYER. Well, I mean prior to World War II. Paid vacations, and all kinds of insurance; naturally, old-age and sick insurance.

Mr. FEIGHAN. The union had a right to strike, did it not?

Mr. PEYER. Well, there was no law against strikes, so they did strike.

Mr. FEIGHAN. They did have an economic weapon if they cared to use it?

Mr. PEYER. They did have an economic weapon, although it was not theirs by law. In the statutes of the trade unions there was a clause which said that no aid shall be paid in case of strikes. But they had special strike funds.

Mr. FEIGHAN. The wages paid a worker, whether organized or unorganized, whether a member of the union or not a member of the union, were sufficient so that he could clothe and feed and house himself and a wife and family if he had one?

Mr. PEYER. Modestly, but it was sufficient.

Mr. FEIGHAN. After the Communists started to run the country of Hungary, you were there from sometime after August 5, 1945, when you left Mauthausen—exactly when did you get to Hungary and become active?

Mr. PEYER. I got back to Hungary sometime in June of 1945, and was laid up for approximately 2 months.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Yes, I know; but you were in Hungary, and you did not leave Hungary, I understand, until November 18, 1947.

Mr. PEYER. Correct.

Mr. FEIGHAN. So that you had more than 2 years in Hungary after the Communists had taken over.

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Or while they were in the process. Of course, you must have noticed a very big contrast between the conditions of the laboring person in Hungary after the Communists took over—

Mr. PEYER. Well, conditions had completely changed because the leadership had been changed, and the old members of the Social Democratic Party received absolutely no protection any more. To illustrate the situation, the man who was the Social Democratic leader in that largest factory in Hungary is today sentenced to life and is now in Siberia, while the other man who threw out the Social Democrat is today minister in Warsaw, ambassador in Warsaw.

Mr. FEIGHAN. What I want to know is this: The condition of the laboring man, the workingman in Hungary, after and during the period in which the Communists have taken over, is in contrast to the

situation before; in other words, is there now any union that really protects the rights of the workingman?

Mr. PEYER. No, there is no union. The trade unions today are under the thumb of the state. They do whatever the state wants them to do. The worker has absolutely no right as regards wages. He cannot voluntarily leave the factory. He has no right to change his job.

Mr. FEIGHAN. And he cannot determine how many hours he works himself?

Mr. PEYER. On paper he has to work 8 hours, but twice a week he has to attend seminars of 2 hours each, and there is a rollcall at the seminar to see whether the person is present or not.

Mr. FEIGHAN. What happens at the seminar?

Mr. PEYER. They indoctrinate them. At the end of the semester the workers have to pass examinations, and those who fail are apt to lose their jobs.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I see. You are talking about the situation that obtained between the period of August 1945 and 1947 when you were there?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. All right, thank you. Of course, the situation has, according to reports, become materially worse for the ordinary worker, but of course since you are not an eye witness to that, I will not proceed any further. Thank you very much, Mr. Peyer.

Mr. PEYER. Besides, workers have to do voluntary work for different causes such as the Korean orphans or Greek refugee children. By the time the worker gets home it is sometimes 10 o'clock at night, because he lives far from his factory.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Peyer, if you have no objection I will have this background statement inserted into the record at the beginning of your testimony. Is that satisfactory?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Peyer, one of the reasons that the Communists fought you in Hungary was because you were opposing the merger of the Communist and the Socialist Parties, is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. Yes; I not only opposed it, but I actually took steps against it.

Mr. BENTLEY. Why did the Communist want to merge with the Socialists?

Mr. PEYER. In order to become much stronger.

Mr. BENTLEY. You mean they wanted to take the Socialists into the ranks of their own party, is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And to destroy the Socialist Party because the Socialist Party had connections with Socialist parties in other countries?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did the Socialist Party in Hungary get any support from Socialist parties in other countries?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. Morgan Phillips came down, and tried to speak with the leader of the party.

Mr. Morgan Phillips wanted to pay a visit to Anna Kethly, the Social Democratic leader, and he was barred from doing it. Dennis Healey, secretary of the Socialist International, also came down in 1947 and talked to me. He promised me that he would do everything that the party—

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me. This was the representative of the British labor movement?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And at the time of which we speak the British Government was also a labor government, am I correct?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. But did the British Government do anything or take any steps which would actively have supported you in your fight against merger or fusion and the disappearance of the Hungarian Socialist Party?

Mr. PEYER. They made promises, but they did nothing.

Mr. BENTLEY. Promises and no action?

Mr. PEYER. No action.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, Mr. Peyer, do you know a man by the name of Antal Szakasits?

Mr. PEYER. Arpad.

Mr. BENTLEY. Arpad Szakasits?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was Mr. Szakasits a Socialist before the war?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. He was a Social Democrat all right, but his role was very minor in the party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know if before the war Mr. Szakasits was imprisoned by the Hungarian Government?

Mr. PEYER. No; not for political reasons. At one time he was——

Mr. BENTLEY. I didn't ask that. I asked was he in prison?

Mr. PEYER. For 1 day once.

Mr. BENTLEY. On what charge?

Mr. PEYER. Slander.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is the only time he was ever put in prison?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. You are sure?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. His wife was in jail for theft.

Mr. BENTLEY. What was Mrs. Szakasits put in jail for?

Mr. PEYER. Early during the Communist regime, in 1919, the Szakasits family moved into a fine mansion in the city park area and then they looted the place. After the fall of the Bela Kun regime, the owner came back to Hungary—he had fled the country prior to that—and naturally he started proceedings against the family. Mrs. Szakasits was then sentenced to 3 years in prison for theft. But even there her behavior was bad. She was a strikebreaker because when the female prisoners went on strike she kept on working.

Mr. BENTLEY. Am I correct in believing that this is the same man that after the war became the President of Hungary?

Mr. PEYER. Yes. The Communists always needed somebody who——

Mr. BENTLEY. And at the same time this woman whose activities you have described was also the first lady of Hungary?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. The same person?

Mr. PEYER. Same person.

Mr. BENTLEY. What has happened to Mr. Szakasits today?

Mr. PEYER. He has been liquidated.

Mr. BENTLEY. His utility to the Communist Party has come to an end: is that correct?

Mr. PEYER. He was not the only thief in the family because his son was also a thief.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see.

Mr. PEYER. For forgery he was sentenced to a jail term.

Mr. BENTLEY. One question more, Mr. Peyer: What has happened to the other people who before the war like yourself were good, honest, upright working representatives of the labor classes in Hungary, whether they were Socialists or not, what has happened to them; are there any of them left today in position?

Mr. PEYER. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. They are all gone?

Mr. PEYER. I submitted a memorandum to the party executive in 1946, and this memorandum was signed among others by——

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you like to make that part of the record?

Mr. PEYER. But this is only Hungarian.

Mr. BENTLEY. You have no translation?

Mr. PEYER. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. I wonder if you would answer my question. Is there anybody left who before or during the war was a leader of the Socialist Party or of the labor ranks in Hungary? Is there anybody left today?

Mr. PEYER. Not one.

Mr. BENTLEY. They are all gone—liquidated or fled?

Mr. PEYER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. The people who today claim to be the leaders of the Labor Party were never known before the war?

Mr. PEYER. They were absolutely unknown. There are 1 or 2 renegades among them.

Mr. BENTLEY. And there isn't one single person who deserves to be called a Socialist; they are all Communists; am I right?

Mr. PEYER. You are right.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is all the questions I have. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you very much, Mr. Peyer, for your testimony.

Mr. VAJDA. Mr. Peyer would like to read the sentence.

Mr. BENTLEY. Read what?

Mr. VAJDA. The sentence.

Mr. BENTLEY. This is the sentence that Mr. Peyer received in absentia?

Mr. McTIGUE. Isn't it true that Mr. Peyer was tried in absentia in Moscow?

Mr. BENTLEY. No; in Budapest.

Mr. VAJDA. He received——

Mr. BENTLEY. I think, Mr. Vajda, the sentence is in the background statement that he has submitted, and, if necessary, the Chair will be glad to confirm it, because the Chair was a spectator at Mr. Peyer's trial in absentia.

Your testimony is very much appreciated, Mr. Peyer, and thank you for coming before the subcommittee. Excuse me; Congressman Feighan has one question.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Peyer, I understand that after Bela Kun's regime was thrown out many of the Communist leaders who were a part of the Bela Kun regime fled, presumably to Moscow.

Mr. PEYER. Some of the Communist leaders were arrested by the Italian mission, by General Romanelli, and taken by special train to Vienna and interned there.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Vajda, I want him to get the full question and then answer it. How many people do you know or know of who left Hungary after the overthrow of Bela Kun's regime and came back when the Communists moved into Hungary, in 1945, and took responsible positions either in industry or politics?

Mr. PEYER. Rakosi, he is the only one. The only important person still functioning today is Matyas Rakosi, the head of the Communist Party. The others who had left in 1919 from Moscow were at that time not important personages. Now they are in important positions. Only one. Most of Bela Kun's staff was executed in Russia later on during the various purges.

Mr. FEIGHAN. But I wondered if there were not some who had escaped and came back, not in a political capacity necessarily, but to run factories or industries.

Mr. PEYER. No.

Mr. FEIGHAN. All right; that is all. Thanks.

Mr. PEYER. The present Communist regime considers the Bela Kun gang traitors.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think that is all. Thank you very much, Mr. Peyer, and Mr. Vajda for translating.

Next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. The next witness is Mr. Barankovics.

Is Mr. Vince Nagy in the room, please?

Mr. BENTLEY. One moment, please, Mr. Barankovics. Is Mr. Vince Nagy here?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you step forward, Mr. Nagy?

Mr. Nagy, do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God before the subcommittee?

Mr. NAGY. I do.

TESTIMONY OF VINCE NAGY—Resumed

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Nagy, I understand you are not here to testify but you have a statement that you wish to submit for the record at this time; is that correct, sir?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you want to identify him, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes.

Will you, Mr. Nagy, for the record, answer the following questions, please? Were you born in Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you live most of your life in Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you briefly give the committee just a background statement of your background. Were you a member of Parliament in Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. (through Prof. Arpad Kovacs, interpreter). I was elected in the First World War, in 1915.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a member of Parliament at the time of the Communist occupation?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. During what years?

Mr. NAGY. During the first Communist dictatorship, or during the Russian dictatorship.

Mr. McTIGUE. No, I am talking about the Soviet occupation in 1945.

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a member of Parliament in 1945?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were a member of Parliament in 1946?

Mr. NAGY. 1946 and 1947, till the end of July 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. And that is when you escaped from Hungary?

Mr. NAGY. Then I escaped.

Mr. McTIGUE. I hand you a document, Mr. Nagy, which I ask you to identify. Is that the statement that you have prepared for submission to this committee concerning the circumstances surrounding the seizure of and the occupation of Hungary by the Communists?

Mr. NAGY. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. And that is in accordance with your knowledge?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were there for those years and you saw these things?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that this statement be marked for identification and admitted as a committee exhibit.

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(Marked "Exhibit 13" for identification.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you another document, Mr. Nagy, in your possession which you wanted to submit to this committee?

Mr. NAGY. Yes, I have here a document prepared by the Federation of Free Hungarian Jurists in America. I was elected its president, and I prepared this indictment on the matter of genocide crimes against responsible members of the Russian and Hungarian Government.

Mr. McTIGUE. Other captive nations or other representatives of the so-called captive nations are also presenting their cases; is that correct?

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You have written the case for Hungary; is that correct?

Mr. NAGY. Yes; only for Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. And the case for Rumania and the case for Czechoslovakia and other countries is being or has been written?

Mr. NAGY. I heard that the other regional groups are preparing theirs.

Mr. McTIGUE. That is right; and you want to submit this statement?

Mr. NAGY. I would like to, for it is based on accurate documents with attached original statements to this indictment.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, that this be admitted as an exhibit and marked for identification with an exhibit number.

(Marked "Exhibit 14" for identification.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Nagy.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Barankovics, do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before this subcommittee?

Mr. BARANKOVICS (through Prof. Arpad Kovacs, interpreter). Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your witness, Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF ISTVAN BARANKOVICS

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you testify in English?

Mr. BARANKOVICS (through Prof. Arpad Kovacs, interpreter). No; only Hungarian.

Mr. BENTLEY. Just try and speak up as loudly as you can, please, into the microphone.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born in Hungary, is that correct, and lived there all your life, until your escape in 1949?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were at the time of this occupation of Hungary editor in chief of one of the largest daily or weekly newspapers in Budapest.

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Since before the Nazi occupation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you an editor of a weekly or a daily paper?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Of a daily and of a weekly.

Mr. McTIGUE. And briefly, you were one of the outstanding and best-known editors, is that correct, in Hungary, about that time?

Mr. KOVACS. He is not sure of that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, what papers were you editor in chief of, or the weeklies, that you just testified to? Will you please name those periodicals?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Hungarian Nation, Magyar Nemzet.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was a daily paper?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. This was the leading anti-Nazi daily.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any connection with any other periodicals?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. There was a monthly periodical called *As Orsof Utja*, the Way of the Nation. This was a periodical of the young intellectuals of anti-Nazi leanings.

Mr. McTIGUE. When the Nazis occupied Hungary in 1944 were you required to go into hiding?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes; I went into hiding, assumed various names, and during the last months of the Nazi occupation I lived disguised as a priest in a monastery.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that during the Nazi occupation?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes; the last months of the Nazi occupation.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened when the Soviet troops entered Hungary, and particularly with reference to the monastery where you were hiding?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. The Russians entered Budapest on December 24, 1944, and on December 25, in the morning, the first Russian soldier entered the monastery. This soldier took our watches, our fountain pens, and other small possessions. This same soldier picked me out from all the others, stood me against the wall, and

made motions of shooting. One of the monks in the monastery who knew Russian begged him not to shoot me, whereupon the soldier laughed and left.

After a few days an artillery battery took up quarters in the monastery. What was left of our small possessions they took away. But as soon as the soldiers found out that there were no women in the monastery and no alcoholic beverages they soon lost interest and left.

Mr. McTIGUE. Later on did women seek sanctuary in the monastery?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes, women came to the monastery and requested medicine against venereal diseases.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you ever happen to ask any important Russians or any outstanding Russians why this kind of thing went on, that is, the raping of young women and girls and old women?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Some of the police who were conversant with Slav languages had discussions on this topic with Russian officers. Their usual explanation was that this was retaliation against the wanton acts of destruction and violence committed by the Nazis in Russia; furthermore, that war usually brings a deterioration of morals.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you left the monastery and came out of hiding from the Nazis, did you try to secure a position to reestablish your newspapers?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened? What did you do?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. During the siege of Budapest I had received visitors, a civilian accompanied by a NKVD officer. This civilian introduced himself as Geza Penzes. He told me that he was an old member of the Communist Party, and that for years he had filled very high positions in the Communist Party, that at the moment he had a special assignment, and would like to have a rather long discussion with me. After a long introduction Penzes told me the following: I must get back the Magyar Nemzet from the Government, as its responsible editor. He realized, he said, that there was a great shortage in newsprint and in cash, generally speaking, but he and his friends could help. He asked whether I would like to take over the chief editorship of the paper. I said yes, I would like to, but whether I would be able to publish it depends on whether there would be freedom of press in the country.

He assured me that there will be complete freedom but he nevertheless would like to have a special request, which was as follows: Only articles may be published in the paper about Soviet Russia which would previously be passed upon by the secret Soviet representative.

The emphasis was here on not publishing articles which they wouldn't like, not to publish articles, which they would resent; whether I would consent to these conditions, and he assured me of complete secrecy.

He added that if I would consent there would be plenty of newsprint and plenty of ink. I answered that I couldn't fulfill these conditions.

After that, all ties with Penzes ceased forever. Nobody ever made this offer again. But I never got back the Magyar Nemzet, although I repeatedly requested the Prime Minister in writing to have the paper

back. After a few months Magyar Nemzet was published, but I had nothing to do with it.

After the appearance of the paper I wrote to the Prime Minister declaring this procedure an outright theft. The Prime Minister, Bela Miklos, who had been an anti-Communist and whom I had known very well, told me that he was powerless to do anything about it.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I interrupt for a moment? Have you got a statement? Is this all written out?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I suggest this, Mr. Chairman, that the statement be made a part of the record.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is it in translation?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. In Hungarian.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you have a translation?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you like to make a translation and insert it later on in the record; Mr. Barankovics, or do you want to proceed as you are doing now?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Who do you mean, yes?

Mr. KOVACS. He could have it translated and have it put into the record.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think that might expedite things. There are several questions, though, that we might ask you. You have some questions, I believe, Mr. McTigue?

Mr. McTIGUE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am anxious to give Mr. Barankovics as much time as possible to answer these questions, and possibly we can insert a translation of the statement at a later date if that is satisfactory to you.

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Good. Will you continue with your questions?

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you the founder of the Democratic Peoples Party, Mr. Barankovics?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes; and its leader.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you try to get your list of candidates on the election list during the elections of 1947?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes; I made up the list, but the election committee struck off quite a few.

Mr. BENTLEY. I may say that your translated statement, Mr. Barankovics, will be inserted in the record at the beginning of your testimony, whenever you can submit it.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you ever have any connection with Matyas Rakosi, the Communist boss of Hungary?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes; several times.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something about it, please?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. At a meeting held in 1948 between the Council of Bishops and the Government, Rakosi made a statement in which he referred to some disturbance which he maintained was caused by religious people. Someone at the meeting challenged the statement whereupon he answered the following: "When the religious organizations were dissolved, the Hungarian Government was not a sovereign government. These religious organizations were disbanded upon the

instruction of the Control Commission on the instructions of the Allied Control Commission."

Mr. McTIGUE. On the instructions of whom?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Of the Allied Control Commission. But Rakosi knew very well that this was identical with the Russians, the Allied Control Commission; that is to say, Voroshilov.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, these Catholic organizations were dissolved. Did that include the Boy Scouts and other movements?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No; the Boy Scouts were not included. They were turned into Communist organizations. Therefore, they were not dissolved.

Mr. McTIGUE. What Catholic organizations were dissolved and by whose orders?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Social organizations, cultural ones, economic ones, youth organizations, even glee clubs.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was responsible for it?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. The Government.

Mr. McTIGUE. The Communist government?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Not the Allied Control Commission as such but the Communist government?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. The Communist government.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did the Soviets and the Russians treat the local Communists in Hungary?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. They received all kinds of support.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they continue to support the Communists from 1945 right up until the time you left?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What single incident or incidents in your judgment caused the greatest growth of communism in Hungary? I am not talking about the occupation of Hungary by the Red army, but was there anything in particular, in your judgment, which caused sympathy with the Communists in Hungary? Have you any observation to make along those lines?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Very few sympathized with communism. A considerable part of the membership of the Communist Party only serve it out of necessity. Force is the first reason why one enters the Communist Party; second, opportunism of all kinds.

I would like to characterize the membership of the Communist Party in 1948. Before 1945, their number was a few hundred. The secret membership was perhaps one or two thousand. This small cadre was then filled up after 1945 in the following way: The first was the mob always ready to go to any extreme. The second category were the small Nazis and people who were persecuted for common crimes, who sought the protection of the Communist Party by joining it, and opportunists who sought power by joining the party.

The third category were those people who were suffering from all kinds of complexes, particularly as a consequence of the Nazi regime, who thereby thought joining the party would find satisfaction.

And the fourth and smallest category consisted of those who were misled.

These were the main categories of the Communist Party in 1945.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was it that you left Hungary, Mr. Barankovics?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. On February 1, 1949.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you engaged in newspaper work here at the present time?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any difficulty getting out of Hungary when you left?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes. Prior to my flight, Rakosi told me privately my sentence and what would happen to me if I stayed.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you able to get out of the country with your family?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. With my wife. I have no children.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you any relatives back in Hungary now?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes; there are.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I have none.

Mr. BENTLEY. I have a few questions I would like to ask Mr. Barankovics.

When did you form the Democratic Peoples Party, Mr. Barankovics?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. In 1945.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you stand for election in the 1945 election?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you keep it in being all the time for the next 2 years until the 1947 elections?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes. I maintained the legal party organization.

Mr. BENTLEY. But you had no representation in Parliament.

Mr. BARANKOVICS. There were two deputies.

Mr. BENTLEY. How many deputies did you have as a result of the 1947 elections?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Sixty.

Mr. BENTLEY. Actually you got the second largest vote of any political party in the country; am I correct?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. I believe it was the first, but the Communists stole some of them.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am talking about the figures that were published.

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes; officially it was the second.

Mr. BENTLEY. Let me ask you, How in the course of 2 years could your party grow from 2 deputies to 60 deputies? Who came into the party? Where did you get all the votes?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. It can quickly be explained by the following: Hatred against the Communists grew tremendously during these 2 years. People realized increasingly that the greatest opposition against communism comes from Christianity. We were a Christian party. But the people expected also a social and political basis, whereupon the party would function. And the fourth and most important factor of our victory was that between the two wars an organization called Kalot grew up which gave us tremendous support.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was your party entirely a Catholic party, I mean as far as the members went?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No. Even among the deputies there were several Protestant members. And I several times publicly announced

that we did not want to use the prestige of the churches; we wanted to help them. And I insisted that we were not a clerical party.

MR. BENTLEY. Most of the strength of your party was among the peasants; am I right?

MR. BARANKOVICS. Among the peasantry, yes, and also among the industrial labor.

MR. BENTLEY. Your party remained until the winter of 1948-49—when was it dissolved?

MR. BARANKOVICS. At the time of my flight.

MR. BENTLEY. You said that was on the 1st of February?

MR. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

MR. BENTLEY. Was that about a week or less before the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty?

MR. BARANKOVICS. It was a week before his sentence.

MR. BENTLEY. What connection if any was there between the arrest and trial of the cardinal and the dissolution of your party?

MR. BARANKOVICS. On January 25, Rakosi called me in and told me the following: He said that my party stood for the same clerical policy as the cardinal, only with slier methods, and therefore the Democratic Peoples Party had to suffer. It had to be disbanded, not when we wanted it, but when he wanted it. And we had to issue a statement, which he would draw up, containing two essential points, one in which I would declare that I misled the Hungarian people, that I announced a Christian policy, but actually it was clerical, and that I announced a democratic policy, but actually it was reactionary, or against the people.

Second, I was to declare that in connection with the Mindszenty case the Vatican had interfered with the internal affairs of Hungary, and in consequence the Vatican had created a spiritual cleavage between the Catholics and the party; it had created a cleavage of conscience among the faithful.

There were other issues, but they were minor in comparison to these.

If I would issue this statement that he wanted, in this case the dissolution of the party would take place without any harm coming to the members. But if I refused, then there would be no such guaranty.

He warned me that I had no chance of fleeing Hungary because the secret police were already watching me. Then he asked pointblank, "Will you sign it or not?" My reply was, "As long as I am free I will not. I might do it in Andrassy Street, 60."

Whereupon he told me that since I had enough time I might think it over, and see whether my head was as hard as the wall. Then I left, after he said a few words about a national church and said that after 10 days we would meet again.

MR. BENTLEY. Have you completed your statement?

MR. BARANKOVICS. That was my last discussion with Rakosi and that is the reason why I fled.

MR. BENTLEY. Yes, but do you think that it was necessary. I mean the dissolution—let me put it this way: The dissolution of your party had to come at the same time as the arrest and the trial of the cardinal; in other words, it was part of the entire conspiracy not to crush the church but to weaken it, the action against the cardinal on the one hand, the action against you and your party on the other; is that correct?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes, but something happened in between, which I found out only later. It is possible that they wouldn't have dissolved the party if something hadn't happened which I will explain. We had spies in the political police. One of them sent a paper after I fled the country—

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me just one minute. You say "we." You mean your party had spies inside of the political police?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. That is right. Yes, that is the case. And one of them sent me a paper, after I fled, which I received abroad. In this paper the following was told: A certain paper called Hazank was going to appear on a Thursday—

Mr. BENTLEY. That was your party weekly?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes. It was going to appear on a Thursday, either immediately preceding the trial of the Cardinal or at the time of its beginning. On the preceding Wednesday morning, an armed attack was planned against my person, in my home. The attackers would have tied me up and would have left me there. In the meantime the paper Hanzak would have published with a leading article under my name, in which I would have declared my approval of the Government's procedure against the Cardinal.

At the same time, to make it more credible, this article would have contained my admonition to the Government to make good their attacks against the church, but at the same time I, too, would have condemned the Vatican's attitude in the Mindszenty case and in their interference into the internal affairs of the country.

After the paper had been published, the police would have freed me. But nothing would have been left for me except to shoot myself.

The letter which was sent to me by this secret agent of mine I still possess, one of my friends, who learned all about this from the spy. Perhaps if this had happened they wouldn't have dissolved the party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Barankovics, would you be able to present a translation, if you still have that letter, for the record?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. To be introduced along with the translation of your other statement later, at this point in the record?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is that acceptable?

Mr. FEIGHAN. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is the man who wrote you the letter still in Hungary?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. I wanted to ask you 1 or 2 things about your experience in—

Mr. KOVACS. Excuse me. He wishes to state that this man is an American citizen.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see. Well, fine. Now, I want to ask you 1 or 2 questions about your experiences in Parliament. When your party was dissolved that was the last large opposition party left in Hungary: am I correct?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And ever since November 1947, when the Independence Party was dissolved, the party of Mr. Pfeiffer, your party formed

the only real opposition in the Parliament to the Government parties; am I correct?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. I said the only large opposition.

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Large; yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you able to accomplish anything in the Parliament by your opposition?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. It was possible for us to protest and state our opinions, but entirely without results. As an example, I declared in Parliament how the Government had violated the agreement concerning the freedom of the press declared by the treaty of peace.

Mr. BENTLEY. And to the extent that your party was able, it had freedom of speech in Parliament? Is that correct? They had freedom of speech in Parliament?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No; only partial.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you explain how it was denied you in Parliament?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes. First of all, they gave us very little time. And we were immediately called to order as soon as we said something unpleasant to the Government, so our choice was either to abstain or receive a rebuke.

Mr. BENTLEY. During the time that your party was in Parliament was your paper, *Hazánk*, able to publish freely?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. It was not. How was it controlled?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Several times it was seized. And the system was that before the publication of the paper I or my deputy editor would receive a call from the secret police from a man named Gulzas, who told us what pages, what articles, or what lines should be omitted from the paper.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see. Now, I want to ask you another question. Mr. Barankovics. During the time that your party was in Parliament there were other opposition or nongovernment parties, the Pfeiffer party and several others. I want to ask you, Was there any thought of ever merging the opposition to the Government, combining?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes; there were such. Even before the envoy, Pushkin—in September 1945, after the elections I went to see—

Mr. BENTLEY. When?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. September 1947 I went to see the representatives of the great powers—the American, the British, and the Russian, and the French.

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me. Mr. Pushkin was the Russian Ambassador to Hungary?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes. Pushkin's first sentence was as follows:

Today you are the most attractive bride. You will have many suitors from the right and from the left. If you give your hand to the right you will be finished.

This was the first indication which proved to me that it was impossible to enter into a formal alliance.

Mr. BENTLEY. In other words, the Russian Ambassador to Hungary as much as told you not to let anybody from the outside into your party or not to combine with other parties.

Mr. BARANKOVICS. It meant that it was forbidden to merge with any party, to the right; that is to say, with any opposition party.

Mr. BENTLEY. No other opposition. In other words, the Russian Ambassador to Hungary, after the elections in which you had won the second place among all the parties, called you in and told you not to join with any other opposition parties, in effect.

Mr. BARANKOVICS. He said—I wouldn't that he said it with these words.

Mr. BENTLEY. But he carried that very clear message to you?

Mr. BARANKOVICS. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think that is all the questions I have. Do the other members of the committee have any for Mr. Barankovics?

Mr. McTIGUE. No; I have no more, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you very much for your contribution, Mr. Barankovics.

Mr. McTIGUE. Paul Vajda.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Vajda, will you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Mr. VAJDA. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your witness, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF PAUL VAJDA

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you spell your name for the record, please?

Mr. VAJDA. P-a-u-l V-a-j-d-a.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born in Hungary; is that right?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you live in Hungary?

Mr. VAJDA. Well, until 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. You lived there all your life?

Mr. VAJDA. Actually I was abroad quite a bit, altogether about 10 years. I came back to Hungary, for instance, the last time, in 1931. And then I took over Reuters and the AP.

Mr. McTIGUE. But for most of your life in the country you were engaged in newspaper work; is that correct?

Mr. VAJDA. In newspaper work; that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. And in 1938 you were the Associated Press correspondent as well as correspondent for Reuters?

Mr. VAJDA. I was an AP and Reuters correspondent from 1932 until 1941.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened in 1941?

Mr. VAJDA. In January 1941 I was forced to escape from Hungary to Belgrade, because the Germans wanted to arrest me, through the Hungarian military authorities, for treason.

Mr. McTIGUE. For treason?

Mr. VAJDA. For treason. I actually reported some troop movements across the country to Rumania at that time. And I went to Belgrade, and in April 1941 the Germans captured me, and took me to Berlin.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you confined at Berlin?

Mr. VAJDA. I was with the Gestapo for 1 day, but then I was sent back to Hungary where they of course arrested me. I spent most of the time during the war in prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. Prison in Hungary?

Mr. VAJDA. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Nazis were driven out of Hungary, and after the Russian occupation, did you resume your position with the Associated Press?

Mr. VAJDA. Well, when the Russians entered Hungary, they picked me up and interrogated me and said that I was an Allied spy, because I had worked for Reuters and the AP, and those organizations were spy organizations.

I tried to explain things to them, and they said, "Well, the Tass people are also our people," which meant that the Tass people, the official Russian news agency correspondents, were spies.

Mr. McTIGUE. And they assumed—

Mr. VAJDA. They assumed I was also a spy.

Mr. McTIGUE. Since the Tass correspondents were spies, they assumed—

Mr. VAJDA. That all the other Allied correspondents were spies. Actually I only resumed working for the AP after several months, because the AP was not in the country. And I helped in that work. I introduced the President to various people, and went with him and established contacts, in an honorary capacity.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it true that you were on very close terms with Cardinal Mindszenty?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes; I introduced to Cardinal Mindszenty practically all foreign correspondents, including Mr. McCormack of the Times, Mr. Walker, John Walker, senior editor of Time, and Albion Ross, of the Times, and Seymour Freidin, of the New York Herald Tribune, and many others.

I went up there regularly, because I knew how to evade the Russian roadblocks. The cardinal was always very nice in giving us all the details we wanted.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you ever get in any trouble as a consequence of this?

Mr. VAJDA. Well, I did. Prior to my escape, I also went out to Cardinal Mindszenty, and took along with me an AP correspondent, and Albion Ross of the Times, and another person who was there at the time. And that was the only occasion when something appeared in the papers. So one of these gentlemen—I think I do know who must have told the Hungarian press about it, and there appeared a small item in the paper.

From that time particularly I noticed that I was being shadowed. But that was not the only reason for my escape. I think the main reason was that the son-in-law of the President of Hungary, Mr. Tildy, approached me, and said that he wanted my advice regarding the escape of the family to the West, so the President of the country wanted to escape to the West. Well, since he was acting on behalf of some other people, too, I couldn't get out of this assignment, and went around with him a great deal, and had secret meetings with him, midnight meetings, and I think that somebody must have found out about that, too, because around the 25th of June there was an anonymous telephone call to the American Legation—I happened to be there with my friend—warning me not to step outside, because they were about to arrest me.

So from that moment on I didn't go home, but until my escape I spent my time in a safe place, which I don't care to mention, and so I escaped.

That day, the day of that anonymous telephone call, I still managed to get in touch with a contact of mine, and found out that that very afternoon there was a Cabinet meeting presided over by the Minister of Justice. Mr. Riesz, and the political police appeared there with a huge dossier wanting him to issue a warrant for my arrest then.

He said, "Well, I can't issue a warrant. If you provide all the evidence I shall be glad to sign it," which was enough for me. I knew he would put his rubber stamp on that. And so 3 days afterwards I was out of the country, and had to leave my wife behind me, because it was not very safe to——

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Vajda, you have had a wealth of newspaper experience?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. All your life?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were the representative for——

Mr. VAJDA. Reuters and the AP.

Mr. McTIGUE. Reuters and the AP.

Mr. VAJDA. Reuters until after the Anschluss.

Then they came down to Hungary because they could no longer work in Vienna, which was the capital of southern Europe, and then I had a fulltime job with them.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is there any such thing as freedom of the press in Hungary?

Mr. VAJDA. There is no such thing, because even if you only report true events and true news items, you are liable to be prosecuted, because true items might also be harmful to the Communist regime, and that is enacted in their code, legal code.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were some of the methods used by the Communists to gradually close down or suppress the press?

Mr. VAJDA. Well, first of all, it was practically impossible to obtain information in the usual manner. You had to have contacts and find out what had happened from them. It was impossible to get news out of the newspaper and out of ordinary meetings. You had to go behind the scenes and find out.

I go further: We couldn't tell absolutely whether what was published in the press regarding the small parties was correct or not, because everything was watered down and naturally changed, as far as the real situation was concerned.

We were also very careful in sending out messages, because we knew that they would be reported back and we would get into trouble.

Mr. McTIGUE. Outside of the censorship that was put into effect, what were some of the other steps? For example, was the allotment of newsprint——

Mr. VAJDA. Well, newsprint did not affect the news agencies, naturally.

Mr. McTIGUE. No. I am talking about the gradual suppression of the press, not the agencies, now. You just explained about the agencies.

Mr. VAJDA. The press could only work if it had an allotment of newsprint, which was naturally dependent on the good will of the state. The state only allotted newsprint to papers which were actually under their thumb. So I might say that there was no such thing as freedom of the press.

And besides, every newspaperman was in danger of being arrested. Actually there was a case of a newspaperman who worked for INS who was picked up for an article and sent to 60 Andrassy, the political prison, after we put out articles through AP. And he also represented a paper of Sweden. What happened was that the Communists didn't like all that publicity, and let him out after a week.

This man then wrote an article in a pink paper praising the political prison. When I met him I told him, "Now, look here, young man, the next time you go to prison you won't put out a single line. You will just stay there."

I understand that man has died since. They used him until a certain time and then naturally discarded him.

Mr. McTIGUE. Isn't it true, of course, that the printers are organized by the Communists?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes, that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. All facilities which go into the makeup of a newspaper?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes, the printers simply would not print articles or items which were detrimental, in their opinion, to the aims of the Communist government.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it true that you were the last man to see Bela Varga prior to his departure?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes. That day there was a political committee meeting and I waited until he came out, and I saw him. I was the last one to see him, and offered to intervene with my friends to take him out of the country. He was very glad for that offer, and said he would go down for that weekend to his country home about say 80 miles from Budapest, and would be back Monday morning. That was on a Saturday. And then we would pick him up. But he never returned, because meanwhile he had heard something over the radio. I used to see him, by the way, several times every week, and he was very cooperative.

Mr. McTIGUE. Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, as you probably know, testified here yesterday. Were you in contact with him?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes, I did have contact with him. But I also had contact with Rakosi, whose trial I covered I think in 1936 in full for AP and Reuters. Actually I visited him in jail, at, where was it, in the south of Hungary. I will remember the name in a minute.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you talking about Rakosi?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes. I met him in jail, and after the war, I mean after he came back from Russia, I called on him, and he naturally immediately recognized me, and said I had been the only man who had ever visited him in jail.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a matter of fact, he spent most of his life in jail, didn't he?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes, about 15 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Until the Communists took over Hungary?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes, I had several meetings with him. At one time I saw a printed form which was to be signed by the Communists. It was

a declaration to the effect that "I acknowledge hereby that I was a Nazi, that I am willing to enter the Communist Party and serve as a faithful Communist member henceforth." So I took this piece of paper up to Rakosi, and in the presence of another gentleman asked him point-blank, "Now, look here, I think this is a forgery." I tried to be careful. And "What is your opinion about it?" He said, "Well, this is true." I said, "Well, how come you take Nazis into the party?" He said, "Are there any other people in Hungary but Nazis?" So that was his witty answer, what he considered humorous.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you cover the Mindszenty trial for Associated Press?

Mr. VAJDA. No. I was out of the country.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were out of the country at that time?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes. The cardinal was still free, so to speak. He was not really free.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the cardinal feel that his arrest was imminent?

Mr. VAJDA. I discussed this matter with him because I was of the opinion that he would be arrested sooner or later. And he said, well, he would stay in the country, and he didn't care. Actually, I was the one who knew ever since 1945 that he would become a martyr, because I knew how things were going. He was less conscious of that. Actually, I drew the attention of the entire American and English press to this person, because they didn't know anything about him, I must tell you the truth, until I started taking them out to see him, because I saw the news value of this person.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you there at the time of the so-called elections of 1945?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes; I actually covered those elections when I went around the country.

Mr. McTIGUE. 1947?

Mr. VAJDA. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Just 1945?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have any comment with reference to the elections of 1945?

Mr. VAJDA. Well, the first elections were, so to speak, clean, although far more people would have voted for the Smallholders' Party had there been no fear in the people.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you got a question?

Mr. VAJDA. Pardon me. There is just one thing I would like to submit for the record, the story of the so-called holy siege of Budapest. During the siege of Budapest I was wondering why the siege actually took place when the Germans had no ammunition left. They were so apathetic that ammunition which was parachuted to Budapest was not even picked up by them. Actually they wanted to surrender.

After the war, after the siege, when the Russians first occupied Budapest they visited several intact buildings and set them on fire. So I found out from several witnesses that the idea was to ruin Budapest, to make it uninhabitable, because the Russians had the idea that once they keep the bourgeoisie busy after the war they could simply sweep the country at the elections.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you a statement in that respect that you would like to make part of the record?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. If there are no objections, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VAJDA. This is an unknown fact. I actually told certain diplomats about it.

Mr. McTIGUE. This will be made a part of the record and incorporated into this part of Mr. Vajda's testimony.

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have completed my questioning of Mr. Vajda.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Dodd.

Mr. DODD. I have no questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan, have you a question?

Mr. FEIGHAN. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. I have no questions, Mr. Counsel.

Thank you for appearing before the subcommittee, and your cooperation, Mr. Vajda. You may be excused.

STATEMENT OF PAUL VAJDA

One week before Christmas of 1944 I was amnestied by the Nazi regime of Hungary and left the Margit Korut jail. Actually, I had not been eligible for amnesty, but the head jailer of the prison knew about my background and American connections ever since 1941, when I had been locked up at the notorious Conti-utca military jail in Budapest as the first so-called American spy. So the man saw the handwriting on the wall, particularly as the Russian guns could by then be heard and some of the long-range artillery shells were dropping in the suburbs of the Hungarian capital. This man, who later on was sentenced to 15 years, had hoped that I would repay him for this favor. Needless to say that the others serving jail sentences for treason and spying had mostly been executed.

Walking out of the prison, I then went into hiding with friends who were active in the underground and stayed with them until Christmas, when finally the ring around Budapest was closed. The siege then began in earnest. Constant artillery fire and air bombardment went on 24 hours a day, turning the city into a shambles as time went on. The city streets were littered with the bodies of dead civilians. Fires broke out and could not be extinguished, as the fire equipment had been evacuated by the Nazis to the west. The injured could not be taken care of, as there were no ambulances, etc.

I then returned home and hid in a closet, as I could not risk going down to the shelter for fear of being denounced. But the second day of the siege, around 2 o'clock in the morning, there was an explosion outside the building and our apartment was wrecked. So reluctantly we went down to the shelter. From then on our life was a torture. Food gave out after a day or two and we had to live on horsemeat. Fortunately, horse carcasses were lying about in the street. Of course, there was no electric light, gas, or water. The entire area shook with huge explosions and tumbling houses. It was hell.

But the siege was a one-sided affair. The German defenders who had been left behind by the Germans to form a so-called hedgehog position scarcely returned the fire. This was particularly true as regards their artillery and anti-aircraft fire.

Our shelter also housed a dozen or so Hungarian soldiers who had not the slightest intention of engaging in the defense of the city. German field police also dropped in from time to time to round up deserters and men of military age. But our sentries had warned us in time, so that we could go into hiding in the upstairs gutted apartments.

And here I come to the crux of the matter. I must assume the field police knew what they were talking about. They told a Hungarian-Swabian in the house that the German troops had wanted to surrender to the Russians, but that they could not get in touch with the Russian command and that it was a lie that the Germans had killed the Russian emissaries, a story which they heard on the radio. They said that the Russians were set on killing them all.

But I go further. After the Germans retired from the Pest side of the capital to Buda, burning our bridges behind them, they occupied the hill, Castle Hill overlooking the Danube and hid in the natural caves with which the whole area

was honeycombed. They would not even move out and pick up the ammunition parachuted to them by the main German forces in the west. An evidence of their utter apathy.

We also used to go out and shout across to the Russians to come and relieve us, telling them that the area was free of Germans. But the Russians only took potshots at us. It was a puzzling situation.

To cut the story short, after they finally moved in on February 12 instead of liberators we were faced by the worst crowd of pillagers and rapers. And may I mention here that the night prior to this event, a couple of dozen ragged German soldiers had descended on us from Castle Hill, spending the night in the kitchen next to the basement room which served as our shelter. They were talking all night and I was able to listen to their talk by holding my ear to the keyhole. It was the same story. They had been unable to surrender, so they decided to try and break through the Russian line at dawn and join the German forces to the west. Not one of them got through. I saw their bodies in our street the next day.

Before going into another subject, let me tell you what I found out later. The Russians must have had orders to destroy the city, because after they finally took over they inspected the main buildings and those which had miraculously remained intact, or only slightly damaged, were set on fire by them. I spoke to several eye witnesses who had seen the Russians set fire to the Adria Building and the Danube Palace (Ritz) Hotel, etc. Remarks prior to the first general elections in 1945 dropped by my Communist contacts to the effect that the people of Budapest will not vote, because they are too busy looking for shelter and food, cleared up the matter for me. The Russians must have had a long-range plan and well knew that Budapest was the main threat to their plans. So they wanted to smash the bourgeoisie to keep them away from engaging in politics. So this is the story of the phoney siege of Budapest.

On the 13th of February 1945, the Russian MVD men picked me up at home and I was escorted to their local headquarters. There I was accused of being an Anglo-American spy. I became indignant and told them that I had merely worked as a correspondent for Reuters and the AP. But they simply could not understand that a foreign correspondent was anything but a spy. They wanted to know the names of all my spy contacts. And of course I had none. All I could give them were the names of Hungarian and German men who had either interrogated me in the past or got me into prison. Finally, after 6 weeks, I was permitted to go home.

In the spring of the same year I went to see the American State Department men who had come up from Debrecen. And I started to advise in an honorary capacity over a period of several months the then press attaché, Mr. Frederick Merrill. I also went with him to see Hungarian officials, etc. Later on he was succeeded by Mr. James MacCargar and I was doing for him the same thing right until my flight.

In the summer of 1945 I began working once more for the AP. Several American AP correspondents succeeded one another and at times I was alone holding the fort. It was exceedingly hard to collect material and I had to see many people. I knew I was being shadowed and was as cautious as possible.

Correspondents came to Hungary from America and Vienna. They all came to see me and I provided them with inside information. Some of their names are: John MacCormack and Albion Ross from the New York Times; Seymour Freidin, New York Herald-Tribune; Leland Stowe, free-lance; John Walker, senior editor of Time; Robert Lowe, Time; the late Reuben Markham, Christian Science Monitor, and so forth.

I was the person who introduced these correspondents to Cardinal Mindszenty and got stories for them. But as I was helping both the American Legation and these foreign correspondents I felt that the Communists would soon be after my blood.

One day a friend, a journalist whose name I cannot recall for sure, told me that Arpad Szakasits, a Vice Premier and former friend of mine, had threatened me with the Russians at a dinner party which this informant had attended. And this because I had allegedly dropped a remark somewhere to the effect that I considered him a badly camouflaged Communist.

I must point out here that I had been approached several times by leading Communists offering to publish an English-language newspaper for me if I would only collaborate. Rakosi's brother himself once invited me—he was chief of Communist propaganda at that time (Biro was his name)—and tried to make me

help them. Of course I always managed to wriggle out of their clutches. They were very much like the Nazis with whom I have had many unpleasant encounters.

In June of 1947, Victor Chornoky, son-in-law of President Tildy, told me about their plan to escape from the country. I was told by Chornoky—this was after Ferenc Nagy, the Premier, had gone to Switzerland—that the Communists made his father-in-law sign many decrees against his will, and so forth, and that he was sure the family could be saved. I was rather pessimistic, but did my best to help him and a certain diplomat was to get the family out—before Tildy was forced to resign.

The President of Hungary having fled his country would have been a feather in the cap of any free nation in the West. I do not know why the plan has failed as I myself had to flee my country a little later, on July 3, 1947.

While I was at the American Legation, the receptionist received an anonymous telephone call asking her to warn me not to step outside as the Communist secret police were waiting for me. I told my Legation friend about this and went into hiding in the ACC building. In the evening I met my Hungarian contact who told me about a Cabinet meeting that had taken place that afternoon and where the then Minister of Justice Riesz had been asked by the Hungarian secret police—who by the way turned up with several dossiers about me—to issue a warrant for my arrest. Riesz promised to do so. That was enough for me. Three days later I left the country, leaving my wife behind, stashed away in a packing case, on a military truck. In Vienna I stayed with my friend, Mr. McCormack, of the Times, until I could be flown out by a small plane to Salzburg. I could not risk taking off from the regular airport as it was in the Russian zone.

A few weeks after I was in Paris and started working as night editor for International News Service until my departure for this country on March 26, 1949. My wife, by the way, managed to get out of Hungary 11 months after my escape.

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will stand adjourned then until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon at 4:30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until 10 a. m. Wednesday, August 25, 1954.)

INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 25, 1954

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUNGARY OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION,
New York, N. Y.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment at 10:15 a. m., room 618, Federal Court House, Foley Square, New York, N. Y., Hon. A. M. Bentley (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Messrs. Bentley and Feighan.

Also present: James J. McTigue, Chief Counsel.

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Call your first witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Dr. Fabian.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Fabian, do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Dr. FABIAN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DR. BELA FABIAN

Mr. BENTLEY. I understand, Dr. Fabian, that you are being called this morning in the capacity of an expert to testify briefly on what has happened to the children of Hungary; is that correct, sir?

Dr. FABIAN. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name for the record, Doctor?

Dr. FABIAN. My name is Dr. Bela Fabian.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you give us a brief statement of your background?

Dr. FABIAN. I was born in 1889. During the First World War I was an officer of the Austro-Hungarian Army. I spent the first year of the Russian revolution in Russia, and I was in Leningrad during the peace treaty of Brest Litovsk. Afterward I escaped. At first I was in eastern Siberia and then I escaped from eastern Siberia to Leningrad, and from Leningrad I escaped later to Hungary.

When I came back to Hungary I published a lot of articles and the first book which was ever published about Russian communism. My book was *The Methods and Means of Communist War Propaganda*, and I told the story of what I had heard from Trotsky and others in Leningrad, where they told of the happenings after the Brest Litovsk peace treaty, that they were not bound by the treaty, they were not interested, it was a piece of paper for them. Then when Bela Kun came to Hungary I was arrested. And afterward—

Mr. McTIGUE. That was in 1919?

Dr. FABIAN. In 1919. I was one of the first ones who was arrested in Hungary. And after Bela Kun's regime, I was elected first a member of the municipal council of Budapest. In 1922 I became a member of the Hungarian Parliament. In 1944 I was arrested and deported to Auschwitz. I was in Auschwitz, Oldendorf, Sachsenhausen, and Oranienburg. I have here the sign of the Auschwitz camp here, on my arm [indicating].

And when I came out of the Auschwitz camp and I was asked if I had changed my mind about the Communists, I hadn't. I said that the Communists were the same as the Nazis, and that there was no difference among them.

And so I didn't go back to Hungary, because I knew very well that there could be no compromise with the Russians. You can serve them, but you can't compromise with them.

Then in 1948 I was in Paris, and in 1948 when the Hungarian National Council's Executive Committee was founded, I became an elected member of the executive committee.

So I came to America. Here in America and everywhere in the world articles were published that Cardinal Mindszenty was a former Nazi. I wrote a book and I wrote articles for the Scripps-Howard papers, where I have proven that the cardinal was always against the Nazis, and I proved that in the whole Mindszenty trial the only man who was not a Nazi was the cardinal. The prosecutor was a Nazi, the president was a Nazi, and all the other people who arrested the cardinal.

Then here in the United States—and if I may emphasize this—I always wanted to show the people everywhere in the free countries that only nations together, the Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Mohammedans, they together can fight successfully against the Communists.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Fabian, when you speak of the people in the Mindszenty trial who were former Nazis, you refer I believe to Chief Judge Vilmos Olti?

Dr. FABIAN. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And the prosecutor, Gyula Alapi?

Dr. FABIAN. Yes. Not only them. The people who were sent to arrest the cardinal, on the second day of Christmas—you know that in Hungary, Christmas—

Mr. BENTLEY. December 26.

Dr. FABIAN. Yes. They took the people who were there before them, and those people were former Nazis. Now they have all disappeared, because they didn't want to have people alive who knew what had happened to the cardinal in prison.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you spend in concentration camps, Doctor?

Dr. FABIAN. In Auschwitz, Oloendorf, Sachsenhausen, and Oranienburg together I spent 10 months. And I was one of the first ones who escaped, and I brought the Auschwitz story to Paris to the Allied headquarters.

Mr. McTIGUE. Doctor, as the chairman suggested at the outset of the hearings today, you certainly have a wealth of testimony as far

as communism in Hungary is concerned. But for the moment, until we resume hearings at a later date on this subject, I wonder if you could tell us something about what happened to the children of Hungary?

Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that Dr. Fabian has made a study of this. He is able to document what he has to say, and I think it would be a very valuable part of our record to have this testimony, particularly with reference to the youth.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is in the capacity of an expert.

Dr. FABIAN. I think that this is a most important problem, at least one of the most important problems, because people in the western countries don't know anything about what they are doing to their children. They hear from the adults, they hear from the intellectuals, they hear from the workers, and they hear from the peasants. Now they want to hear about the children. How? I brought a document, which document is dated May 31, 1951, and signed by the board of directors of the Matyas Rakosi Children's Home.

The Matyas Rakosi Children's Home certifies hereby that Mrs. Istvan Nordja, nee, Julia Kovacs, volunteer of the First Women's Regiment of the Peoples Army, has sold her 2-year-old son to the state for 2,000 forints. At the same time she has renounced all of her parental rights, conveying them to the Matyas Rakosi Children's Home.

At first they did it without any separate government decree. The women who were called to military service, or to work in the factories, these women were approached, and they said, "What will happen to your child?" And they suggested that would be best for them to sell the children.

So in Budapest there are a lot of children's homes, and in these children's homes are the children of these people who were called to military service, the women, single women and all who were called.

You see, as to the children of the former bourgeoisie, former middle-class people, when in 1951 people were deported in thousands from Budapest and from the other cities, they didn't want the children to go with the parents. They wanted the children to come in the children's homes. And then they separated the children from the parents. And they wanted to get the souls of the children.

Here I think it would be important that I give the number of the decree of the Government, of the Government decree which made it legal to take the children away from their parents.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Fabian, one word: This document from which you have just read, which in effect says that this woman sold her child to the state for 2,000 forints, would you tell the committee how that document came into your possession?

Dr. FABIAN. Julia Kovacs escaped.

Mr. BENTLEY. The mother who sold her son escaped?

Dr. FABIAN. Escaped.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see.

Dr. FABIAN. And this was the only document she brought with her.

Mr. BENTLEY. Where is she now; do you know?

Dr. FABIAN. I don't know anything. I got the document 3 years ago from a newspaperman who had the first interview with her, and who made the pictures. I had a Hungarian copy of the certificate.

Mr. BENTLEY. But you are willing to state under oath that that document, so far as you know, is authentic?

Dr. FABIAN. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you. You may proceed.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go right ahead, Doctor.

Dr. FABIAN. No. 136, 1952, decree from the Hungarian Government. The first paragraph:

The Hungarian People's Republic takes over the care and education of all children whose parents or other relations under obligation to care for them are either deceased, reside in an unknown place, or otherwise are unable to provide adequately for their maintenance.

It means that they can rob the parents of their children. I know of one case, one friend of mine who had a brother, and he had two children, and because everybody has to work, the parents came home from work and the children said, "We were very lucky today, because we were addressed by a very nice gentleman, and this gentleman asked us about our parents, and has given us candy. And they asked about our address."

The parents at first were afraid who this man might be. At 9 o'clock this man came. He was a man of the secret police. He said, "You are neglecting your children. You don't know what your children are doing. I have seen them; they were out on the street. If you give the children to us, to a children's home, in this case you will not be deported. If you don't give up the children, you will be deported."

The parents didn't want to give up their children. They were taken to the secret police, and the officer of the secret police said, "What do you want? You lose your children in any case, if you give them up or if you don't give them up. If you give them up you will not be deported. If you don't give them up you will be deported." And so they have given up their children. The mother went crazy. This is the story of what happened to the children.

I know that the children will be taught that they must liberate the American children, because the American children have nothing to eat, that they are living in misery, and that the first task of all the children in Hungary is to liberate the children here in America.

All the children are "tank minded," as they say, and "airplane minded." God is a tank and God is an airplane, and they must serve the Soviet Union, and they must work together with the Soviet Union.

The biggest enemy of the whole Communist propaganda are the grandmothers. If once it could be said who are the greatest heroes in the resistance against the Communists behind the Iron Curtain, then it would be the grandmothers. You see, the parents work and the grandmothers stay with the children. And the grandmothers tell stories to the children about the old times, when they had everything to eat, when it was not a problem how to get a button, and how to get a dress for the children. I can't tell you what the grandmothers are doing. It is the best that can be done against Communist propaganda.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have any estimate on the number of children who would now be called unwilling wards of the state?

Dr. FABIAN. No; I don't.

Mr. McTIGUE. I haven't any further questions.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Dr. Fabian, I express the appreciation of the subcommittee for the testimony that you have presented.

Mr. BENTLEY. Call your next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Dr. FABIAN. May I thank the committee and the chairman of the committee for helping to expose not only the Hungarian case but the

whole case of communism, what the Communists are doing behind the Iron Curtain?

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Fabian, would you take your seat again for 1 second? I have one more question I want to ask you.

Dr. Fabian, there is a gentleman who has been in the news considerably for the past few days. He is now a member of the Hungarian delegation to the World Council of Churches meeting at Evanston, and his name is Janos Peter, Bishop Janos Peter. Do you have any information that comes to you from reliable sources concerning this individual which you could give the committee?

Dr. FABIAN. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you give us that briefly?

Dr. FABIAN. Yes. In 1946 I spoke with somebody who was very close to the President of the Hungarian Republic at that time, to President Tildy. And President Tildy was a very good friend of mine in old times, and he was an excellent member of the resistance against the Nazis. I can't understand how it is possible that President Tildy is not the old man, not the same man he was in the resistance against the Nazis.

This man—not man, this relative of the President told me that Janos Peter is responsible for everything. She said that he is a Communist spy.

Mr. BENTLEY. I understand this person to whom you referred, whom you do not care to identify, the reason is that this person is still in Hungary, is that correct?

Dr. FABIAN. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you. You are excused.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mrs. De Szily, please.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Mrs. DE SZILY. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you spell your name, please? Would you be seated?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Mrs. D-e S-z-i-l-y.

Mr. BENTLEY. I will repeat that. It is D-e S-z-i-l-y.

Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF MRS. DE SZILY

Mr. McTIGUE. Mrs. De Szily, you were born in Hungary, is that correct?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you lived all your life there until you left recently?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Yes. Except for some trips abroad I was always living in Hungary, till 1947. In 1947 we escaped.

Mr. McTIGUE. You and your husband?

Mrs. DE SZILY. With my present husband. He wasn't my husband at the time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you any relatives in Hungary now?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a member of the Parliament at one time?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Yes; I was. In 1945, November 4, until 1947. I think it was the 3d of July.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were very active in the Red Cross; is that correct?

Mrs. DE SZILY. I was. I was working more than 3 years there.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were also a leading social worker?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Yes; I worked as a social worker in the Red Cross.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the time that you were a member of the Parliament, in 1945 to 1947, and during the time you were one of the organizers and one of the leaders in the Hungarian Red Cross, can you give us testimony with reference to what was happening to the youth of Hungary under the Communist occupation?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And can you also tell us thereafter about the infiltration of the Hungarian Red Cross by the Communists?

Mrs. DE SZILY. I would like to make a correction. I was not a leader in the Hungarian Red Cross. I was a social worker there. This was in the beginning. And later I came into public life in politics, and after the war I never worked again with the Red Cross, because it was at that time absolutely infiltrated. All the old workers, one after the other, were turned out. I think there is a witness after me who can tell much more about this question, because she was there.

Mr. McTIGUE. All right, you just tell then what you know about the youth.

Mrs. DE SZILY. The youth and the women, these subjects are the most important for the committee, because I have seen that the first brutalities of the whole siege and occupation are very often discussed. But I think what the Communists can do with the human being is much worse in a long-range program than directly at first, after the war. The war is a terrible thing, but it is eventually over, and if somebody doesn't die, he will be a normal person after all. But it is impossible for a normal human being to live under the Communist regime.

If I may be allowed to discuss the question as to how they change the life of the women, and how they are going to destroy the whole family life, and the whole society for a human being and the family, I think that is one of the most important aims of the whole Communist goal, how to capture the human beings as persons.

I don't know if this is correct and you are interested in these matters, but this is something I would like very much to go into, some of the personal experiences, personal stories that I have seen.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why don't you give us a few of the personal experiences you have had?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Yes. At first, as in most countries, wives didn't work outside of the house. It was the duty of the man. And from the very beginning the Communists wanted to effect the legal right for the working power of each women. This was going on in the first days very easily, because after the war everything was destroyed. You can't imagine how, after a 10-week siege, for example, the capital of the country looked. And they ordered the so-called public work for everybody from 16 years, I think, I am not sure for women to 45 and men to 50.

Mr. McTIGUE. All women then at the present time and from that time that you are talking about, 1945, must make some contribution to the state; they must work?

Mrs. DE SZILY. They had to work. And this was forced on us in the very beginning, because after the siege we were coming of the shelters and the Russians were there. They forced it on us from the very beginning, to do this public work. And nobody wanted to do it, not because they were afraid of the work and to clean up the city, but they were then in the hands of the Russian soldiers. What was to happen to women you have heard here yesterday. And something terrible could happen also to the men, because they didn't have so many workers. Therefore, they were going around on the streets, and were collecting every able-bodied man for work. Therefore, nobody wanted to do it.

But this so-called public service was carried on so far that finally, in the very last year, everybody had to pay some taxes who was in another position and was unable to go for physical work.

For example, by this public-service law—I have not seen it personally but I heard from a very up-to-date source, at that time, this was in 1945—they took the young womanhood of entire villages in upper Hungary, I think 4 or 5 villages, and took them, due to this public-work decree, away to Russia, and as long as I was home nobody came back. I couldn't tell for sure what it is like now, because some of the prisoners died in the meantime.

This was one of the first steps. Then they wanted to deprive all the women of the possibility to carry on their old life as mothers, as wives, speaking as a leader of the family. Perhaps this is most important; they wanted each man and each woman, and individual, one single individual can earn only so much for the living, enough for her or himself, but it is impossible to earn enough that they can provide for everybody or anybody else.

Please imagine, as in a human society here, what a terrible thing it is for you to know that if you have old parents you can't care for them.

Mr. McTIGUE. You can't what?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Care for the old parents. They have nothing to eat. You understand?

Mr. McTIGUE. No, I don't.

Mrs. DE SZILY. Excuse me. I will tell you then. In the family everybody pays. If you have old parents and they cannot earn their livelihood, you can take them yourself and take care of them because you have responsibility for this. This is done by the Communists because you cannot earn enough to take care of anyone else except yourself. You can't take care of your children. If they are left with the family, they must go to day schools. Everything they get through the schools, and you can imagine how they are influenced against the parents, as you heard before.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a matter of fact, in Communist Hungary now, the child gets very little time with his parents; isn't that correct?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Really nothing. You can't imagine the 6 days in which they work so very hard. Father and mother are tired on Saturday evening. What can they give their children during this single Sunday, if mother must go out for some—I don't know what—demonstration or party meetings, or so on, because from the very

beginning, in 1945, the women, who were going to work because they must go to work, they couldn't eat otherwise, they couldn't buy food, were very often used to go out for demonstrations, sometimes against their own interest.

I have seen, myself, a demonstration in 1946, beginning about January or February—January, I think—when they wanted to change the whole administration because the old people in the administration couldn't carry out the new decrees as they wanted, and they ordered out all civilian employees on the street to demonstrate against the old state employees. I have seen this with my own eyes. It was something terrible. I have known some of these people who were marching there, demonstrating against themselves.

Mr. McTIGUE. This kind of thing you personally experienced?

Mrs. DE SZILY. Yes, yes; for everything I have a personal story because I was 21½ years in the middle of the whole thing.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I wish to thank you for the presentation of your testimony, which shows so vividly how the aim of the Communists of Russia, who, unfortunately, have infiltrated Hungary, is to destroy the sanctity of the home—the relationship between the mother and the father, which is the basis upon which our civilization is grounded. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair has no questions but appreciates your appearance here, Mrs. De Szily. Thank you very much.

Next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Stephaich.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Mr. STEPHAICH. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Sit down, please, Mr. Stephaich. The Chair has a statement here which I understand is a statement which you wish to have inserted in the record; am I correct?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. You acknowledge this statement?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection, that will be entered into the record at this point.

STATEMENT OF PETER STEPHAICH

REPORT OF THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

The Foreign Office in Hungary during the war was considered the most pro-Western and anti-Nazi of all public offices. At that time, Mr. Szentmiklossy, the Assistant Secretary of State, was killed in a German prison camp. Mr. Szegegy-Mazak, head of the political division, and Mr. Kallay, Prime and Foreign Minister, both went through the horror of the German prison camps.

To become a career diplomat in the Hungarian Foreign Office, every applicant had to have a doctorate of law, political science, or economics. Besides this, each one had to speak German, French, and English, and had to have some knowledge of a Slavic language.

During the war, several attempts were made by the government of Mr. Kallay, who had been Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister until the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, and who was considered by everyone as

anti-Nazi. He tried to convince the Western Powers, principally England, to make a separate peace treaty with Hungary. All his efforts were executed through the Hungarian Foreign Office that was in touch with the British Ambassador in Ankara, through Mr. Ujvary, in Turkey, Mr. Ullein-Laviczky in Stockholm, Mr. Wodianer in Lisbon, Mr. Bessenyei and Mr. de Barcza in Switzerland (who negotiated with Mr. Allen Dulles), and Mr. Apor in Rome at the Vatican.

During the war a secret radio transmitter was hidden in the building of the Foreign Office, and this was one of the means of communication with the above-mentioned diplomats abroad. Unfortunately, the great and heroic efforts of Mr. Kallay did not succeed; and after the German occupation of Hungary, he had to ask asylum in the Turkish Legation.

Christmas Day 1944 was the beginning of the siege of Budapest. Cellar living began. In our cellar we had a French refugee, a Jesuit professor from a university, deserted soldiers and even active front soldiers, some aristocrats, and a torch singer, among others. The Russian troops captured Pest, the eastern part of the city, on the 18th of January. Conditions at that time were unbelievable; the city had been bombed, there was no heat, no electricity, no telephone service, no gas, no communication, no water, and dead bodies were lying around in the streets. This was the perfect living hell.

All this was not so bad in comparison with the Soviet atrocities. Next to our cellar there was an Italian lady with three daughters. She offered her 2 oldest girls, 17 and 18 years old, to the Soviet soldiers, begging them to have mercy on her youngest one aged 12. Her fight, her tears, her begging were in vain. Another aspect of these brutalities occurred in Professor Feigyesy's clinic for expectant mothers. These women were raped by dozens of Red army soldiers, animals have more respect.

Two days after the occupation of Pest, the first newspaper appeared, consisting of only one page. We placed two lines in this paper, calling on all the members of the Foreign Office to meet at a private place. We decided that two of us would go down to Debrecen, a city in eastern Hungary, where the provisional Hungarian Government had its seat.

The provisional Hungarian Government in Debrecen had been established after a peace treaty with the Russians, signed in Moscow December 1944. The provisional government had been called in, not elected, by the population. General Miklos became the first Prime Minister. He was a close associate of the regent, Admiral Horthy. For the Russians to nominate a well-known general as head of the provisional government was aimed to deceive the Western Powers, which they did.

In the spring of 1945 the provisional government moved to Budapest. For the first time I got in touch with the new members of the Foreign Office. Mr. Gyongyosi had been chosen by the Russians to become our Foreign Minister. Nobody had ever heard of him before: he had a little bookshop in a small city, and certainly had no education or experience for this position. He was a member of the Smallholders Party, so all outsiders thought the Foreign Office was not communistic.

Right after the arrival of the provisional government in Budapest a screening committee was appointed which consisted of a representative from each of the existing political parties (Smallholder, Social Democrat, Peasant, Communist and Bourgeois Democrat, plus a representative of the trade union). This committee screened all the prewar members of the Foreign Office, so from the very beginning the leftwing had an absolute majority in decisions, since the Communists, Social Democrats, peasants and trade-union men mostly voted together. I would like to point out the fact that not only in the Foreign Office but in every institution the screening committee was the most important factor at that time.

Let me illustrate with an example how the Communist control was built up: Every house in Budapest had a superintendent. This superintendent had to keep his eyes and ears open to what was happening in the whole building. He even checked the garbage cans and if he discovered chicken bones, for example, this was a bad point against the people who ate it. This superintendent had to report to his boss, the block attendant; and the block attendant had to report to the district attendant.

More or less the same system had been established in the Foreign Office. Every section or division in the Foreign Office had at least one new person who was a member of the Communist Party. His main duty was to keep extremely alert and report to his boss about everyone's remarks and attitude. To establish this

organized fear among the employees was the definite purpose of the Communist Party. No one knew who the spy was. It might be a messenger boy; it might be a telephone operator; it might be anybody. Even behind closed doors no one dared to speak freely.

From 1945 on, the main job of the Foreign Office was to prepare for the Paris peace treaty. We still had excellent people in this division, headed by Mr. Kertesz. All the experienced former members of the Foreign Office did the work, because the new members had no education or experience, and no capabilities generally. The old members had been chiefly in administrative positions, without the power to decide. I remember very well the problem the peace treaty preparation division had, not knowing how far they could go in representing the idea and real aim of the population, without crossing the intentions of the Communist Party. The problem of minorities had not been allowed to be touched on, nor the real situation with the prisoners of war. We had about 300,000 people missing in Russia. Mr. Grigoriev, first secretary and right-hand man of the Soviet Ambassador, Pushkin, was a daily visitor at the Foreign Office, and he was the real supervisor. Here is a small example of what little power the Foreign Office then had; When Americans or Hungarians or any people of any nation wanted to leave Hungary for any purpose, as well as his visaed passport, he needed a Soviet exit permit. Without this permit no one was allowed to leave the country.

Mr. V. Bohnn, a former member of the Soviet Embassy, and later a professor at a Soviet university, became Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. Heltay, a convinced Communist, was No. 2 Communist in the Foreign Office, heading a political department. The political department's job in those days was to direct press, economic and cultural departments simultaneously. So his power was exceedingly large. Mr. Podor, a Communist from Paris, was head of the Foreign Minister's Cabinet, No. 3 Communist.

In my opinion Moscow decided to openly take over Hungary in 1947, because by then most of the United States troops had left Europe. Moscow wanted to be sure that the Red army was to be the largest and strongest in Europe, before they took over completely in the eyes of the world.

The Paris peace treaty was a great disappointment to the Hungarian public. This treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, and the United States, permitting Soviet troops to remain in Hungary as long as the peace treaty in Austria was not signed. As we well know, the Austrian peace treaty has not been signed as yet, so the Red army even today is in Hungary with the approval of the three great powers.

Finally, we got good news in the summer of 1947. The news informed us that United States Congressmen and Senators would visit Hungary on a general tour through Europe. We had hoped that the lawmakers from Washington would realize the situation in Hungary, and that they would do something about it.

Congressman John Lodge asked the President of our Hungarian Republic, Mr. Tildy, in my presence, "Why don't you accept American help from the Marshall plan or the UNRRA?"

Mr. Tildy, of whom this question was asked, answered: "I am not the person with whom this matter can be discussed."

Congressman Lodge, astonished, asked: "Who is the right person for this question to be addressed?"

Mr. Tildy just smiled and left the question unanswered. This visit of Americans was well faked by our Foreign Office. They were kept busy throughout their stay in Hungary with official visits, banquets, and receptions. In the few factories which they visited the workers had been coached carefully how to answer questions. Even I, being their guide, had no opportunity to talk to them freely, except by a coincidence, with Representative Lodge.

In 1947 the Ministry, now openly communistic, replaced Mr. Gyongyossy with Mr. Molnar, an old experienced member of the Communist Party. By January 1948 the situation was ripe enough to get rid of most of the prewar trained members of the Foreign Office. The new members by now had acquired enough knowledge to carry on. So the Communist Party decided to get rid of us old members. A little note arrived signed by Dinnyes and Molnar, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, conveyed the message that the recipient must leave the office immediately, as his beliefs were not in accord with the democratization of the Foreign Office. I was one of those people and a few days after I received this note I left Hungary for Rome.

Later in Rome, before I left for the United States in October 1948, out of curiosity, I called on Mr. Podor who was chargé d'affaires of the Hungarian

Legation at Rome. I asked him, "Why don't you leave your government job? You have a wife and three children, and you are all in Rome, a free country. Don't you want to bring your children up in an atmosphere of freedom, humanity, and dignity?"

He answered: "Look. I'm about 40 years old, I spent quite a few years before the Second World War in Paris, and have been a follower of the Communist Party ideas for years. The western countries would not accept me in any case, because of my Communist affiliations. You know as well as I do," he continued, "that the Soviet troops will never leave a country without being kicked out; and believe me the United States will never start a war. Therefore, the Soviet will conquer slowly one country after another. The Soviet knows what he wants: to conquer the world for his ideologies. Lenin and Stalin expressed that so often. What does the western world do? They are negative; they want to protect what they possess, sacrificing so many countries just to avoid a great conflict. The western world has to know the mentality of the Soviet Orientals, to understand the word 'honor'; signed papers mean nothing in accomplishing the goal of conquering the world for their ideals.

"I want to educate my children in a country which will belong to the growing power, communism. Look at the end of the war in 1945. The Soviet ruled 190 million people. Since, adding the Iron Curtain countries and China, they rule about 650 million people; and they will spread out further as there is no one stronger to step them."

As the result of my experiences during the war in Russia, the siege, and the years from 1945 through 1948, I think it is very important that we should not attack the Russian people. We should distinguish between Russians and Communists. Most of the Russian individuals are very primitive, simple people, who are fed by the Communist propaganda and do not know anything else. Let us not forget how the Russians utilized a picture of the opening of a New York movie house with a long waiting line. They had a caption in their papers, "New York waiting line for bread."

Let me mention the true story of a Russian soldier who put his live fish in the toilet, as this was the only place where he could find water. I met a Russian boy in Lakeland, Fla., in 1948 who fought on the Soviet side in August 1944 opposite my division in the bridgehead of Warsaw. In Lakeland, under the orange trees, we discussed our experiences and he also confirmed my first-hand information from the Ukraine, that the Ukrainian people received at the beginning the German Army as their liberators. Only after a few months of impossible treatment, politically and humanly, they became enemies of the Germans. The same boy in Lakeland remained Russian and will always remain one in his heart; but will always fight communism.

Experts on communism from every nationality are available for us, and we should use them to learn. We should listen and follow their advice, as they not only learned but experienced the horrors of communism. It seems to me we should try to get as many important Communists as possible over to our side. This could be accomplished if correctly organized by making personal offers attractive. Every good American has to take a definite and active part in the struggle with communism, as we are alone and the time is now. Never forget that time is on the Soviet side. If they can educate another generation for their purposes, it will be too late to act.

TESTIMONY OF PETER STEPHAICH

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Stephaich, first of all, your name is Peter Stephaich?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Peter Stephaich is correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were born when and where?

Mr. STEPHAICH. 1920 in Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. And when did you enter the Hungarian Foreign Office?

Mr. STEPHAICH. I entered the Hungarian Foreign Office in 1944. Then there was a break—I had been recalled to arms—and I reentered the Foreign Office in 1945, spring, after the Foreign Office moved back from Debrecen with the provisional Hungarian Government to Budapest.

Mr. BENTLEY. How long did you remain in the employ of the Hungarian Foreign Office?

Mr. STEPHAICH. I remained until January, 1948.

Mr. BENTLEY. At which time you left Hungary?

Mr. STEPHAICH. I left Hungary, and I went to Rome, and in October 1948, arrived in the United States.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you a member of the Hungarian Foreign Office in September of 1947?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you connected in any capacity with the joint American Senate and House Congressional Committee which came to Hungary in that month?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, sir. I was a member of the Protocol Division, and I was assigned as a guide to this committee.

Mr. BENTLEY. And were you present at the time the committee paid a visit upon the then President of Hungary, Zoltan Tildy?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, sir. I was present and I was used as an interpreter in those days.

Mr. BENTLEY. And was one of the members of the committee then Congressman, now I believe Governor of Connecticut, John Lodge?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. And did he have a conversation with President Tildy?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, he had.

Mr. BENTLEY. Can you repeat that conversation?

Mr. STEPHAICH. I recall the conversation. Maybe I don't remember the words definitely, but the sense of it was that Representative Lodge asked President Tildy, "Why don't you accept some help which had been offered to the Hungarian Government?"

Mr. BENTLEY. Was that under the Marshall plan?

Mr. STEPHAICH. I am not quite sure whether it was Marshall plan or UNRRA. One of them.

Mr. BENTLEY. What was the President's reply?

Mr. STEPHAICH. The President said, "Well, I am not the right man to whom you have to address the sentence."

So Representative Lodge was very astonished, because Mr. Tildy was the President of the Hungarian Republic. So he said, "Whom shall I contact?"

So the President just smiled, and that was the end of the whole conversation, as far as the help is concerned.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were in the Hungarian Foreign Office before that time. Do you recall whether or not this Government offered or requested or invited Hungary to participate in the Marshall plan in 1947?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, sir. To my best recollection I remember.

Mr. BENTLEY. And that offer or invitation was refused by the Hungarian Government?

Mr. STEPHAICH. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. The assumption then would be from the conversation that you have just given the committee, just quoted to the committee, that the decision was not made by the Hungarian Government as to whether or not Hungary should participate?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Right. I know the decision was actually made, not even by the Communist members, but by some Russian, Grigoriev, who was the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy, right-hand man of Mr. Pushkin. He was just a daily visitor in the Foreign Office.

Mr. BENTLEY. And you think this man Grigoriev, the first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Budapest, was actually making important foreign policy decisions for the Hungarian Government?

Mr. STEPHAICH. I definitely think so.

Mr. BENTLEY. I believe that is all, Mr. Counsel, unless you have any additional questions.

Mr. McTIGUE. I had one question that I would like to ask the witness.

When were you able to get out of Hungary?

Mr. STEPHAICH. January 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any difficulty in getting out of Hungary?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes; I left Hungary, what we call black. Illegal papers.

Mr. McTIGUE. Secretly?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Secretly, right. Illegal papers.

Mr. McTIGUE. And on your way to the United States you stopped in Rome, is that what you have already testified?

Mr. STEPHAICH. Yes, sir. I stopped in Rome, and if I may tell, I had a very interesting experience with Mr. Podor, who was a member of the Communist Party and Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires of the Hungarian Legation in Rome.

I had my American visa already, and just from curiosity I called on him, and I asked him, "Now, could you explain to me, you are here with your wife and your children. Why don't you resign, and why don't you join the free countries? You have all your family out. Nothing could happen to you."

I don't remember exactly the words, but the sense of it had been that, "I had been a member of the Communist Party. I lived in Paris before the war. So the Western Powers wouldn't accept me in any case. I wouldn't be able to get a visa. Now, in case I would get a visa, the question is, What would I be able to do? I would be a second-class man in any case. It would be very difficult for me to get a job.

"And secondly," he said, "once I would like to be on the side which is winning and will win. I want to educate my children in Hungary, which will become a part of the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union is the growing one."

He put it even in an example: In 1945 the Soviet Union had 190 million people, and by 1948, controlling China and the Iron Curtain countries, around I think 650 or 700 million people.

So he said, "All right, my children won't know anything about the comforts that I had in Paris, but they will be educated completely under the Communist doctrine, and they will be able to make a career, because the Soviet has the future."

As far as I later found out, he has been arrested, he was recalled to Budapest and arrested.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Stephaich, for your contribution, both verbally and in your statement. You are excused.

Your next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Gabor.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Mr. GABOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Gabor, do you wish to testify in English or avail yourself of an interpreter?

Mr. GABOR. May I use an interpreter?

Mr. BENTLEY. You have one present?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you identify yourself, please?

Mr. PISKY. My name is Piskey, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you solemnly swear to interpret to the best of your ability the testimony of this witness?

Mr. PISKY. I do, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

You may proceed, Mr. Counsel. The witness will testify through an interpreter.

Are you going to testify in Hungarian, Mr. Gabor, or are you merely going to have Mr. Pisky for assistance?

Mr. GABOR. I will testify in Hungarian.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you both sit as close to the microphone as possible, please, and speak directly into it. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT GABOR

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born in Budapest in 1919; is that correct?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You attended the University of Budapest?

Mr. GABOR. Two years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you graduate from the university?

Mr. GABOR. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. I understand, Mr. Gabor, that you are a former member of the Hungarian political police, and that during the time you were in Hungary, under the Communists, you served for a certain period as a member of the political police; is that correct?

Mr. GABOR. Yes. From 1945, November, to 1947, September.

Mr. BENTLEY. When did you first join the political police?

Mr. GABOR. 1945, November.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us something about the circumstances under which you joined the Hungarian political police. How did you become a member and why?

Mr. GABOR. I would prefer to disclose these details in a closed hearing, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. When did you join the political police, Mr. Gabor?

Mr. GABOR. 1945, November. A few days after the first election.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you a member at that time of a political party?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. What party?

Mr. GABOR. Social Democratic Party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you join the political police because of your party connections?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you chosen by the party to be a representative of it in the political police?

Mr. GABOR. Certain members of the party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Certain members, among whom you were one?

Mr. PISKY. No, Mr. Chairman; as Mr. Gabor understood the question, it was whether he was representing the party or he was chosen by the party. Now, he has defined it that certain members of the party had chosen him.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see, but he was chosen by the party.

Mr. PISKY. By certain members of the party.

Mr. BENTLEY. Certain members of the party, to serve in the political police.

I think that is your answer, Mr. Counsel, unless you care to develop it.

Mr. McTIGUE. No; I will accept that. Obviously the witness doesn't want to go into it any further, unless it is in a closed session. That means we will have to have a closed session.

In any event, how and for what purpose was the political police originally formed? What was the original purpose of the political police?

Mr. GABOR. The political police department was established in 1945, January, the end of January, under the leadership of Gabor Peter. He had already been an executive member of the underground Communist Party. The organization began in the building of the Andrássy Street, 60. This building had formerly been the headquarters of the Hungarian Nazi Party. The Hungarian Government by this time was in Debrecen. In these days it was the Communist Party which had the initiative in Budapest, having been the first political party organized. The Communist Party itself had selected and delegated the first members of the political police.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me ask you this question: Can you tell us something about the relation between the Communist Party and the political police of which you were a member?

Mr. GABOR. There was a direct connection between the executive council or executive committee of the Communist Party and the leadership of the political police. During my 2 years Mr. Gabor Peter discussed and referred all serious matters to the Communist executives.

There was even a material connection between the Communist Party and the political police. There were occasions when Gabor Peter helped the party by financial means, and certain other occasions when the party gave money to the political police.

Here is an example. It happened in Budapest in one of the Budapest districts that the political police found a safe formerly hidden by some persecuted Jewish citizens, and after this discovery they turned it over to the Communist Party. It contained some jewelry and foreign currency, over about \$10,000.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of training did you have to go through, Mr. Gabor, in the political police?

Mr. GABOR. There was no definite ruling by that time. Some people got training courses even in Russia. Some other people didn't get any courses whatsoever.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you yourself have to undergo any training?

Mr. GABOR. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was this a full-time job from morning till night in the secret police?

Mr. GABOR. Yes. From the morning until the afternoon, so that it was a full-time job.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was it because of your university background that you were selected by the party to become a member of the police?

Mr. GABOR. (No reply.)

Mr. McTIGUE. Why do you think they selected you?

Mr. GABOR. I have to refer again, sir, to this question; I would like to answer it in a closed session.

Mr. McTIGUE. I didn't get the last part of that.

Mr. GABOR. I would repeat again, sir, to this question I would prefer to answer it in a closed session.

Mr. McTIGUE. How about the other members of the political police who were there at your time? Were they average men, were they above the average, were they intelligent, were they well equipped by reason of their background to engage in police work, or were they of the ordinary run of mine men and women?

Mr. GABOR. The elements that we call intelligentsia could be estimated to be only about 20 percent of the crowd.

Mr. McTIGUE. About 20 percent of the secret police have—

Mr. PISKY. Mr. Gabor is speaking about the detectives, the plainclothes element, I suppose.

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could you speak a little louder. I didn't get that last.

Mr. PISKY. He was speaking about the detectives, not about rank and file policemen.

Mr. McTIGUE. If you were a member of the political police for this 2-year period you can tell us certainly about the organization of spies, the infiltration as a consequence into all walks of Hungarian life?

Mr. GABOR. Yes. It was in 1946, September, when the political police was reorganized according to the pattern of the Russian MVD. It was about that time that the police got a new name, the State Security Department.

There were 16 subdivisions established. The first subdivision had the task to infiltrate the political parties and the Hungarian internal organizations. They placed informers in all political parties. Through them they gained information as to the plans of the political leaders of the concerned parties.

It so happened, for instance, that one of the parties, as an example, the Freedom Party, even in the executive committee they had informers, but all the other parties had a similar situation.

The leader of this subdivision was a Moscow-trained Communist. Also it was the same subdivision which got the task to disturb political meetings or interrupt political meetings, with the close cooperation of the local Communist cell.

Mr. McTIGUE. What division, Mr. Gabor, were you a part of?

Mr. GABOR. I was working in a district.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your particular job? What were your duties in this district?

Mr. GABOR. If you will permit me, sir, later on I will explain. Should I go ahead with the details, I mean the job of these different subdivisions?

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, yes. I don't want to take too much time in details on that. But you go ahead in describing this setup in a general fashion, not too much detail.

Mr. GABOR. As a short summary, the other subdivisions were given the task to, first, control the foreigners in the country; second, to deal with the church affairs; third, with the youth movement; fourth, former army officers; fifth, with the ministries; sixth, the departments; seventh, spot investigations; eighth, with the administration of the cases; and ninth, with the social associations, and so forth. The tenth was a file registration subdivision. The 11th was similar to the 8th, administering the cases. The 12th was payroll and personnel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Personnel work?

Mr. GABOR. Yes. The 13th subdivision was a passport office. The 15th subdivision provided services providing guards for the President and ministers, and so on. And the 16th was the so-called district organizations of Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. And were you in one of the district organizations?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is a district organization?

Mr. GABOR. I will give it in private, sir. Of course, I am talking now about the situation after the organization of the police, after 1946, September. The district organizations understood the task of infiltrating the local organizations, every kind of organization. Yet these district organizations had no right whatsoever to cross-examine witnesses or arrest witnesses. In a national average, as of 1947, the political police had already about 70,000 informers in the network.

Mr. McTIGUE. How would these informers report to you? Was it at certain designated times?

Mr. GABOR. By appointments or through mail.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were these informers paid by the police or were they given rewards of some kind? Was it voluntary?

Mr. GABOR. There were two different methods used by the state security police. The first one, by voluntary informants. Voluntary informers were, for instance, Communist Party members, smaller Communist Party members, who for some pay undertook some tasks of reporting, for a fee, or voluntarily without a fee.

There were a good many informers taken into the network from among the prostitutes and homosexuals. By masses they built in, and took in the former members of the Nazi Party. It happened that the political police got hold of the blank membership cards and files of the Nazi Party. Sometimes they forged the signature of a person, and by this means pressed him to undertake the informer job.

In some other cases the person would have come to trial, according to the laws prevailing by that time, as having committed some crime, but these crimes were ignored if he undertook the job of an informer for the police.

There were cases where prisoners were set free, temporarily, only in order to accomplish certain tasks.

In cases of applying for a trade license, or just extending trade licenses, there was also a pretext of building up pressure on the person.

Mr. BENTLEY. Let me break in just a moment, please. When did you say that the number of police informers approximated 70,000?

Mr. GABOR. As of the fall of 1947.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was that only in the city of Budapest or throughout the country?

Mr. GABOR. That was throughout the country.

Mr. BENTLEY. Approximately what was the population of Hungary at that time, roughly?

Mr. GABOR. Roughly 9 million.

Mr. BENTLEY. And among those 9 million people there were 70,000 people who were police spies?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. All right, proceed.

Mr. GABOR. In some cases in a factory, I mean in case of discovering some theft in a factory, these cases were ignored if the person concerned undertook the informer's job. Also, similarly, in graft cases.

Then some persons were taken into the police headquarters and they were told that the Russian authorities demanded the transfer of them to the Russians, and that they had to transfer them to the Russians. For this purpose even Russian officers were present.

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me again. Mr. Gabor, do you intend to give information regarding the liaison between the state security police of Hungary and the MVD of the Soviet Union? Do you have that information?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is it very detailed? Is it very long?

Mr. GABOR. No, I can shorten it.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you briefly just summarize the relationship between the Russian MVD and the Hungarian security police?

Mr. GABOR. There was a standing liaison between the MVD authorities located in Budapest and Gabor Peter. High-ranking Russian officers went to Gabor Peter. On the Hungarian side, first Maj. Laszlo Csillag, and later Gyorg Szollosi, were the officers in charge who brought orders from the Russians. All matters of major importance were discussed and consulted with the Russian MVD.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were Soviet MVD officers often present in the Hungarian police headquarters?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were they present, do you know, during interrogation of prisoners?

Mr. GABOR. According to my information, yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is it correct that the methods of interrogation used by the Hungarian state security police were of Russian origin, of Soviet origin?

Mr. GABOR. Yes, generally, yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Continue, please.

Mr. GABOR. Here I would like to mention the use of different drugs.

Mr. BENTLEY. This is very important, and I want to be sure that the committee understands. You say now you are going to begin the discussion of the use of drugs to obtain information from prisoners as used by the security police; am I correct?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you continue then, please.

Mr. GABOR. In 1947 for the purpose of introducing the methods of using drugs, Russian officers arrived. The first person was a medical doctor, Maj. Istvan Balint, who had the task of establishing a training course.

I have information that as of the fall of 1947, shortly before my escape from Hungary, Dr. Balint had already held training courses for about 15 other persons.

Mr. BENTLEY. Doctors?

Mr. GABOR. Doctors and other medical persons. As to the use of the drugs, I have indirect information that they had already been introduced during the summer of 1947. I have information that drugs were used in the case of General Dalnoki-Veres. According to my information, General Dalnoki-Veres had to stand up against a wall for days, and when he got physically tired, that was the time when drugs were mixed into his meals.

Mr. BENTLEY. I was going to ask you that. How were these drugs administered?

Mr. GABOR. By that time through food.

Mr. BENTLEY. They were never introduced by hypodermic injection?

Mr. GABOR. I don't know. Only from hearsay I gathered that later on they used even hypodermics.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know, Mr. Gabor, what type of drugs were used, or were you coming to that?

Mr. GABOR. I know that actedron and a certain mixture of actedron and morphine was used.

Mr. BENTLEY. Morphine and a-c-t-e-d-r-o-n?

Mr. GABOR. Yes, sir. The morphine is for dimming consciousness.

Mr. BENTLEY. I beg your pardon?

Mr. GABOR. The morphine is for dimming consciousness. It washes away distinctions between reality and reason; actually suggests the interrogator's will into the interrogated person. The interrogator actually suggests his will into the interrogated person, and because of the strain, the physical and mental strain, the interrogated person can't resist.

Mr. BENTLEY. The person being interrogated eventually loses any distinction between guilt and innocence?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you have any other information, Mr. Gabor, concerning other methods of interrogation, or other methods of extracting information that were used besides drugs?

Mr. GABOR. They used also, just like the Russians, reflectors. And also that method of frequently interrupting sleep at night, bringing back the interrogated for cross-examination, letting him back again for an hour's sleep, and then calling him.

Mr. BENTLEY. Constant interrogation at all hours of day or night with limited periods of rest?

Mr. GABOR. Yes. And also physical torture.

Mr. BENTLEY. Are you able to describe any of the physical tortures?

Mr. GABOR. Almost all versions or all kinds of physical torture, beating up the prisoners, burning the fingers, burning parts of the body, pulling the hair. Almost any other kind.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were there any particular devices used in inflicting these tortures?

Mr. GABOR. Police sticks or anything else, any other instruments for the beating of the prisoners.

They used also the boiling hot and ice cold bath method.

Generally speaking, they had not applied these physical tortures in case of the intelligentsia, yet there are many cases when they used them; for instance, my wife, Mrs. Gabor's case.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your wife was tortured by the political police?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. I have no more questions for the moment.

Congressman Feighan, do you have any questions?

Mr. FEIGHAN. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Have you completed your description of the organization of the political police, Mr. Gabor?

Mr. GABOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. I just want to ask 1 or 2 more questions, then I think you can be excused. When did you leave Hungary?

Mr. GABOR. 1947; September.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you, after your departure from Hungary, tried in absentia by a Hungarian people's court?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. On what charges were you tried, briefly, please.

Mr. GABOR. High treason, spying.

Mr. BENTLEY. Espionage?

Mr. GABOR. And conspiracy against the state.

Mr. BENTLEY. I beg your pardon?

Mr. GABOR. Conspiracy against the state.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was this the same trial at which Mr. Peyer, whom we had as a witness yesterday, was also tried in absentia?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And I am correct, Mr. Gabor, that the man who is interpreting for you, Dr. Pisky, was also tried in absentia?

Mr. GABOR. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And what sentence was passed upon you in absentia?

Mr. GABOR. I was sentenced to the gallows.

Mr. BENTLEY. I have no more questions, Mr. Counsel.

I thank you for your contribution, Mr. Gabor. The subcommittee will consider whether or not to hear you later on in executive session. You and your interpreter may be excused. Thank you.

Call your next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. MCTIGUE. Dr. Jekely.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before the subcommittee, so help you God?

Dr. JEKELY. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DR. LESLIE J. JEKELY

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your full name for the record, Doctor, please?

Dr. JEKELY. Leslie J. Jekely.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you born in Hungary, Doctor?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us where and when?

Dr. JEKELY. In Budapest, 1906.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you give us a short statement of your background, Doctor, for the record?

Dr. JEKELY. I was a practicing lawyer in Hungary. After 1945 I became a member of the highest court of Hungary, and also a member of the Hungarian Parliament. Later on I was appointed to be the Chief of the Cabinet of the Hungarian President, and I remained in my position in the Parliament, too.

Mr. McTIGUE. You stated that you were a member of the Hungarian Supreme Court at one time?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And were you also chief of the office of the President?

Dr. JEKELY. Chief of the Cabinet of the Hungarian President.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was President Tildy?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you occupy that position, Doctor?

Dr. JEKELY. From the beginning of the office, from January of 1946 till my escape from Hungary, which was June 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was the top administrative office in the President's setup, is that correct?

Dr. JEKELY. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, as a matter of fact, all appointments went through your hands or through your office, is that correct?

Dr. JEKELY. It was the same function as we have here in America in the White House, in the top administrative office of the President.

Mr. McTIGUE. And as the top administrative officer, the President of course discussed or cleared or talked over all appointments with you, is that correct?

Dr. JEKELY. It was the nature of my office.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was there ever an exception made?

Dr. JEKELY. As I remember; yes. Once there was an exception, the appointment of Mr. John Peter.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you spell that name, please, the last name?

Mr. JEKELY. P-e-t-e-r.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who is he?

Dr. JEKELY. He is maybe better known now as Bishop John Peter.

Mr. McTIGUE. He is Bishop John Peter who is out at the World Church Council at the moment in Evanston?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And who recently said that there was freedom of religion in Hungary?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes. He made the statement.

Mr. McTIGUE. How was Bishop Peter appointed as the President's secretary?

Dr. JEKELY. In the middle of 1946, or in the second part, I don't know exactly, I got a message from the President that he would like to see me. I went into this room, and he told me that he had appointed Mr. Peter as a personal secretary, and asked me to take care of this appointment. It was a rather unusual appointment. Therefore, later on I went into his room again and asked him for an explanation, because as far as I was concerned, the right way and the proper way, or I should say the usual way would be that he should ask me, that I should take the necessary steps for an appointment, as it was before and it was afterward.

He was upset, and he told me that he just couldn't give me any explanation, but that is his wish, what he would like to do, and asked me to give him a chance, that he should have the right place for his office, and I should give him all the assistance that he needs to carry out his duty to be personal and appointments secretary to the President.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was Bishop Peter's—

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me, Mr. Counsel. I don't believe Mr. Peter was a bishop at that time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes; that is correct.

Dr. JEKELY. Certainly not.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was Mr. Peter's position just before he was appointed by the President?

Dr. JEKELY. As far as I know, he was a clerk in the Hungarian Foreign Office, in a position of some cultural relations.

Mr. McTIGUE. So out of a clear blue sky from a clerical job in the Hungarian Foreign Office—

Dr. JEKELY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was suddenly made the President's secretary; is that correct?

Dr. JEKELY. Correct, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you yourself know Peter?

Dr. JEKELY. No; I didn't know him, and therefore I tried to find out who he was. And my information was at that time that he was related to Bishop Albert Bereczky, who is here in America today in the same delegation.

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me just one moment. Would you spell Bishop Bereczky's name?

Dr. JEKELY. B-e-r-e-c-z-k-y.

Mr. BENTLEY. Continue.

Dr. JEKELY. I understood that he worked for him as a trainee or something like that during 1944 in his church in Budapest, and after the so-called liberation of Hungary in 1945, he went into Government service, to the Foreign Office of Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why if he were such a prominent churchman do you suppose that he accepted a more or less minor job in the Hungarian Foreign Office?

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me, Mr. Counsel. Has the witness stated that he was a prominent churchman at that time?

Mr. McTIGUE. I thought he stated that he was.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was Mr. Peter an ordained minister at that time?

Dr. JEKELY. I don't know. But I know that he was a graduate theologian, and he worked for Bereczky, but he couldn't be a prominent church member, because I don't believe that he would change his

prominent position in the church for a very, very low position in the Foreign Office.

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me, Mr. Counsel. Go ahead.

Mr. McTIGUE. So his rise in the church more or less corresponds with his rise in the Government of Hungary; would you say that was a fair assumption?

Dr. JEKELY. I really don't know. As far as I am concerned, my opinion is in this question that he was very, very much satisfied with the position that he had in the Foreign Office, which means that his position in the church must, or had been a very small one, and it was maybe a promotion for him to be in the Foreign Office, a clerk, even in such a capacity.

Mr. McTIGUE. After Mr. Peter's appointment as President Tildy's secretary, and while you still occupied your high office as Chief of the President's Cabinet, were there any other incidents that you can recall in which Peter was involved?

Dr. JEKELY. Oh, yes. For instance, after a very short period, I got a request from the President again to give Mr. Peter a personal car for his use. I must explain to you, sir, that it was a very, very big question, and a very big request from the President, because at that time we were in such a position regarding cars that maybe Ministers or the department chiefs had one, but it was very unusual that a man in a relatively small position like his should have a car.

So I asked the President again for an explanation of his wish, and he told me that Mr. Peter was working in the early morning at his home, and I should give him a chance to be at his side in his office, which was a very weak and unsatisfactory explanation, because it really changed the morale of my office. Everybody was very much upset about it, and they tried to find some real reason for this unusual treatment.

Mr. McTIGUE. At the time that you were chief of the President's office, were there any important documents which were missed?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes, sir; a few months after he took office. It happened that somebody broke open the desk of the President. The President asked me to introduce an investigation, and because in my office I had a squad of police, and also a squad from the so-called political police, which was attached to my office, I ordered them to begin their investigation and try to find out what happened there.

After a very short time they gave a report to me that they just couldn't find anything, and they were without any success.

Then I asked the help of the Minister of the Interior, who at that time, if I remember it well, was Mr. Rajk, who has been eliminated from the Government since then.

He sent out people from the regular police and from the political police, and they couldn't find a thing about these missing documents.

Afterward, I tried a confidential investigation through the guard which I had in my office, the personal guard of the President, consisting of about 60 men with a general as commander, and as a result of this investigation there was no doubt about it that it was an inside job, and somebody did it from inside in the office.

To understand the situation, very few people had the chance to go into the room of the President. All doors were guarded by the people

in this duty, and therefore the most likely explanation must be that somebody who had regular access to this room did the job.

Now, I am a former jurist, and I wouldn't say that he had anything to do with this incident, but it was a very, very funny incident. We never had it before; it was just after he took office as secretary of the President.

After a few days somebody broke open my desk, too, but I was more careful at that time and I put everything interesting in my safe, so they couldn't find anything in my desk.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Jekely, do you recall the nature of the documents which were taken from President Tildy's desk?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes; they were all concerned with the party of which the President was the former head, the Smallholders Party of Hungary, the only resistance party at that time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did those documents contain names and other information which—

Dr. JEKELY. Partially, yes, but they were interesting names, because we knew that we had to be very careful, and everything which was very interesting was placed in a different place.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did Mr. Peter remain as secretary to President Tildy?

Dr. JEKELY. As I recall, he stayed after Mr. Tildy was forced to leave his office.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Peter stayed on, did he?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes; as far as I know.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you stay on?

Dr. JEKELY. I beg your pardon?

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you stay on in your position as Chief of the President's Cabinet?

Dr. JEKELY. As I said, until the 10th of June 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. But when you left Peter was still there, is that correct?

Dr. JEKELY. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I have no questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Jekely, you stated that Mr. John Peter was completely unknown to you before he was brought into the President's office, is that correct?

Dr. JEKELY. Absolutely.

Mr. BENTLEY. And you have stated that he came in under, shall we say, unusual circumstances in that his appointment did not go through the normal channels?

Dr. JEKELY. Very unusual, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did the President ever give you an explanation of why he was brought in in this manner?

Dr. JEKELY. I don't ask for it, because I saw that it was very unpleasant for him to give an explanation, but there were rumors there that the President was forced to take him. And I have to tell you something, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee. I did have some information as to the nature of these circumstances, how he appointed him, namely, a former Hungarian Government officer told me that once Mr. Tildy answering the question of his son-in-law,

Mr. Chornoky, who was murdered after a mock trial in Hungary, gave an answer that he wanted to appease the Communist Party, showing that he would not only be surrounded just by Smallholder Party members, but even by people who are in the grace or in the trust of the Communists.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were informed reliably that President Tildy told his son-in-law, Victor Chornoky, that the reason he kept Peter in his office, the reason he took him in and kept him in, was for the purpose of appeasing the Communists?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes. I have no doubt about it. The man who informed me is an absolutely trustworthy man, and this statement happened in his presence. He is here in America in exile, but he asked me not to give out his name, because he has very close relatives in Hungary, and he wouldn't like to endanger them. But I suppose I can do it very safely, if I give the name to you, Mr. Chairman. I am sure that you know him by reputation and by name. Maybe I should ask you to have a confidential investigation in this matter, or maybe in an executive session which would give him a chance——

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair will consider holding an executive session at a later date for the possible appearance of this witness. (Card handed by the witness to Mr. Bentley.)

Dr. Jekely, you have stated that after President Tildy was forced to resign the Presidency, that John Peter remained in the office of the new President; is that correct?

Dr. JEKELY. Yes, as far as I know, and he served under the second President.

Mr. BENTLEY. Szakasits?

Dr. JEKELY. Mr. Szakasits; yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was there anybody else who was in Tildy's Cabinet who remained in office after he was forced to resign?

Dr. JEKELY. I am sure that it will be very hard to explain to anybody that nobody from my former staff, even the lowest ranking administrative people in my office, could be there after I escaped from Hungary and after the President was forced to resign. Part of them are in prison, a few work here, and those who could escaped from Hungary and they are now in exile.

The only one who remained in his office, and not just remained in his office, but reached a very high church office, was Mr. John Peter.

Mr. BENTLEY. The only one of your entire staff, which numbered approximately how many people?

Dr. JEKELY. Oh, I should say with the guards and with the police force and with the detectives, and so on, they were over a hundred.

Mr. BENTLEY. And the only man of these hundred, to the best of your knowledge, that remains in Hungary and in a Government or a favored position, is Mr. John Peter, today?

Dr. JEKELY. At least all the people on whom I can check and whom I can remember, and who were in the smallest executive capacity in this office.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see. One more question: I don't think we have quite established what position Mr. Peter held in President Tildy's office.

Dr. JEKELY. Mr. Peter was in charge of the appointments, which meant that he took all the people who wanted to see Mr. Tildy, he

made a list of the names, he reported directly to Tildy, and afterward he acted during the receptions.

This gave him the possibility at least to check on everybody who saw the President, and also partially to have some influence or knowledge about the things which happened in the office of the President.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did much official correspondence pass over his desk?

Dr. JEKELY. No; I should say nothing except the personal——

Mr. BENTLEY. Personal correspondence of the President?

Dr. JEKELY. Personal correspondence; yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. A very important position.

I think that is sufficient, unless you have another question, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Jekely, on behalf of the committee I wish to thank you for appearing before us here and contributing to this information about this man who is so much in the news today. And the committee, as I say, will consider possibly an executive or closed session at some later date. But I appreciate the information. It has been very helpful, because we are interested in bringing out all possible information regarding these people who are in Evanston at the present time. Thank you for your appearance.

Next witness.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Varga.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before the subcommittee, so help you God?

Mr. VARGA. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Are you translating, Mr. Vajda?

Mr. VAJDA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Chairman, Countess Revay, who was to be here today as a witness, was unable to be present, but has sent her statement, and may I suggest that this statement be made a part of the committee's record and marked for identification, if there are no objections.

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(Marked Exhibit 15 for identification.)

TESTIMONY OF LASZLO VARGA

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Varga, you were born in Budapest in 1910, is that correct?

Mr. VARGA (through Mr. Paul Vajda, interpreter). Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And in 1947-48 you were a member of Parliament in Hungary, is that correct?

Mr. VARGA. Correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the war with Germany you saw service in the armed forces of Hungary, is that correct?

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the war with Germany and upon your release did you undertake the practice of law in Budapest.

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have occasion to defend a great many cases before the so-called Communist people's court?

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you briefly tell us a little something about these cases? Can you take 2, 3, or 4 of the more prominent cases?

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And tell us something about them, please?

Mr. VARGA. I should like to give a few examples about the infringement of personal liberty, infringement of political liberty, and freedom of speech.

Pater Szalez Kiss and 15 of his followers were arrested. The prior asked me to defend Szalez Kiss.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who asked you?

Mr. BENTLEY. P-r-i-o-r.

Mr. McTIGUE. What is the prior?

Mr. VARGA. The prior is a church functionary, in charge of the monks. He was a Franciscan monk.

Szalez Kiss had been in America for 10 years before the war. I could not find him in prison. I received secret information that in June of 1946 he had been taken to the jail in Budapest, together with his followers.

I went immediately to the Communist chief prosecutor, but he would not receive me. I sent word to him through his secretary that I would not budge from the door until he received me.

Finally he received me, and he told me, "Dr. Varga, you will never be able to set an eye on Pater Kiss or the 15 others, because 10 minutes ago they were arrested by the Russians and taken to Siberia."

I escaped from Hungary in 1948, and until that time they had not been seen.

At the time I called on the Minister of Justice, Istvan Riesz. The Minister of Justice told me, if I undertook even one step in this matter I would receive the same fate as Pater Kiss and his followers.

Now comes another example regarding freedom of speech. I defended a workman who had told a policeman, "Wait, things will be different later on." But this one was sentenced to 6 months in jail.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the sentence again?

Mr. VARGA. He made a remark somewhere in public that things would change.

Mr. McTIGUE. Things would change?

Mr. VARGA. Things would change.

Mr. McTIGUE. And for that he was sentenced for 6 months?

Mr. VARGA. For 6 months.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you defend him at the people's court?

Mr. VARGA. This was the first trial held by Vilmos Olti.

The Communists themselves acknowledged this state of affairs, and I am going to quote a law to this effect. It is a copy of the original law.

Mr. McTIGUE. Original Hungarian law?

Mr. VARGA. Hungarian law.

Incitement is also committed by anyone who makes a statement to the effect that the present regime is not to his liking, and that some day things will be different.

That is verbatim from the law.

Mr. McTIGUE. It is against the law to criticize the regime.

Mr. VARGA. I can quote the law of 1946, paragraph II, page 22.

Mr. McTIGUE. As your client found out when he was sentenced to 6 months.

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was that law enacted?

Mr. VARGA. In 1946.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before the Communists took over Hungary there were no such laws on the statute books throughout Hungary; is that correct?

Mr. VARGA. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you find out that in a great many of your cases the sentence was often prepared before the trial?

Mr. VARGA. Yes. One of the chairmen of the people's court came to see me 1 day before the trial was to take place and told me, crying, "Don't be cross with me, Dr. Varga, but tomorrow your client will be sentenced to death, and I can't help it."

Mr. McTIGUE. This was before the end of the trial?

Mr. VARGA. One day before the trial.

Mr. McTIGUE. One day before the trial?

Mr. VARGA. Before the trial was scheduled.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did that come about?

Mr. VARGA. Yes. But the appeal actually freed him—not freed, changed the sentence to life imprisonment.

Mr. McTIGUE. In the case of those who were found guilty and sentenced to be executed, is there a period of appeal provided?

Mr. VARGA. In certain cases the defendant was entitled to appeal, but there were several cases of accusation when there was no such right. And so that in certain cases the defendant was executed within 2 hours of the passing of sentence.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were these the same judges that you had tried cases before, the same courts, prior to 1945 and 1946?

Mr. VARGA. The so-called judges of the people's court were new ones, because the so-called jury system had ceased with the end of the war. But otherwise the regular judges were oldtimers.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have occasion to protest the procedures in behalf of your clients?

Mr. VARGA. On every occasion I defended my clients, and I have here a newspaper clipping, which proves that I had done my duty, and is also evidence of why I had to leave the country in such a hurry.

I went to Győr, and said the following:

Actually I compare the prison system of investigation with that practiced during the Hungarian Nazi regime.

For this sentence the chamber of Hungarian lawyers said the following:

This lawyer who incites against democracy should be driven out of the country, driven out of Parliament, and have his position filled in the municipality of Budapest as soon as possible, and be placed before the people's court for trial.

Mr. McTIGUE. And as soon as that appeared in the newspapers, you decided it was time to leave; is that it?

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you leave?

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you leave with your wife?

Mr. VARGA. Yes; with my wife.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have any relatives back in Hungary now?

Mr. VARGA. Yes; my mother, who is 87, and my father is 86 years old.

Mr. McTIGUE. You tried all told approximately 150 cases before the people's court; is that correct?

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. From your experience before that court, would you say that there was any real justice of any kind meted out?

Mr. VARGA. Jurisdiction had absolutely no basis whatsoever, and all sentences were based on so-called political party considerations. Actually the judges of the people's court never tried to hide this fact, the Communist Party members of the people's court.

Mr. McTIGUE. Justice in Hungary today is a mockery; is that correct?

Mr. VARGA. Correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Were there many instances in which an accused was acquitted?

Mr. VARGA. In certain cases where the Communists didn't attach any importance to the case, it was possible to have them acquitted, but not in the opposite cases; only minor cases, where they simply didn't bother to interfere.

Mr. FEIGHAN. How many Communists were on the court, as judges?

Mr. VARGA. The people's court had six members. Three of the members were delegated by the Communist Party, the Social Democrat Party, and the trade unions. These were naturally under Communist influence. The other three were delegated from the Smallholders Party, the Peasant Party, and the Bourgeois Party.

Actually, the other three were trying to do their best to mete out justice, but the Communist Party prevented them from doing that job.

Mr. FEIGHAN. These judges of the so-called people's court then are appointive and subject to discharge at the will of the appointing authority?

Mr. VARGA. They were appointed by the parties, by all the various parties, the several parties.

Mr. VAJDA. Dr. Varga would like to place in the record a booklet which deals with the legal aspects of forced labor in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we have that marked for identification and entered as a committee exhibit.

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection it is so ordered.

(Marked "Exhibit 16" for identification.)

Mr. FEIGHAN. Was that written by you?

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. You have probably given some thought and work on the subject of slave labor?

Mr. VARGA. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. What is your general conclusion there with reference to the position of labor in Hungary?

Mr. VARGA. Everybody who is sentenced to a prison term must do forced labor, those who are interned also, and thirdly, which is most

important, so-called free labor has also been transformed into forced labor.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair has no further questions.

Thank you for your appearance, Dr. Varga. You have contributed very much to the work of the committee. You are excused.

Are there any other witnesses, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. McTIGUE. There are no more witnesses, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENTLEY. In which case the subcommittee will now adjourn to convene tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock at the Federal Building in Cleveland, Ohio.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until Thursday, August 26, 1954, at 10 a. m. at Cleveland, Ohio.)

INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 26, 1954

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUNGARY OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION,
Cleveland, Ohio.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a. m., in the west courtroom, Federal Building, Cleveland, Ohio, Hon. Alvin M. Bentley, chairman, presiding.

Present: Messrs. Bentley and Feighan.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order. This is a continuation of hearings of the congressional Committee on Communist Aggression in the case of Hungary.

Before the first witness is called, the Chair would like to make a statement.

The invitation of witnesses to appear before this subcommittee, not only here in Cleveland but also in Washington and New York, does not in any respect constitute endorsement or approval by the subcommittee of either their backgrounds or their present activities. They are merely invited with the belief that their own stories and first-hand information can contribute to the information, to the testimony which this subcommittee is anxious to obtain.

Mr. Counsel, will you call the first witness, please?

While we are waiting for the appearance of the first witness, the chair will continue.

As a rule, this committee does not desire to hear testimony from either anonymous or concealed persons. However, in this particular case the Chair understands that the witness has a legitimate desire to remain anonymous due to the presence of close relatives behind the Iron Curtain. The Chair will request complete cooperation from all those present in the courtroom to protect his desire to remain anonymous.

Is this the interpreter?

I am going to give him the oath. Will you first ask him, "Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before this subcommittee?" He does?

The INTERPRETER (Mrs. Theresa Stibran). Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Madam Interpreter, will you interpret his testimony fully and accurately to the best of your ability?

The INTERPRETER. Only the truth and nothing but the truth.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you please sit down? Take the chairs there. And will you both endeavor to speak as loudly as possible into the microphones, please.

Proceed with the witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF MR. Z (THROUGH THE INTERPRETER)

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Witness, are you now living in Cleveland and do you work here in Cleveland?

Mr. Z. Yes. I am a resident of the city of Cleveland.

Mr. McTIGUE. Off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Z. I live in Cleveland, and I am a permanent resident of the city.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you born and raised in Hungary?

Mr. Z. I was born in Hungary and I was raised in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you still have a wife, two sons, a daughter, and some grandchildren still in Hungary?

Mr. Z. I have a wife, a son, a daughter, and two grandchildren living in Hungary now.

Mr. McTIGUE. This is the reason, then, isn't it, Mr. Witness, why you have asked the committee not to reveal your identity?

Mr. Z. Yes; this is my reason.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you arrested?

Mr. Z. I was arrested on February the 8th, 1945, in the city of Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why were you arrested?

Mr. Z. I believe they arrested me because I was an ex-officer of the army.

Mr. McTIGUE. Of the Hungarian Army?

Mr. Z. Of the Hungarian Army.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you were arrested, what happened to you?

Mr. Z. I was living in an apartment house where 14 other persons lived. We had an order that on a certain date we should turn in all our guns or other arms or other weapons or else we should be arrested the next day. And women and children were likewise told to come and report, even though they didn't have any arms with them, but they were to report. They arrested me on the second day after this happened.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you put in a concentration camp?

Mr. Z. They took me to the city of Debrecen and they locked me up in an internment building with 600 others.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were in this internment camp, did you happen to meet or did you know of the presence of any ministers of the gospel?

Mr. Z. Among the 600 there were 200 women, 400 men. I was the only Catholic and the rest were Protestants, and among them were 14 clergymen.

Mr. McTIGUE. Fourteen Protestant clergymen?

Mr. Z. That is right, 14 Protestant clergymen.

Mr. McTIGUE. How were they treated by the Communists?

Mr. Z. The clergymen, these 14, were treated the same as others, with the exception that from them they took the Bibles and other reli-

gious books and they did not allow them to pray or do anything to console others.

I saw with my own eyes when they beat up Louis Torok, clergyman, and Arpad Lelossy, who was also a clergyman. They beat them up a great deal. And Joseph Nagy.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, how long were you confined in this concentration camp? How long were you kept there?

Mr. Z. I remained in the same camp for 1 year.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time when you were able to escape from this concentration camp?

Mr. Z. During this 1 year I never believed that it was possible for me to escape, for there was a double wire fence around the entire building and outside of the wire fence there were posts, Russian police at posts at all times.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you get out of the camp?

Mr. Z. At the end of the period they brought me to Budapest and they took me to my residence, where I was supposed to live under police custody, and I was not supposed to appear at any public gathering and not to leave my residence. I was ordered to never leave my residence.

Mr. McTIGUE. In other words, you didn't escape, but you were voluntarily released after you served your sentence; is that correct?

Mr. Z. Yes, sir; I did not escape, but they took me to Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you were taken to your home in Budapest, what did you learn about the fate of your daughter?

Mr. Z. From Budapest, where I did not find my family, temporarily we all went to Balatonfured to a summer residence.

The INTERPRETER. There is a question in my mind, Mr. McTigue.

Mr. McTIGUE. This is off the record.

(Discussion, off the record.)

Mr. McTIGUE. What I am trying to establish now is the fate of his daughter. What happened to his daughter? Who told him? Whether he was told in Budapest or the country place doesn't make any difference for the record.

The INTERPRETER. Now, to this first question, he says now that the family was separated and his daughter was at Balatonfured earlier than him and his wife.

Mr. McTIGUE. Oh, I see. The family was separated, and she was at the summer place?

The INTERPRETER. That is right. The daughter and the maid were at the summer place.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you returned, Mr. Witness, to Budapest after your release, what did your wife tell you about the fate of your daughter and the maid who were at your summer place in Hungary?

Mr. Z. When I arrived in Budapest my wife and son soon went to a nearby city, Gyor, and from there they went to Balatonfured, and my wife told me that my daughter was not feeling well because they had attacked her while they were still in Budapest. The Russian soldiers came into the house, looted the house, and attacked my daughter.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did your wife tell you that that happened again at the summer place?

Mr. Z. Before I went to our summer house in Balatonfured the daughter and the maid had met with the same fate. The house was

looted and 24 Russian soldiers came in. They raped the maid and my daughter. My daughter was unable to say how many times she was attacked.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to your daughter after that?

Mr. Z. My daughter was extremely ill and she was so mentally disturbed that at a moment of complete—I can't find a word—completely disappointment and disgust with life, she took poison and died. The maid herself was ill at the time, unable to assist the rest of the family. The maid remained ill for some time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then your daughter as a result of this terrifying experience committed suicide, is that correct?

Mr. Z. The maid had dug a hole in the garden, a shallow grave, in which she put my daughter—she put my daughter with her clothes on and just as she was and buried her. Later when my wife came to Balatonfured she had my daughter dug out from this shallow grave and she bought a coffin and had my daughter buried in the proper way.

Mr. McTIGUE. You still have one daughter who is living in Hungary at the present time, is that correct, and your wife is still there?

Mr. Z. Well, I have two daughters still in Hungary. One was a nun and she was in charge of a convent when I last heard of her. Now, I do not know where she is, but I have heard that they arrested her, but first they stripped her of her religious robes and then they let her go without any clothes. That's the last story that I have heard of my older daughter.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you leave Hungary?

Mr. Z. I left Hungary April the 15th, 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Excuse me a moment. Madam Interpreter, if the witness would care for a glass of water, there is one right there.

Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Witness, why were the 14 ministers in the concentration camp with you? They are men of God. What did they do to cause them to be imprisoned?

Mr. Z. I was not beaten during the daytime, but when I came the next day I was taken upstairs in the evening and they asked me questions, and when I could not answer those questions they beat me until I was unconscious and I collapsed and I do not remember any more.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I would like to ask you, Mr. Witness, why were the 14 ministers of the Gospel placed in the concentration camp? They are men of God and I just wonder what they did that would cause them to be imprisoned.

Mr. Z. The 14 clergymen accused were preaching during the war, saying that communism is not going to help religion and communism is anti-God, and they tried to tell religious people to hold out and stick to their religion. And that was why they persecuted the ministers.

Mr. FEIGHAN. That is, they were imprisoned because they preached the Gospel and spoke the truth about communism?

Mr. Z. Yes; that's correct.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I understood you to say that in the camp they were deprived of all their religious articles and they were refused the opportunity to give spiritual consolation to their fellow prisoners?

Mr. Z. The clergymen were told not to give any religious services whatever, but later in the evening in the dark they tried hard to console the people, and the Russians, the soldiers there, somehow heard that they were trying to console the people and had asked the people to remain religious in spite of everything and that is why the clergymen were also accused of antisovietism or anticommunism.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. Z. The clergymen behaved extremely well during the circumstances.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Witness, you have testified that during your absence in this prison camp your home in Budapest was visited by Russian soldiers and your daughter and the maid of the house were violated a number of times: is that correct?

Mr. Z. I knew that before I went home or even before they had arrested me that in my home in Budapest there were other people that were living with us, other guests, women, and that they had already been attacked by Russian soldiers even before I left the house and before I was arrested.

Mr. BENTLEY. Well, I want an answer to my question. Did the witness answer "Yes" to my question?

The question was: That this happened to his daughter and the maid of the house, this violation, numerous violations by Russian soldiers happened in his home in Budapest while he was away at camp. It was in Balatonfured.

Mr. Z. It was in Balatonfured, not in Budapest.

Mr. BENTLEY. How old was your daughter at this time?

Mr. Z. My daughter was 24 years old.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your daughter was 24 years old? And how old was the maid?

Mr. Z. The maid was 18 years old.

Mr. BENTLEY. The maid was 18 years old? Did the maid have any after effects because of her treatment? We have had testimony to the effect that your daughter, Mr. Witness, suffered greatly and finally committed suicide. Did the maid have any after effects of her treatments by the Russian soldiers?

Mr. Z. The maid was sick, physically ill, for a while, but she did not, however, try to commit suicide.

Mr. BENTLEY. With a social disease?

Mr. Z. I do not know that.

Mr. BENTLEY. The witness heard many other instances of the same kind of treatment meted out to Hungarian women and girls? These are not isolated examples of which he is speaking?

Mr. Z. I know that during the war and especially during air raids almost all of the female population of Budapest was in air-raid shelters or in basements, and especially in basements, just ordinary basements of houses, and when the Russians came in they ordered them to come out immediately and go with them and work in kitchens, to peel potatoes or vegetables, and this was the reason why they were supposed to go with them.

Mr. BENTLEY. I see. One more question. The witness was in the Hungarian Army during the war?

Mr. Z. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. I thought he was. Wasn't he a soldier? I am sorry. That's all. The witness is excused. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Interpreter.

Will you call our next witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. McTIGUE. Dr. Nyaradi.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Nyaradi, will you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. NYARADI. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. You may be seated.

Your witness, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF DR. NICHOLAS NYARADI

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your full name, please, for the record, Doctor?

Dr. NYARADI. Dr. Nicholas Nyaradi. N-y-a-r-a-d-i.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were born in Hungary?

Dr. NYARADI. Born in Budapest, Hungary, in 1905.

Mr. McTIGUE. You lived there continuously until when?

Dr. NYARADI. Until 1948 when I escaped from my country.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a banker in prewar Hungary?

Dr. NYARADI. In prewar Hungary and during the war I was associated with one of the greatest Hungarian banks, the First National Savings Bank Corp. of Budapest, and at the end of the war I became the managing director and legal adviser of the bank until I was called for a Government position.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you at one time Minister of Finance in Hungary, Doctor?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes; between 1946 and 1947 I was the Under Secretary of the Hungarian Treasury and from 1947 until my escape I was the Minister of Finance of the Hungarian Coalition Government.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you escape from Hungary?

Dr. NYARADI. I left Hungary in November 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you then come to the United States?

Dr. NYARADI. Shortly afterward my wife and I, who escaped with me, were admitted to the United States of America, and at the present I am the chairman of the department of economics at Bradley University in Peoria, Ill.

Mr. McTIGUE. Bradley University?

Dr. NYARADI. Bradley University, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you do a great deal of lecturing throughout the country?

Dr. NYARADI. I am doing a great deal of lecturing throughout the country because I feel it is the goal of my life to tell the American people what happen to the world behind the Iron Curtain in order to alert Americans to the terrible threat of Russian communism.

Mr. McTIGUE. Doctor, can you tell us how you first got into political life in Hungary?

Dr. NYARADI. Well, I had nothing to do with politics as a financial and economic expert, but during the war I was rather strongly anti-Nazi and so I was a very good friend of Msgr. Bela Varga. And immediately after the war Msgr. Bela Varga was, of course, a leading member of the Hungarian Small Landholders Party. And immediately

after the Russians had occupied Budapest early in 1945 I saw to what an extent the Russian occupation troops were helping the newly created Hungarian Communist Party. I was deeply concerned that this would cause all the promises given to us in the Yalta agreement concerning our freedom and independence and a national democratic government to be violated by the Russians, so while the Germans were still bombing Budapest I went out to the streets and I looked up Monsignor Varga, who was then organizing the Small Landowners Party, and I told—

Mr. McTIGUE. This was in 1945?

Dr. NYARADI. 1945, in January 1945. And I told him that because his party was the only one which could stand up against the Communists, with the backing of the Hungarian peasantry, the Hungarian farmers, and because they had no economic and financial experts, I would like to offer them my training and my experience and do for the party whatever I could. And Monsignor Varga was, of course, very happy to accept my offer. And first I stayed in the background. I became the chairman of the financial and banking committee of the Small Holders Party and in this I had some part in raising funds and financing our election campaign which ended in a terrible defeat for the Communist Party. And the Communist Party had, of course, the backing of the Russian occupation army. And so I, together with several of my friends, tried to create some kind of material support which I organized among the banking people in Hungary, and we were able to give this material support to the Small Holders Party which scored an amazing victory of 60 percent in the national elections.

And then in 1946 Prime Minister Nagy asked me to become Undersecretary of the Hungarian Treasury. And then in 1947, early in 1947, I was sent to Washington, D. C., by the Prime Minister to negotiate for some more economic help to Hungary so we could resist Communist pressure and domination and while I was in Washington I was appointed Minister of Finance of Hungary and then I tried to do whatever I could to halt or at least to slow down the economic penetration of the Russians. And when my work became completely impossible I finally escaped from Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, how did the Russians use economic methods to achieve political penetration?

Dr. NYARADI. According to communism doctrine, sir, there is a very interesting point that the best way to take away peoples' political and religious freedom is to weaken or destroy their economic independence. Therefore, I can testify that the methods of economic infiltration, of economic pressure, were as important or perhaps even more important than political pressure and military pressure exerted on the Hungarian Government.

The methods were briefly thus: First, unlimited looting by the Russian Army immediately after they took over the country. This looting was made possible through the presence of special booty commissions of the Red army. The booty commissions consisted generally of an appraiser, an accountant, and a few well-trained locksmiths. These booty commissions were immediately dispatched to all the Hungarian banks when the Russians came in. As an executive of one of our banks, of course, I witnessed what happened. They dynamited

the door of our huge safety deposit vault and they were working inside and those locksmiths broke into one safety deposit box after another and they emptied the contents of those boxes on the floor. In one corner they piled up currency, and money, in the second corner they piled up gold, jewels, silver; in the third corner, bonds, coupons, and so on. And then they put these assets into sacks and, to add insult to injury, we, the executives of the bank, were forced at gunpoint to carry out these sacks on our backs to the waiting Russian Army trucks, load them there and see the Russians carry them away.

To show you an example, for instance, they looted in this way from the Budapest banks alone 800 million pengos worth of Hungarian currency.

Now, when the Provisional National Government took over in Hungary they were unable to pay the state employees because the German Nazis who were retreating, had stolen our printing equipment, and the Russians had stolen our cash.

And then Marshal Vordshilov, the chairman of the Allied Control Commission, agreed at the request of Gen. Bela Miklos that the Russians would make a loan to the Hungarian Government of Hungarian currency so the Hungarian Government could pay its employees. The loan made by the Russians was actually our money which they had stolen from us. And, to add insult to injury, 2 or 3 years later I got a note from the Russian Ambassador asking me to repay in dollars the value of the loan which the Russians had given us in our own stolen currency. Of course, I refused, and you can imagine what happened later. But it just gives you an example, of course.

Mr. Counsel, the second method of economic penetration was by the reparations clause of the peace treaty. The Russians twisted these reparation clauses to such an extent that they made Hungarian industry work for them after they had looted almost all the equipment of the Hungarian industry.

So first they killed the goose laying the golden eggs. Then they forced this lame duck, if I may put it this way, to produce with its final energy and to surrender all products in reparations to Russia.

The reparations agreement called for \$300 million worth of reparations. Actually, the reparation pressure was so great that by inflicting heavy penalties on Hungary for being delayed in reparation payments they multiplied this original amount.

To give you an idea of what those penalties were, for every delayed reparation shipment we had to pay a 5-percent penalty. But not yearly, sir; monthly. Which meant that a 60-percent annual penalty was levied on the Hungarian treasury for every delay in reparation payments.

The next step in this Russian economic penetration was the formation of so-called Russian-Hungarian mixed companies. This was engineered strictly by the Hungarian Communist Party and by its second in command, Erno Gero. Gero was the Minister of Commerce of the Provisional Hungarian Government. He went to Moscow in August 1947, and without the authorization of his Government, of the Hungarian Government, he signed an agreement agreeing to the formation of Hungarian-Russian mixed companies in which 50 percent of the capital would have been put up by Hungary, and 50 percent would have been put up by Russia. Those mixed companies were

formed in practically every important field of the Hungarian national economy, river transportation, bauxite production—bauxite, aluminum, is the greatest national wealth of Hungary, of course—and coal, iron, steel, and so on.

Those combines operated the way that Hungary—well, after Gero had given it away, had given practically all working capital and all assets to those companies, but the Russians were in charge of those companies.

Now, we had a little joke at that time. There was a river navigation company, a Russian-Hungarian mixed river navigation company, and we said that this means that we had 50 percent participation in it, which means that we Hungarians could navigate the river crossways and the Russians could navigate the river lengthwise, which, of course, gives you an idea of how these companies were set up.

The next phase and one of the strongest phases, of course, was the Russian interpretation of the Potsdam agreement, a paragraph of which was included in the Hungarian Peace Treaty, I think, article 23. According to this paragraph, all the so-called former German assets behind the Iron Curtain were to be handed over to Russia as a part for her claims concerning German reparations.

As early as in 1945 Marshal Voroshilov as the chairman of the Allied Control Commission simply ordered the Hungarian Government to hand over everything of what was termed "German assets." Unfortunately, the agreement didn't specify what should be regarded as German assets. So that, for instance, assets which had been forcibly confiscated by the Nazis and which had belonged to French, Americans, Jewish people, and so on, the Russians termed "German assets." And in this way they got tremendous headway into the Hungarian economy, because they were able to obtain leading positions in the former German businesses.

In Hungary there had been strong German interests, of course, and the Russians took over these German interests, and they got a tremendous leverage from where they could, of course, turn the screw and blackmail and put pressure on the Hungarian anti-Communist resistance.

This was briefly the description of the economic methods.

Mr. McTIGUE. By unilateral action you mean that the Russians, or Voroshilov, did that without consultation with the Americans or British?

Dr. NYARADI. Sir, there was an unfortunate agreement there. The British and the Americans had agreed that although they would participate in the Allied Control Council, the Council itself regarding the Hungarian Government would be represented by its chairman, Marshal Voroshilov, so that Marshal Voroshilov, without consulting his American and British colleagues, gave orders to the Hungarian Government which the Government had to obey under the terms of the armistice treaty. And legally he was right, because the British and the Americans had agreed that they should be represented by the chairman, Marsh Voroshilov, in their dealings with the Hungarian Government.

The original armistice treaty reads this way:

The supreme authority in Hungary will be vested in the Allied—

and then in parentheses—

(Soviet) Control Commission. The supreme authority will be exercised by the Allied—

in parentheses—

(Soviet high command),

which was, of course—

Mr. McTIGUE. And, of course, Voroshilov was the permanent chairman?

Dr. NYARADI. Voroshilov was the permanent chairman, because according to, I think—I don't know exactly which agreement—the chairman in the three eastern European countries of the Allied Control Commissions, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, were to be invariably Russian generals or marshals on the Commission, so the power was vested in them at the very beginning.

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes; but in the cases of all countries other than Hungary, isn't it true that there was a revolving chairmanship?

Dr. NYARADI. Not behind the Iron Curtain, sir, because the revolving chairmanship was in Austria and in Germany, which was originally under four-power occupation, but Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were under exclusive Russian military occupation and therefore the chairmanship did not revolve according to the interallied agreement.

* Mr. McTIGUE. While you were Minister of Finance did you have any contact with the Soviet secret police?

Dr. NYARADI. Well, sir, the reason why I had very frequent and unpleasant contact with the Soviet police is because the whole Russian foreign ministry and the Russian organs of international economic representations are not under the Soviet secret police; they actually are the Soviet secret police. Soviet diplomats and commercial representatives are not checked by the secret police; they are the employees of the secret police. All the Russian Embassy members who sit today in the Soviet Embassies in the free world, as well as the trade representatives of Russia, are actually members of the Russian secret police.

Now, how I contacted these men was a very sad story because Russian policy in Hungary was briefly this: To acquire economic positions and to use them for blackmail for political power advantage. When they had achieved another step ahead by acquiring these political advantages, they used their political positions for blackmail for some further economic advantages.

Shortly after I got home from Washington, Prime Minister Nagy told me with a terrified expression on his face that we were facing economic collapse because among the German assets—the so-called German assets which Hungary was forced to hand over back in 1945—was a Hungarian indebtedness of 600 million German marks toward Germany.

Now, the Russians took this over, saying, "These are German assets so the Hungarians are now our debtors"; and we got a note asking us to pay, not German marks, because they were devalued by that time by the inflation, but the equivalent of this—200 million United States of America dollars.

This, of course, would have been a mortal blow to the Hungarian treasury and all of us saw that if the Russians were able to enforce

this specific demand they would succeed in getting what they had always wanted to have—an economic collapse of Hungary. They tried to drive us into inflation which we finally avoided with the help of America.

Then they tried, of course, to put pressure through these Soviet-Hungarian mixed companies and when all this didn't succeed they came in with this terrifying bill.

Then I was asked to go to Moscow, heading the Hungarian financial delegation, and as the head of this delegation to try and negotiate this Russian claim. I sat for 7 long months in Moscow, from May 1947 until December 1947, involved in the most dangerous and terrible negotiations I ever had in my life. For 4 weeks I was under house arrest, in spite of my diplomatic status and my diplomatic immunity, and they denied my wife and myself exit visas from Russia because I had rejected one of their demands to create another new mixed company in Hungary.

But after 7 months of this day-to-day haggling I was able to reduce the original Russian claim from 200 to 45 million dollars.

Now, of course, this didn't mean anything a few months later because, of course, I am sure that they not only got the \$200 million but the entire Hungarian economy. But during this time my negotiating opposite in Russia was Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan, a member of the Politburo, the economic czar and dictator of Russia, and a mysterious man who was General of the Armies Merkulov. This general, as I found out, was a secret police general, Beria's first assistant and closest friend. He was executed last December as a traitor together with Beria. His last position was as Minister of Soviet State Control.

Now, this man Merkulov, whom I found out was not only a secret police general but during the war he was Minister of the Interior of Russian, and one day he told me he had signed the order which ordered the deportation of several hundred thousand Baltic people in 1941 when the Russians took over for a short time the Baltic States. He was actually responsible for the deportation of the Baltic intelligentsia.

Now, of course, through this man and through his deputy, whose name was Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov, who later became Minister of the Interior of the Soviet Republic of Georgia and who also was executed with Beria during the last so-called treason or spy trial in Russia, I got, of course, a pretty good insight into the operation of the Russian secret police. This was the Beria gang, I would call it.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you, Doctor, ever had any experience with the question of East-West trade?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, sir; I have had the most unfortunate experiences, because I can tell you very briefly, sir, that, from what I have seen in Russia, if the West wants to trade with the Soviet orbit, this is tantamount with suicide for the free world. Russia today, according to my own personal experiences—and this I state here under oath before this committee—is an armed military camp where all kinds of goods are used, not for civilian consumption for the benefit of the people, but in order to strengthen Soviet war potential. The greatest blow which America has ever dealt to Russia was the ban on the exportation of

strategic materials which the Government of the United States imposed on March 1, 1948.

Then, sir, I can tell you what happened. Russian factories, war factories, had to stop because of the lack of American and Western ball bearings. In Czechoslovakia airplane production for Russia stopped because precision instruments were not coming from the West. There was a critical shortage of nonferrous metals in Russia. And I can tell you, sir, that the fact that we are not at war with Russia today, that Russia hasn't attacked us yet, is not that we have the A-bomb or the H-bomb but that the Government of the United States was wise enough to impose this ban.

Now, sir, I can tell you another thing. There was always a great amount of pressure from certain Western European and other countries that the so-called lists of critical or strategic materials should be narrowed. There are certain countries today which are desperate for business, to expand their markets, and they would be willing to trade, of course, with Russia and its allies.

Sir, I should like to tell you that according to my personal experiences there is no such thing as nonstrategic materials in East-West trade. Take wood and glass, which are certainly nonstrategic, but if you ship them today to Russia to be used to make picture frames for the pictures of Malenkov, to hang on the walls of the barracks to raise the morale of Soviet soldiers, in the hands of the Russians wood and glass are strategic.

Sir, I should like to tell this to the whole free world through the publicity of this committee: that there is only one way to trade safely with Russia—not to trade at all.

MR. FEIGHAN. Doctor, speaking of so-called nonstrategic materials, such as food, wheat, and grain, is it not your opinion, as it is mine, that even such so-called nonstrategic materials, products, really are strategic to the Soviet, Red, colonial empire of Russia, because if we give them grain and food, we permit them to take from the farms manpower which they can transfer to work in the factories to build up their armaments for the sneak attack which they plan on the United States and the free world?

DR. NYARADI. Congressman, you are a 100 percent right, and I should like to add something to this observation. Today our greatest weapon against Russia is not our atomic or hydrogen bomb stockpile but it is the Russian people's hatred against their own masters. The Russian people are held to a very low standard of living, an inhuman standard of living, because this was the cost, of course, of increasing war production, which is tremendous today. But, sir, if we agree that, for instance, English bicycles, German television sets, Italian oranges, or even French perfume are to be shipped to Russia, the Russian Government will be able to create a false impression of plenty in the minds of its own people.

They will say, "Well, this Malenkov is really a better fellow than Stalin, because he gives us sardines and oranges and what not."

So we would destroy our strongest allies, because, Malenkov could slowly through this false prosperity win to his side the Russian people.

And one more thing, sir. There is another tremendous weapon in our hands, the hatred of the non-Russian people against their oppressors, the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles, and so on.

Mr. FEIGHAN. May I interrupt?

Dr. NYARADI. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. FEIGHAN. In addition to the non-Russian nations, such as the so-called satellite or captive nations of Poland, Hungary, Rumania—

Dr. NYARADI. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and so on, yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. There are also within the U. S. S. R. 15 non-Russian nations, such as—

Dr. NYARADI. The Armenians.

Mr. FEIGHAN. The Armenians, the Azerbaijanians, the Byelorussians—

Dr. NYARADI. White Russians, Ukrainians, and such; yes, sir.

Mr. FEIGHAN. And all told 15?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, all told 15.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Well, what applies to the people who are resentful of the Red, criminal colonialism in these captured countries, probably also applies not only in the 15 non-Russian nations within the U. S. S. R. but possibly even in Moscow, in Russia, itself?

Dr. NYARADI. Very, very correct, sir.

And now, of course, sir, I should like to tell you, we here, very rightly so, are making tremendous efforts through the radio to keep alive the hopes of these unfortunate, oppressed people. We have always told them that we don't forget them, that we are thinking about their future, what they mean for us, and we don't forget their hope for liberty. Now, sir, imagine what we can then tell, for instance, to the Hungarian people when the Hungarian people hearing these reassurances and, rightly so, have hopes for the future but then they see that in the Government-owned Communist shops in Budapest the Communist government begins to display goods which have received by trade from the so-called free nations in which those people put their last hope of liberation. It is a psychological blow to our whole propaganda, our whole campaign of truth program.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Do you not think that along similar lines that same reaction would be in the minds of the enslaved people if we cut off all diplomatic relations with them and withdrew all our Legations and Embassies and all representatives?

Dr. NYARADI. Naturally, sir, this is a very much discussed question here recently in America, but I can tell you from personal experience that it makes an extremely bad impression on the imprisoned people when they see some of their Communist leaders shaking hands at diplomatic receptions with the leaders of the free world in which those people place their last hope for liberation.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Have you any further questions, Congressman Feighan?

Mr. FEIGHAN. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Nyaradi, you were a member of the Smallholders Party from what date until your escape from Hungary?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, sir. And I announced my resignation from the Smallholders Party because I saw that the Communists began to use it as a Communist front.

Mr. BENTLEY. When did you begin your party affiliation?

Dr. NYARADI. In early January 1945.

Mr. BENTLEY. And you remained a party member—

Dr. NYARADI. Until November 1948.

Mr. BENTLEY. Until November 1948?

Dr. NYARADI. That's right.

Mr. BENTLEY. And you were Under Secretary of the Ministry of Finance until January——

Dr. NYARADI. No, from 1946, March, until 1947, March.

Mr. BENTLEY. March 1947?

Dr. NYARADI. 1947, that is right. Then I became Minister of Finance.

Mr. BENTLEY. Since that time, until your escape from Hungary, you were the Minister of Finance?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Nagy?

Dr. NYARADI. Nagy and Prime Minister Dinnyes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Prime Minister Nagy and Prime Minister Dinnyes?

Dr. NYARADI. Correct.

Mr. BENTLEY. At that time, the Small Landholders Party was 1 of 4 parties in a so-called coalition or national front of independence, the other 3 members being the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the National Peasant Party?

Dr. NYARADI. May I add, sir, that it was a coalition government based on the terms of the agreement in Yalta, but it wasn't a national independent front government, because the national independent front government was formed on March 15, 1949. This was when the national independent front was announced.

Mr. BENTLEY. It was nevertheless a coalition government?

Dr. NYARADI. It was a coalition government based on the principles of the Yalta agreement. Coalition governments were formed from France to Rumania.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was there anything in the Yalta agreement that specified that Hungary had to have a coalition government?

Dr. NYARADI. The Yalta declaration specified that all liberated and former Axis satellite countries would have to form governments of all anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist democratic parties, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Including the Communist Party?

Dr. NYARADI. According to the interpretation of the Yalta agreement, the Communist Party was such a democratic party. Should I put in quote, unquote? And this is the reason why in France, in Italy, in Holland, and down to Rumania, of course, Communists were included in such coalition governments.

Mr. BENTLEY. But in 1945 in the November elections, the Smallholders Party of which you were at that time a member——

Dr. NYARADI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Won an absolute majority in the election?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. And nevertheless they still formed a coalition government afterward?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, sir; on the orders of Marshal Voroshilov.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know personally of those orders?

Dr. NYARADI. I know personally, sir, of these orders because Marshal Voroshilov's personal agreement was needed according to the terms of the armistice treaty for the appointment of any Government member. We were still in a state of war and the supreme authority was,

of course, the Allied Control Council, and Marshal Voroshilov again acting, unfortunately, in the name of Great Britain and the United States of America, simply did not permit more than 50 percent of our party membership to be in this Government, in spite of the fact that we had a 60-percent majority in the Parliament and the rest of the Cabinet posts were filled with allies of the Communist Party, who formed the so-called leftist bloc against us.

Mr. BENTLEY. What you are saying, then, Dr. Nyaradi, is that Marshal Voroshilov had personally to agree to each and every Hungarian Cabinet appointment at that time?

Dr. NYARADI. Under the terms of the armistice treaty which vested the supreme authority in the Allied Control Commission.

So this Marshal Voroshilov didn't act as a Soviet field marshal but he acted as an appointed chairman of an interallied commission of which, of course, America and Great Britain were also members.

Mr. BENTLEY. And then in the May 1947 coup which ousted Prime Minister Nagy—

Dr. NYARADI. Nagy, yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And resulted in the succession of Prime Minister Dinnyes, a coalition government still continued of which you were a member; is that correct?

Dr. NYARADI. Still continued, sir. Prime Minister Nagy's ouster was one of the slices of salami which Rakosi described.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, in the new Dinnyes government was Marshal—not Marshal Voroshilov but Sviridov?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, the Lieutenant General.

Mr. BENTLEY. S-v-i-r-i-d-o-v.

Dr. NYARADI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. General Sviridov also agreed to the composition of the Hungarian Government?

Dr. NYARADI. The composition of the Hungarian Government was absolutely the same, except Ferenc Nagy. No new member was appointed then and no old member was dropped.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, what happened to the Hungarian Government after the August 1947 elections?

Dr. NYARADI. Then there was again a readjustment, because in the 1947 election, and because the Hungarian people against the Communists voted in an overwhelming majority, we had an 80-percent non-Communist vote in the 1947 elections. The Communists used some fraudulent techniques of transporting their voters from one voting place to the other, the so-called absentee votes. I think that—

Mr. BENTLEY. We have had testimony on that in New York.

Dr. NYARADI. You had testimony; yes. And they increased the strength of their party, but they had still only 20 percent and the 80 percent was still non-Communist.

Mr. BENTLEY. The coalition government of the four political parties, including the Small Land Owners Party of which you are a member, continued in existence after the August 1947 elections?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes; it continued in existence, as far as I know, until May 15, 1949, when, according—I got this from U. S. News & World Report—the Communist coup in Hungary brought a full Communist government to Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. Prior to that time, of course, the Social Democrat Party had disappeared?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, sir; the Social Democrat Party was merged with the Communist Party on June 12, 1948, if I am not mistaken. So then they were together.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, Dr. Nyaradi, what was your reason for remaining so long in a coalition government that came to be dominated more and more by the Communist members of that coalition?

Dr. NYARADI. Because I wanted to save as much of Hungary as I could and I wanted to save as much of our friendship toward America as I could.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you think that your remaining in the Government had any success along that line?

Dr. NYARADI. Well, sir, if you remember the case of the two American executives, Bannantine and Ruedemann—

Mr. BENTLEY. We have had testimony from Mr. Ruedemann in New York.

Dr. NYARADI. Yes. Well, Mr. Ruedemann and Bannantine were released after 2 days.

Mr. BENTLEY. One week.

Dr. NYARADI. One week or whatever it was. Two days after I knew of the affair I sent an ultimatum to Mr. Rakosi and to several of his men. And a year later when my good friend, Mr. Vogeler, was put into prison and when I wasn't there any more, he languished 2½ years in the prison and then the United States Government had to pay quite a ransom.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Nyaradi, when did you go to Moscow as head of the Hungarian delegation?

Dr. NYARADI. May 19, 1947. While I was in Moscow Prime Minister Nagy escaped and resigned.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you at any time during those months in Moscow meet personally with Marshal Stalin?

Dr. NYARADI. I didn't meet Stalin personally. I saw him once at a reception. My contacts were, of course, with my diplomatic negotiators, with Mikoyan mostly, who was the economic expert, and then with Molotov, to a small degree. It was mostly Sorin, Deputy Foreign Minister, who is still there, I think, who carried on the foreign diplomatic part of the negotiations. And, of course, I knew Voroshilov, who was the third member of the Soviet Politburo, whom I had known in Budapest.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Nyaradi, in addition to your trip to Moscow and your trip to Washington, you made some other visits abroad, did you not, with the idea of negotiating commercial agreements?

Dr. NYARADI. No, sir; I didn't negotiate commercial agreements at all. It wasn't my—

Mr. BENTLEY. Well, financial agreements?

Dr. NYARADI. Well, mostly my visits abroad with the French and British and Swiss Governments had as their purpose to try to save as much of the foreign properties, the Western properties in Hungary, as possible. I was pretty successful until I was—

Mr. BENTLEY. In April of 1948, I believe, you were—had you gone abroad at that time?

Dr. NYARADI. Yes, sir; November 15.

MR. BENTLEY. That's November 15? And it was during your stay abroad in France, am I correct?

DR. NYARADI. Yes; it was first in Germany. I first visited in Germany my old friend, Gen. George H. Weems, who was formerly the American commander of the Allied Control Council of the American section in Hungary, and I told him that it looked to me as if I won't be able to hold out very much longer and I asked him to submit this report to the Government of the United States.

And then when I arrived in Paris I got the news which gave me the impetus for my decision. One was that Rakosi, as usual, had broken his word which he had given me that all foreign properties and especially American properties, of course, would be exempt from nationalization, in Hungary. And as soon as I arrived in Paris I heard that one of the oil properties—I do not remember correctly which one—was suddenly taken over.

And the other news, of course, which was even more disturbing than that, was that as Finance Minister from the very beginning on I had held down to the barest possible minimum the military expenditures in my budget. I didn't want Hungary to get an army at all, because I knew that as the secret police was Communist dominated from the very first minute the army would be Soviet dominated, too.

So in the budget which I had submitted to the Hungarian Parliament in January 1948 I had appropriated money for a 12,000-man army, exactly one-fifth of the 65,000 men which the peace treaty allowed for Hungary. The equivalent of this money was about \$15 million. And while I was in Paris I got the news that Gero, who had been the Minister of Communications in this government ever since 1945, wanted to increase the military appropriations some 150 times higher than I had originally agreed for.

MR. BENTLEY. And it was on the basis of this knowledge that you decided that your work in Hungary—

DR. NYARADI. Yes, that it was impossible. And my wife was with me. Fortunately, she was with me in Moscow, where she acted as my secretary, because I didn't trust anyone else.

And then in Paris, with only two overnight suitcases, I sent back my official limousine and my three aides, and I wrote a letter in which I openly accused Rakosi of disrupting every friendly tie which had tied Hungary to the United States and accusing him of breaking his word.

MR. BENTLEY. And with that letter in effect was your resignation?

DR. NYARADI. And this was my letter of resignation. My letter of resignation from my parliamentary post as a deputy, as a parliamentary member of the Small Landowners Party, and also a third letter announcing my expatriation of my Hungarian citizenship and also my resignation from the Small Landholders Party membership.

MR. BENTLEY. I believe there are no further questions, Mr. Counsel. Congressman Feighan has another question.

MR. FEIGHAN. In view of your experience, do you believe that peaceful coexistence with Russian communism is possible?

DR. NYARADI. Congressman, I should like to quote to you here the last page of my book, *My Ringside Seat in Moscow*, which was published 2 years ago in New York City and the fourth printing of which is just out now:

The inevitable lesson which I learned from 4 tragic years was that there is no such word as compromise in the contemporary Russian language. My own

solace, small though it was, is that Americans at great cost have learned how difficult it is even for a powerful nation to induce the Russians to keep their word to honor agreements. It was impossible for a weak nation like Hungary to do so. I was successful in my dealings with the Russians temporarily when I mustered courage to say "No," but such success has proved illusionary in the absence of any power with which to back them up. America, too, must learn to say "No" and to mean it.

I think this answers your question, sir.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Well, put the answer directly. Would you say "Yes" or "No"?

Dr. NYARADI. The answer is, sir, that the Communist doctrine was laid down in one of Lenin's books 36 years ago in which he said that there would be a series of showdowns in the world before the final showdown comes between the forces of capitalism and communism—and I am quoting Lenin verbatim—and that after the final showdown the funeral dirge will be sung either over the tomb of communism or over the tomb of capitalism.

This, I think, excludes any such thing as coexistence, because coexistence is impossible not because we don't want it but because they don't want it. It is their dogma which simply doesn't permit it.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you for appearing before the subcommittee, Dr. Nyaradi, and contributing your testimony.

Dr. NYARADI. I am very grateful, sir, for this opportunity. And may I add one more thing: I think that this subcommittee in getting these facts to the American public is doing a tremendous job in reenforcing the free world, because, sir, I am not afraid of the Soviet A-bombs and the H-bombs. Malenkov has a more vicious and more dangerous weapon. It is the complacency, the taking for granted, the ignorance, and the indifference of the Western World today against this threat. May God bless you for what you are doing.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you for your observations, Dr. Nyaradi. You may be excused.

The next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mrs. Kiraldy.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mrs. Kiraldy, will you stand up and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, before this subcommittee, so help you God?

Mrs. KIRALDY. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF MRS. LEWIS KIRALDY

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name for the record, please?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Mrs. Lewis Kiraldy.

Mr. McTIGUE. And where are you living now, Mrs. Kiraldy?

Mrs. KIRALDY. I am living in South Bend, Ind.

Mr. McTIGUE. With your husband and your family?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes; with my husband and my family.

Mr. McTIGUE. And what does your family consist of?

Mrs. KIRALDY. I have three girls and my husband.

Mr. McTIGUE. Three girls and a husband? Were you born in Hungary, Mrs. Kiraldy?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes; I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. And how long did you live in Hungary?

Mrs. KIRALDY. In Hungary?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes.

Mrs. KIRALDY. Until 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you then escape from the country in 1948?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Together with your family; is that correct?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes; together with my family.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, is it true, Mrs. Karaldy, that you were a leader of the women's division of the Small Holders Party in Hungary?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. At what time was that?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That was from 1945 until 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it also true that you were the first woman elected to the executive committee of the city council of the city of Budapest?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That's right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, what caused you, Mrs. Kiraldy, to enter a public career in Hungary and how old were you at the time?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Oh, at the time I wasn't very old, but I felt that with the Russian occupation our country was in real danger and when we had the chance for free elections, then I felt that everybody had to fight for our freedom, and so I felt that, even I was not too old at that time and I had two small children, and I had to fight for freedom for my children, and that's why I entered in the public life.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time after your entrance into public life and after the Communist takeover of the country that you were arrested by the NKVD?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes; in 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was the first time you were arrested by the NKVD?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes; that was the first time. It was because somebody had escaped from the country and they said that I helped him.

Mr. McTIGUE. They told the secret police that you had helped the escapees; is that correct?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, what happened to you at that time? Where were you taken?

Mrs. KIRALDY. At that time, I was taken to the Andrassy Prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. Andrassy 60?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Andrassy 60; that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were arrested by whom?

Mrs. KIRALDY. The Hungarian secret police, and then the Hungarian secret police handed me over to the peoples court, and at that time I was tried and I got a year's sentence. But my husband was able to release me after 3 months of jail until my case came before a higher court. So I spent 5 days at home, and after 5 days, one night the political secret police came again and then they took me to Andrassy 60, the Hungarian—the so-called Hungarian secret police, but actually I don't think it is a Hungarian prison. I think that it is a Russian prison.

Mr. McTIGUE. And Andrassy Street is where Cardinal Mindszenty and other prominent Hungarian patriots were held from time to time; isn't it?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is this the first time you were arrested?

Mrs. KIRALDY. No; that was the second time I was arrested.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was the second time? Now, what can you tell us about what happened after you returned to Andrassy Street?

Mrs. KIRALDY. After my return to Andrassy Street, they accused me of an entirely different matter. They said that I was a spy for the English, because I had a good friend who was at that time a member of the English Legation. She was the press attaché in the English Legation. I can tell her name, because she is now in South Africa. At that time her name was Miss Jean Dunkin. She was married after that. And they said that I gave information to her and so I was a spy for the English. I denied that, because it wasn't true. I did give information to her, information that she could have gotten from every third man in Hungary.

But if I had confessed and had told them that I actually gave her this information, they certainly would have given me at least 10 years in Siberia. And that is the difference between West and East, see. It is the same word, but used in an entirely different meaning. They say, "Democracy there, democracy here, it is just the same." The same word but the meaning is entirely different. Spying here and spying there, it is just the same. They would have called me a spy and here everybody in the Western countries would have laughed in my face for such a thing. That wasn't spying.

Well, first they put me upstairs in a room and I had to spend 5 days there. In the meantime, a policeman always took care of me. And it was very strange. I heard in the night—I was very surprised—Russian voices, and then I found out that some Russian officers came into the so-called Hungarian jail and questioned some Hungarian people through interpreters, so I always heard the Russians yelling and shouting and threatening those poor people who were questioned. So then I could find out what kind of an institution was Andrassy Street, 60.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, what happened to you while you were there? This is the second time that you were charged with espionage?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes; that was the second time. They questioned me all the time.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you say, "all the time"—

Mrs. KIRALDY. And I said all the time. No. Then after 5 days they removed me and put me in a cellar. All by myself in a small cellar. I hardly got any food and I had to remain by myself. They questioned me then several times. And I was there in the hole about 3 weeks. At the end of the third week, one night, they took me again for questioning and they told me, that I had 2 chances to be free: One if I would sign my confession. They said they knew everything about me and they knew that I was a spy. So I had better sign this confession and then I could be free.

I had another chance. I could work with them, they said. I could go home and keep my old connections, my old friends, my family, and so on, and then what I had to do was to meet once or twice a week with some nice gentlemen from that nice institution. And so they would give me some questions and I had to answer them.

Well, I knew what that meant. That meant spying, spying for them, being a spy on my family and on my friends.

So I refused, and I said, "No, I am not going to do that, because I don't believe in that."

So they said, that if I didn't want to sign my confession and I didn't want to work for them, they would hand me over to the Russian Army.

Well, at that time, the Hungarian Peace treaty had been signed, so they had no right to hand a Hungarian over to the Russian Army.

So I thought, that maybe it was just a trick and, well, I believed it and I didn't believe it. Certainly I hoped that it was just a trick, and I denied everything.

So I went back to jail and that night they actually took me and handed me over to the Russians. It was very interesting. In the courtyard a car was waiting for me just like a Budapest taxicab, so that you would think it was a taxicab, but it was actually a car from the Russian NKVD, and sitting in the front were the driver and another man.

And they took me to a nice home on Vilma Kiralyne Street. That was a beautiful home that had belonged to a Hungarian aristocratic family.

Well, do you want the details?

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were at Andrassy Street were your daughters permitted to visit you?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Oh, no. Nobody could ever visit at Andrassy Street. Not even your lawyer had that permission.

Mr. McTIGUE. How old were your daughters at the time all this was happening to you?

Mrs. KIRALDY. The oldest one was 7 and the smallest one was 4 at that time.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were your thoughts about your family when you were undergoing this confinement and this constant questioning and threats and interrogation?

Mrs. KIRALDY. I believed that my family was all right and, well, certainly I was terribly upset and my hope in the good Lord was what actually kept me alive.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you were taken from the prison at Andrassy Street to the villa which you were just about to describe, what happened there?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Well, I saw a beautiful home, but such an incredible amount of dirt that I don't think any American would believe it without seeing it, would believe that such an important place like that could be in such a shape. Papers and watermelon rinds on the floor, and, well, it was actually shocking even for me who had known the Russian people until that time.

First they called a woman who entirely—oh, I don't know the right expression—they looked for—you know, I had to take off my clothes.

Mr. BENTLEY. They searched you?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes, she searched me. She searched me and then they put me upstairs in a small kitchen. I think it was the second or the third kitchen of this nice home and that's what they used as a prison for women. I found there four ladies, very pale and very thin. They told me they had already spent 3 months in this jail with just food enough to keep themselves alive, but it wasn't enough for them to live decently on.

We just had an hour or so to tell our stories there, and then they took us, all five of us, downstairs and we were told that they were taking us out of the country without any questioning, for example, of me. They put us in big trucks. We had to climb up there. They told us that if anybody opened her mouth or tried to make a movement, that they would shoot us. We had two big trucks loaded with people.

Mr. McTIGUE. All women?

Mrs. KIRALDY. No, there were in all five women and the men were all tied up inside in back of the truck. Nobody could see them, because they were thrown into the truck, and we had to sit in the front of the truck and we looked like women who had asked the Russians for some transportation. Really like peasant women.

And on each truck there were three soldiers, all with arms, and they had to guard us. So they said that if we moved, they would shoot us. They were taking us out of the country. It was in 1948, in the summertime.

Well, you can imagine how I felt, a young mother with two small children, actually being taken out of my country, without any help, without no possibility to help myself or even to tell my people to try to help me. I was all by myself. I only had the help of the good Lord and maybe my own. I could only depend on the good Lord and myself. You know, seeing this beautiful Hungarian country that was already in harvest time, you know, and seeing this truck going out of the country, taking out Hungarian citizens with no trial, without even a possibility of help. I mean I felt terrible. I was sure I never would see my husband again and I would never see my children.

And then I actually realized what communism means, when a young woman, an innocent young woman could be taken and——

Mr. McTIGUE. Disappear?

Mrs. KIRALDY. And can disappear with no possibility to defend themselves.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you had left the villa and you were en route out of Hungary, where were you taken to?

Mrs. KIRALDY. We were taken to Baden bei Wien. That is a small village near Vienna, and it was then and I think even today the headquarters of the Russian forces in the west.

Mr. McTIGUE. That's always been referred to as the gateway entrance——

Mrs. KIRALDY. That was the gateway for Siberia. That was the name of this small village. And it was the headquarters of the NKVD.

Mr. BENTLEY. This is the Soviet Zone of Austria?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That is the Soviet Zone of Austria.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to you there, Mrs. Kiraldy?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Pardon?

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to you there?

Mrs. KIRALDY. There they put me in a cell, in a small room, just as at Andrassy 60, but even dirtier and even more terrible than that. I was always alone. This was for 3 days and then on the third day I had a roommate who was a young Austrian girl 20 years old. We spent about 10 weeks in that dreadful place and in the meantime she told me that she had been a Communist who had actually served the Russians with her body and soul. She was a beautiful young Austrian girl. But after she had done her duty and she had to disappear. They couldn't leave her to tell her story.

So they beat her, as she told me, to make her confess to things she had never done, because she was a Communist with her whole heart, but that is, I think, the reward for every foreigner who helps the Russians, for every collaborator, I think, because the Russians only depend on them, and believe them, just as long as they can use them.

So I met while in jail many persons like this young Austrian girl.

Mr. McTIGUE. And they all, I suppose, signed confessions?

Mr. KIRALDY. Pardon?

Mr. McTIGUE. They all signed confessions from time to time?

Mrs. KIRALDY. They had to sign confessions because the Russians always had the way to make them sign confessions. I myself was there, as I told you, for 10 weeks. For the first 3 week they didn't question me, just left me there to become weak. This is one of the psychological methods they use. They let a human being just stay there without any questioning and, believe me, this is more terrible than maybe beating or maybe even injections, because they just—oh, I don't know.

Mr. BENTLEY. It's fear of the unknown, isn't it?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes. It undermines your whole psychosis. It was dreadful. It was terrible. I heard on many nights men crying like animals in there. And they didn't harm them in any other way; just let them sit there in those dreadful cells.

Mr. McTIGUE. So that after a while you would almost give anything to have an interrogation or a questioning; isn't that correct?

Mrs. KIRALDY. When I was down there in the cellar I thought I would, but then when they brought me up, I don't know, maybe fate always gave me strength to control myself. And then I always thought, well, nobody can help me but myself, so if they want to have me, they can have me, because they could kill me, I mean, any minute and nobody would ask where I was, because nobody knew actually where I was, but I wouldn't help them.

So I always had the strength to say, "No, no, no."

They always took me at night. The one who questioned me was always in the dark. He had a big stick and tried to impress me, but later, I think, he knew that beating wouldn't impress me too much, so he didn't try to beat me. I think he was very well educated in psychological methods.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were confined there and during the period you were being interrogated, did you have the occasion to talk to some of these Soviet guards?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Actually I didn't, because I myself didn't speak Russian, and nobody could enter our cells but the officer in charge, but there was a small window on every door, and through this the Austrian girl, who spoke excellent Russian, had an opportunity to talk with the guards, so we could find out who were the others who were in the same jail. And so we learned that there were all nationalities—Polish, Czechs, Hungarians certainly, Austrians, and even English and American in that jail. There was an English lady just beside our cell and in front of us was an American gentleman. We never had an opportunity to know who he was, but, according to the guard with whom this Austrian girl spoke, he was supposed to be an American, and I even saw his luggage one time. So I think he actually was one.

MR. MCTIGUE. You say that during the time you were confined that you were able to withstand the Soviet or the Communist efforts to extract a confession; is that correct?

MRS. KIRALDY. That is right.

MR. MCTIGUE. Did you maintain that attitude throughout or did you begin to believe that the time had come when you must adopt some other kind of an attitude?

MRS. KIRALDY. No, no; thanks to the good Lord, I must say that I never, never, gave up, because I was sure if they wanted to kill me, they would kill me anyway, but I wouldn't help them. So I denied everything until the last time. And then at the end of the 10th week, they took me upstairs again and the major who questioned me was suddenly very, very mild with me and very nice and kind. I was surprised.

And then he said to me, "Well, Mrs. Kiraldy, we are very sorry that we had to keep you here, but actually we are so surrounded with enemies that we had to do that, because we thought that you were a spy."

And then I couldn't help myself. I asked him, "Which enemies do you mean?"

He said, "Well, the English and the American."

And I was very much surprised, because before I had spoken with English and American people and they had always mentioned the Russians as our allies, but I didn't care to ask him then, "Aren't they your allies?" because I thought that I was in a pretty bad situation anyway so I shouldn't ask them questions like that.

MR. MCTIGUE. So you were released when?

MRS. KIRALDY. So then I was released at the end of the 10th week of—

MR. MCTIGUE. What year?

MRS. KIRALDY. 1947. That was, I guess, about the end of August or the beginning of September.

MR. MCTIGUE. In conclusion, can you tell us briefly of your escape from Hungary?

MRS. KIRALDY. Yes, certainly. After they had released me, I could see that I was being watched all the time. We could hear through the telephone, even when we took off the receiver, this little sound, and we knew that it was the political police, and then I saw many times men who always followed me wherever I went. So my husband and I decided to stay together as long as we were not important people, because I didn't want to leave them. I mean my husband and my two children. So we decided to escape together and then we had to wait for a year. After a year there were some more unfortunate people, so I wasn't interesting any more.

My husband made contact with one of the peasants who lived on the western border. We left our home just as you left yours right now, with everything in it. We didn't say goodbye to anybody. We took our two children and traveled to the western border. There we went to the peasants' home. And at that time our smallest child was 5 years old and the older one 8. I gave drugs to the smaller one so she went to sleep. And then I tied her on my back. The other one walked with my husband. And we went, all four of us with the leader, through the Austrian border. Certainly by that time the

Iron Curtain was already rolled down. So we had to choose a way which was pretty hard, through mountains and across rivers. We walked as much as 20 miles until we reached the Austrian border. And that was not exactly the goal of our excursion, but anyway Austria wasn't so dangerous as Hungary. But, as you know, that was still the Russian Zone. And then we had to go through Vienna and then to Salzburg to the American Zone.

But, anyway, God helped us and so we lost everything but we gained freedom and I think freedom is worth everything.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Mrs. Kiraldy. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I have no questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mrs. Kiraldy, I just have one or two. What was your husband's occupation in Hungary?

Mrs. KIRALDY. My husband was a corporation lawyer in Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was he employed by some private company or was he in practice for himself?

Mrs. KIRALDY. He was in practice for himself but was employed by some private companies, too.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was he interfered with at all while you were in Hungary? He was never in prison, was he?

Mrs. KIRALDY. No; he was never in prison, but he never was in politics either.

Mrs. BENTLEY. And you were elected to the city council of Budapest as a member, as a representative of the Small Holders Party?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. And that was when?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That was in 1945.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was that during the municipal elections in October 1945?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. And you were arrested when, again?

Mrs. KIRALDY. I was arrested in 1947. In March 1947.

Mr. BENTLEY. This city council of Budapest had representatives of all political parties in it?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Including the Communist Party?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Certainly.

Mr. BENTLEY. But the mayor was a Smallholder; am I correct?

Mrs. KIRALDY. At that time the mayor was a Smallholder.

Mr. BENTLEY. During the times that you were arrested you were never physically beaten or mistreated?

Mrs. KIRALDY. No; I wasn't mistreated.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were just constantly questioned all the time?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That's right, but I don't think a human being needs to be physically beaten after he has spent weeks and weeks in a cellar.

Mr. BENTLEY. These other women who were with you in this MVD prison in Budapest, what had they been arrested for? Did they tell you?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes; they told me they had been arrested in an English case. They were accused of belonging to an English spy organization.

Mr. BENTLEY. The same charge as was made against yourself?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Yes; I think that is why they actually took me with those unfortunate people to go to Baden bei Wien and why nobody ever came back.

Mr. BENTLEY. You have told a very moving and a very interesting story, Mrs. Kiraldy, and you have certainly gone through a great deal to go through both Hungarian and Russian police prisons. When you finally were able to escape for freedom, walking with your child on your back, you say you walked 20 miles in 1 night?

Mrs. KIRALDY. That is right, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. You had to travel only at night?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Certainly. We couldn't take a chance, because actually it was a case of life or death, because if they had caught us, we would have to walk to Siberia, I guess, and our children would have been taken from us, that is certain.

Mr. BENTLEY. You had to cover that distance in 1 night, 20 miles, with your child on your back?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Certainly. We walked, oh, I don't—I couldn't tell you how many hours, but at that time, you know, you can have super-human strength, I guess.

Mr. BENTLEY. The committee appreciates very much your appearance and your very interesting and moving testimony and wishes you good luck in the land of freedom.

Mrs. KIRALDY. Thank you very much, sir. One thing I would like to explain.

Mr. BENTLEY. Please.

Mrs. KIRALDY. Many people couldn't believe how it was actually possible that the Russians let me free from a prison like that. So I'd like to make that clear.

Mr. BENTLEY. Please do.

Mrs. KIRALDY. I was wondering for a long time, too, how it could be possible that they released me from there. Actually, I was popular in Hungary after 1945 as a speaker. So I traveled during election time all over the country and was speaking to women. But actually I was a young and inexperienced politician. So I wasn't any danger to the Russians. So they thought that way, I guess. If they would free me, it would be good propaganda for them. They would take me to Budapest, anyway. And so they could say, "Well, we are nice boys to free someone who is innocent." And then, on the other hand, they never thought we could escape from Hungary after 1947.

Mr. BENTLEY. And I don't suppose after you had been released from the Russian prison that you were able to tell the truth about your experiences as long as you were in Hungary?

Mrs. KIRALDY. Certainly not. They knew that I had my husband and my two children, that I would never leave them, and that for a family to escape was pretty risky at that time.

Mr. BENTLEY. Again, the committee appreciates your appearance. Just a moment. Congressman Feighan has a question. I have no questions.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did the other women who were in that prison ever tell you that they were tortured physically?

Mrs. KIRALDY. No, they didn't. Well, they were tortured physically in that they didn't have enough to eat for 3 months. They were just like skeletons. But, no, they didn't.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mrs. Kiraldy.

Mrs. KIRALDY. Thank you very much, and I appreciate the fact that I could appear by this committee.

Mr. BENTLEY. You are excused.

The subcommittee will stand adjourned until 1:30 at this time.

(Whereupon, at 12:07 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 1:30 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Will you call your first witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. The first witness, Mr. Chairman, is Bishop Alexander St. Ivanyi. Will you step forward, Bishop, please?

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you raise your right hand? Do you swear to tell the truth the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, before the subcommittee, so help you God?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Bishop.

Mr. Counsel, before we begin, the Chair would like to make a statement. As has been known, the subcommittee yesterday afternoon dispatched a telegram to Bishop Albert Bereczky in Evanston, Ill., the senior clergyman of the Hungarian delegation now attending the World Council of Churches at Evanston. The telegram said that statements made by members of this Hungarian delegation at Evanston concerning the question of the freedom of religion in Hungary were in direct conflict with testimony which already had been taken before this committee, and testimony which was expected to be heard at a later date.

In view of these conflicts Bishop Bereczky and other members of his delegation were invited to appear before the subcommittee and give under oath any information or opinions they had regarding the question of the freedom of religion in Hungary, since one of the things which the subcommittee is endeavoring to do is to ascertain the truth regarding the existence of such freedom.

I have now been informed by the press that Bishop Bereczky has acknowledged receipt of this telegram but that he believes it to be unworthy of reply because of the fact that conditions regarding the lack of religious freedom in Hungary, such as we have already received in testimony, do not exist, therefore it seems that the subcommittee will not receive an answer to its telegram.

The first witness this afternoon, as I understand, is a gentleman of the Unitarian faith, who is expected to testify further upon the conditions of religious freedom in his own homeland in Hungary.

You may proceed with the witness, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF BISHOP ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you identify yourself for the record, please, Bishop?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. My name is Alexander St. Ivanyi.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born in Hungary; is that correct?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was born in that part of Hungary which now is Rumania.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you educated in Hungary?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was educated in Hungary and then I came to this country on a special scholarship and I studied at Harvard University and later on at the University of Chicago.

Mr. McTIGUE. Theological courses?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Courses in theology, yes; and I took courses in political science at the University of Chicago.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you thereafter return to Hungary?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. After that I returned to Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. And how long were you in Hungary after your return?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. After my last visit in this country, which was in 1933, I was in Hungary up to the end of 1946.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you thereafter leave Hungary and come to this country?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. After that I was forced to leave Hungary and come to this country, and after having been in this country for 3 years I was naturalized as a United States citizen.

Mr. McTIGUE. You are now pastor of the First Church of Christ at Lancaster, Mass.; is that correct?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. And that is a Unitarian church?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. It is.

Mr. McTIGUE. It is true that you were president one time of the Hungarian National Red Cross?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were also president of the Conference of Christians and Jews of Hungary?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were also president of the Citizens Democratic Party of Hungary?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were the ranking Unitarian Bishop of Hungary; is that correct?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was the only Unitarian Bishop of Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were in Hungary during World War II; isn't that correct?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was there.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were also in Budapest at the time of the occupation of Hungary by the Reds; is that correct?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was there, yes; after the siege of Budapest in 1945.

Mr. McTIGUE. How were you treated by them, incidentally, when they came in?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. By the Russians?

Mr. McTIGUE. By the Russians.

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. We were in a very fortunate position because during the war I had taken care of the British and United States citizens who were in Hungary. I also took care of the escaped prisoners of war, British and United States, from Germany, and on account of that certain letters of recommendation were sent to the military commandant of the Russian Army, so that our little group was the first to receive 4 guards from the military commandant of

Budapest, and was protected because of the 4 guards, but we saw plenty of what was going on in other parts of the city.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were the principal religious faiths in Hungary up to World War II?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. In Hungary the Roman Catholic, the Reformed, the Lutheran, and the Unitarian Churches are the so-called historical churches, because for many centuries they worked for cultural and educational principles and purposes in Hungary; therefore, these four religions are the so-called received religions incorporated in the constitution of Hungary. All other religions have freedom of religion but the terminology was different.

They were recognized, but these four churches were received.

Mr. McTIGUE. There was complete religious freedom in Hungary up until the time of the Communist occupation of Hungary; is that a correct statement?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. There was. As a matter of fact, Hungary has a very good historical record, because in 1568 the Hungarian Parliament passed the first religious toleration act in Europe, which granted complete religious toleration.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Counsel, may I interrupt at this point. I think to be perfectly correct, when you say that there was complete freedom of religion in Hungary until the time of the Communist occupation, Bishop, we should make a certain exception with regard to that period of time beginning in March of 1944 when the Nazis were in occupation. There was abridgement of religious freedom there at that time; wasn't there?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. There certainly was.

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me. Go ahead.

Mr. McTIGUE. How were all of the religious faiths treated, Bishop, in the first days of the Communist occupation of Hungary? That would be beginning in late 1944.

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. The eastern part of Hungary was occupied by the Russian armies in August 1944, and then they came forward toward the center and the west of Hungary, so the occupation of Hungary was completed by the end of January 1945.

As the Russians came we saw them treat the churches according to their system of the rhythm of dialectics, meaning that alternately they were harsh with the churches and then again lenient with the churches.

At the very first they wanted to show their power and their treatment of all churches without denomination or affiliation was rather harsh. That was the time when Roman Catholic Bishop Apor was shot by Red soldiers. Also, that was the time 6 months after the occupation—in other words, when war conditions were over, that my predecessor, Bishop Nicholas Yozen, was beaten up so severely by Communist Party members that he was taken to a hospital and in the hospital he died.

Mr. McTIGUE. How old was he at that time?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. He was 78 years old.

Mr. McTIGUE. And by whom was he beaten up?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. He was beaten up by persons whom he identified when he was in the hospital as members of the local Communist Party.

Mr. McTIGUE. He was a ranking Unitarian bishop of Hungary at that time; is that correct?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes; he was the ranking Unitarian bishop at that time.

Mr. McTIGUE. And this followed closely on the heels of the shooting of the Catholic Bishop Apor?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. It did.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened when Marshall Voroshilov came to Budapest? What happened to religion then?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. General Chernikov, as the military commandant of Budapest, first showed understanding of the needs of religion proper, but when the church heads, the leaders of the churches, asked his help to stop the atrocities of the Red army soldiers against women and children, then General Chernikov turned against the churches.

It so happened that I was the first to be received by General Chernikov of all the church leaders in Hungary. He had the letters of recommendation left by Allied agents for me, and on account of that he treated me favorably. As I already reported, he sent four guards for the protection of our group. Therefore, he was personally very understanding and polite with me; but when I forwarded the petition of all the church leaders of Hungary for protection for the women and children, he showed sincere surprise at that petition, and the following questions and answers took place:

He asked me, "Aren't Hungarians and Russians friends now?" To which my answer was, "Yes; we are."

"Well," he said, "if the Hungarians had bread and water and the Red army soldiers had nothing to eat and drink, wouldn't you offer your bread and water to the Red soldiers?" To which my answer naturally was, "Yes; we would."

"Then," he said, "you Hungarians have women, and the Red army has no women; therefore, it is your duty to offer your women to the Red army soldiers just as you would offer bread and water."

Mr. McTIGUE. Bishop, as president of the Hungarian National Red Cross at the time, did you receive many petitions concerning the deportation of Hungarian citizens to the Soviet Union?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I did. Over 100,000 petitions were filed with the Hungarian National Red Cross by wives or other members of deported civilians. This was exclusive of prisoners of war or military personnel who were taken prisoners on the streets, rounded up by Red army soldiers, not because of any war crime or other crime they might have committed.

Also, as president of the Red Cross, I tried to get in touch with a Russian organization similar to the Red Cross, which they called the Red Star, trying to find out if they had any way of allowing us to help those who were in their country as prisoners, and, to my great surprise, the answer was that they had no lists of prisoners whatever. They had only nuns.

As I understand, it was only when, later on, these various prison camps in Russia was organized that the names were established and, through cross-questioning, the identity of the persons was determined.

Mr. McTIGUE. Bishop, can you tell us when and how the Soviet first started to apply pressure to the churches?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. After this first show of strength, the assassination of Bishop Apor, the beating up and subsequent death of Bishop Yozen, there came a period, especially after the arrival of Marshal Voroshilov, who was Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, when both he and other representatives of Russia in Hungary showed an understanding attitude toward the churches. This was followed, however, only until after the first elections took place in Hungary, when the Communist Party received only 17 per cent of all the votes.

Also, as the church leaders tried to intervene on behalf of the women and children and other victims of Red army atrocities, the Russian authorities became more and more dissatisfied with the behavior of the church leaders, and they tried to get the church leaders to cooperate with them, as they put it, not to put forward grievances, which they said were matters to be settled by Government authorities, but they expected the church leaders to stick to their own business, as they put it, namely, to conduct religious services only, and not to mix in problems of human affairs, and also in atrocities committed by the Red army.

When the church leaders naturally couldn't shut their eyes to the atrocities, and kept on trying to get some help from the authorized persons of the Red army in Hungary, they became more and more dissatisfied.

At first they tried to drive a wedge between the headquarters of the churches and the local clergymen. When the Land Expropriation Act was passed by Parliament, the land and estates of all the churches were confiscated, but small amounts of land were given to local congregations, so that the general church had no means of support whereas the local congregation did gain through this land gift.

Secondly, they began the payment of salaries to ministers, priests, and rabbis, which they refused to do through the headquarters of these churches, but sent them directly to the individual ministers or priests or rabbis, thereby trying to make or establish a direct contact between the individual priests, ministers, and rabbis, and the Government, leaving the leadership of the churches outside of it.

When even this did not work they began to threaten the church leaders. One of the threats was that unless the leaders fell in line, as they put it, they would discontinue giving salaries to their individual priests and ministers and rabbis.

Still later on, when even this didn't frighten the church leaders, they came forward with a very serious threat, which we can understand only if we understand the Hungarian situation. The Hungarians, the Magyars, as they call themselves, are a nation not related to any other nation in Europe. About the only other nation which is related to the Hungarians is the Finnish nation far up in the north, and that relationship is purely linguistic. The Hungarians thus being entirely isolated in Europe always felt solitary in Europe. They never had another nation, near or far, with whom they could speak about the future of their nation on the basis of race relationship. The Russians knew about this part, and the following conversation took part between myself and Marshal Voroshilov, the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission: By coincidence, at that time I was the only head of a church in Hungary who was also in Parliament, and on account

of that the other churches often asked my intervention, intervention which was possible for a Member of a Parliament but which was not possible for a church leader, and as such again I went to Marshal Voroshilov to protest about the handling of the civilian population in Hungary, when he suddenly turned the conversation to an unexpected course. He asked me through his interpreter if I had heard about the deportation of the middle class population in the Baltic States. I said yes, I did, because not only through the newspapers but also from persons who escaped from the Baltic States and arrived in Hungary, most of us were cognizant of that story.

But, he continued, had I heard about exchanges of population in Russia proper, in the course of which he stated that whole nationalities up to 1 million were resettled away from their original home in far-away districts of Asiatic Russia. I said, "I have not heard about that, but if the marshal says it is so I believe it, it is so."

Well, he asked me if I realized that the Hungarians had no racial relations anywhere in Europe, that the Hungarian nation was a very small nation. I said, "Yes; I fully realize that." He said that with the improved techniques which started with exchange of populations during the National and Socialist regime of Germany, and continued by the U. S. S. R. later on, if I thought it was impossible to have an exchange of populations through which the Hungarian nation could be settled in Asiatic Russia?

To this I answered, "I don't know whether technically it is possible or not, but I do not believe it is possible otherwise." He asked me what I meant by "otherwise."

"Well," I said, "first of all, the Yalta agreement wouldn't permit that." To that he answered, "In Hungary I am Yalta."

Then I said, "The Western Powers wouldn't sit back and tolerate such a wholesale deportation," which is what the exchange of population would amount to. He said, "The western populations, western democracies, have nothing to do with territories occupied by the Red army," to which I answered, "Then I still don't believe you could do it. God would not permit it," to which he laughed, and the interpreter said, "The marshal thinks that God is of no consequence."

This conversation, which was never a direct threat, saying, "Yes, we will deport the Hungarians," but which in the fullness of questions could lead to no other conclusion on my part, naturally disturbed me very much.

On the other hand, I didn't know what to do because to discuss this possibility would have meant that Hungarian resistance probably would have weakened, therefore, for about 2 weeks I didn't speak to anyone about this conversation with the marshal.

Then at the secret meeting of the church leaders of Hungary this fear was voiced by other heads of churches. My impression was that they had also been approached by representatives of either Russia or of the local Communist Party with this threat, that unless the church leaders would fall in line deportation of the Hungarian nation might be used as a disciplinary method.

Mr. McTIGUE. In New York on Monday, on this Monday, the past Monday, Bishop, we had testimony from the Reverend Vatai who was one of the prominent clergymen of the Hungarian Reformed Church. At that time he testified, in New York, that the persecution

of the Protestant religion in Hungary, as well as persecution of the Catholic and Jewish religions, was a systematic one, that first it was the suppression of the press, of the church press, followed by the closing of the schools, the expropriation of church property, threats to church leaders, imprisonment of church leaders, and so forth.

Is that testimony, according to your knowledge, correct testimony?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. It is a perfectly correct testimony. I would like to add only this much, that the Russians in Hungary always showed this rhythm-of-dialectics method. After each harsh treatment of churches they seemed to turn around and show a friendly face, but that friendly atmosphere did not last too long, either, because after each friendly period came again a harsh period, and this way, alternating between harsh methods and mild methods, they went always a step farther.

The educational problem of the churches in Hungary was probably the one in which all churches agreed and through which all churches suffered.

In Hungary education had been in the hands of the religious denominations for many, many centuries. Hungary is situated at a crossroads of history. Various great powers occupied Hungary at various times. During those times the official state of Hungary was unfriendly toward Hungarian freedom, even toward the Hungarian language; therefore, it was only through these denominational schools that the freedom and independence of the nation was preserved all during these centuries. Therefore, these churches insisted on keeping their denominational schools, simply because they never knew when the Hungarian state would be again dominated by a foreign power, in which case these schools would not help the Hungarian cause; also, through these schools and through religious instruction in all schools, among them state schools and public schools, the churches wanted to develop religious personalities who would have creative values for Hungarian civilization and western civilization in general.

Therefore, after they lost their fight for their denominational schools, they kept on fighting for religious instruction in the state schools.

Finally, they lost that fight, too. Today there is no instruction, religious instruction, in any of the Hungarian schools, which means that the Hungarian children are brought up by teachers who are specially trained by the new regime.

Children, from their first elementary primary grade, are subjected to Communist propaganda. They are alienated from their parents. They try to convince them that only the state can take care of them.

One very common story which many teachers use is the famous story of the apple. The teacher asks the pupil, "Say, 'Oh, God, give me an apple.'" and when the child says, "Oh, God, give me an apple," then the teacher tells him, "Well, now, say it again." The child repeats it, "Oh, God, give me an apple." Then the teacher asks the child, "Well, have you an apple?" The child says, "No, I haven't got an apple."

"Well," the teacher says, "now say, 'Comrade Stalin, give me an apple.'" The child says, "Comrade Stalin, give me an apple." Whereupon the teacher right away gives the pupil an apple and says, "This apple was sent to you by Comrade Stalin. You see, when you ap-

pealed to God you did not get an apple, but when you appealed to Comrade Stalin he gave you an apple."

This is the first way to turn the interest of children toward the state, and the surface entity, which used to be Stalin in those days, from whom comes everything they can get.

A second commonly told story to the children in the primary grades is that they should have no feeling of gratitude toward their parents because they are the result of physical pleasure which the parents enjoyed, therefore they have no reason to be grateful to the parents. "On the other hand, Comrade Stalin had no physical pleasure connected with your birth, yet he is working for your future day and night; therefore, do not be grateful to your parents, be grateful to Comrade Stalin."

Well, such simple stories, of which there are hundreds, repeated day after day, try to develop a new type of man. In Soviet Russia they call the new type of man the Soviet man. They try to produce that Soviet man in the satellite countries also. There is one reason why the churches fought so desperately, first for their schools, and when they lost their schools, they fought for religious instruction in the schools, but they lost out there, too.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you were a student in Hungary, Bishop, and while you were the leading Unitarian bishop there, was there ever any doubt in your mind that all religions were being persecuted by the Communists?

Bishop Alexander St. IVANYI. I never had any doubt in my mind, because I had actual experiences, of how every religion was persecuted.

The first head of a church ever to be imprisoned was the Lutheran Bishop Ordass.

Simultaneously, or even before that, however, I saw how the Jewish religious communities were put into a very delicate situation by their Hungarian Communist leadership. Systematically they sent Jewish representatives of the Communist party, or promoted perfectly inexperienced men, to be heads of police and sent them to troubled areas where they, following the instructions of the Communist Party, had to carry on the rather drastic methods of the police. This way the Communist Party systematically tried to build up a feeling of anti-Semitism in the population, because the population in many instances saw that chiefs of police and representatives of the Communist Party in troubled areas were usually of Jewish origin.

My late good friend, the chief rabbi of Hungary, Dr. Steven Hevesi, and I, tried to protest against it, pointing out that the whole thing seemed to be too systematic to be called a coincidence, and that after the Nazi period it was playing with fire when they tried to carry on their most drastic police methods, practically everywhere, through those Communist Party members who happened to be of Jewish origin, who were a small number of the Communist Party, but the answer was that all these were Government matters, not religious matters, consequently neither the chief rabbi nor myself had anything to say about it.

Still later on, in Kunmadaras Communist Party members, led by a man called Laszlo Piros, instigated popular uprisings against Jewish merchants and other Jewish civilians, in the big city of Kunmadaras in Hungary. The population received an address, a political address,

by Comrade Rakosi, a Hungarian, who was the Communist boss of Hungary, in which he denounced the capitalists and merchants in such a fashion that those local people centered their attention on those capitalists whom their leaders pointed out to them and who, according to Comrade Rakosi were sabotaging Hungarian production.

Because of this popular uprising many individuals were killed, and others beaten up. Again the chief rabbi and I called attention to it, but again we were not heeded, but the man who led this uprising, and should have been put in jail right away, because the uprisings resulted in deaths, was later on promoted, and today is a Cabinet minister in Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. Bishop St. Ivanyi, I call the attention of the committee to the effect that we have already received testimony concerning the Kunmadaras uprisings, and Laszlo Piros, who led these uprisings, this pogrom, in effect at that time, is according to the testimony today the Hungarian Minister of the Interior?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Continue please.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you any doubt that there is religious persecution in Hungary today?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I haven't the least doubt about it. All the refugees who arrive from Hungary to western territory, and also other channels which we have, keep us informed day after day as to what is going on in Hungary.

Most of the Roman Catholic monasteries are abolished. Hundreds of priests, ministers, and rabbis are in prison. No church is allowed to publish anything without the censorship of the Ministry of Cults, which includes the Ministry of Religion and Education.

Individuals holding competent positions are discouraged from attending church services.

There is a new and very determined effort in Hungary to worship secretly. This is what we usually call by common name "underground Christianity," because they find that going to churches might reflect on the positions which they hold. They find it also necessary at times to have secret religious services because in the regular religious services there are always agents of the Communist-controlled secret police present.

All these phenomena, to which many others could be added, convince me without a doubt that in Hungary there is no freedom of anything, least of all religious freedom.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time, Bishop, when you were asked by the other faiths in Hungary to contact their coreligionists in the United Kingdom as well as in the United States?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. There did. According to my knowledge in the whole history of Hungary that was the first occasion when all the historical Protestant churches issued a document in which they recommended me to their coreligionists, especially in the United Kingdom, England, and the United States of America, to represent their vital interests, and to further religious conceptions between English, American, and Hungarian Protestants.

Behind this was the natural apprehension, of the church leaders of the old regime, if I may put it this way, those who are not in power any more, who were forced either to resign or were put in prison or

were killed, we have the natural apprehension about the future of the Protestant churches, and about the possibility of that exchange of population which alternately was held over our heads, therefore, coming out from Hungary to attend the World Council of Jews and Christians in Oxford, England, to which, however, I couldn't come because the Russians didn't give me an exit permit early enough, I made use of that journey, showing this document to various religious leaders in the United Kingdom and in the United States, trying to find out just what amount of cooperation or help Hungarian Protestants, Hungarian Roman Catholics, and Jews could have from their coreligionists abroad.

Going to church leaders, because I was also head of a political party in Hungary, I found it possible to have an interview with Mr. —, he was State Minister in the British Labor government. His name escapes me just now—Hector McNeil, who substituted for Mr. Bevin, who was Foreign Minister then, in his absence. Talking to him about the problems, I asked what help he thought Great Britain could give to the Hungarian population, to which he answered in a very surprising statement. He said, "Today there are two and a half great powers in the world, and Great Britain is the half." Whatever we think about the situation today, in September 1946 this statement was very surprising to me. Nevertheless I thought I knew what he meant by it.

Coming to this country I contacted church leaders and also the State Department, and the long and short of it is that I did not see the possibility of any effective help which Protestants or governments could give to either the Hungarian people or to Hungarian churches which were behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. McTIGUE. Bishop St. Ivanyi, I hand you a document which I ask that you identify if you can.

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes. This is a document which was issued to me, signed by the heads of the Protestant churches, asking me to represent their religious interests with the Protestant leaders of Great Britain and the United States of America.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I ask that this be marked for identification and entered as part of the record?

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you entitle this "Cleveland Exhibit No. 1"? (Paper writing marked "Cleveland Exhibit 1.")

Mr. McTIGUE. Bishop, it is true, isn't it, that the true leaders of all the churches in Hungary were removed from office by the Soviet and either imprisoned or banished?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. It is perfectly true. The heads of the Hungarian churches, the heads of the respective denominations, at the time the Russians occupied Hungary, none of them are in power today. Everybody knows about the fate of Cardinal Mindszenty. Bishop Ravasz of the Reformed Church was forced to retire because the Government suspended the pay of all the Reformed ministers until Bishop Ravasz resigned.

Lutheran Bishop Ordass' fate is pretty well known in this country, too. He was imprisoned and after a prolonged imprisonment without a sentence he was released on the condition that he would resign, and now he is in semicustody in Hungary, and of course I, myself,

was the first head of a church who was implicated in a so-called conspiracy against the Communist-sponsored Hungarian Government, and those friends of mine who were taken prisoners and were taken through the first real show-window trial of Communist Hungary, had to confess that I went abroad to collect money for the organization of an armed rebellion of the Hungarians against the new democracy.

The same way, the head of the liberal Jews, the neo-Jewish community, as they are called in Hungary, Dr. Hevesi, whom I mentioned already, was also forced to leave Hungary, and he died in this country.

None of the heads of the Hungarian churches, who were heads at the time of the Russians' arrival in Hungary, are heads of churches any more.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, how about the men who have been selected to replace these great leaders of the church, who formerly held office in Hungary?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Without exception I would feel it safe to say that none of them would have been elected heads of churches by their denominations if those denominations had had any freedom of choice. This I base on the situation at the time I left Hungary.

It is only natural, especially in Protestant churches, that the probable or possible successors of elderly church leaders are discussed in clerical circles. There were several about whom priests, ministers, rabbis talked about as possible successors to the then church leaders, but never in my experiences did I hear about the names of any of those who are presently heads of the churches in Hungary.

This convinces me of the fact that these present church leaders would never have become church leaders if they had not been forced through the intimidation of their churches, by the Communist-controlled Government.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Bishop. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Bishop, did you, when you were in Hungary, know any of the ministers who are now in the United States and claiming that there is religious freedom in Hungary?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I knew Bishop Albert Bereczky very well, and he is the head of the present delegation.

I believe that we cannot describe an individual in colors of black and white only. I personally believe that Bishop Bereczky is a religious personality. I also believe, however, that political considerations entice him into fields where his experiences do not help him. I feel that he is following a political conviction rather than a religious conviction when he states that there is complete religious freedom in Hungary.

Mr. FEIGHAN. What purpose are they actually attempting to serve?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. First of all, their very existence depends on the good graces of the Government of Hungary. Without the favor of the Communist Government they could not remain in their places for 1 day.

Secondly, and I believe it is fair to mention, they individually might be seriously concerned about the future of Protestantism, of religion, in Hungary. They might feel that unless they cooperate

with the Communist Government the Communist Government will annihilate all forms of organized religious life in Hungary, and they might feel that it is better to have a cooperating religious organization than no religious organization at all, but may I repeat that this is the field where I believe that Bishop Bereczky, for instance has no experiences whatever. In other words, he allows a political judgment of the situation, a field where he has no experience, to influence his actions, which should be conducted by him as the bishop of his church in a religious field.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Bishop, may I ask you, do you feel that, or believe that, they speak for the Protestant people of Hungary?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I do not.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Bishop, do you believe that Rakosi is a Hungarian or a Russian citizen in fact, if not in fiction?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. He told me himself that he was a Russian citizen and so were the first five members of the so-called cadre of the Communist Party in Hungary.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Are you aware, Bishop, that the top Communists in the captive nations such as Chou En-lai of China, are Russian citizens?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I thought they would be on the basis of what I have seen in Hungary, but I have no actual and factual knowledge about it.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it is a subject which we might very well inquire into further.

Bishop, with reference to Marshal Voroshilov's statement to you that the entire population of Hungary might be moved so that no Hungarian would remain in Hungary, I would say that was not an idle threat—you didn't say it was a threat—or an idle statement, because we have heard eye witness testimony from a lieutenant colonel in the NKVD, the highest secret police of Russian communism, who told us how in the short space of 24 hours the Russians took the population of Chechen-Ingush, which was a nation that had long had its own independence, and they put them in boxcars and sent them to far-away places from which they have never been heard, and there is no longer any such place or nation as Chechen-Ingush, and there is no such person living, so far as anyone has been able to ascertain, who has been a former resident of Chechen-Ingush. That is about a half million population.

Also, we heard the testimony that the entire nation of the Crimean Tatars were taken away from their own independent nation and obliterated from the face of the earth. Where they went I don't know, but entirely destroyed. That was nearly 200,000 people.

Also the nation of the once independent and free Kalmucks, in population exceeding 300,000, were likewise taken away from their country, and their country as such has been entirely destroyed.

Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Bishop, you have given us some very revealing and enlightening testimony here this afternoon based upon the unique position which you occupied. You have been on the stand for some time. I hope you are not too tired because I have a few more questions I would like to ask you myself.

In the first place you are not serving as a bishop, now; am I correct?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Are you a curate? Would that be proper to say?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. No. I am a minister. May I put forward something here?

Mr. BENTLEY. Surely.

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was already in exile, and all the Hungarian newspapers which were under Communist leadership denounced me, and I naturally had to resign as head of the Hungarian Unitarian Church because I was afraid that my continued connection with that church would reflect on it unfavorably. When the annual meeting of the Hungarian Unitarian Church, in my absence, elected me honorary bishop vicar of the Hungarian Unitarian Church for life, I always think of this act as one of the most courageous ones which was done by churches in Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. Well, on the basis of that very courageous action I will continue to address you, if I may, as Bishop during the rest of these questions.

Now, the time that you departed Hungary in June of 1947—

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. September 1946?

Mr. BENTLEY. You departed Hungary then?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were a deputy of the Citizens Democratic Party?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I was president and also deputy. Member of Parliament.

Mr. BENTLEY. And I believe your successor as head of that party was Supka?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And you had been elected a deputy in the 1945 elections?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes. I was elected a deputy first, in the first so-called elections in Budapest in February, which were by acclamation. The whole thing was Communist arranged.

The occupational authorities allowed five parties to exist and the representatives were elected at that time in February 1945 by acclamation, but I was also elected later on in November when there were general elections held in Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. Bishop St. Ivanyi, I have here a translation of the text, or at least the partial text, of the agreement which was signed on October 5, 1948, between the Hungarian Government and the Unitarian Church. This agreement was signed on behalf of the Government by Minister Ortutay, who although allegedly a member of the Smallholders Party was, I believe, at least in sympathy with the Communist aims, am I correct?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. The agreement was signed on behalf of your church by two men, Vicar Gabor Csiky and Istvan Galfalvy. Do you know these two men?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I know them very well, indeed.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you say that they are the type of men to acquiesce in the domination of your church by the state?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Dr. Csiky was pro-National Socialist during the war. He was pro-Communist after the war.

Mr. BENTLEY. He was a pro-Nazi during the war and a pro-Communist after the war?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes. And Dr. Galfalvy was promoted to be a judge by the Communist government and was a Communist Party member from 1946 onward.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, I will read you the partial text of this agreement between the Hungarian Republic and your own church, and I would like you to comment, if you will, briefly, as I read these paragraphs. I will stop and ask you to comment. The text, incidentally, is the same text that was signed between the Hungarian Reformed Church and the Government, signed on the same date:

The Government of the Hungarian Republic recognizes and supports the free exercise of religion by all means at its disposal. The churches recognize that the legislation of the Hungarian Republic safeguarded, and in fact extended, the freedom of religion up to the present. The Government of the Hungarian Republic considers the holding of religious services, Bible readings, Church conferences, and evangelizing meetings, religious press propaganda, the propagation of the Bible and religious literature, social welfare activities as well as all clerical self-Government activities to be within the scope of the free exercise of religion.

Would you have any comment on that, sir?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I would like to say that the interpretation of that word "religion" is the secret, because by religion the Communist government always meant something which we would call theological. In no way was the problem of human rights or individual freedom to be included in what they meant by religion.

Mr. BENTLEY. I will continue:

The aim of the agreement is the safeguarding of peaceful relations and cooperation between church and state.

The Government grants a state subsidy, to be cut every fifth year, to the Reformed and Unitarian Churches for the next 20 years. During the first 5 years 100 percent of the state support, during the second 5 years, 70 percent, during the third 5 years, 50 percent, and during the last 5 years, 25 percent of the state support shall be paid.

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. This year we arrived at the end of the first 5-year period, and this reduction was not carried through. According to the report of the official Unitarian paper, the Government graciously kept the old standard. I would add "in return for services rendered."

Mr. BENTLEY. I continue:

According to the agreement, both churches will take measures for including the usual prayers—for the Hungarian Republic, the statesmen, the Government, and for the welfare and peace of the whole Hungarian nation in the order of their religious services.

The two churches take due note of the fact that the Government of the Hungarian Republic decided to nationalize schools which are not of a religious character, together with the connected students' homes.

The Government takes over the personnel of the nationalized institutions into state service in conformity with their service years. The nationalization does not affect theological institutions.

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Theological institutions, by that they mean institutions which train ministers.

Mr. BENTLEY (reading):

In appreciation of the merits of the Reformed and Unitarian Churches in the field of public education, the Government of the Hungarian Republic exempts the following schools from nationalization.

Most of the schools listed here are Reformed schools, the one Unitarian school exempted was at Fuzesgyarat. Is that still exempted?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. It is entirely manned by the Government, but in name it is under the Unitarian Church.

Mr. BENTLEY. It is entirely staffed by the Government?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. I might add as a matter of interest that the following institutions are supposed to be exempted: The Reformed colleges of Sarospatak and Debrecen, the Doczi College, the Papa College, the Budapest High School, and the Budapest High School at Baarmadas. I also recall that in the fall of 1951 at least two of these had been completely closed down, a direct violation of the agreement between the Government and the Reformed Church.

I would like to just take a few more minutes now and ask you specifically, Bishop, about the individuals who are members of the Hungarian delegation at Evanston. Congressman Feighan has already asked you about Bishop Bereczky. Do you know Bishop Janos Peter, a member of the delegation?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I may have met him. He was a man of no importance during the time I was at home. Since I came away, naturally, I have heard his name, but I cannot say that I knew him personally.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know Bishop Lajos Veto of the Lutheran Church?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know Bishop Dezserly of the Lutheran Church?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know Dr. Papp, also a member of the delegation?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. He is a professor of theology?

Mr. BENTLEY. Yes.

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes; I know him.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you care to comment on him?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. I think that Professor Papp was a very many-sided gentlemen. He was professor of the theological school, Reformed Theological School, of Budapest, but his activities always included a wide variety of subjects: Literary activities, journalistic activities, also activities which could be headed cultural activities, but which covered many philanthropic organizations.

One always felt that he was more a man of the world than a man of God.

Mr. BENTLEY. In February of 1952, Bishop Dezserly made the statement which I quote—this is speaking of the Lutheran Church:

Our church laws will be drawn up in a country building socialism. By passing these laws we prepare ourselves for the mode of life, for the new order of a people's regime which are represented by the Hungarian Peoples Republic.

Would that indicate to you that the new church laws, the new constitutions of the Protestant churches, must be tailored so as to fit entirely in with the wishes and the demands of the Hungarian Communist government?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. 100 percent.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is a quotation from Bishop Dezser, who is presently a member of the delegation at Evanston.

In 1952 a Reformed bishop by the name of Andor Enyedy was discharged from his post. In connection with that Bishop Peter, also a member of the delegation made the following statement on February 1, 1952:

Those who are not able to watch with understanding the agreement between the peoples' democracy and the Hungarian Reformed Church are not fit to fill an administrative position in the Hungarian Reformed Church.

In other words, that anyone who is not in complete agreement with the Hungarian Government can occupy no position in the Reformed Church?

Bishop ALEXANDER ST. IVANYI. Yes, which is exactly the denial of 400 years of Protestant tradition in Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is a quotation from Bishop Janos Peter, also a member of the delegation at Evanston.

I believe that the record and your very eloquent testimony, Bishop speaks for itself concerning the true picture of religion today in Hungary. The committee appreciates your appearance and thanks you for your very valuable information.

If the other members have no questions you may be excused. Thank you.

Will you call your next witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, before the subcommittee, so help you God?

Dr. TELEKI. I will.

Mr. BENTLEY. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF DR. GEZA TELEKI

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name for the record?

Dr. TELEKI. My name is Geza Teleki.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born and educated in Hungary; is that correct?

Dr. TELEKI. I was born at Budapest, educated in Hungary and at Vienna.

Mr. McTIGUE. At the present time you are on the faculty of the University of Virginia; is that correct?

Dr. TELEKI. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you leave Hungary, Dr. Teleki?

Dr. TELEKI. 1949. March 10.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were the son of Count Paul Teleki; is that correct?

Dr. TELEKI. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us something about your father?

Dr. TELEKI. He was twice Prime Minister of Hungary and held several government offices before and in between and was also a professor of geography. That was his real field, especially political geography. He held two honorary professorships here in the United States.

Each time he was Prime Minister was during a time when Hungary was in distress, once after the First World War, from 1919 to 1922, and then when World War II started, he killed himself in 1941, April,

when the Germans forced Hungary to participate in the campaign against Yugoslavia, with which country he had signed a friendship pact.

Mr. McTIGUE. So your father chose death instead of dishonor at the hands of the Nazis; is that correct?

Dr. TELEKI. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, Dr. Teleki, were you a member of the Hungarian armistice delegation which went to Moscow?

Dr. TELEKI. I was a member of this delegation.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you leave Hungary to go to Moscow in connection with the Armistice? What year was that?

Dr. TELEKI. September 26, 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you get to Moscow?

Dr. TELEKI. We first had to pass the German lines to Slovakia, where behind the German front Russians, Slovaks, and other peoples were waging guerrilla warfare. They had troops stationed at a place called Zvolen. This was really headquarters of the Russian guerrilla troops. They sent an airplane which took us to Kiev and then a day later to Moscow.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who were the other members of the delegation?

Dr. TELEKI. One was Thomas Szentivanyi, former diplomat, and the third, General Farago, commander at the time of the police forces of Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Both of these men now are no longer alive, or have disappeared?

Dr. TELEKI. Mr. Thomas Szentivanyi has been sentenced to life and is today in jail. He tried to commit suicide several times without success. I don't know the whereabouts of General Farago, but he is under Russian control and supervision somewhere in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. When the delegation got to Moscow did you meet there with Molotov?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes. We first got acquainted with General Gozevov, counter-espionage chief, and we were taken soon to Foreign Minister Molotov, for our first discussion, which after two meetings led to the signing of the preliminary armistice between the Allied Powers and Hungary, the 11th of October 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before the delegation saw Molotov did you receive any instructions from the Soviet general who you just mentioned? Did you receive any prior instructions from the Soviet general?

Dr. TELEKI. No; not from General Gozevov. We got some orders through Russian military channels in a letter written to the Regent, in which they made certain proposals and on the strength of which the delegation had gone, whereas in Moscow, although we had a kind of diplomatic immunity, we were guarded all the time.

We couldn't see anybody, and couldn't meet with anyone, but all the time they acted in the name of the Allied Powers.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us something about your discussions with Molotov.

Dr. TELEKI. Well, one of the interesting facts, perhaps, is that—which may not happen to representatives of the Allied big powers, but which was certainly happening to those of the small nations—every conference is held at night between midnight and 6 a. m. Before you go to the conference you are taken to dinner in the evening, which lasts

about 2 or 3 hours. Then you are invited to attend a movie. This lasts about 3 or 4 hours. In general, at Russian movies, for those who don't understand it, or even for those who do, they are told, "Oh, you may not understand so we will explain what is happening. That is so you shouldn't go to sleep.

There is a good reason for that. After 6 or 7 hours of enjoying this amiable invitation you are so tired that at the conference you don't work as well as you generally do, especially at the time of night when Western people in general are asleep. These are the tactics they use, and naturally you adjust yourself, but it takes quite a while.

MR. MCTIGUE. Now, while you were in Moscow did you receive any instructions or suggestions from the Soviet military as to future procedures?

DR. TELEKI. Yes. After the preliminary armistice was signed 4 days later the Russian chief of staff tried to get lists of Government people, but as nobody knew who was in Hungary and what had happened to the Regent, and his people, or to the Hungarian Government, there was no possibility at the time. We felt quite certain that there was tremendous pressure from the side of the United States and Great Britain to get Hungary on to the allied side so that they would participate against the Germans, even with military forces, yet the Russians were not too much interested in getting the Hungarian military on their side. This impression I can't naturally prove today.

I can prove, or I can state, that at the time we signed the preliminary armistice Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were present in Moscow, so we are told by Mr. Molotov. It was the only time when they really hurried to get us to sign something or to arrange something. Later they tried to drag things out. What they really wanted to have was a poor exhausted Hungary without any military forces, possibly with a destroyed administration, which would have made the taking over of power easier than in a country in which, like Rumania, they had already had a little trouble with Rumanian military personnel.

MR. MCTIGUE. I didn't quite get the significance of Eden and Churchill being in Moscow at the time that your armistice delegation was there.

DR. TELEKI. I can't tell you the reason. I know only, that it was stated by two persons who were present, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dekanozov, that they had come a week earlier, and were then there, and so the preliminary armistice had to be signed quickly and rushed through.

Now, at the time when we signed the armistice Mr. Molotov and Dekanozov were walking out of the room, leaving the door open to the next room, talking to the British statesmen, who were talking in English, and Molotov in Russian, through interpreters, which is, I think, a well-known fact, that that is simply to gain time and to consider even if they understand the language, so they can think about their reply.

MR. MCTIGUE. Well, the implication was, then, or the implication that Molotov was trying to pass on to you and the other members of the delegation, was that Eden and Churchill were there and were anxious that this armistice be signed, and that as a matter of fact, he, Molotov, was conferring with them at the very time?

DR. TELEKI. Yes: he did say at the time, several times, that he represented the Allied Powers, with the Hungarian delegation.

Mr. McTIGUE. One of the objects of the armistice commission, where there were armistice discussions, was to draw up some kind of a provisional government which could operate at the end of hostilities? Isn't that correct?

Dr. TELEKI. After the coup d'etat, when the Hungarian Nazis and the German Nazis took over power in Hungary, this delegation was the only legal, or let us say constitutional, group which could act in the name of Hungary. We had full powers at the time given to us by the regent, and the final point should have been to sign the final armistice. As we didn't reach that point, and Hungary at that time was occupied by the Nazis, there was nothing else to do but to set up a kind of provisional government quickly and Molotov declared that this should naturally be done by democratic means, and that the Hungarian National Assembly would be called, which would choose a national government.

Instead of that, on December 5, 1944, the chief of counterespionage in Moscow presented us with a Hungarian Government list, and with the proclamation which was typed there at his office, which the Prime Minister, or the future Prime Minister of Hungary, would have to read in front of the national assembly. He asked us to take it, read it over, and agree with it. We told him we needed at least 24 hours to give an answer.

The same night after a dinner and movie we were again taken to Molotov in his private apartment in the Kremlin where his office is, too, and he said simply that, "I hear that you have received the government lists and the proclamation and I do hope you have accepted everything, but anyway I will ask each of you as Hungarian representatives if they will accept membership in the government." That included General Miklos, who was to sign as Prime Minister, Mr. Farago as Minister of—I can't tell you now—and Gen. John Varasz.

When Molotov asked if we would accept, I had certain points to raise and I refused three times—first on the basis that the Soviet Union had declared, or Molotov had said on November 16, 1944, in a conference that they did not agree with the policy of my father, so I said I would refuse on the grounds that why would they want the son, if they didn't like the father?

Then I refused on constitutional grounds, and at last I said, "I don't see any reason for me to participate in this government", and Molotov said simply, "You can accept or not. That is your own business, but if you don't accept we will arrange it in our own way." I suppose that could have meant anything.

Now, the government list which they gave us was composed of 3 nonparty members, 3 generals, and myself. There were 2 Smallholders, 2 Social Democrats, 1 Peasant Party member, and 2 Communist members. In addition there was one member whom Molotov claimed was a Social Democrat. He was really a crypto-Communist, Mr. Eric Molnar, Minister for Welfare, Public Welfare, who, after the government had started its work, was declared to be a Communist. This is how they got three Communist members, by treachery, into the government. Unfortunately we didn't know much about Mr. Eric Molnar at the time.

Another crypto-Communist was Mr. Francis Erdei, Minister of Interior, who was a member of the Peasant Party, but who was really

their own stooge. This meant that they had 4 Communist members in a government of 12 men. They also had the help of Foreign Minister Janos Gyongyossy, and so there was a kind of balance in which I would say they had the greater share.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, you have a copy of the proclamation in front of you?

Dr. TELEKI. I have the copy of the proclamation as it was presented to us.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that the only copy you have, Doctor?

Dr. TELEKI. That is the only copy. I have a translation of this, and I would like to submit that to the committee for its use.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you identify this as a correct translation from the Hungarian into English, of the proclamation of the Hungarian Provisional National Government?

Dr. TELEKI. Well, whether this is correct, and whether all the words are correct I couldn't say myself. Maybe there are words in English which you would use instead of those in Hungarian.

Mr. McTIGUE. Suppose instead of admitting this document at this time into the record, Mr. Chairman, since the witness isn't altogether sure of some of the translated words, that we set this aside at the moment with the request that Dr. Teleki submit it later on, and it can be made a part of the record.

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Dr. TELEKI. The assignment of the delegation to Moscow I will submit to you.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, after the armistice negotiations were concluded in Moscow you returned to Budapest; is that correct?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes, I returned to Budapest, and I would like to stress here the point that every move which the provisional government made at the time, and the national assembly made, was already a pattern which was planned much earlier in Moscow. This is proven by the fact that they presented the government lists, and the proclamation to be read, as if the national assembly would have chosen the government and the Prime Minister would have read his own statement. They always tried to claim legality and show that they conducted everything in legal and constitutional ways and manners.

I did not return to Budapest at first. The provisional government was set up in the city of Debrecen and was not allowed to move to Budapest on the grounds that they told us which were that the government should not risk moving close to the front, the purpose of which was not to let the government move to the capital until they had a firm grip in the political and economic taking-over power in the capital of Budapest.

They kept us in Debrecen for 3 months, although some of us, like myself, went twice to Budapest and tried to settle these differences.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you then assume the position of Minister of Education in the Cabinet?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes; I did so.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, while you were Minister of Education did there come a time when there was a concerted move on, or effort made, to discredit a certain group of doctors in Budapest?

Dr. TELEKI. There was, the reason for which is that in Hungary all universities have autonomy which even the state, including the government, the parliament, and even the head of state, has to accept.

They had chosen their own faculty members. The universities decided on how to run education, although they were all subsidized by the state. Now, one of the first things the Communists tried to do was to abolish the autonomy of the universities. Every autonomous group is naturally something they must get rid of first because it means a kind of traditional power, and they preferred to start that by installing so-called trade unions in the universities, including persons such as janitors, nurses, and so on, who even instructed the professors, medical doctors, on whom and how to operate, and how to treat them, and what amount of money would be paid for that purpose.

As all universities at that time were under my control, after quite a fight I kept that autonomy, at least for the time I was in the government, and they discarded these unions for the time being, but they started new ones just in the clinics of the universities, and one of their first moves was to discredit professors, and medical doctors. When they couldn't do that by normal propaganda they used other means. One of them was a scheme worked out by Mr. Emil Weil.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is he a doctor?

Dr. TELEKI. He was Minister Plenipotentiary for a while to the United States.

Mr. BENTLEY. The former Hungarian Minister to Washington?

Dr. TELEKI. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was he Minister to Washington?

Dr. TELEKI. 1951. Is that right? I don't keep such records any more.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he a doctor?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes, he was a medical doctor.

Mr. McTIGUE. And he was involved in this?

Dr. TELEKI. There were certain doubts that he really was an M. D., but, nevertheless, I believe he had.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is he the same doctor who took a leading part in the Mindszenty trial?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes; that is the same person who assisted in the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty.

He worked out a scheme by which certain instruments of the professors just before an operation were infected so that a few people died under the hands of these professors, and immediately the newspapers ran articles, Communist and Social Democrat newspapers, that the bourgeois professors were killing the poor proletarians.

This was a way to get rid of certain important members of the universities because this procedure and investigation, included quite naturally all the friends and faculty members and members of other related faculties or good friends of these professors.

That is how slowly they tried to destroy one of the main faculties of the universities in Hungary, especially at Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. While you were Minister of Public Education do you recall the time that the Communist engaged in book-burning campaigns?

Dr. TELEKI. After the Russians entered the country in every big city they first collected books out of libraries in which they were interested. Everything on raw materials, everything on industry, mining, and naturally they were very much interested in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, which they took wherever they found it.

Later on they ordered the Government to pass an order that all Nazi literature should be collected and burned. The Government naturally didn't like this because it didn't mean simply Nazi literature, but included anything which they claimed to be Nazi literature.

It went slowly. So the Russians moved in to cut off the big libraries, especially in Budapest, and began to pick out books on the order of the Control Commission under Marshal Vorosiloff.

They went into the main libraries. One of the main libraries of Hungary is in the national museum, and in this library Russian officers came in and had lists in their hands with terms, or check words, and wherever they found something on their lists they picked it out and required such books to be handed over. Of all such books which were loaded on trucks, a great part was burned, and a great part was taken out, I believe, to the Soviet Union.

Among these books, interestingly enough they found some books on literature dating back to the 17th century. Because they found the title "Horticulture," which really means gardening, and because the Regent of Hungary was called "Horthy" they assumed that this was culture in support of the Regent of Hungary. I had to intervene personally. I tried to save that because it included works of the early 17th century. I explained in vain that in the 17th century there was no world war. There wasn't anybody called Horthy. Nevertheless they took the whole bunch because they had an order that everything which had the name of Mr. Horthy must be burned.

There are several such cases. They proceeded to achieve the purpose or to fulfill their orders.

I would call the Russian political strategy an organized disorganization. It seems their first step is to disorganize everything, to destroy everything possible in the cultural field as well as in other fields. The committee has heard about these in detail, I think, so I won't have to repeat it, yet I would like to state one fact which shows this very clearly.

There were thousands and thousands of deserters from the Russian Army moving across Hungary in 1945. They looted, they raped women, they shot people, and when we asked Marshal Voroshilov to help catch them, and keep order, he said, "We can't. We would be very glad if you could help us retrieve them because they are deserters."

The number of these deserters was close to 200,000 people. This is organized disorganization. It means letting them desert, but not on orders. They were not ordered to desert. A simple Russian soldier with his gun deserted because there was so much opportunity. There was wine, there were watches, there were different things, and they let them do anything. Then when they had a firm grip they collected them back up.

MR. MCTIGUE. What prompted you to decide to leave Hungary?

DR. TELEKI. I resigned from the provisional government. I was asked by the University of Budapest to fill the vacant chair of my father in economic geography. I had the office of Minister of Public Instruction, which is called in Hungary, Minister of Religious and Public Instruction or Education. I had power to handle certain things until the Vatican nominated Cardinal Mindszenty. I was in very close contact with him. I even did some other work which en-

dangered me, and which I cannot state in public. On that basis, by the end of 1948 I was in danger. I tried to get a passport, but naturally couldn't. I was refused several times. I even went to Ambassador Pushkin and asked his help. I got the same refusal, and when I got a message from an old friend of mine, or rather a club member in the Hockey Club, a member of the Hungarian national hockey team, who was with the political police, he told me, "You have 3 weeks to get out, and if you don't get out they will arrest and try you on the charge of being the head of a spy ring working for the United States."

Well, in 2 weeks I was out. That is all.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. When you were in Moscow did your committee have anything to do with writing up that armistice agreement, or was it just handed to you by the Russians?

Dr. TELEKI. It was handed over by Mr. Molotov personally, saying that in the name of the three Allied Powers he was handing us this preliminary armistice agreement containing all of the conditions to be met for the Regent of Hungary. He had to get an answer, a complete answer, and in that case we could sign. We had no chance whatsoever to discuss this, although the Regent previously, in September 1944, had offered to send a delegation to set forth Hungary's point of view, her needs and wishes, and the discussion was to finally lead to an agreement, but when we arrived in Moscow it was simply a statement that "This is the thing to be signed, and this thing I present to you in the name of the three Allied Powers."

Mr. FEIGHAN. In other words, you must sign this?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. And that is the end of that?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes, naturally, if we wanted to get out of the war, because he even stated that, "If you wish, you may refuse it."

Mr. FEIGHAN. Well, under the conditions that were set forth, it would not have been possible for a free and unfettered government to come into being; is that not so?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes. After all, there was no such chance. Hungary was a satellite, regarded as a satellite of Germany, and had to accept conditions. It was willing to accept conditions.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Yes, but the conditions were such that it would have been impossible by the terms of the instrument which you signed for there ever to be created in Hungary a government which would represent the free expressions of the people of Hungary?

Dr. TELEKI. No, because the preliminary armistice did not contain anything about the future of Hungary. It included only the terms sent to us which we have to fulfill, and if we did that in a certain number of days they would be willing to sign the final armistice. This was a kind of preliminary armistice. They wanted to have an assurance that we would fulfill certain conditions, which were to declare war on Germany, to surrender our troops, and so forth. It didn't include anything else.

Mr. FEIGHAN. It didn't make a provision for the setting up of a provisional government in the event that the war would be over between

the so-called allies—I mean the people in the free world—and their cobelligerents, the Russians?

Dr. TELEKI. Not the preliminary armistice. The preliminary armistice did not.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Teleki, who were the other members of the armistice delegation?

Dr. TELEKI. Mr. Thomas Szentivanyi and Gen. Gabriel Farago.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know what has happened to these two men?

Dr. TELEKI. All I know is that Mr. Szentivanyi was serving a life sentence in jail in Hungary, at least up until 1951.

Mr. BENTLEY. What was he sent to prison for?

Dr. TELEKI. He was arrested during the 1946 period when they arrested Smallholders Party members and other people, fearing that they would start an underground movement. I don't know what it was called at the time, but it was a movement led by people who then were sentenced.

Mr. BENTLEY. And what has happened to General Farago?

Dr. TELEKI. General Farago, from what some Russian officers told me, was taken into the custody of the Red army, because he, or rather, Marshal Stalin had shaken hands four times with Mr. Farago. There must have been a reason for that. With the Russians that is something quite important, and so they didn't let him be captured by the Hungarian Communists, and they protected him, but kept him under custody so that since 1948 nobody has seen him, contacted him, or knows anything about his whereabouts.

Mr. BENTLEY. He just disappeared?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes, although my personal belief is that he is still in the custody of the Russians in the same place. They have a few camps in Hungary where not even Hungarian Communists may enter or approach, encircled by three different barbed wire fences. There is 1 in northern Hungary, 1 in central Hungary, and 2 others that I can't locate.

Mr. BENTLEY. There are still 3 or 4 Russian internment camps in Hungary itself?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And you think that this man is in one of them?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes. One person who was chief of staff of General Miklos, later Prime Minister of Hungary, who during 1944 was his chief of staff, Mr. Kery, and who was with General Miklos in Moscow and was captured a few months after we had returned to Hungary by the Russians, was put into a forced labor camp at a place called Reesk in northern Hungary, and was kept there for quite a while, and there are rumors that he died there or was executed.

I believe that all military persons whom the Russians wanted to keep under their control were taken to this place.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Teleki, were you a member of the Government before you went to Moscow in September 1944?

Dr. TELEKI. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were not?

Dr. TELEKI. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. You had never served in the Hungarian Government up to that time?

Dr. TELEKI. No. I had served as a Government employee in the geological survey of Hungary. Then I was professor of economic geography and geology at the university, but I never had any intention to take a high ranking Government position, at that time.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, after your Moscow mission in September 1944 you did not return to Budapest until after the Russians had captured the city; am I correct?

Dr. TELEKI. No. We were taken to Debrecen, and I personally, with the consent of the Prime Minister, went in February 1945 to Budapest to check on certain matters and to make a report for the Prime Minister.

Mr. BENTLEY. You were in Budapest in February 1945, which was just immediately after the siege of Budapest; am I correct?

Dr. TELEKI. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. I just want to ask you one question. Do you know how the Royal Palace in Budapest was destroyed?

Dr. TELEKI. I didn't see it destroyed and personally what I know are merely stories, or hearsay, which means what I know is that the Nazis set it afire. I don't think it was completely destroyed, but I know one thing, and that is that many Government offices, palaces, and even hotels were destroyed by the Russians, and when I once asked Colonel Susmanovich, who was really heading the politboro section in Hungary, when I asked him, "Why on earth did you burn these places or destroy them," he said, "Well, so that the members of the Control Commission coming from the United States and Great Britain should have no good lodging."

Mr. BENTLEY. The Russians in effect admitted they, themselves, destroyed many buildings in Budapest for the reason that you have just given?

Dr. TELEKI. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. This destruction was after the fighting had finished?

Dr. TELEKI. After the fighting was finished they did it in order to have the United States and British representatives scattered throughout the whole city, which means, one, better control of smaller groups, second, the possibility to make more work, which meant that the westerners had to spend more time and money, which in political tactics is quite valuable.

Mr. BENTLEY. Yes. I believe that is all. Thank you, Dr. Teleki.

Unless there are further questions you are excused with the thanks of the committee for your appearance.

Call your next witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. Dr. Stephen Kertesz.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, before the subcommittee, so help you God?

Dr. KERTESZ. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DR. STEPHEN KERTESZ

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your name for the record, Doctor, and place of birth?

Dr. KERTESZ. Very well. I was born in 1904 at Butnok, Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. You have lived most of your life in Hungary; is that correct, Doctor?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes, I have. I studied in Hungary and in France and I had a Rockefeller fellowship in the United States and Great Britain and several European countries.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a Rockefeller scholar at Yale in 1935 and 1936?

Dr. KERTESZ. 1935 and 1936, and afterwards I went to Oxford, Geneva, and I visited the German International Institute in 1937.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you in the Hungarian Government service since 1927, prior to coming to the United States?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes. I started Government service in 1927.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you at any time tried by a Nazi courtmartial during the Nazi occupation?

Dr. KERTESZ. I am not sure, it was a Hungarian military court-martial. I was tried on December 2, 1944, for treason.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tried for treason by the Hungarian Nazis?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes. This was a special court which tried most of the political opponents, but we were acquitted.

Mr. McTIGUE. What positions did you hold in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, actually in 1931 I started in the Ministry of Justice, and I was attached to the Office of the Hungarian Government, which represented Hungary before the mixed Arbiter of Tribunals, before the World War.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were in Budapest when the Red army entered, Doctor?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes, I was. I spent the seige in Buda.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was the Hungarian Foreign Office reestablished, or when did it manage to reestablish itself?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, the Hungarian Foreign Office was reestablished in Debrecen.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many were in the office then?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, I reached Debrecen in March 1945, and I had to escape from Budapest since the Russians had kidnapped almost all the civilians as war prisoners, and so in Debrecen I found maybe 15 of my old colleagues.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs?

Dr. KERTESZ. John Gyongyosi.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was he?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, John Gyongyosi was a former member of the Smallholders Party, an old member, I would say, but he did not play any particular political role. I think he had a Ph. D., and he was editor of a country newspaper.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the Communists eventually manage to acquire important positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was originally, as with most of the Civil Service in Hungary, established on a non-party basis, but after the war the coalition parties agreed that the leading positions should be distributed among the four coalition parties.

Since the Foreign Minister was a Smallholder, some competent positions in the Foreign Ministry were given to the Communists, such as Chief of Cabinet—and first, the Deputy Chief of the Political Division, which corresponded to the geographical division in the

State Department, and later this man became the Chief of the Division, of the Political Division, of the Foreign Ministry. In other words, the two competent positions in the Foreign Ministry, the Chief of the Cabinet of the Minister, and the Chief of the Political Divisions, were Communists.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the main activity of the Foreign Ministry in the early days of its work?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, when I arrived in Debrecen, with the people in the Foreign Ministry, I wrote various notes to the Russians on behalf of Hungarian citizens who were kidnaped in eastern Hungary and taken as war prisoners to Russia, but this was just the beginning of these activities. In Budapest such requests amounted to tens of thousands and I believe eventually several hundred thousand requests reached the Foreign Ministry, because civilians were just picked up, rounded up by the Russians, put into concentration camps, and eventually taken to Russia.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, there came a time in 1946, Doctor, when you were appointed secretary general of the Hungarian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference; is that correct?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes; it is. Originally the peace work started in 1943, in the old Foreign Ministry. Then I was in the Political Division, and we started the work at that time.

After the war a special division was organized. I became the Chief of this Division, and when I went to Paris in 1946 then I became the secretary general of the delegation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, did the Hungarian Government send a delegation to Moscow before the Paris Peace Conference?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes. The Hungarian Government delegation visited Moscow in April 1946.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, a deadlock was reached in the peace treaty preparatory work. The coalition parties, because of the Communist attitude, could not agree on the peace aims, and the suggestion was made that Moscow should be asked.

I submitted my resignation at that time to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Minister. I didn't want to do the job. And all of a sudden the Foreign Minister informed me that things were not entirely hopeless because the Russians had invited a Government delegation, and the negotiations in Moscow seemed to be progressing, and they asked me to accompany the delegation as a political adviser.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were there any other experts or well-trained political advisers in this delegation?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, actually I didn't go to Moscow because next day the Foreign Minister informed me that Minister Pushkin had objected to my name, and the name of the economic adviser, and he told the Minister that those were serious negotiations and so only leading politicians were wanted, and experts were not necessary.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you prepare for the peace conference in Paris?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, personally, I received the assignment—before I came to the United States Count Teleki was at that time the chairman of the National Scholarship Council, and he thought that the first peace settlement in Europe would take place under American

leadership, so he contacted the Rockefeller people and he suggested that I apply for a scholarship, so this was my first step in this direction. Then in 1943 the Foreign Minister started this work, before the Nazi occupation, and then I went to Switzerland, and after the war I renewed these activities.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the reaction of the Soviet to this long period of preparatory work?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, Soviet Minister Pushkin three times refused to grant me a permit to leave the country in order to bring back our peace preparatory materials which were deposited in Switzerland in 1943 and 1944 before the German occupation. He told Foreign Minister Gyongyossy that such material was not needed.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have a conversation with Rakosi regarding the details of your plan?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, our general plan was the establishment of a co-operative association of the Danubian people, the settlement of the nationality problem on the basis of self-determination of the people, and the establishment of intercultural committees between Hungary and her neighbors. In other words, large-scale and free cooperation, between Hungary and her neighbors.

Now, I put this in a note. The note was signed in the name of the Government by the Foreign Minister. The allied powers did not react at all, but the Russians and our own Communists reacted very strongly, and Pushkin objected to this note. He told the Foreign Minister that this could have been sent by the Horthy regime, it was considered a reactionary note, and Rakosi told me personally that these nations were so reactionary, that they could not cooperate yet; they must become democratic first and then they would cooperate.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did the Soviet think you should have prepared for the peace conference?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, their general idea was that Hungary should first liquidate the Fascists and the reactionaries in our country, and this would be the best preparation because this would give Hungary a good reputation.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time when you went with the delegation to Paris, to the peace conference?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes, I did.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened there, Doctor, briefly?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, in Paris we thought actually that there would be serious peace negotiations, but none of our proposals were considered for the reorganization of the Danubian Basin, and the armistice agreements were practically transformed into the form of peace treaties. The Paris Peace Conference is nothing but a myth. No serious negotiations took place at all.

Mr. McTIGUE. And the Russians were calling, or the Soviets were calling all the shots? In other words, they had carefully prepared in advance what they wanted to happen at the Paris Peace Conference?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, according to the Potsdam agreement, the Council of Foreign Ministers prepared a peace treaty, and since the old Paris Conference had only advisory powers, the Council of Foreign Ministers was free to take it or leave it. It was just an advisory body, but even this advisory body just proceeded without any questions, and the issues were not rated on their merits.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now that you look back on that Paris Peace Conference of which you were a part as secretary general of the Hungarian delegation, what do you think were the main results?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, as far as the Danubian countries, Hungary, and the Balkan countries were concerned, their situation deteriorated rather than improved, because until the peace conference, the Western Powers were represented at least in the Allied Control Commission.

It is true that this Allied Control Commission was dominated entirely by the Russians, even after the Potsdam agreement, according to which equality should have prevailed in the rotation of the chairmanship, and so on, and this did not happen, but still with the Allied Control Commission there was a large American mission, but after the certification of the peace treaties, the Allied Control Commission disappeared and those countries became captives of the Soviet Union.

Mr. McTIGUE. As secretary general of the Hungarian delegation did you warn representatives of the Western Powers that this kind of thing might happen?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, I think that this was known in Paris. I realized myself for the first time in Paris what our fate would be. Until that time I was rather optimistic, but we still were hopeful that after the evacuation of the country something might happen.

Mr. McTIGUE. In other words, you were hoping for the miracle but by the time you got through with the Paris Peace Conference you could pretty well see the handwriting on the wall; is that right?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, in a way we had seen the handwriting on the wall all the time, but on the other hand the fact that in Hungary free elections had taken place and the Communists had been heavily defeated in these free elections, we were hopeful that after the Russian evacuation of the country, we hoped that the Western Powers at least would force the Russians to evacuate the Danubian countries, so from this point of view we were optimistic in thinking that after the Russian evacuation a real democratic revolution could have taken place in the Danubian countries.

Now, this was our hope.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the Paris Peace Conference did you return to Hungary?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes; I did.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did you stay?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, I was appointed as Hungarian Minister to Italy in March 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened thereafter?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, then the Communist seizure of power gradually took place in Hungary, beginning in May, and so in June, I went on leave prior to the Marshall plan, but I did not succeed in persuading the Hungarian Government to take part in the Marshall plan, and so I asked for my dismissal and eventually I resigned.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you when you offered to resign?

Dr. KERTESZ. I don't quite get that.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you located at the time you submitted your resignation?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, I was living in the legation, in our legation in Rome.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were Hungarian Minister in Rome?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you resigned while you were Hungarian Minister to Rome; is that correct?

Dr. KERTESZ. I asked for my dismissal, and when I received my dismissal I handed over my letter of resignation from the Hungarian Foreign Service to my successor.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you come to the United States, Doctor?

Dr. KERTESZ. In February 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. And what are you doing here in the United States now?

Dr. KERTESZ. For 2 years I was visiting professor at Yale Law School, where I studied as a Rockefeller fellow, and then since 1950 I have been professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame.

Mr. McTIGUE. And it is your judgment in looking back at the Paris Peace Conference now that it was simply a waste of time?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, I think it is a myth to call it a peace conference. The official title was Conference of Paris. It was not supposed to be a peace conference in the same sense as the Congress of Vienna or Versailles, to speak of the great conferences of the past. It was a conference of advisory power, and even this advisory power was checked by Russian sabotage during the first 2 or 3 weeks, and the problems of the Danubian questions were not discussed on their merits. None of our proposals on the organization of the Danubian Basin were even considered.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Doctor. I have no more questions.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I have nothing.

Mr. BENTLEY. Dr. Kertesz, it was agreed at the peace conference that following the ratification of the treaties of peace the military occupation personnel would be withdrawn from the three countries of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; am I correct?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, yes; but on the other hand—

Mr. BENTLEY. Let me go on and finish.

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. But because the Soviets maintained troops in Germany and Austria it was further agreed that they would be enabled to have communication troops through Hungary and Rumania; am I correct?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes; but this was not limited.

Mr. BENTLEY. That was unlimited?

Dr. KERTESZ. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you have any idea as to how many troops the Russians maintained in Hungary before the peace treaty?

Dr. KERTESZ. Well, during the armistice period sometimes they had as many as 1 million soldiers.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you have any idea as to how many they maintained in Hungary following the peace treaty under the guise of being communication troops?

Dr. KERTESZ. I wouldn't know this because I haven't been in Hungary since 1947. I don't have any idea.

Mr. BENTLEY. But it is because of this provision of the peace treaty that the Russians still maintain the legal fiction of military occupation personnel in Hungary today?

Dr. KERTESZ. They have limitless power. There was a Western proposal, I believe, for a maximum of 5,000, but the Russians never accepted this, so they have an entirely free hand.

Mr. BENTLEY. As long as they call them communication troops they can legally and technically have as many troops in Hungary as they desire?

Dr. KERTESZ. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you. I have no further questions, Dr. Kertesz. The committee appreciates your appearance. You are excused.

The subcommittee will stand in recess for 10 minutes pending the arrival of the final witness for the afternoon.

(Recess.)

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will be in order.

Mrs. Toth, do you swear to faithfully interpret everything this witness says to the best of your ability, so help you God?

The INTERPRETER (Mrs. Toth). I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you repeat to him the oath, please? Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before the subcommittee, so help you God?

Mr. FEKETE. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair wishes to announce that this witness also wishes to remain anonymous because of the presence of close relatives still in Hungary. He is listed as Endre Fekete, but to continue the anonymity in which he wishes to remain he will be questioned and addressed as Mr. Black.

Will you proceed, Mr. Counsel?

TESTIMONY OF ENDRE FEKETE (THROUGH THE INTERPRETER)

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Black, were you born in Hungary?

Mr. BLACK. Yes, I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you live in Hungary all of your life until recently?

Mr. BLACK. Until 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a soldier in the Hungarian Army?

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your rank?

Mr. BLACK. First lieutenant.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time when you were arrested by the Soviet?

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. When?

Mr. BLACK. July 3, 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. I want to go back for a moment, now. Are you a resident of the city of Cleveland?

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you work here in Cleveland?

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you relatives back in Hungary?

Mr. BLACK. Yes, I have.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that the reason that you ask that your identity, your true identity, be concealed?

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And that is the reason why you want to testify under a name not your own; is that correct?

Mr. BLACK. That is the reason.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, after you were arrested by the Soviet in July of 1944 what happened to you?

Mr. BLACK. I am sorry. That was 1945, not 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why were you arrested by the Soviet in July of 1945?

Mr. BLACK. At that time the Soviet Union needed men and they went around collecting everybody that they could get hold of.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you were arrested in July of 1945 what happened to you?

Mr. BLACK. They arrested me, together with 2,500 others, and put us into trains, into boxcars. Over the windows they put barbed wire, and thus they transported us to the Soviet Union.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many men, for example, were in the boxcar in which you were transported?

Mr. BLACK. In 1 boxcar there were 45 men.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you have any food or water?

Mr. BLACK. Once a day we received food and once a day we received water.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did this cattle train in which the 2,500 men you have testified to here were deported have its origin? Where did this train start?

Mr. BLACK. It was between two cities. The name of one is Komarom and the other one is Csachovara. Sort of halfway between.

Mr. McTIGUE. In Hungary?

Mr. BLACK. In Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, what was the destination of the train?

Mr. BLACK. One thousand five hundred went to Kiev and at a point about 60 miles on this side, 1,000 were sent in one direction and the other 1,500 were sent to Kiev. That was Bialacerhoa.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was it this camp that you were taken to, Mr. Black?

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did the trip take?

Mr. BLACK. They reached Bialacerhoa on the 28th.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long did it take in number of days?

Mr. BLACK. Twenty-two days.

Mr. McTIGUE. Twenty-two days you were en route in these cattle cars; is that correct?

Mr. BLACK. No. For 2 days we stopped somewhere and then we continued the trip. We were in these boxcars the other 20 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. It took a total of 22 days from the time you started until the time you arrived at this camp?

Mr. BLACK. Twenty-two days; that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of a camp was this?

Mr. BLACK. At this place there was a small town of about 17,000 people, and there were 6 fields there.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of fields?

Mr. BLACK. One was an airfield, and then they had 6 armories, or camps, and 1 was for the air corps and then there was a tank field and artillery post.

Mr. McTIGUE. In other words, this was a Russian military base; is that correct?

Mr. BLACK. Yes, that is right; it was a military base.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of work were you assigned to there?

Mr. BLACK. The thousand prisoners who were assigned to this place first had to repair the damaged airfield, and they were also assigned to lengthen the runways, which were previously a kilometer and a half, and now they were made—that is, the concrete runways—were made 3 kilometers long.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why were they lengthening these airstrips?

Mr. BLACK. I did not know at the time why we lengthened these concrete runways, but I learned in 1948 when we were at Kiev where they also had us lengthen runways, because we saw the testing of jet-planes there.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you kept at this camp before you were released?

Mr. BLACK. At Bialacerhoa I was there until December 5, 1945. Then I was transferred to Kiev and there I stayed until 1948, May 10, 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. So you were assigned to this forced labor by the Soviet for a period of almost 3 years; is that correct?

Mr. BLACK. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, were there other members of the Hungarian military elements, as well as Hungarian citizens, who were also a part of this slave-labor group?

Mr. BLACK. Yes, there were civilians, there were men from all phases of military life, and there were also Germans in this group of a thousand.

Mr. McTIGUE. Just men, or were there women there, too?

Mr. BLACK. All men.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you give us any estimate of how many Hungarians were assigned or required to do this kind of work?

Mr. BLACK. Eight hundred Hungarians were assigned to such work.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you ever have occasion to talk with your Russian guards about the war, about the possibility of future hostilities?

Mr. BLACK. Before 1947 we had very few chances to talk to them because they didn't trust us at that time and they beat us most of the time. In 1947, however, the situation changed somewhat. Our food rations were improved. We received 13 grams of lard daily and they seemed to be kinder to us.

Mr. McTIGUE. Whose food ration was improved, Mr. Black? Are you talking about the food rations to the prisoners or to the guards?

Mr. BLACK. The POW's food rations improved at that time.

Mr. McTIGUE. At that time?

Mr. BLACK. At that time we had a chance to talk to both the guards and the civilians because we were thrown together in our work.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead. What did they say to you and what did you say to them?

Mr. BLACK. There were 35 guards at this camp, and they took a vote on whether they could beat America if a war should come between the 2 countries, and only 2 voted that they could not. The other 33 said that they could.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they all seem to feel that a war was inevitable?

Mr. BLACK. I saw that there was definite preparation for war because in all the factories and the plants the guards were very strict and it was very obvious that the Soviet is preparing. I worked at 3 different airfields, military airfields, and around all the fields they had gasoline tanks underground, enough for 1 year's supply in case of war. These are in Hungary; tanks.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, I will repeat the question I asked: Mr. Witness, in your discussions with the Russian guards did they indicate, or did they say at any time, that they felt that there was going to be a war in the very near future; that war was inevitable? Was there any discussion along those lines?

Mr. BLACK. Yes; there was. The Russians said that definitely there is going to be a war because there has to be either communism or another form of government.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you sent home from this camp in Russia?

Mr. BLACK. On May 11, 1948, we started for Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why did they release you?

Mr. BLACK. Because the doctor's diagnosis showed that I was not fit for work.

Mr. McTIGUE. In other words, the Russians were sending you home to die; is that correct?

Mr. BLACK. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you return to in Hungary?

Mr. BLACK. One day I was at Miskolc, for 4 days I was at Budapest, and then I escaped to the West.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you escape to the West?

Mr. BLACK. On May 29 I was in Graz, in Austria.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. BLACK. I arrived on January 30, 1954.

Mr. McTIGUE. You arrived here in Cleveland?

Mr. BLACK. In Cleveland; yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you are now working and living here in Cleveland?

Mr. BLACK. Yes. I live in Cleveland and I work in a factory.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Witness, were you a member of the Hungarian Army on July 3, 1945, when you were arrested in Budapest?

Mr. BLACK. I was not a member of the Hungarian Army because there was no Hungarian Army at that time, but I had been in a hospital with a serious injury.

Mr. FEIGHAN. When you were arrested were you charged with any crime?

Mr. BLACK. No. No; I was not.

Mr. FEIGHAN. How long after you were arrested were you put on the cattle car?

Mr. BLACK. Three days.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Bialacerhoa and Kiev are in the Ukraine, are they not?

Mr. BLACK. Yes; they are.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did you have a chance to observe the Ukrainian people while you were in the Ukraine?

Mr. BLACK. Yes; I had a chance to observe them. Once I worked on a collective farm and at another time in a smaller village, and there I had a chance to observe them.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Do they oppose Red colonialism? That is, the domination of the Ukraine by Russia?

Mr. BLACK. Yes; they did. In all the cities and towns of Ukraine the officials are all Russians who were brought in from Russia, and all the Ukrainians have been replaced with them. In all important positions the Russians have placed their men and the Ukrainians do not trust the Russians, and resent them very much. They have a few men here and there, even the Ukrainians have a chance to have a man here and there, but there are very few in the secret police and such places as that.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did you observe a strong nationalistic spirit among the people in the Ukraine? That is, the desire to be separated from control by Moscow?

Mr. BLACK. Yes. One afternoon I spoke to an older Ukrainian and he said, "The only time we will be in a good position, or we will be happy, is when Stalin finally dies and communism ceases," because the Ukrainians hoped that when Stalin would die they could free themselves, and that would bring the freedom of the Ukraine.

There are many underground organizations among the Ukrainians and they are rather effective because they sabotage quite often. For instance, they burn wheat fields and various other things which can be counted as sabotage.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did you have an opportunity to observe any of the members of the NKVD or MVD, the Russian secret police, in the Ukraine?

Mr. BLACK. I did not have much opportunity to observe that, except on one occasion. There was an NKVD man at the camp where I was. He beat up one of the Germans and that was the only thing I saw or observed. This happened in March of 1948.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Do you have an idea of what the people of the Ukraine think about the members of the NKVD or MVD?

Mr. BLACK. If there were three Ukrainians together then they never talked politics. If there were one Ukrainian who talked to these PW's, then they would say they hated the NKVD. That is all that I heard, but I knew that they hated the Russians because in all important positions the Russians were there.

The NKVD has its headquarters in Kiev on a certain Marx Street, and it is guarded very heavily so no one can get in.

It happened on one occasion that one of the PW's stole some potatoes out of a field and a guard saw him and just shot him. The group to which this PW belonged called the guard who killed the PW a murderer.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Black, how long were you in the Hungarian Army?

Mr. BLACK. Twenty-five years.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you a member of the Hungarian Army during World War II?

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you see military service in Russia during the war?

Mr. BLACK. I was not at the front due to my age.

Mr. BENTLEY. You did not see service outside of Hungary?

Mr. BLACK. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. We have heard testimony both today and earlier as to the behavior of Russian soldiers when they came to Hungary, violations, arson, looting, et cetera. I suppose you were familiar with some of the things, some of the ways, the Russian soldiers acted when they came into Hungary?

Mr. BLACK. In 1944, the fall of 1944, when the Russians came in, in a certain town, I took down the records of the women who had been raped, and there were 70 of them, and the ages of these women ranged from 15 to 70.

Mr. BENTLEY. In a town of how many people?

Mr. BLACK. The population consisted of about 1,000 or 1,200.

Mr. BENTLEY. Seventy women out of a town of 1,000 population?

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Actually I wasn't asking for information, although that factor is interesting. I merely asked if you are familiar with these things that went on and your answer indicates that you are.

Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, Mr. Black, you were in the army for 25 years and you saw not only, I imagine, Hungarian soldiers but possibly soldiers of other countries. Did you ever know of the military of any other country in the world that behaved as the Soviet armies did when they came into Eastern Europe?

Mr. BLACK. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Hungarian soldiers never acted like that when they were in Russia or elsewhere?

Mr. BLACK. No.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you. I think that is all the questions I have. You are excused. Thank you, Mr. Black, and Mrs. Toth.

There being no further witnesses the subcommittee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY

FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 1954

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUNGARY OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION,
Cleveland, Ohio.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a. m., in the west courtroom, Federal Building, Cleveland, Ohio, Hon. Alvin M. Bentley, chairman, presiding.

Present: Messrs. Bentley and Feighan.

Also present: James J. McTigue, committee counsel.

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Call your first witness, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. The first witnesses are Mr. and Mrs. Kapus of Midland, Tex.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you stand up, please, Mr. Kapus?

Will you both raise your right hands, please? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before this subcommittee?

Mr. KAPUS. I swear.

Mrs. KAPUS. I swear.

Mr. BENTLEY. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will put the questions alternately to them.

Mr. BENTLEY. That will be quite satisfactory.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF MR. AND MRS. GEZA KAPUS

Mr. McTIGUE. Mrs. Kapus, were you born in Hungary?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes, I was born in Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you live most of your life in Budapest?

Mrs. KAPUS. I lived in Budapest all my life until 1951 and then I had to live in a village called Vamosgyork, where I was for 2 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you study outside of the country in England, for example, at any time?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes, I spent 1 year in England. That was in 1937.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you do in Hungary for most of your life?

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, after I studied, I got married, and then I was a housewife and I kept house, that was all.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Kapus, were you born in Hungary?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes, I was born in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something briefly of your background, your education, your profession, positions that you held?

Mr. KAPUS. I studied law and after I finished my studies I joined my father-in-law in his office in the bauxite-aluminum company. Then I was the head of our purchasing agents until 1949, where the whole firm was nationalized, and after the Communists came they fired me.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was your position in the bauxite industry, again?

Mr. KAPUS. At first I was the head of the purchasing agents.

Mr. McTIGUE. Of the purchasing agents?

Mr. KAPUS. Purchasing agents, yes. But after 1949 I couldn't find any job because I was an anti-Communist. So I had to work as an accountant in a state-owned factory.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you take your law, at the University of Budapest?

Mr. KAPUS. University of Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. When were you and Mrs. Kapus married?

Mr. KAPUS. In 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. And how many children do you and Mrs. Kapus have?

Mr. KAPUS. Eva. Only Eva.

Mr. McTIGUE. A little girl?

Mr. KAPUS. A little girl.

Mr. McTIGUE. Here this morning; is that correct? When did you take over your position with the bauxite company in Hungary?

Mr. KAPUS. In 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. 1940? You were there during the period of the German occupation; is that correct?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes; that is correct. I had to do all the purchasing. I had to support my family. It was a bauxite mine in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you and Mrs. Kapus there at the time of the Communist takeover of Hungary?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did anything in particular happen to you or Mrs. Kapus from the period of 1944 until 1949 under Communist occupation?

Mr. KAPUS. Nothing in particular because I never was a member of any party. I only had to do my job and I did it, so I never had any political activities of any kind.

Mr. McTIGUE. In 1949 you lost your job because the bauxite industry was nationalized; is that correct?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did they nationalize the particular plant in which you were working? What word was conveyed to you concerning your job?

Mr. KAPUS. Well, at first about 80 percent of the old employees were fired.

Mr. McTIGUE. Eighty percent of the employees were fired?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you among the 80 percent?

Mr. KAPUS. I was among the 80 percent; yes. They brought in newcomers, mostly Communists, who had no idea about doing such jobs.

Of course, the factory had many difficulties because they had no idea how to operate, so in the first year of this nationalism they had a deficit.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the 80 percent were fired, are you testifying that the Communists then came into the factory and tried to run it?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. And didn't do it or weren't able to do it because they weren't technically qualified?

Mr. KAPUS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. You lost your job; isn't that correct?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. In 1949?

Mr. KAPUS. 1949.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then what did you do?

Mr. KAPUS. Well, I looked for a job. It was very difficult for me to get any sort of job because I was known as an anti-Communist. But I finally found a small job as an accountant in a state-owned factory.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you paid enough as an accountant under the Communist regime to live with ordinary things of life?

Mr. KAPUS. No, not at all. They didn't pay me enough, so I had to use our little savings we had from before.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you selling some of the possessions you had in the meantime?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was Mrs. Kapus selling her possessions in order to keep the family alive and intact?

Mr. KAPUS. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time while you were trying to hold your family together, and live under communism, when you were deported to a certain restricted area in Hungary?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes, sir. That was in 1951.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your little girl was how old then?

Mr. KAPUS. She was 5 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Five years old? What happened in 1951 to you and your family?

Mr. KAPUS. In 1951 I was again a purchasing agent of the Hungarian Siemens factory in Budapest. I had done my job correctly but it came out that deportation was imminent, so I had some fear that we would be deported, too. So I went to the general manager of our firm and asked him what would happen to me if we were deported. He told me I had nothing to fear because I did my job well here and whether I was working for the Communists or for the firm directly, nothing would happen to me. Well, this satisfied me for a while, but after 4 weeks I got orders from the police to leave Budapest within 24 hours and go to a small village called Vamosgyork.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, Mrs. Kapus, let me ask you some questions, please. Do you remember that day in 1951 when your husband came home and told you that you, as well as he and your little 5-year old daughter, were going to be deported?

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, I certainly do. It didn't happen in just the way you just said, but one night when we were fast asleep, at 4 o'clock, a member of the police knocked at our door and he produced a sheet of

paper which said that my husband, I, and our daughter, Eva, had to leave Budapest, leave our flat, and go to this village and report there the next morning.

Mr. McTIGUE. This was, you say, at 4 o'clock in the morning?

Mrs. KAPUS. This was 4 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were told to report when?

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, they actually told us that we were going to be picked up at about the same time next morning, within 24 hours.

Mr. McTIGUE. Within 24 hours?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes. And, well, we had to get the few things packed that we were allowed to take with us and the rest of our furniture and the rest of our belongings had to stay behind.

We didn't wait until the police came and picked us up, but we managed to get a truck and leave, just the two of us, and go to that village where we were given an address where we were going to live. So we reached this village at about 2 o'clock the next night.

Mr. McTIGUE. Before you got to the village, did the Communist authorities give you any reason for your deportation?

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, all these papers gave the reason. It meant that our occupation was printed on that sheet. Usually the reason for the deportation was that, well, people either had been officers in the army, higher officers or members of Parliament, well, years before, and our paper said that my husband was a stockholder in the bauxite company.

Mr. McTIGUE. So the reason for the arrest and deportation was because your husband happened to be a stockholder in the bauxite company?

Mrs. KAPUS. That's right. But, as a matter of fact, it isn't right, because although my father was a stockholder in this company we never really owned any shares, because when my father died I was supposed to inherit some shares, but before I could get them the company was taken over by the Communists, so we never had the shares in our hands.

Mr. McTIGUE. I see. Now, will you tell me when you and your husband were married? What year were you married?

Mrs. KAPUS. In 1940.

Mr. McTIGUE. In 1940? And by virtue of his position, your husband's position with the bauxite company, I suppose the days after 1940 were pleasant, that is, that you were able to have a good living, a substantial living; is that right?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. But that ended at the time of the Communist takeover; isn't that correct?

Mrs. KAPUS. That's correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. After your source of income had been suddenly cut off, can you tell us from a woman's viewpoint, let us say, the difficulties you had, if there were difficulties, in your life under communism? Your husband testified that after the Communist takeover and after he had lost his position that he as well as you had a terrible time holding the family together and in getting the ordinary needs which a family requires. I wonder if you can tell us something about that.

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, you see, I had very little money to spend on food and that was the only thing we bought at that time. We had no

money to spend on dresses and, well, any so-called luxuries or amusements.

I can perhaps tell you that these difficult times were made easier for me through my sister, who was at that time in the United States, and she sent packages to us which we could sell and make money from. So, well, that's what made life just a little easier for us.

Mr. McTIGUE. You have a sister here in the United States, you say?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes; I do.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who is your sister, incidentally?

Mrs. KAPUS. She is married to William S. Key. K-e-y. They got married in 1946 when my sister first came over to the United States.

Mr. BENTLEY. Can you speak a little more directly into the microphone, please?

Mrs. KAPUS. All right.

Mr. BENTLEY. And also I believe the record should show that that is William S. Key, Jr.

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. That's the son of General Key, who was a member of the Allied Control Commission?

Mrs. KAPUS. Allied Control Commission in Hungary in 1945. And that was the year when my sister and her future husband got acquainted. My sister was a secretary with this Control Commission in Budapest.

And, well, as I was saying, in 1946 my sister came over to the United States and they got married in Washington. Now she lives in Midland, Tex., where they own a motel.

Mr. McTIGUE. And that's where you and your family are living at the moment; is that correct?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, getting back to the deportation in 1951; what month was that, again?

Mrs. KAPUS. That was July.

Mr. McTIGUE. July of 1951? You arrived at the village where you were to be located at 2 o'clock in the morning, I believe you testified?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Can you tell us what happened after your arrival?

Mrs. KAPUS. We went to the address in that village and there was a farm family that lived in a 3-room house and it was a large family of 7 people, and they were rather frightened when we woke them up at night, and they said that they had heard nothing about our arrival but they said we should stay there for the rest of the night and in the morning could inquire at the police. And so in the morning the police came to this house where we were and they gave orders to the farmer to have one room emptied and that would be our living room for the rest of the time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, when you say "the police," do you mean the Hungarian State Police, Security Police, or was it the Soviet?

Mrs. KAPUS. No, it was the Hungarian police.

Mr. McTIGUE. The Hungarian Communist-controlled Police?

Mrs. KAPUS. That is right.

Mr. McTIGUE. Sending you to this farm where you all were to be quartered in a single room in this farmer's home, was that your sentence, the farm and forced labor?

Mrs. KAPUS. It was. The farmer with whom we had to stay was a so-called kulak and he had an awfully difficult time himself to earn his living. We were not supposed to work on his farm; the only work we could do was on the state-owned farm. And we were only allowed to do the most heavy and most—well, difficult work. Nobody else would do it. And they paid less for that heavy work.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of work were you required to do?

Mrs. KAPUS. I wasn't forced to work. They just told me that I had better work on the farm because otherwise I might be sent to a worse camp where I should be forced to do even worse work. And so we had to work in a sugar-beet field.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who took care of your little girl during the working hours of the day?

Mrs. KAPUS. The farm family—I mean the farmer himself had an old mother. She was 76 years old and she didn't work in the fields. She just stayed home and cooked for the rest of the family or did a little work in her own garden, and so she took care of my little daughter and her own granddaughter.

Mr. McTIGUE. What kind of work did your husband do?

Mrs. KAPUS. My husband had to pull weeds with his hands and—

Mr. McTIGUE. Did they give you any idea, Mrs. Kapus, for how long you and your family were to be required to do this kind of work, how long your period of deportation would exist?

Mrs. KAPUS. They never told us, but they also never told us that we would be able to leave this place at any time in our lives, so we just had to go on living from one day to the next and never knew what would happen the next day.

Mr. McTIGUE. So for all practical purposes, as far as you were concerned, it could have been for the rest of your life; is that correct?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you pretty well resigned to your fate under those circumstances?

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, I certainly wasn't. It wasn't a life we wanted to live, even for a short period, and certainly not for a lifetime.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were there many other people in that village living under the same circumstances as you people, people who had been deported?

Mrs. KAPUS. There were eight families in all in that village. It was a small village, about 2,000 inhabitants in all.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you have any knowledge that in other villages in that area there were other people who had been deported under the same circumstances as you?

Mrs. KAPUS. Oh, certainly. And, as a matter of fact, in even worse circumstances. I mean that they perhaps had a much smaller room than we had. Ours was bad enough, but there were villages where there was no electric light, and they might have had to live in barns or sheds, not even a room. We had a room, at least.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you or Mr. Kapus have any idea how many people all told were deported in and around the period in which you were deported?

Mr. KAPUS. I can't say the exact number, but I was told it was about 70,000.

Mr. McTIGUE. 70,000?

Mr. KAPUS. 70,000 people from Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you required to live and work under these circumstances in this village? You arrived in July of 1951?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes. And we left in July 1953, but we left of our own accord. We weren't released.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were there for a period of 2 years?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the reason given for your release?

Mrs. KAPUS. We weren't released. That's what I am going to tell you. We left without any permission at all. We found that our life there was unbearable, and so we decided to escape.

Mr. McTIGUE. You escaped, then, from the village which you have just described, and returned to Budapest?

Mrs. KAPUS. We came through Budapest. We just spent about an hour or two there, and then we continued to the Austrian border.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was this escape prearranged?

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, we had been planning it for a long time, and when the day finally came, well, we just left the village. We had to take great care that nobody should even suspect our plans to leave the village and we contacted just one friend who managed to send a car to meet us in this village and which took us to Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you leave the village in the nighttime?

Mrs. KAPUS. No, in the morning. In daylight.

Mr. McTIGUE. In the event you had been stopped, what reason were you prepared to give the authorities for not reporting to work?

Mrs. KAPUS. It was, well, sort of a coincidence that this happened just a few days after Imre Nagy had made a speech, in which he said that deportees and inhabitants of concentration camps would be able to go back to their homes, and so we decided that this might be an excuse to leave the village. Of course, we didn't have any permission to do that, but we just tried.

Mr. McTIGUE. Nagy was the Communist Prime Minister of Hungary and he had made this speech that deportees might some time in the near future be returned to their homes?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a matter of fact, they never have; isn't that correct?

Mrs. KAPUS. They have been freed in their villages where they were forced—well, locations where they had to live since 1951, but they have never had a chance to go back to their homes and have never gone back to Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the date that you started your escape from the village you have just described?

Mrs. KAPUS. July 10, 1953.

Mr. McTIGUE. You and your husband and your daughter then proceeded through the village for a period of time until such time as this car picked you up; is that correct?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes, that is correct. Well, as a matter of fact, my husband left early in the morning to go to work in the fields the way he did each morning, and I made up our room and decided to leave with my little daughter and meet my husband, well, in one of the fields in this village.

Mr. McTIGUE. At a certain designated place?

Mrs. KAPUS. That is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair is very happy at this point to acknowledge the presence of Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton.

We are very happy to have you here, Mrs. Bolton, and invite you to stay as long as you care to.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman. I couldn't have you come to my city without welcoming you and thanking you for coming to us with this very interesting evidence that you are gathering.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you very much.

Proceed.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you had met your husband at this prearranged place, how far did you walk then before you were picked up by the car which you described previously?

Mrs. KAPUS. Only about 20 or 30 minutes walk.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were picked up by the car and then driven to Budapest?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. How far is Budapest from the village where you were confined?

Mrs. KAPUS. About 60 or 70 miles from Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you stop over in Budapest?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes, we stopped in Budapest and had lunch there and then we went to the bus terminal and took a bus which drove us to Kesztheny. You want the spelling?

Mr. McTIGUE. Please.

Mrs. KAPUS. K-e-s-z-t-h-e-n-y.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you afraid by this time that an alarm had gone out for you and your family?

Mrs. KAPUS. We certainly were, but since, well, we also knew that it would be an awfully difficult thing to find someone in a big city, and we really thought that it wasn't so bad to be in Budapest, because there was little chance that they could find us there but they could on all the roads that went west from Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Didn't you take a long chance after your arrival in Budapest when you took the bus out of Budapest?

Mrs. KAPUS. I didn't get what you mean. What chance?

Mr. McTIGUE. Why did you take the bus? Why did you select the bus over the train?

Mrs. KAPUS. Because buses are safer than trains. There is less control on buses than there is on the trains.

Mr. McTIGUE. During your stopover in Budapest, did you have an opportunity to contact your relatives for the purpose of saying goodbye or did you dare that?

Mr. KAPUS. No, we certainly didn't do that. We told no one that we were leaving, because we were afraid that it might bring danger to them.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are there close members of your family still living in Hungary?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes. My husband's family, his father and his brother, are still living in Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you had boarded the bus with your family, how far did you proceed by that mode of transportation?

Mrs. KAPUS. We proceeded to this town that's a summer resort near Lake Balaton, and we arrived there the same day at about 9 or 9:30 that evening.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened thereafter?

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, we had to find a place where we could rest, but there was no room in the hotel, so it was lucky for us because we received a room from—well, a private family, I mean, who rented a room to us, and we spent the night there. And she was very friendly and she asked us no questions, and so we escaped registration.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did she know that you were attempting to escape to the West?

Mrs. KAPUS. No, she didn't know. I suppose it was just lucky that we didn't have to register there.

Mr. McTIGUE. If you had had to register, the chances are pretty good that you would have been picked up by the police; is that correct?

Mrs. KAPUS. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, at that point, how far were you from Budapest and how far were you from the border?

Mrs. KAPUS. One hundred miles from Budapest and about 70 or 80 miles from the border.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were a little more than halfway there at that point; isn't that correct?

Mrs. KAPUS. Oh, yes; much more than halfway.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened the next day after your stay at the inn?

Mrs. KAPUS. You talk about that.

Mr. KAPUS. The next day when we woke we saw that there were military police in the village, asking for papers. So we wondered what would happen to us and whether this police search was for us, whether they were looking for us or somebody else. We didn't know. So we spent the night with this woman. At this little farmhouse where we spent the night was also the headquarters of the police. So we could telephone from police headquarters for the car and nobody suspected that we were deportees. I told them that I was a high officer of the Communist Party and I had come to visit the neighborhood. They believed me and they let me hire a car again and the car came and we left without any disturbances.

Mr. McTIGUE. They didn't ask you for any identification?

Mr. KAPUS. No; I made a very good appearance and the police believed me. It was our only chance to come through, because we had no papers and if the police had asked me any questions it would all have been finished.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you get to the border?

Mr. KAPUS. Well, we got to the border after 24 hours. We had to travel with the car about 5 hours to 15 miles from the border. Then we had to leave the car, because it was a border zone and it was not permitted to enter this zone without a special permit. So we had to leave the car and hide in the forest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you traveling from that point on with a guide of any kind?

Mr. KAPUS. No; we had to walk from this point to the border.

Mr. McTIGUE. Until such time as you crossed the border were you strictly on your own?

Mr. KAPUS. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had no guide of any kind?

Mr. KAPUS. No.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us what happened from that point until the point where you got across the border?

Mr. KAPUS. Well, I mean we had a sort of guide, but it was not a guide, it was an old friend who happened to live in the village next to the border, next to the Austrian border. We had to meet this person's family about 2 miles before the border and we had to go through this forest to come to this little village. So we had to travel all day and it was late at night when we arrived at the small village where this family was. There we spent the night because our child was very frightened and she cried and said she wouldn't go in the forest any more. And she ran a high temperature, and was sick, so we simply were unable to go that night through the border, and had to spend the whole day in this little village next to the border. It was very, very dangerous to spend 1 more day, because we didn't know whether the police had suspected that we had left for the border or not.

But we got through somehow and the next evening at 10 o'clock we started for the border. I put my little daughter on my shoulders and carried her with my wife following me and before us went the farmer with his family. We had to walk about 2 hours in darkness, in total darkness, and we had to be very, very cautious, because in this zone there were heavily armed border guards all the way and we knew also there were minefields and bloodhounds and the border guards were heavily armed and would shoot anybody who tried to cross the border.

After 2 hours our guide showed us the barbed wire fences and he cut these with his shears and at that moment he said we could get over the fence. There was a terrible explosion behind me. I heard a terrible explosion behind me and as I turned back I saw my wife lying on her back and screaming. My first thought was that the border guards would come very soon, and this happened because at this moment we heard small-arms fire and another explosion, possibly from a hand grenade. So I took my little child from my back, brought her to the barbed wire and threw her on the other side where the guide was standing. Then I went to my wife, picked her up and carried her through the wire fence. It was very difficult because the hole was very small and I had to drag her and we were both badly torn and lacerated.

After that I still had to stop the bleeding and look after both of us, because they were coming after us at the border. So we had to hide. So I had to carry my wife further and we hid her in the cornfield. There we had to spend a whole day until rescue came.

I asked the farmer to go to Vienna to the American military and to say that we had a badly wounded woman who needed first aid urgently and try to manage somehow to bring an ambulance.

It was another 24 hours until the ambulance came. And until that time—yes, it was, of course, in the Austrian border but in the Soviet-occupied territory, so it was most dangerous for us to spend the whole day there, because the Austrian border would not have protected refugees who simply had crossed the border, and if the Russians had

found us they would have returned us. But luckily that did not happen.

So after 24 hours we got an ambulance, came to Vienna to the American sector, where my wife entered a hospital and got very good care there.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mrs. Kapus, how many hours a day did you work when you worked in the field?

Mrs. KAPUS. I worked about 5 or 6 hours daily when I had to work.

Mr. FEIGHAN. How many days a week did you work?

Mrs. KAPUS. Well, I didn't go every day. Well, about 3 or 4 times a week.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Were you given wages for the work that you performed?

Mrs. KAPUS. No, I wasn't paid. You see, this was a field which we were given to work on and after harvest time we were supposed to get a certain amount of the crops, but it never happened because we left before harvest.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mrs. Bolton, would you care to ask 1 or 2 questions of the witnesses?

Mrs. BOLTON. I don't want to ask anyone questions, but I just want to thank you for your courage, for the inspiration that you are to so many others behind that curtain today, and we hope very much that some of your answers and your story will reach them and bring them hope. I know that is one of the great reasons why these hearings are being held so that there may be hope put back into the hearts of those who must by now be almost hopeless.

Thank you so much for coming, both of you and your adorable daughter.

Mrs. KAPUS. Thank you.

Mr. KAPUS. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair has only one question, Mrs. Kapus. In view of all you have suffered personally in your quest to seek freedom which you have now found and in spite of all that you have gone through, if you had to do it all over again and know what was ahead of you, would you still do it?

Mrs. KAPUS. I certainly would do it again. It's been an awful hard time and I have really suffered very, very much, but I think that to be here and to live in the free world and in free America is worth the loss of my leg.

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee wishes to express its unbounded admiration for the remarkable courage that you and your husband and your little daughter have shown and also its great appreciation for your long and tiring trip from Texas. There are no further questions and with the gratitude of the committee you are now excused. Thank you.

The subcommittee will recess for 10 minutes.

(Recess.)

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will be in order.

Will you call your next witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. George Perczel.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will you raise your right hand, sir? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God, before the subcommittee?

Mr. McTIGUE. This will have to be through an interpreter.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is Mrs. Toth the interpreter?

Will you repeat the oath to him, Mrs. Toth, the usual one?

(Witness sworn through the interpreter, Mrs. Theresa D. Toth.)

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE PERCZEL (THROUGH THE INTERPRETER)

Mr. McTIGUE. Your name is Mr. George Perczel, spelled P-e-r-c-z-e-l, and you are residing at 3711 Chatham Avenue in the city of Cleveland; is that correct?

Mr. PERCZEL. It is.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you employed in the city of Cleveland?

Mr. PERCZEL. I am ill. I cannot work.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born in Hungary; is that correct, Mr. Perczel?

Mr. PERCZEL. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Would you tell us something briefly about your life in Hungary before World War II?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was the head of a group of detectives consisting of 88 men.

Mr. McTIGUE. Then your career was a police career; is that correct, Mr. Perczel?

Mr. PERCZEL. Criminal police. In the criminal department.

Mr. McTIGUE. Mr. Perczel, you were a detective in the criminal department of the—

Mr. PERCZEL. Police department.

Mr. McTIGUE. Police department?

Mr. PERCZEL. That is correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you, Mr. Perczel, when the Nazis took over Hungary?

Mr. PERCZEL. In Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that where you were engaged in police and detective work?

Mr. PERCZEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you flee the Nazis?

Mr. PERCZEL. I fled the Nazis on November the 22d, 1944.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where did you go?

Mr. PERCZEL. That is spelled J-a-n-o-s-f-a-l-v-a. That is a small town in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why did you flee from the Nazis?

Mr. PERCZEL. Because while I was in Budapest I helped about eight men to escape who were of the Jewish faith, and I knew that when the Nazis would come in that would be held against me.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you stay in hiding during the period of the Nazi occupation of Hungary?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was in hiding at this place while the Nazis were in power.

Mr. McTIGUE. During what period was that?

Mr. PERCZEL. On March 15, 1945, I left Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. I am getting back to the period of time in which you hid from the Nazis.

Mr. PERCZEL. About 4 months.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that in 1944, prior to the time of the Communist takeover of Hungary?

Mr. PERCZEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where were you when the Red army entered Hungary?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was in Austria at that time.

Mr. McTIGUE. That was in late 1944; is that correct?

Mr. PERCZEL. No; that was in 1945, because the Russians came in, but they were going northwards, so they still did not occupy all of the country. Budapest fell at the end of December in 1944 and from then on the Russians progressed northward.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were in Austria in 1945; is that correct?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was in Austria until June of 1945.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you decide at that time to return to Hungary?

Mr. PERCZEL. I did not go back of my own accord. Upon American orders, about 2,000 Hungarians were collected by the Americans and forced to return to the country.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were one of those forcibly repatriated; is that correct, Mr. Perczel?

Mr. PERCZEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. How were you received by the Hungarian people when you returned?

Mr. PERCZEL. When I reached the border or when our transport reached the border the Americans let us go and told us to scatter in every direction we could, so most of us escaped wherever we could or went into hiding.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you scattered at the border where did you eventually go to in Hungary?

Mr. PERCZEL. After a number of weeks I went back to Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. When you got to Budapest did you go to the police to register?

Mr. PERCZEL. At first I visited my relatives and friends and later I went to Andrassy 60 to report to the police for registration.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you see anybody you knew when you reported for registration?

Mr. PERCZEL. Yes; I met a former acquaintance, George Prince, who had formerly been a tailor's assistant, and now he was a captain in the secret police.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did he tell you?

Mr. PERCZEL. He told me that I would get my papers certifying who I was and that I could live peacefully in Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened to you then when you went to the police station?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was taken up to the third floor to another police captain, that is, a secret police captain, and he said to me, "Would you be willing to turn informer for us?" And he also told me that my job would be simply to report on people I knew before the Russians came in, and if I didn't care to come down to the police station to report, then I could assume another name and send the report in by someone else.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you tell him after he made that proposition to you?

Mr. PERCZEL. I refused to become an informer on my friends and people I knew, so he said to me, "All right, I will give you an hour. You sit in that other room and we will see in an hour what your answer is. Think about it."

Mr. McTIGUE. After the hour had passed what happened?

Mr. PERCZEL. When I was returned to Jekely, who was the detective chief, you might say, he said, "Of course, we are going to be friends, aren't we? Everything is all right?" And I said, "No; I will not turn informer for you."

Mr. McTIGUE. Then what happened?

Mr. PERCZEL. Then he swore at me and used various unmentionable names and tried to persuade me to accept the assignment. And then he said to one of the detectives, he said, "Kick him down." And then they started kicking me and led me down to a room on the main floor.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you ever agree at any time to become a stool pigeon for the Communist police in Budapest?

Mr. PERCZEL. I never did and I didn't know there were such things at all.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you had refused to become a stool pigeon, what did they do to you?

Mr. PERCZEL. After I was shut into this cellar, a dirty cellar full of lice, they left me there for 6 days without food and drink. Nobody opened the door.

Mr. McTIGUE. After the sixth day what happened?

Mr. PERCZEL. Then they took me up to the third floor and led me into a certain room. As I was led in I was in such a weakened condition that I fell against this torturer, or whoever he was, and he threw me back and said, "You Fascist. You are trying to knock me down?"

There were a number of these rough-looking men in the room and they kicked me from one man to the other and the other would hit me and I was thrown all around the room, kicked and beaten up and hit. There were two Russians present at this time, but at that time they did not touch me. Then they tied my feet together and started striking them and beating them. Then my hands. I had to hold my hands out and they beat them. Then they tied my wrists together and put a rod between two tables or desks. They put me on there with my hands and my feet tied and then turned me around in a spinning motion. At the same time they were spinning me around they had hard rubber rods and a man on each side was beating me while this was going on, while this spinning was going on.

In the meantime, during this period I also received at least 200 slaps. I was slapped about 200 times. Then I was taken back to jail again.

As they took me down, I recognized a former acquaintance. His name was Alman Pasztai, who was associate—you might say Assistant Secretary of the Interior. I sat on the floor, all beaten up and bloody, when he came to me. He looked at me.

Then they brought in another woman, the wife of an attorney. The name of this woman was Mrs. Endre Spur, who is now in Pittsburgh.

Mr. McTIGUE. What had happened to her?

Mr. PERCZEL. According to my knowledge, she was in there, too, for 90 days.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was she beaten up?

Mr. PERCZEL. I don't know, but this woman was there, so at least there is someone who knows about this and saw me there.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were then returned to your cell; is that correct, Mr. Witness?

Mr. PERCZEL. This time I was not returned to the cell where I had been earlier but to another place.

Mr. McTIGUE. What happened then?

Mr. PERCZEL. In that particular prison you might say were the best people of old Hungary. Not society. No, not society, but I mean they were——

Mr. McTIGUE. Leaders?

Mr. PERCZEL. Leaders of Hungary. Not necessarily society people.

I was not bothered for 2 days, but the investigator had said to me, "I will see you in a short time."

Then I was carried back again and the beating started all over again. This continued for 2 months daily. I can tell you about the tortures I had gone through, which were horrible.

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes; we would like to hear something about that.

Mr. PERCZEL. When I went in the first time, when I went to see that police captain and when they put me into that other room for an hour, a woman came in, a very beautiful woman. A very lovely, very beautiful woman came in. And she tried to get me to admit that I was a friend of the—she tried to get me to say—she said that she, too, had had affairs with some German officers. Not quite affairs but almost. And she really was a sort—she said she liked the Nazis, too, and asked me if I didn't, too.

I very cleverly evaded her questions.

They were asking me in the office, whether I had had my vital organs tortured, if I had received such tortures. And since I hadn't, they decided that I should have that kind of treatment also.

Mr. McTIGUE. During the 2 months' period which you just described here previously in testimony, you were continually beaten; is that correct?

Mr. PERCZEL. Always. Every day.

Mr. McTIGUE. Your teeth were knocked out, your kidneys broken, and generally you were beaten day and night continuously; is that correct?

Mr. PERCZEL. No; I was not beaten at night. I was beaten only during the daytime. My teeth were knocked out, my kidneys were beaten, my bladder was injured, my stomach, and so forth.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you held in this prison altogether?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was at Andrassy 60 for 2 months. But altogether my imprisonment was for 30 months.

Mr. McTIGUE. How did you finally succeed in getting your release from this prison?

Mr. PERCZEL. After 2 years I was charged with having killed Alex Dnoky Deutch(?). I was taken back to Andrassy Prison for another week of torture and when I couldn't possibly resist any longer I signed a confession that I had killed Alex Dnoky Deutch(?).

Mr. McTIGUE. After you signed this confession were you then released?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was not released. I was taken to the Marko Street Prison. I sat there for 6 months. This was the prison where they kept those who were to be executed. I had three trials. At the third trial, since this was in the newspapers, one of my friends saw my name and decided to hire a private detective to see if they couldn't find this gentleman I was supposed to have killed. And he paid 3,000 florints to this private detective and they did find the man, who was alive and was asked to come to the police station, which he did, and on proving that I had not killed this man, I was finally released.

Mr. McTIGUE. At each one of your trials did you protest that the confession which was admitted into evidence was extracted from you after beatings and terrible physical tortures?

Mr. PERCZEL. During the trials they didn't ask me anything. I just sat there.

Mr. McTIGUE. After your release, where did you resume living in Hungary?

Mr. PERCZEL. I returned to my former home. My former residence. I stayed there 6 months.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you finally escape from Hungary?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was arrested again and then I escaped to Austria.

Mr. McTIGUE. How long were you confined after your most recent or latest arrest to which you have just testified?

Mr. PERCZEL. Pardon?

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the charge brought against you, Mr. Perczel, on the occasion of your last arrest?

Mr. PERCZEL. They gave me no reason whatsoever for arresting me.

Mr. McTIGUE. And how long were you under arrest at that time?

Mr. PERCZEL. One month.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were then again released?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was released again. I have my release papers with me. They are right here.

Mr. McTIGUE. And when did you escape from Hungary to Austria?

Mr. PERCZEL. December the 8th, 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you any close relatives living in Hungary at the present time?

Mr. PERCZEL. Yes; I have.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. PERCZEL. In August of 1949.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was that under the Displaced Persons Act?

Mr. PERCZEL. Yes; under the Displaced Persons Act.

Mr. McTIGUE. You came here to Cleveland where you are living at the present time?

Mr. PERCZEL. First to Ottawa, Ill.

Mr. McTIGUE. And then later to Cleveland where you are living at the present time?

Mr. PERCZEL. I was in Champaign and I was also in Cincinnati before I came to Cleveland.

Mr. McTIGUE. You are still convalescing from the terrible tortures and beatings which you underwent in Budapest at the time of your trial and imprisonment that you have just described in some detail; is that correct?

Mr. PERCZEL. I will never be well. They knocked my teeth out and my heart is bad. I have asthma. I shall never recover from those injuries.

Mr. McTIGUE. That's all.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you for appearing. The brutal, inhumane torture which was inflicted upon you, I regret to say, as you probably know, has been dealt out to thousands upon thousands of people who have tried to live a Christian life and not lend themselves to the deceit and brutality of this red colonial empire which is directed and controlled by the Kremlin in Moscow.

Mr. BENTLEY. Any further questions? The Chair has no questions, but it expresses its appreciation to the witness for appearing. Thank you. You are excused.

The subcommittee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 2 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. BENTLEY. The subcommittee will come to order. Will you call your first witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. McTIGUE. The first witness, Mr. Chairman, is Msgr. Stephen Kerner.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is Monsignor Kerner in the room?

Do you have another witness?

Mr. McTIGUE. We have Dr. Wagner.

Mr. BENTLEY. Raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, before the subcommittee, so help you God?

Dr. WAGNER. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. All right. Be seated, please.

TESTIMONY OF DR. FRANCIS S. WAGNER

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you give your full name, for the record, Dr. Wagner, please?

Dr. WAGNER. My full name is Dr. Francis S. Wagner.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you very briefly state your background for the record, Doctor?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Tell us where you were born.

Dr. WAGNER. I was born in Hungary in 1911.

May I continue?

Mr. McTIGUE. Yes, please, Doctor.

Dr. WAGNER. In October 1945 I became an expert on Slavic affairs in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, and I served there as an expert on Slavic matters until June 1946, and then I was appointed as head of the Hungarian Consulate General in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, and I was in charge of this office until the 31st of October 1948, and then I escaped.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were born in Hungary; is that correct, Doctor?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes, I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you educated in Hungary?

Dr. WAGNER. I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you a graduate of the University of Budapest?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes. Ph. D.

Mr. McTIGUE. And prior to your position in the Foreign Office of Hungary what important positions did you hold in Hungary?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes. My position was important when I was a Slavic expert there because there was an international agreement between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in connection with the so-called minority population exchange created by the Soviet Union.

Mr. McTIGUE. In your capacity in the Foreign Office did you have the opportunity to enter into negotiations with representatives of Czechoslovakia?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something about that briefly, please?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes. I have in my hand an original document dealing with Czechoslovak-Hungarian matters, a so-called minority population exchange sponsored by the Soviet Union.

At that time, on the 27th of February 1946, there was signed an international agreement between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and on the same day there was an oral agreement between the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Dr. Janos Gyongyossy, and on the Czechoslovakian side there were Vladimir Clementis, then Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, and the Czechoslovak Ambassador, Dr. Gyorgy Slavik.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is the Dr. Clementis that you just mentioned the same Dr. Clementis who was recently liquidated by the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes. He is the same.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you know him, incidentally, as a dedicated Communist?

Dr. WAGNER. Vladimir Clementis was a dedicated Communist and a high-ranking Communist, an out-and-out Communist, in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had a very close relationship with him in these negotiations; is that correct?

Dr. WAGNER. We met many, many times in Budapest and Bratislava and in Prague, about 15 times or more.

Mr. McTIGUE. From your own personal experience would you see anything unusual in the final demise of Dr. Clementis?

Dr. WAGNER. Mr. Chief Counsel, it was not unusual in the case of Mr. Vladimir Clementis, because it is a common thing for those who serve Moscow, and when the leading Communists in the Kremlin are not satisfied with them, or they do not need their services, they are liquidated by Moscow, and this was the same fate of Mr. Clementis, too, a few years ago, when he was executed in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Doctor, it seems to be the pattern and technique of the Russian Communist imperialists that they use an indigenous Communist in another nation and when he has served their purpose they are usually the first to be wiped out or killed?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Such as the case of Vladimir Clementis?

Dr. WAGNER. That is right. And I have in my hand this document, and the main point of this document is the following: There was an oral agreement between Janos Gyongyossy, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, and Dr. Vladimir Clementis and the Czechoslovak Ambas-

sador, Dr. Gyorgy Slavik. They made this oral agreement. I was instructed by the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Dr. Gyongyossy, to permit the use of Communist newspapers and Soviet motion pictures in the propaganda activity made by the so-called Czechoslovak special committee, which was dealing with these propaganda matters at that time, and I refused to do so, and I was instructed again by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry to do so, and I refused again.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that the main point of the document you have in your hand?

Dr. WAGNER. This is the main point of the document; yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And that is to produce propaganda——

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. On behalf of the Soviet?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes; it is.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are all Soviet films tailored along those lines?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes; and Communist newspapers.

Mr. McTIGUE. Go ahead, Doctor.

Dr. WAGNER. When I was in our foreign service as head of the Hungarian Consulate General in Bratislava, I read a report made by the Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow, by Dr. Julius Szekfu, who is now a member of the so-called Supreme Soviet in Hungary, and he had met with Mr. Dekanozov, a Soviet Ambassador, then Chief of the East European Division of the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow.

Mr. Szekfu was instructed by the Hungarian Government to meet with Mr. Dekanozov in the case of Mr. Stephen Bethlen.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who was he?

Dr. WAGNER. He was the Hungarian Prime Minister from 1920 until 1931.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was he ever taken into custody?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. By whom?

Dr. WAGNER. Mr. Bethlen was taken into custody by the Red army troops at the very end of World War II in Hungary. He was captured and sent to Moscow, and Mr. Szekfu made an intervention in the case of Bethlen but Mr. Dekanozov refused to permit Mr. Szekfu to see Mr. Bethlen, and Mr. Dekanozov told Mr. Szekfu that Mr. Bethlen was being investigated by the Soviet authorities, and the case of Mr. Bethlen was completely out of the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Government, and Mr. Szekfu then made a report, and sent it to Budapest.

It was in the spring of 1947, and a year later I met Mr. Szekfu in the Hungarian Foreign Office on the 6th of May 1948, and he confirmed this report and told me everything in connection with the case of Mr. Bethlen, who was Prime Minister of Hungary for a long time.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, the point you are making now, Doctor, is that from your study of this case and from your knowledge of it, that the Russians consider that anybody who happens to be in their clutches de facto is not entitled to the protection of the legal government?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Regardless of what it is or which government it may be?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, Doctor, in your capacity were you aware of the methods used by the Russians in rounding up Hungarians for deportation to the Soviet Union?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes. I had many firsthand experiences in connection with this.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something about that, please?

Dr. WAGNER. When the Russian Army came to Budapest there were many Hungarians, civilians, captured by the Red army on the streets of Budapest, and at that time I was the Russian interpreter for the Hungarian authorities in the sixth district of Budapest.

For instance, on the 17th of January 1945, in Budapest, when Pest, the bigger part of Budapest, was liberated by the Red army, that after Hungarians of the Jewish faith were just coming out from a ghetto established by the Nazi elements, 8 or 10 of them were forced by a Russian first lieutenant to destroy the barricades at the crossing of two streets near the west railroad station in the sixth district where I served as an interpreter for the Hungarians.

I explained to the Red army officer that these poor Jewish people were suffering very much and were just coming out of the ghetto and were starving. The Russian officer became angry and ordered them to Godollo, a camp for war prisoners, from where prisoners of war were sent to Foksani in Rumania, or inside Russia, or maybe to Siberia.

It was the most interesting story which I have of my firsthand experiences in that time.

Mr. McTIGUE. The point you are making here is that the Jews who were released from the ghetto——

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a consequence of the Nazi deportation——

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were in turn deported by the Hungarian Communist authorities?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. You had firsthand experience in that respect by virtue of your position as the interpreter to whom?

Dr. WAGNER. To the Jewish people, and for the Jewish people.

Mr. McTIGUE. How many would you estimate were deported?

Dr. WAGNER. I don't know exactly, but there were rumors in Budapest that, of the Jewish people, many thousands were deported, but I don't know the exact number.

Mr. McTIGUE. The fact of the matter is, they went from one terrible fate to another; is that correct?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes, it is.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were there?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes, I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. You witnessed it?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you leave Hungary, Doctor?

Dr. WAGNER. I left Hungary on the 31st of October 1948. I left from Czechoslovakia because I was then head of the Hungarian general consulate in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.

Mr. McTIGUE. After you protested to the authorities about the deportation of the Jews, what answer was given again to you, please?

Dr. WAGNER. This Red officer, a first lieutenant, told me that it was necessary to work for the Red army and he became angry and he did not say anything to me but he ordered these poor Jewish people to go where a concentration camp had been established by the Red army.

Mr. McTIGUE. Isn't it true that the leaders of the various religious faiths in Hungary at that time protested this action?

Dr. WAGNER. They did not specifically protest against this action because there were many such misdeeds against the Jewish people and against people of various other religions. It was not only in that particular case but similar things happened all over the country at that time, because the head of the so-called Allied Control Commission was Mr. Voroshilov, now president of the supreme council in Moscow, and he hated these people and did not do anything for them.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Dr. Wagner, you mentioned a letter?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes, I did.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Could we see that letter, please, or a copy of it?

Dr. WAGNER. It is the original document signed by Dr. Okali, who was at that time a high-ranking Communist and a close friend and relative of Mr. Clementis, and when Mr. Clementis was sentenced to death and executed a few weeks ago Mr. Okali was sentenced to 18 or 20 years in prison.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Do you have an English translation?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Dr. Wagner, what was the capacity of this Dr. Gyorgy Slavik? Was he a former Ambassador?

Dr. WAGNER. To the United States.

Mr. FEIGHAN. From?

Dr. WAGNER. From Czechoslovakia.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this be marked for identification and admitted as a committee exhibit?

Mr. BENTLEY. Without objection it is so ordered.

(Paper writing marked "Cleveland exhibit 3"; translation marked "Cleveland exhibit 3-A.")

Mr. McTIGUE. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair has just one question, Dr. Wagner. Were these Jewish deportations in January 1945, of which you spoke, carried out by Hungarian Communists or by Russian soldiers?

Dr. WAGNER. By Russian soldiers, because at that time in Budapest the Hungarian Communists had no power to take such actions.

Mr. FEIGHAN. In fact, there were practically a negligible number of Hungarian Communists in Hungary before the coming of the Russian troops; is that not so?

Dr. WAGNER. Yes. Before the Russian troops came into Hungary there were only a few Hungarian Communists, because the Hungarians hated the Communists since they had had firsthand experiences in 1919 when a so-called Hungarian Soviet Republic was established for 133 days only, and the Hungarians had recollections in connections with this so-called dictatorship.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. With no further questions, your testimony is appreciated, Dr. Wagner, and you are excused.

Dr. WAGNER. Thank you.

Mr. McTIGUE. The next witness, Mr. Chairman, is Msgr. Stephen Kerner.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Monsignor KERNER. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF MSGR. STEPHEN KERNER

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you give your full name for the record, please, Monsignor?

Monsignor KERNER. The name? Please, what was the question?

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your full name for the record, please?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. Stephen Kerner, a Hungarian priest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where are you residing now, Monsignor?

Monsignor KERNER. Now I am going to have a job in Los Angeles. Cardinal McIntyre called me and gave me a job to teach there. I have been in New York State in the diocese of Albany, working in Schenectady 4 years now.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were located in Schenectady; is that correct?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you are awaiting an assignment—

Monsignor KERNER. Going to take my assignment in Los Angeles.

Mr. McTIGUE. In Los Angeles. Were you born in Hungary, Monsignor?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you spend most of your life in Hungary?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you educated in Hungary?

Monsignor KERNER. Partly, because I also was at the university in Rome.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you ordained?

Monsignor KERNER. Ordained in Rome.

Mr. McTIGUE. In Rome. After you were ordained you returned to Hungary; is that correct?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Monsignor, were you in a position to observe the manner and the techniques that the Communists used in their efforts to destroy the Catholic Church in Hungary?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes, because I was in the Kalocsa diocese in the city of Kalocsa. I was director of the seminary and spiritual adviser to Archbishop Grosz. So with a big job in the diocese as director of the seminary and as spiritual adviser to the archbishop, I naturally could observe everything that happened in those days when the Russians came to Hungary. I was especially watching how they were proceeding against the church.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is it true, Monsignor, that you were a very close personal friend of Cardinal Mindszenty?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; I was. From youth, when as young priests we were both professors of religion, not in the same town but in different cities, but we saw each other many times at meetings of the professors, or in the holy retreat.

Later I visited him when he was a parish priest. Then I met him as a cardinal. He came to visit my seminary, and I was visiting in Estergom as his guest.

Now, when he was visiting Kalocsa the archbishop, Monsignor Grosz, told me, as director of the seminary, that Cardinal Mindszenty would come and visit the seminary, so I was waiting for him with my students and he came, and when he went on the floor my students were kneeling on both sides, and he was giving a blessing, and once I took a picture of him and I was very grateful later when a priest sent it to me in America.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is that the picture you have?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes, that is a picture of Cardinal Mindszenty at the right. Monsignor Grosz, the archbishop, is coming in the seminary and I am giving them an explanation of the seminary.

Mr. McTIGUE. When was that picture taken, Monsignor?

Monsignor KERNER. Six years ago, 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, I want to go back for a moment. When did you leave Hungary?

Monsignor KERNER. 1948, so it was only a short time before I left Hungary when we were last together.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, what has happened to the archbishop; do you know?

Monsignor KERNER. The archbishop has been sentenced to prison. So it is interesting that we are there in the seminary, very quiet and calm, 3 priests, and after 6 years all 3 of us would be in jail if I had not escaped.

The cardinal, in the middle, was sentenced to life. The archbishop was sentenced for 15 years, and I was sentenced to jail, so that is the situation now in Hungary.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were the fortunate one, then, Monsignor? You got out?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. I escaped.

I have another very interesting picture of Cardinal Mindszenty when he came to the city of Baja to give a speech, and the Boy Scouts were marching in front of the cardinal and we were standing, 8 or 9 priests, on the steps of the church, and we were watching how the Boy Scouts were marching to honor the cardinal.

It was also in 1948, in June, and now only 6 years later of the 8 or 9 priests, 5 are in jail.

Mr. McTIGUE. So again you were the fortunate one, Monsignor?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. I was among them, standing near the cardinal, but later I had the luck and grace to escape, and I escaped because they had sentenced me to jail but had not called me to trial. They sentenced me in absentia.

Mr. McTIGUE. You were out of the country at the time you were tried; is that correct? You were tried in absentia?

Monsignor KERNER. I was still in the country, not outside, so they sentenced me before I had escaped. I read it in the newspapers, but in the newspapers they published my sentence, and when I read that Monsignor Kerner, director of the seminary at Kalocsa, was sentenced to jail because he was an enemy of the people, I was not at home, but was on vacation. Kalocsa is on the left bank of the Danube River and I was on the right, so I was nearer to Austria.

Then I started to escape, because they had not given me an opportunity to defend myself and I did not want to go to jail, so I escaped in 1948, July 5.

Mr. McTIGUE. Is there the slightest reservation in your mind, Monsignor, based on your own personal experience in Hungary, that there is persecution of not only the Catholic Church but of all religious faiths, as well, in Hungary?

Monsignor KERNER. Certainly not, because when there came to Hungary, the Communists and the Russian leaders, especially the well-trained Hungarian Communists from Moscow, they declared, "We are, as you know, working on the principle of dialectical materialism, that denies the spirit, the soul, the supernatural, heaven, God Himself," so they had to fight, and they are fighting against all nations, because they say there is no supernatural world, only the material world.

So basically they have to fight and they are fighting step by step, using the same tactics from the beginning.

Mr. McTIGUE. Yesterday, before this subcommittee one of the former leading Unitarian bishops in Hungary testified that there was religious persecution of the Protestant faith as well as of all other faiths. He gave us a step by step description of what happened as far as that persecution was concerned. He pointed out, No. 1, that the first step in 1946 was suppression of the religious press.

Monsignor KERNER. Very correct.

Mr. McTIGUE. He testified in particular about the Protestant press. Did you find the same thing to be true in the case of the Catholic press?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; and today we have no press—no Hungarian Catholic press. We cannot print magazines, newspapers, or books, so we have to have our spiritual life—our religious life—without this literature and without the bread of the spiritual world.

Mr. McTIGUE. He described the next step as being the expropriation of church property.

Monsignor KERNER. That was the first step. We know very well now that they took away our properties to make the church poor, and when it is poor the church has no power to do anything against Communist aggression.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you have any idea, Monsignor, as to how much land the Catholic Church lost as a result of the 1945 land reform?

Monsignor KERNER. I would like to give it exactly, but I am not certain. I know that my archbishop had for the whole diocese about 80,000 acres, but the church had in the whole country maybe 10 times more, so that was all taken away from the church.

But that was not all. It was in the first year, in 1945, when they ordered that church property must be taken away and given to the people.

In 3 days, without any recompensation for the church, they said to the people, "Come out of the city, you will have the land"; and they went out and this was the method: "You take 20 steps and what you cover in 20 steps belongs to you."

Now, someone might say to another, "My friend, you take bigger steps, you are a bigger man, take these 20 steps for me. That will belong to me."

But they did not ask if the people could work on the land. Had they the means? All this and other things. No. They only wanted to take it away from the church and enrich the national treasury.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you. Continue, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. McTIGUE. The bishop of the Unitarian Church also testified yesterday, Monsignor, that the next step was the gradual closing down of the schools, of the Protestant schools. Did you find that to be the same in the case of Catholic schools?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. From the Catholics they took away in 1948—I was there in these days—all the schools, more than 3,000.

One day, to our very great surprise, they attacked the church and took away all church schools with their properties. Everything that was in the schools or around the schools was taken away from the church, and from the parish rectories. In the villages, they had parish schools and those were taken away, so truly that was another step forward in taking away the schools, taking away youths and infants from the church.

Mr. BENTLEY. Am I correct in believing that anyone who had anything to do with the nationalization of the schools was excommunicated by the cardinal?

Monsignor KERNER. No. That was not the case.

Mr. BENTLEY. Are you sure?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. Excommunicated by the cardinal? The cardinal was fighting for the schools, really fighting for the schools, but he did not excommunicate those who were trying to nationalize the schools.

Mr. BENTLEY. All right. Continue.

Mr. McTIGUE. Are you of the opinion, or do you know of your own personal knowledge, that there is religious persecution of all faiths in Hungary today?

Monsignor KERNER. I am sorry to say that I have no personal experiences because I have now been 6 years abroad, so I know only from newspapers, and from letters, that I received from home, and personally and truthfully I cannot say that today there is persecution, but after Cardinal Mindszenty was sentenced and put in jail, they called together the Hungarian bishops, the Roman Catholic bishops, and said, "Cardinal Mindszenty was our enemy and never wanted to make an agreement with us or compromise with us. Now he is in jail. You do not have to follow him any more. You can make a decision for yourselves." But they did not do so, and 2 years later, in 1950, they seized in one night monks and sisters, schoolteachers, and priests, and put them in a concentration camp, and then the bishops were brought together and they said to them, "Now will you make an agreement with us? Will you acknowledge the Red government as the rightful government?" Because they knew that Cardinal Mindszenty never would have done it.

"And if you do not agree with us and do not make this contract then we will send your nuns and priests who are in concentration camps to Russia." There were about 9,000 of them.

So the bishops had a meeting to consider it. They said, "Yes; we will make an agreement," and my archbishop signed the contract. In Rome the Holy Father, and here in America, many people were surprised. What was it? Had they left the policy of Cardinal Mindszenty? And it was true that they had left the policy of Cardinal Mindszenty, because Cardinal Mindszenty had said, "No compromise," and they had done it.

Now, after that agreement I received a letter from a Hungarian priest, saying, "Now we hope that after all the bishops have signed

the agreement, there will come peace and no more persecution." That was the belief and the hope of the Hungarian priests after 1950, when the bishops had signed the agreement, and in the agreement they returned some schools. I think about eight high schools were given back to the church, but no more.

Then came another maneuver on the Communist side, which was to split the bishops and the priests, and they built up the so-called Peace-Loving Priests Society.

Mr. McTIGUE. As Congressman Feighan has suggested, can you say yes or no to this question: Was there religious persecution of the Catholic Church and the Catholic religion in Hungary at the time you were there?

Monsignor KERNER. When I was there?

Mr. McTIGUE. When you were there.

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; there was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Does that also include, to your own personal knowledge, persecution of other faiths as well as the Catholic faith?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. And your subsequent testimony is based on reports that have come to you?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. Letters.

Mr. McTIGUE. And through official organs of the Catholic Church; is that correct?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, Monsignor, you were starting to tell us something about how the Communists set up the so-called Priest-Loving Society of Hungarian Priests; is that correct?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you tell us something about that, please?

Monsignor KERNER. They wanted cooperation from the priests, you know, because they thought that the priests had a great influence among the people. Now, they wanted to get some priests to follow them and so they established the Peace-Loving Society. The head of this society was in jail, Monsignor Bereczky, and had been tortured. I heard from another priest who spoke with him after they released him that his life in jail was hell, so they let him out to be the leader of the Peace-Loving Society, and then he started to work with others of his friends in this direction, which was to build up a new society, and to cooperate with the Red government, and they forced some priests to enter because otherwise they could not get their salaries, or they would lose their jobs, so the Peace-Loving Society was established.

Then they took over power to rule the Catholic Church in Hungary. The bishops who were good bishops are in jail. The others who were not put in jail, are under house arrest. They could not exercise real power to rule their dioceses. Then the vicars general and the chancellors had to resign, and they sent into the dioceses other priests who members of this society, and they were put in the place of the vicars general and the chancellors, and these were able to rule the dioceses. The vicars general and the chancellors, because they had closest connections with the priests, so that they were not dependent on the bishops, were called from other parts of the country and sent to direct the religious life in the dioceses, in order to drive a wedge between the bishops and the priests, these men, who came from abroad, took over

the power to rule the dioceses. Then they forced more of the priests of the dioceses to enter this Peace Loving Society. They had many meetings and they got permission to bring out a weekly Catholic newspaper, called the Cross, but I had many numbers of this paper, and it was always saying that they could not write anything except that we are fighting for peace, and America is a warmonger country, and the pope is helping them, so they began to write against the pope and to stir up animosity against America.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was there a tieup or a connection between this so-called Peace Loving Society of Hungarian Priests and the World Peace Conference which was sponsored by Moscow?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. They had to send representatives there, and after returning from the peace conference, they called the priests together and gave them a report of what had happened, and the newspapers were filled with the sermons of these speakers from these international meetings.

Mr. McTIGUE. These Catholic priests who joined this Peace Loving Society of Hungarian Priests became willing or unwilling dupes of the Communists; is that right?

Monsignor KERNER. They had the idea, that we had to find a *modus operandi*, and to live together.

Mr. McTIGUE. Coexistence?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. Coexistence. Many believed that the persecution would not cease but at least it would be not so strong.

Mr. McTIGUE. Hasn't the Catholic Church condemned the society?

Monsignor KERNER. Not yet. Not yet, because there are so many priests who are members in good faith because they were forced to join. Otherwise they could get no salary and not have their old jobs in the parish rectories, so they were forced to join, and the church will not condemn innocent people.

Mr. McTIGUE. I have nothing further.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I have no questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Monsignor, where were you located in Hungary when the Russians entered?

Monsignor KERNER. I was in the city of Kalocsa.

Mr. BENTLEY. How far is that from the city of Gyor?

Monsignor KERNER. Gyor is only 2 hours from Austria and Kalocsa is near Yugoslavia.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you know Bishop William Apor of Gyor?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes, I was a very good friend of his.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know what happened to Bishop Apor when the Russians entered Gyor?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you be able to tell the committee briefly what happened to him?

Monsignor KERNER. He was a very great man and very popular, and a very fine, good man, and the people loved him and he loved the people, and when he went out to see what was happening in the city of Gyor, three girls ran toward him crying, "Excellency, save us, save us, the Russian soldiers will take us and violate us," and he stepped in front of the Russian soldiers and said, "Don't do it," and one took a pistol and shot him and I think 16 or 17 wounds were in his body. He fell down.

Then they took him to the hospital and after 3 days he died asking, in his last words, "Were the girls saved?" And when they said yes, he answered, "For the innocence and the purity of Hungarian women, I give my life."

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you in Hungary during the summer of 1948?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know the story of Pocspetri?

Monsignor KERNER. Only what I read in the newspapers.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you remember hearing the name of Father Janos Asztalos?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. According to the papers what happened at Pocspetri that you remember, that you can tell the committee about?

Monsignor KERNER. It is a little difficult to remember exactly. I heard something like this that he went out of the church to save the people, and because he went out in front of the people, and wanted to save them from the Russians, they seized him or killed him.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, I am going to ask you about one more man. He is a very different type of individual from the ones that you have been talking about. Do you know, or did you know, in Hungary, Father Stephen Balogh?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; I knew him.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is he a Roman Catholic priest?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is he recognized as such by the Church?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; he is. He is now in a little village rectory.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you say that Father Balogh cooperated with the Communists at certain times?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; I heard him express such opinions with my own ears.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you be able to remember what he said?

Monsignor KERNER. He said, "We have to cooperate with these people. Don't look toward the West, you know, and don't wait for the Americans to help you. We are now under the occupation of Russia, and we have to cooperate," and he said, "All who resist are fools," so he recommended to us, the priests who were sitting around him, that we should adopt his opinion, and as he said, we have to cooperate as far as possible.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you remember if he at one time occupied a position in the Hungarian Government?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you remember what that position was?

Monsignor KERNER. He was not a state secretary.

Mr. BENTLEY. Under secretary?

Monsignor KERNER. Under secretary.

Mr. BENTLEY. In which department?

Monsignor KERNER. I don't remember.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did he have his own political party at one time?

Monsignor KERNER. He tried to build it up, and some members of Parliament were with him.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did his party stand for election in 1947?

Monsignor KERNER. I think so. I had no vote, no right of vote, so I did not have much interest.

Mr. BENTLEY. Were you disfranchised from voting in 1947?

Monsignor KERNER. I voted in 1945, but 1947 they took my right away.

Mr. BENTLEY. What was the reason they gave for taking your right to vote away?

Monsignor KERNER. As I was rector of the seminary and editor of the newspaper, the diocesan newspaper—here in Cleveland we have the Universe Bulletin, and we had in Albany the Evangelist Diocesan newspaper—and I was the editor of our newspaper, and before the Russians came, 1941–43, I wrote articles in the newspaper with the title “Moscow or Rome?” And I warned the Hungarian people that the danger was from the East, that our leader was not Stalin but the Holy Father in Rome, and 3 or 4 years later they found the newspapers, and they asked me who wrote the articles, and I did not deny them and confessed that I had written them, so they sent me to jail, and I was in jail for nearly 2 months for these articles.

Then the archbishop said, “I need him because he is the director of the seminary,” so they let me go home under house arrest, and I was in the seminary under house arrest, but because I had been arrested I had no right to vote.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Monsignor. You have told a very interesting story.

One more question. You were in Hungary during the time that the church schools were nationalized; were you not?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; I was.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you remember one day in the summer, I think it was in June of 1948, that a procession formed in Budapest in protest against the schools?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; I was present.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know what happened to the people who were in that procession?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes. The Russian soldiers came and beat the people, you know, broke up the procession and dispersed the people.

Mr. BENTLEY. The people were assembled in peaceful procession to protest against the taking away of the schools?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. And the Communist police dispersed and broke up the procession and arrested many who were there; is that correct?

Monsignor KERNER. Yes; that is right.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you very much, Monsignor. If there are no further questions you may be excused.

Mr. McTIGUE. The next witness, Mr. Chairman, is the Reverend Andrew Hamza of Dayton, Ohio.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is Reverend Hamza in the room?

Will you hold up your right hand? Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Reverend HAMZA. I do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Before we proceed with the next witness the Chair would like to make a brief statement. In spite of the original declarations on the part of the Hungarian delegation at the World Council of Churches meeting at Evanston, that the committee's telegram to

them of a few days ago inviting them to appear at the hearings to testify on the question of religious freedom in Hungary, in spite of the fact that they claimed that this telegram originally wasn't worth of reply, a reply has been received from Bishop Bereczky rejecting the invitation to appear.

Notice has also been taken, according to the press, of an invitation issued by the Hungarian delegation to the central committee of the World Council of Churches at Evanston, to have a meeting in the near future in Hungary. The Chair was not aware that Bishop Bereczky is in position to determine who can and cannot come to Hungary, but feels he would like to say that if Bishop Bereczky is able to issue invitations to visit Hungary that the subcommittee would also very much appreciate receiving one. The Chair attempted last year in Europe to obtain a visa to Hungary for the purpose of trying to find out the truth about conditions over there, a visa which was refused at that time, in October, but inasmuch as the Chair doubts very sincerely that Bishop Bereczky can actually say whether or not the subcommittee or the central committee of the World Council of Churches, or anyone else, can or cannot go to Hungary, this subcommittee will take into consideration the possibility of requesting a visa or visas from the Hungarian Legation in Washington for the purpose of attempting, or making the attempt, to go to Hungary and find out about conditions there insofar as we cannot get the representatives of the Hungarian Government or the present representatives of the Hungarian churches to come before this committee.

With that statement you may proceed, Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF REV. ANDREW HAMZA

Mr. McTIGUE. Will you state your full name for the record, please?

Reverend HAMZA. Andrew Hamza.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you born in Hungary?

Reverend HAMZA. I was.

Mr. McTIGUE. When and where, please?

Reverend HAMZA. May 4, 1920, in Seregelyez.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you educated in Hungary?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes. In Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you receive a degree in theology?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes; I did. I attended the college of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Budapest, and after that I entered the seminary of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Budapest. I graduated in 1942.

Mr. McTIGUE. When did you escape from Hungary, Reverend?

Reverend HAMZA. May 20, 1948.

Mr. McTIGUE. You are now the pastor of the Hungarian Evangelical and Reformed Church of Dayton, Ohio; is that right?

Reverend HAMZA. That is correct, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was there a time, Reverend, when you were assistant pastor in a church in Hungary of which Reverend Bereczky, who is now in Evanston, was the pastor?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir. Not only that but I grew up in his congregation. He was pastor of my home church.

Mr. McTIGUE. And you were the assistant; is that correct?

Reverend HAMZA. After I had graduated from the seminary I spent 2 years in another congregation and then for 3 years I was assistant pastor in Budapest.

Mr. McTIGUE. You know Reverend Bereczky very well; is that right?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you editor of the youth paper at any time in Budapest, Reverend?

Reverend HAMZA. From 1945 to 1946, besides my ministerial work I was editor of the youth paper, the official youth paper, of the Hungarian Smallholder Party, the party of Ferenc Nagy.

Mr. McTIGUE. What was the name of this youth paper?

Reverend HAMZA. Translated into American it means Independent Youth.

Mr. McTIGUE. Was it a paper sponsored—

Reverend HAMZA. By the party.

Mr. McTIGUE. By the party?

Reverend HAMZA. By the Smallholders Party.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did it have any connection with the church?

Reverend HAMZA. No, none whatsoever. It was a political youth paper.

Mr. McTIGUE. And as such you wrote many articles concerning the youth in Hungary?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes. Not only concerning the youth but concerning the situation in Hungary, too. You see, sir, at the beginning it was a youth paper and technically it remained a youth paper for the whole time, but after a few months when the public found out that it was almost the only outspoken non-Communist weekly in Hungary our circulation jumped up, and at the end, when on the request of a Russian commander they had forbidden us from publishing the paper any more, at that time it had a circulation of 40,000, which is a very high circulation in Hungary as far as a weekly is concerned.

Mr. McTIGUE. What were you publishing in this newspaper that gave the Communists such grave concern?

Reverend HAMZA. You see, we covered the whole Hungarian life systematically and we wrote articles in which we criticized the Communist Party, its teachings, and its practices in Hungary. We criticized everything except the Russian occupation army, because it was too dangerous to do so.

Mr. McTIGUE. Were you still an assistant to Bishop Bereczky at that time?

Reverend HAMZA. At that time; yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could it be said that he endorsed your position at that time?

Reverend HAMZA. I wouldn't say so, sir, but he knew about my doings, and after all I was under the discipline of the church, and an assistant pastor is responsible to his boss, the regular pastor, and he was my boss for 3 years during which I was the editor of this paper. Let me put it this way: He never said anything against the policy of the paper, which was strictly anti-Communist. Under Russian occupation that is a special thing, but that is the way it was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there ever come a time, Reverend, during the Communist occupation of Hungary, when you were arrested by the NKVD, the secret police?

Reverend HAMZA. On January 25, 1947.

Mr. McTIGUE. Could you tell us a little something about this, please, what the charges were and the circumstances?

Reverend HAMZA. Before I tell you about the charges I want to tell you about the circumstances because it throws a very interesting light on the methods of the Communist secret police. The Communists started to take over the Hungarian Government around December, in my opinion, around December 1946, and from January 1947, up until the end of May 1947, there was a coalition government in Hungary.

Now, the first step they made was that from the end of December 1946 until the end of January 1947, they arrested about 300 people. Those 300 people who were the coworkers of Ferenc Nagy and Bela Kovacs, and some of my friends had been arrested earlier, and on January 25, 1947, I got up early in the morning and I went out to pick up the morning papers in front of my apartment. I used to read 4 or 5 of them every morning. Among them was the official daily newspaper of the Communist Party, Szabad Nep, meaning free people. I went in, still wearing my pajamas, and went back to bed to look over the papers. I opened the Szabad Nep and on the front page the main headline was this: "Andrew Hamza, the editor of the weekly Independent Youth, was arrested yesterday, and here is his confession, at the headquarters of the secret police," and then in three columns they gave my confession.

I want to emphasize the fact that I read this article, a front-page article, in my home, wearing my pajamas, early in the morning, so they made a mistake in the schedule.

Mr. McTIGUE. Somebody got their wires crossed; isn't that correct?

Reverend HAMZA. I didn't get you, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Somebody got their wires crossed?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, that must have happened. Later on I will tell you how I found out that they made a mistake in the schedule.

Now, after reading the newspaper I got dressed, said goodby to my family, for a long time as I told them, and then I went up to the Office of the Prime Minister, who was Ferenc Nagy at that time. I wanted to show him the article, but he was out of town, and then I went to the office of the Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament who was at that time Msgr. Bela Varga. I showed him the article and at that time he said, "It means, Andy"—that is my nickname in Hungarian—"that you are the next one." The Hungarian expression means something like here in America, "Your number is up."

"If you want to escape I can help you."

Mr. McTIGUE. This Monsignor Varga told you?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes; and I said "No." He said why? I said, "Because all my friends are here and it wouldn't be a nice thing to do, because I was lucky to have a warning so to speak, to go away, but," I said, "what I am going to do, I will walk down now to the headquarters of the secret police and I will ask for some explanation from those people as to how is it possible to publish an article

on the front page that I have been arrested and to give the text of my confession while I am still a free man, walking around Budapest."

It was awfully hard to get into the building. The officer who was in charge of the gate, said, "Reverend, you are a fool," he said. I said why? "Because you don't wait until they go after you, but came yourself." I said, "I want to have some explanation." Then he said, "Listen, you should learn something about this gate. It is awfully hard to get in here, but it is even harder to get out of this building."

Finally I got in and asked for an explanation from a police officer who wore the uniform of a secret police colonel. I put the paper down on his desk and asked him for an explanation, and then he started to laugh in a very cynical way, and said that it was not interesting at all, and said that he wanted to thank me for saving some work and expense for them. I think he meant that they didn't have to come after me. And he told me that I was under arrest.

Now, I was down in the cellar for 2 weeks where the prisoners were kept and nobody asked me a single question. The surroundings in that basement cell were awful. It was damp, and full of bugs, and all they gave us was one bowl of soup every day, and a slice of bread about this big [indicating], so it was a starvation diet.

And to illustrate that I want to tell you this: I have always been a heavy man and I was like this at the time of my arrest, and after the 7 weeks that I spent in the basement of Andrassy 60 I lost 55 pounds on that diet. It was not a very healthy diet, sir.

And then after 2 weeks—I am not sure it was 2 weeks, maybe it was 13 or 15 days—but after 2 weeks when they took me up to the questioning room, then the first thing the investigator did was to show me a document, 2 typewritten pages, and he said that this case was very simple and all I had to do was to sign those 2 pages and that would be all, and then I said, "All right, sir, I am going to sign it, but," I said, somewhat jokingly, "my mother told me not to sign anything before I read it." Then he said, "Go ahead and read it," and he was nervous from that moment on, and I became very nervous after I had read the paper. It was exactly the same document which had been published on January 25 on the front page of the Szabad Nep. In other words, they must have had my confession, a prepared confession, at least by the 25th of January, but my guess is that they arranged the whole mass trial long before that, and as a matter of fact, in my case and in the case of my friends, most of my friends, the whole investigation, the hearings at the headquarters of the secret police, was nothing else but an attempt to persuade us by different methods to sign the papers which they prepared beforehand.

In other words, they asked almost no questions. It was funny about that hearing, because you expect to hear some questions when you are questioned, but it was not so. All they did was to persuade people to sign prepared statements.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you sign them?

Reverend HAMZA. No; I did not. That is the reason I was very lucky. Let me explain it to you. Later on we learned about their methods, when at a mass trial they start working on the people. In our so-called plot there were 300 people arrested and the trial proceeded in 9 groups. I was in group 4 with 5 of the members of Parliament. They were members of the Smallholder Party, the Nagy

party, and then some other leading politicians, 47 of us, were in that same group, and I was defendant No. 19 in that group.

Now, the way they work is like this: They start working on the people, and after they have succeeded with about 90 percent of the defendants, they say, "All right, the group is ready. Let's go ahead and take them over to Marko Utea. That was the court prison in Budapest. It is in the middle of Budapest. And those people who are not at the head of the list and have strength to endure the questioning might be lucky to be in that 10 percent, and at that time I was in very good condition, and even the loss of 55 pounds didn't hurt me, so when about 90 percent of my group was ready for the trial they said, "Let's send them over there," and then they started preparing the trial and that is the reason I didn't sign.

I just want to say, sir, that it is no credit to me that I didn't sign. I don't want to take any credit for it, you see, because it is only a question of time until everyone signs those papers—I mean those statements. My luck was that they didn't hold me 10 or 12 more days. Sometimes people are very inconsiderate about these signed statements. I think, after my personal experiences, that there is no shadow on the character of a person who finally signs any statements at a hearing in a Soviet prison, sir.

MR. FEIGHAN. It is really a question of signature or survival?

Reverend HAMZA. Both, sir. I will tell you why. You see, at the first minute you sign the statement you are legally guilty, because there it is not possible, for instance, behind the Iron Curtain to tell the judge that they forced you to sign that paper. They would laugh in your face if you did that. Some of us tried to do it, and actually did, one of the defendants, a very good man, a very brave Hungarian patriot, tried to do this: He broke down after I don't know how many weeks of questioning, and then when he came up before the judge, he said, "My signed statement is false because they did this and that to me" and then the judge adjourned court, the peoples court, right away. There was an adjournment of about 4 or 5 days. The whole procedure was suspended, and they took this man back to the headquarters of the Hungarian Secret Police in the Andrassy 60 to readjust—that was the expression they used—to readjust the man.

Now, at the first time when he appeared before the peoples court his hair was dark brown. He had almost no white hair on his head, and after 5 days he was brought back and the trial reopened again and when we saw him through a window when he walked around in the prison court, there was a white streak about an inch and a half wide, in his hair, and then when the trial was opened again he did what he was supposed to do, so, sir, as I said, legally it is enough for you to sign the paper, but practically it is not enough, you see, because these trials, and especially the important mass trials of a peoples court in Hungary or anywhere behind the Iron Curtain, are not only a judicial procedure, but it is at the same time a big show, and a person, and especially an important person, who has a leading role in the show is not supposed to be unprepared without a real rehearsal. That is what I mean, you see, so especially in the case of the leading characters it is very important for them to cooperate not only with their signatures but with a surrender in which these people agree to play their part in the show.

That is my answer, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did there come a time, Reverend, when you were tried before the peoples court?

Reverend HAMZA. The time was in August, in August 1947, and at that time I received a sentence of a year and a half, and then I was set free because that was the custom. There were two grades in the Communist peoples court, the peoples court itself, which initiated the case. Then they passed sentence, and in 5 or 6, sometimes 8 months, the higher court, which they call *Nepbirosagon Orozagos Tanacsas*, which translated means something like the supreme committee of the peoples court, then they would reopen the trial again and pass the final sentence.

Now, as I had received 1½ years at the first trial they set me free temporarily pending the trial before that superior court, and that trial came up on May 20, 1948, and on May 19, 1948, I left the country. Later on I learned that they gave me a sentence of 3 years.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did the judge have anything to say to you prior to passing the sentence?

Reverend HAMZA. That was another funny thing, namely, when he passed the sentence he opened his files and then he looked at my page and he looked here and then he turned one page forward and he looked there and then he looked back and saw the previous page, and then he was a little disturbed and he said, "Well, well," he said, "Andrew Hamza, he was the editor of the Independent Youth. A year and a half." That was all. So no explanation of the sentence, nothing. "Well, well," he said, "a year and a half." That was all.

Mr. McTIGUE. As a minister of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Hungary, Reverend, can you state whether there was persecution of the Protestant religion in Hungary from your own personal knowledge?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir. I want to divide the persecutions into two groups. First of all, persecutions against persons, mostly ministers of the church, and then a slow but sure plan which developed concerning the Protestant churches of Hungary.

There is not much to say about personal persecutions because, as I read from the newspapers, the committee has more than enough examples of those personal persecutions. What I want to elaborate on is that slow but sure persecution which they started against the churches and which brought the Hungarian churches to their present situation.

So if you have any questions then you just ask them, or if you want me to, I will go ahead as I know it.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, we have quite a bit of testimony here and in New York, Reverend, regarding the persecution of the Protestant Church, beginning with the suppression of the Protestant press. Would you agree with that?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir. I don't just agree, but I have a little illustration here for you and for the committee. This paper here in my hands [indicating] is the official weekly of the Hungarian Reformed Church.

Mr. McTIGUE. Published where?

Reverend HAMZA. In Budapest. Now, I want to emphasize the fact that this is the only paper for church members. Now, sir, I have three issues of that one and only weekly of the Hungarian Reformed Church.

It is written in Hungarian, but there is one thing you will understand on the front page, namely, the date.

Here, gentlemen, you see here is the date, 1949, sir, and you just open the paper and count the pages, sir. How many pages are there?

Mr. BENTLEY. Eight.

Reverend HAMZA. Here is another issue. That is 1951. As you see it here?

Mr. BENTLEY. Six.

Reverend HAMZA. Here is the third one, 1954.

Mr. BENTLEY. Four pages.

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir. So that is what I mean, and I think that is a very simple illustration of what constitutes the plan they are working on, slowly but surely.

Mr. McTIGUE. Who is the editor of that paper?

Reverend HAMZA. The editor today—I have to look it up because he changes quite often—the editor is Sandor Fekete. He is a minister, a Hungarian minister.

Mr. McTIGUE. Didn't we have testimony in New York, Mr. Chairman, from the Reverend Vata, that Fekete was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BENTLEY. That I don't recall. The record will have to show it.

Mr. McTIGUE. To pursue my question on the persecution of religion a bit further, is it true also, as others have testified here, that the persecution of the protestant religion in Hungary was continued by such acts as expropriation of church properties?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir. I see what you mean. It started as an unorganized action of the local Communists.

Now, in 1948, the Hungarian Reformed Church, and I am talking about my own church, I am talking about the Reformed Church now because that is the story I know, in 1948 the General Synod of the Hungarian Reformed Church concluded an agreement with the Hungarian Peoples Democracy—and I have another issue of a Hungarian church paper which gives the contents of that agreement—

Mr. BENTLEY. Excuse me, Reverend. I think it was yesterday during testimony when the text of the agreement between the Hungarian Government and the Unitarian Church was read into the record, and I believe the text is the same in both cases; is it not?

Reverend HAMZA. No; it is not, sir. There were some differences, and I am going to talk about the differences now.

Mr. BENTLEY. All right.

Reverend HAMZA. The differences were mostly regarding the schools of the Hungarian churches. The Unitarian Church was a very small church in Hungary and the Hungarian Reformed Church had a membership of 2 million, so the case was entirely different, since we had thousands of elementary and grade schools which belonged to the church and then colleges which belonged to the church, and academies and seminaries.

Now, the first very severe blow of the agreement was that they took away all the schools from the churches, all the elementary schools, all the grade schools, all the high schools, and all the colleges except four. The Budapest, Papa, Sarospatak, and Debrecen colleges and two colleges for girls remained in the possession and under the administration of the church.

Now the same thing happened with these schools that remained in the possession of the church, namely, in 1948 there were 4 colleges, 4 seminaries, and 2 colleges for girls. The first step they made was to close 2 of the seminaries, so today there are only 2 seminaries in all of Hungary, at Budapest and Debrecen. They closed the Papa and Sarospatak colleges.

Now at the same time they took away from the church the 4 men's colleges and the 2 women's colleges, so out of the 10 schools which had remained in the possession of the Hungarian Reformed Church, according to the 1948 agreement, they now have only 2. It was a legal agreement, and it said at one point that these were the educational institutions which would remain in the possession of the church, but the church wanted to keep the right to establish new institutions in the future. That was in the 1948 agreement.

Now, instead of founding new institutions, we lost 8 out of the 10 which belonged to the church at the time of the agreement, sir.

MR. MCTIGUE. Is there any doubt in your mind, Reverend, that there was persecution of the Protestant religion in Hungary at the time you were there, and that there is persecution of the Protestant religion in Hungary today?

Reverend HAMZA. It is a very hard thing to say. There was persecution and there is persecution, but sometimes the persecution is open persecution, sometimes it is hidden persecution; so, sir, if you want to ask me this question—whether all churches, not only Protestant but all Christian churches, have freedom in Hungary—it would be easier for me to answer your question.

MR. MCTIGUE. Very well. I will rephrase the question along those lines. Is there freedom of worship in Hungary today?

Reverend HAMZA. There is no freedom in my opinion. They did not have and they do not have freedom, in my opinion, in Hungary. That is my answer, sir.

You see, the difference, sir, between persecution and having freedom is not the same because sometimes there is no persecution and there still is no freedom.

MR. MCTIGUE. You testified at the outset, Reverend, that you were an assistant pastor or an assistant to Bishop Bereczky?

Reverend HAMZA. I was.

MR. MCTIGUE. While he was a pastor you were the assistant pastor?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir.

MR. MCTIGUE. Now, was there a close relationship between you and the Bishop?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes. There was a very close relationship between a pastor and assistant pastor. We worked together for 3 years.

MR. MCTIGUE. Were you a protege of his?

Reverend HAMZA. No, sir. I was a member of his congregation before I entered the seminary and from 1945 to 1948 I was his assistant pastor, and, besides that, I liked the man very much because he was my Christian leader and we worked together and it is a very pleasant memory to me, those years we were together, and to be perfectly honest with you, sir, I still like the man very much, although our opinions now differ.

MR. MCTIGUE. But there was a very close relationship between you?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Now, since the bishop has arrived in this country as a member of the Hungarian delegation of bishops, together with the other bishops, have you had the occasion to see him?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir; I did, last week.

Mr. McTIGUE. Where?

Reverend HAMZA. I went up to Evanston to attend the meeting and I spent 3 whole days in Evanston, and during that time I had a chance to talk with Bishop Bereczky not only once but several times.

Mr. McTIGUE. What did you talk about?

Reverend HAMZA. First of all, I asked him about my family and friends. That was the most important thing for me.

Mr. McTIGUE. Did you talk about religion?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes; and he told me about all the favorable signs in the Hungarian Reformed Church, which are many, but what surprised me very much, even when we talked privately, between the two of us, was that he didn't mention any difficulties which exist in church life in Hungary, and being a pastor myself I think there is no such thing as a church or a church body in which there are only good favorable signs. There used to be trouble in every church, I mean in every congregation and church body, and what surprised me was that he did not talk about the difficulties and problems.

Mr. McTIGUE. Why don't you think he talked about them?

Reverend HAMZA. That is a hard question, sir. I did not probe their minds and try to find out what the real reason was, so I have my own guess but that is another story. If you are interested in my own guess I can give it to you, but I cannot tell you what their actual reason was.

Mr. McTIGUE. Well, I am interested. I don't know whether the chairman and Mr. Feighan are.

Mr. BENTLEY. The witness may proceed.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Yes.

Mr. McTIGUE. Let me ask this frankly, and I will be very direct: You have talked to the bishop at Evanston: is that correct?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Have you talked to any other members of the delegation?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Do you believe that the members of this delegation, the Hungarian delegation at Evanston today, have accepted communism as a way of life or are following the Communist line?

Reverend HAMZA. You ask me two questions, sir. Have they accepted the Communist way of life and do they follow the Communist line? As to the first question, yes, sir; they have accepted it as a fact that Hungary and their respective churches—I am talking about the Reformed and the Lutheran Churches now—are in Hungary and will stay there. My opinion is that at the beginning—willingly or unwillingly, that is another question—they accepted the fact that for the time being they are behind the Iron Curtain.

Now, meanwhile, I did not see these people for 6 years. My impression is that they have accepted the fact not only on a temporary basis, but on a more or less permanent basis. Now, as I understood from their statements, they want to live there and continue their church work. To live behind the Iron Curtain and to continue any kind of

work there means that you have to cooperate with the Government, which is a Communist government today.

As for your second question, following the Communist line, my opinion, from talking with those people is the following: They are not Communists, in my opinion. To be a Communist means to be a member of the party and believe in communism as a political principle and, so to speak, as a modern godless pagan religion, so they are not Communists in this respect, but on the other hand I think that they follow the Communist line and, following the Communist line, they help the Communist case to a certain extent.

That is my opinion, sir.

Mr. McTIGUE. Thank you, Reverend, very much. That is all the questions I have.

Mr. BENTLEY. Congressman Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Reverend, when you were the editor of the weekly paper addressed particularly to youth organizations, was one of the objectives of your paper to preserve the rich heritage, the culture, the folklore of the great Hungarian nationalistic spirit, their love of God and country, the true patriotism of Hungarians?

Reverend HAMZA. It was, sir, and let me give you this answer: Besides all these, what our main goal with that paper, and with the whole Smallholders Party and its youth organization was this: We were expecting the signing of the peace treaty. What we had hoped was this: That after the peace treaty was signed, and the Russian occupation troops had gone back to Russia, in Hungary we would have a chance to build up a real Christian and a Western kind of democracy, so our main objective was to keep up the patriotic spirit of the young people and at the same time to train them in democratic ways and means, in a democratic way of life, to make them ready to be able to do something about it after the time of our liberation.

Naturally, we were wrong. We were wrong because that liberation didn't come, you see.

Mr. FEIGHAN. You followed the proper principles. What testimony we have received shows that Russian imperialism is attempting to break the nationalistic spirit in peoples of all nations enslaved by Red colonialism, including the 15 non-Russian nations within the U. S. S. R. itself.

Reverend HAMZA. Absolutely, sir. Those are the so-called Russian tactics; namely, in those nations which are not yet under their rule they try to nourish a nationalistic fire. Now, from the first moment those nations come under Russian or Soviet rule, they are not supposed to be nationalistic any more, so up to that point it is very important to be nationalistic, especially for colonial people. From that moment it is impossible, because they have to follow not only the Communist line, you see, because it is not only a question of a Communist political and economic form in those occupied and satellite states, but at the same time they have to accept the rule of Moscow, so in the guise of communism and a Communist political system those nations, those countries, have to serve Russian imperialism, so in my opinion, in the background there is one thing, the age-old Russian imperialism, and on the other side there is a new form, a new gospel, and that is the Communist gospel, but deeply inside you will find Russian imperialism, and I am sure you have had many opportunities in this committee

to talk to economic experts who told you what it meant in the economic field to be a colony of Russia.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Yes. They attempt to destroy the nationalistic spirit in each nation and substitute an international spirit which is Red colonialism or Russian imperialism?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, but they don't give it this name. They call it the comradeship of the working classes. That is the slogan, but it means obedient service to Russian imperialism.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Their sovereignty. Thank you, Reverend.

Mr. BENTLEY. Reverend Hamza, I would like to ask you just a little bit about the background of your former pastor, Albert Bereczky. Was he formerly in the employment of the Hungarian Government?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes. In 1945 he served—I don't know for how many months, but it was more than three. I think it was for 5 or 6 months that he served as Under Secretary of the Department of Culture.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is that his only government experience, his only government employment?

Reverend HAMZA. In my knowledge; yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Was he ever a deputy in Parliament of the Small-holders Party?

Reverend HAMZA. He was.

Mr. BENTLEY. When was he elected?

Reverend HAMZA. He was elected at the 1945 November elections.

Mr. BENTLEY. And when did he resign, or did he resign?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes; he resigned. I am not sure now, but my recollection is that he resigned around the end of 1946 or early in 1947.

I will tell you why, sir. When I was arrested I remember that he was still a member of the Parliament. That is my recollection. Now, when I came out of prison he was not a deputy, so I am not sure, sir, but it must have been either the end of 1946 or the beginning of 1947. That is my recollection.

Mr. BENTLEY. When did he become a bishop of the Reformed Church?

Reverend HAMZA. After my departure from Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you remember the name of his predecessor?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir. He was my bishop before the change came. Dr. Laszlo Ravasz was his name.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you have any knowledge as to why Dr. Ravasz resigned his bishopric from the church?

Reverend HAMZA. It is a long story, sir. Yes; I have some knowledge. You see, it became evident in 1947, and especially in 1948, that, as some people put it in Hungary, Bishop Ravasz was an older man and he didn't have any elasticity. That was the expression.

Mr. BENTLEY. You mean he didn't have any more give to him when it came to giving in to the Communists; is that it?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir; that is about the fact. He was very strict. He was a typical hard-boiled Hungarian and a kind of a Hungarian who batters and breaks but doesn't bend.

Mr. BENTLEY. What you are trying to say, Reverend, is that because he didn't have the elasticity to conform to the new order of things his resignation was more or less forced upon him?

Reverend HAMZA. I know there was some kind of—I wouldn't say force, sir, but I would say a very deep persuasion. Put it that way.

Mr. BENTLEY. And his place was taken by Albert Bereczky?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir; but I want to mention something here which might be new for you, because as an assistant pastor of Bishop Bereczky I had the chance to overhear a conversation between the former bishop and the present bishop. It was not snooping, because there was a conversation between the two people and I was driving the car of Reverend Bereczky.

Mr. BENTLEY. Please repeat to the committee what you can recall of the conversation.

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir. The conversation went like this: Reverend Bereczky said after Reverend Ravasz had resigned, he said, "Laszlo, I want you to understand one thing, under these circumstances I don't want to and I am not going to accept the bishop's seat under any circumstances."

The explanation of this is very simple. You see, before 1948, for a long long time one of the most popular Hungarian reformed ministers was Bishop Bereczky. In my opinion, and in the opinion of many people, he had a very good chance under normal circumstances to become the bishop of the Budapest synod of the Hungarian Reformed Church in a smooth and regular way, by popular vote.

Now, what Bereczky meant, at that time, was this: "I don't want to be in a situation like this. Namely, I don't want to accept the bishopric under these circumstances."

Mr. BENTLEY. And yet that was just exactly what he did; am I correct?

Reverend HAMZA. Who did it, that is another question. But I recall the exact answer of Bishop Ravasz. He said, "Bereczky, I insist, now, that you have to take this seat," and there was another remark and I don't know; it is not too clear in my mind, but it sounded something like:

"You"—and in Hungarian that is plural—you and you and you and you, so many people; it was not the exact expression, but it meant something like this: "You cooked something and you go ahead and eat it." So that is about it.

Mr. BENTLEY. Reverend, do you know any of the other members of the delegation from Hungary?

Reverend HAMZA. I know all the members, sir. Five.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you know all of them in Hungary?

Reverend HAMZA. I knew four of them in Hungary. I knew these even before the war.

Mr. BENTLEY. I believe that Bishop Bereczky and Bishop Peter are of the Reformed Church, and Bishop Veto and Bishop Dezsery are of the Lutheran Church?

Reverend HAMZA. And Dr. Papp, who is the president of the Budapest Seminary.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you know Bishop John Peter in Hungary?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir. He was a chaplain of a hospital in Budapest.

Mr. BENTLEY. When?

Reverend HAMZA. Before and during the Second World War.

Mr. BENTLEY. Have you known him since the war?

Reverend HAMZA. I knew him before the war, too. He was one of my colleagues.

Mr. BENTLEY. I say, but have you known him since the war?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. BENTLEY. Did you know him when he was employed in President Tildy's household?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes. He was personal secretary of President Tildy at that time.

Mr. BENTLEY. When was the last time that you remember seeing him?

Reverend HAMZA. In Evanston, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. No; I mean in Hungary.

Reverend HAMZA. It was a few weeks before I escaped from Hungary.

Mr. BENTLEY. That was in April 1948?

Reverend HAMZA. To be exact, it was at the Hungarian National Fair in 1948. This is an annual exposition in Hungary, and I don't recall in which month it was, but it must have been some time in April, because I met him at the fair for the last time.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you have any particular comment with regard to this man? I may say the testimony before this committee has indicated that there is a possibility of his Communist connections.

Reverend HAMZA. Sir, what I have read in the newspapers and what I know about the testimony before this committee concerns the question, Is he a Soviet agent or not? That is the question.

My answer to this is the following: It is irresponsible on anybody's part to say that he is a Soviet agent. The reason is very simple, Soviet agents do not wear badges, and nobody else knows who is a Soviet agent and who is not, except the agent himself; no one knows that but the person himself and the good Lord.

Now, all I can state—and I think other people who appeared before this committee should have said this—this and that is what Bishop Peter did or did not do, because I wouldn't make such a statement under oath, sir, because nobody knows who is an actual agent.

Mr. BENTLEY. I call your attention, Reverend, to the fact that the State Department in a recent press release indicated its belief that Bishop Peter was, if not an agent, at least a Soviet informer.

Reverend HAMZA. That is another question, because being an agent and an informer are two different things, but I read that release of the State Department, sir, and there was one thing I didn't like about that release at all, namely, in my opinion if we want to fight for a cause then we have to do it in a very honest and in a very exact way.

Now, in that statement there was a sentence according to which, although he is a bishop in Debrecen he has not recently performed any clerical functions or preached in the pulpit, and I think—excuse me for my opinion, this is my personal opinion—that that is not the way to fight against another cause or people, because it is not true, but if you ask me for my personal impression of Bishop Peter, then this is my impression, that out of all the Hungarian Reformed pastors and bishops and the whole Hungarian clergy, in my opinion he is the man who is most friendly toward the Hungarian Communist Government and the Soviet Union.

That is my personal impression.

Mr. BENTLEY. Reverend, you have been very cooperative this afternoon with the committee and we are not going to keep you any longer but you have done a good deal of reading, I see, in following this question. Did you read the 32 question-and-answer press statement put out by Bishop Peter?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes; I read it in the Dayton papers, but they didn't print all the 32 questions and answers; just the more important ones.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you remember the particular question that was asked of him, "Can one be a Communist and a Christian at the same time?" And his answer was "Yes"?

Reverend HAMZA. That was a stupid answer, sir. I will tell you why. Excuse me. You see, he contradicts himself. You just read one of the previous questions and the question was, "Could you be a Communist and a Christian bishop at the same time?" And he answered, "It would be impossible." On strictly Protestant principles, sir, there is no difference between a bishop and an average church member. The only difference is the office and the particular work the person is doing as a Christian, so if it is impossible for a bishop to be a Communist and a Christian at the same time it is just as impossible for an average church member.

Now, in my opinion, sir, the reason why I said that was a stupid answer is because in my opinion, and in my experience, communism is not only a political system, not only an economic system, but basically, in my opinion, communism is a religion, a Godless anti-Christian religion, to be sure, but a modern pagan religion.

Now, to say that a person can be a Christian and a Communist at the same time is something like, for instance, saying that a person can be a Christian and a Mohammedan at the same time.

That is impossible, because if you take your religion seriously then you stick to one religion, and that is all. You cannot have two religions at the same time.

That is the reason I say it is impossible, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. I call your attention, Reverend, to the fact that I personally don't recall testimony before this committee which said positively that John Peter was a Soviet agent and I know I have never made such statements myself.

Reverend HAMZA. But the newspapers said something like that, although you are not responsible for the newspapers.

Mr. BENTLEY. There have been accusations of Communist collaboration by the Chair and by some witnesses against Albert Bereczky and I am not going to ask you unless you would care to associate yourself with such accusations or not?

Reverend HAMZA. Yes. I will tell you what I feel about him, and that feeling is based on my personal experiences with the man, that he is cooperating with the Hungarian Government, and through the Hungarian Government with Communists 100 percent.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you care to make the same statement about the other members of the delegation?

Reverend HAMZA. Please don't ask me that question, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. I will be glad to withdraw it.

Reverend HAMZA. Thank you.

Mr. BENTLEY. One more question and then I think we do owe this witness a chance to step down.

Do you think it was a good thing or a bad thing from the standpoint of the people of Hungary to allow these individuals to come to the United States?

Reverend HAMZA. I didn't understand the question.

Mr. BENTLEY. From the standpoint of the Hungarian Protestant people, do you think it was a good thing or a bad thing to allow the delegation to come to the United States?

Reverend HAMZA. It was a mixed thing, sir, in my opinion.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is a mixed answer, Reverend.

Reverend HAMZA. Yes, sir; yes, sir, and I am willing to give you the answer, but not on the tape recording. Excuse me, sir. Allow me that, because there are some people whom I have to protect.

Mr. BENTLEY. I understand. The subcommittee appreciates your cooperation and expresses its gratitude for the very fine testimony that you have given here, Reverend.

I think if there are no more questions that you may be excused. Thank you very much.

Reverend HAMZA. Thank you.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, there are few people to whom history has afforded a more crucial role in civilization's defense than the Hungarian people.

There is an inescapable necessity for everyone to shoulder the burdens of civic and social responsibility today, because our freedom and our basic liberties are imperiled by barbarians. For centuries the people of Hungary held at bay the Tartars and the Turks, barbarians determined to overthrow western civilization. When the forces of democracy failed everywhere else in Europe in 1849, Hungary continued to fight against the powerful army of the Russian Czar, Nicholas I.

Humanity cannot forget that until Hungary was herself invaded by Hitler in March 1944, she gave asylum to hundreds of thousands fleeing from Nazi persecution. Numbered among these victims were Polish, Austrian, Czech, and German political refugees, persecuted Jews—not to mention British, French, and American airmen who had escaped from German war-prisoners' camps.

Hungary has shown the Western World an heroic example of opposition to communism, a fearless and persistent opposition that began with the elections of 1945, defying the presence of the Red army.

Hungarians are an undiscourageable people. They have continued their courageous resistance, confident of ultimate liberation. That liberation will come. It is guaranteed by the same spiritual truths that sustain Hungary's fight against totalitarian tyranny. Cardinal Mindszenty was confident of the future because, as he said, "Hungarians are a praying people." Only such peoples fully understand the nature of the Communist peril and have the heart to oppose it."

Americans of Hungarian descent—heirs of that tradition—have contributed very much to our great Nation, and the United States and its Congress will not fail to assist in the liberation of the great land of their forebears.

Mr. BENTLEY. The Chair would like to make this statement.

In concluding our hearings today, I feel that I should express the appreciation of our subcommittee for the splendid cooperation we have received from everyone in our effort to portray the manner in

which Hungary lost its freedom. Having been in Hungary when the Communists seized control, I can say, and I know Congressman Feighan concurs with me, that this series of hearings in Washington, New York, and Cleveland has enabled us to fully consider and carefully examine the true story of what happened in Hungary.

I am confident that when we, as a subcommittee assigned to this specific case, file our report we will be able to state that the case of Hungary has been as carefully studied as that of any other satellite nation.


I want to thank the brave people who have appeared before us as witnesses and express the appreciation of the subcommittee for the cooperation we have received from the press, radio, and television.

What happened to Hungary might happen anywhere in the world. But if we can succeed in bringing home to the people the fact that freedom, not communism, is our one great hope for world peace, then I believe we will have fulfilled our mission.

The subcommittee stands adjourned sine die.

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